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Miscellany: LV 




The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact 


London : Geoffrey Gumbcrlege : Oxford University Press 





Many individuals have made this book pos- 
sible. I am greatly indebted to William R. 
Castle, who as assistant secretary of state in 
1927-29 had much to do with negotiation of 
the Kellogg pact; Mr. Castle most kindly per- 
mitted use of his hitherto unpublished volu- 
minous diary. 

The essay was originally written as a dis- 
sertation for the degree of doctor of philosophy 
at Yale. William Weed Kaufmann's sugges- 
tions and encouragement were very helpful. 
Hajo Holborn with patience and thorough- 
ness aided toward understanding the European 
context of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Harry R. 
Rudin first called my attention to the "new 
diplomacy" of the post-igi8 era; It was his 
view of the origins of the Kellogg pact which 
led to this present study. Samuel Flagg Bemis 
has helped in so many ways that it is im- 
possible to enumerate them; the essay would 
have progressed nowhere without his friend- 
ship and criticism* 

The editor of the Yale Historical Series, 
Lewis P. Curtis, made many excellent sugges- 
tions in preparing the manuscript for publica- 
tion. Miss Jane Hartenstein of the Yale Uni- 
versity Press likewise read the manuscript with 
a keen eye for error. It has been a pleasure to 
work with the editor of the Press, Eugene 


Acknowledgment vii 

ONE: Armistice f$i8 i 

TWO: The Search for Peace: The Advocates 13 
THREE: Salmon O. Levinson and the 

Outlaivry of War 31 
FOUR: The Search for Peace: The Diplomats 38 

FIVE: France and Her New Allies 52 
six: Renunciation of War Between 

France and the United States 66 

SEVEN: Airplane Diplomacy 84 

EIGHT: Action and Inaction 98 
NINE: American Enthusiasm and 

European Realities 113 

TEN: Denouement 128 

ELEVEN: Briand's Dilemma 144 
TWELVE: Modifications, Qualifications, 

Considerations, Interpretations 170 
THIRTEEN: The Force of Interpretive 

Notes in International Law 192 

FOURTEEN: <( The Miracle Has Come" 201 

FIFTEEN: Travail in Washington $>%i 

SIXTEEN: The Treaty and the Senate 240 

SEVENTEEN: Ratification and Proclamation 253 


EIGHTEEN: Conclusion 2^3 

The Kdlogg-Briand Pad :(> 

Note on Sources 27 

Index aSr, 

Chapter One: ARMISTICE 1918 


A he 

Jie "war to end war" came to an end on Novem- 
ber 11, 1918. Never was there such a celebration. In Paris, the capi- 
tal of the victorious Allies, cannon opened the day with a boom- 
ing salute to victory* With one accord the populace turned into the 
streets. Throngs of people jammed the boulevards from sidewalk 
to sidewalk. One almost could have stepped down the middle of the 
Champs filys<Jes on the shoulders of the happy, shouting crowd. A 
great mass of people gathered in the Place de la Concorde, where 
the statue of the captive City of Strasbourg after forty-seven years 
shed her crape and mourning wreaths, and took on instead the tri- 
color of France. Premier Georges Clemenceau declared to his re- 
joicing countrymen: "Le jour de gloire est arrival" 

There were similar scenes, in London, As soon as the armistice 
news became known, a huge mass of humanity began to converge 
toward Buckingham Palace. The crowd flowed over the Queen 
Victoria Memorial. Small boys perched themselves on the lap of 
the statue. All eyes looked toward the Palace, where scarlet cloth 
and gold draped the balcony above the main entrance, sign that 
royalty would appear. The waiting crowd was becoming restless 
when the king in naval uniform, the queen bareheaded, the Princess 
Mary, and the Duke of Connaught stepped out on the balcony. 
Cheer after cheer rent the air, flags and handkerchiefs waved, and 
the Memorial became a pyramid of fluttering color. The massed 
bands of the guards struck up "God Save the King/' then the na- 
tional anthems of the Allies* The crowd finally broke up and poured 


back into the London thoroughfares to the tune of "It's a Long, 
Long Way to Tipperary." For the rest of the day London gave itself 
up to celebration. 

In the United States the real armistice was an anticlimax. False 
rumors of peace had prematurely touched off a boisterous revel on 
November 6. Many people, hearing that the armistice rumors were 
spurious, declared they would continue celebrating until the actual 
end of the war. When the final news came on November 1 1, all 
New York let loose. The canyons of Manhattan filled with so much 
wastepaper that the National Board of Fire Underwriters became 
seriously worried. Impromptu parades started up everywhere, with 
opprobrious effigies of Kaiser Wilhelm as the center of attraction. 

In Washington President Woodrow Wilson hastily assembled 
the Congress, and there followed a memorable scene. At two min- 
utes past one o'clock the chief executive appeared at the House 
chamber escorted by a committee of senators and representatives. 
"The President of the United States," shouted Joseph Smjiott, 
sergeant-at-arms of the House, as Wilson entered through a door- 
way to the left and rear of the rostrum. In an instant the entire com- 
pany was on its feet, cheering. "It is not now possible," Wilson said, 
"to assess the consequences of this great consummation. We know 
only that this tragical war, whose consuming flames swept from one 
nation to another until all the world was on fire, is at an end . . ." x 
In his own heart and mind the president was resolved that this vic- 
tory should, if possible, be a victory over war itself: out of it would 
come some sort of international constitution for keeping the peace 
of the world. 

In Berlin, the capital of the defeated Hohenzollern Empire, 
there was a different scene. A revolution of the proletariat was on 
foot. The Soldiers' and Workers' Council issued a communiqu 
announcing that "Great joy and enthusiasm prevail everywhere." 2 
But there was reason for doubt. The German people could not have 
been joyful on the day when so many of their dreams collapsed and 
when so much that was long familiar disappeared. Great joy and 

1. New York Times, Nov. 12, 1918. 

2. London Times, Nov. uj, 1918. 


enthusiasm probably were not much in evidence except among the 
stalwarts of the revolutionary movement itself. Undoubtedly, how- 
ever, millions of tired German soldiers looked forward on Novem- 
ber 11, 1918, to returning home, and to living in peace the rest of 
their days. 

People everywhere on November 1 1, 1918, were sick of war and 
glad of peace boisterously glad in the Allied capitals, at least hope- 
fully relieved in gloomy Berlin. Peace at last was a reality, a much- 
blessed reality. Peace felt good indeed after four long years of 
frightful war. It was a day of glory all over the world, glory in hope 
of universal peace. 

Perhaps the Armistice would actually mark the dawning of a 
new war less era for the human race! It was incredible to think that 
the nations, having found peace after so much travail, would lose 
it. Although Wilson very cautiously advised his listeners that "It is 
not now possible to assess the consequences of this great consum- 
mation," it was rather Lloyd George who voiced the deep spirit 
of November 1 1 when he emotionally told the House of Commons: 
'1 hope we may say that thus, this fateful morning, came to an end 
all wars." 8 

The popular desire for peace, of course, did not first arise dur- 
ing the Great War. People have wished for peace ever since hu- 
man beings started fighting each other and that, we may rest 
assured, was a very long time ago. Popular longings nevertheless 
rarely became articulate until fairly recently in the modern era, 
during and after the period of the French Revolution when thrones 
and altars at last began to shake and fall as the people arose to take 
over their governments. 

The French National Assembly invoked international peace in 
1790. It wrote into the Constitution of France a solemn pledge: 

3. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Nov. 11, 1918, quoted in 
Harry R. Rudin, Armistice 1918 (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1944), 
P- 385- 


"The French nation renounces all wars of conquest, and will never 
use its forces against the liberty of another people/' * Here at long 
last was response to yearnings of millions of the downtrodden 
French peasantry. Although it is sadly true that after this noble 
renunciation the French nation turned all Europe into a twenty- 
year battleground, popular aspiration for peace unrelentingly con- 
tinued in strength and voice during the wars of the Revolution and 

After Waterloo and prior to August 1914 the main cause of war 
in the Western world was the desire for achievement of national 
states in central and southeastern Europe, thus completing the 
work begun in France in 1789. During the nineteenth century the 
great powers busied themselves principally in oversea expansion 
or in industrial growth. The century 1815-1914 was a relatively 
peaceful century compared to the Napoleonic conflict which had 
gone before. But although there was no general war among the 
nations of the world, war still remained recognized as to use 
Clausewitz' phrase an * 'instrument of policy/' 

Plans for peace nonetheless seemed almost unnecessary until 
the European alliance system began to tighten up visibly near the 
end of the century. Oddly enough the remarkable French Foreign 
Minister Thophile Delcass, foremost apostle of revanche and de- 
stroyer of the work of Bismarck, was one of the unintentional 
mentors of the peace movement, for Delcass's skillful construction 
of ententes and alliances helped create an ominous war psychology 
in Europe, alarming men of good will and turning their thoughts 
toward planning more actively for peace. 5 These humanitarians 
addressed their efforts to the Peace Conferences at The Hague and 
to the promotion of arbitration treaties among the nations. 

It is a fairly well-known story that the First Hague Conference 
originated not in the idealism of the Russian monarch who pro- 

4. For interesting details of this renunciation, see Albert Sorel, UEurope 
et la revolution fran$aise (8 vols., Paris, 1885-1904), II, 84-91. 

5. Delcass was foreign minister during the years 1898-1905, Although he 
returned to the Quai d'Orsay during the World War, it is his earlier work for 
which he is remembered. For an excellent biography of this French statesman, 
see Charles W. Porter, The Career of Thdophile Delcasst (Philadelphia, 1936). 


posed it, but in the difficulties of his finance minister, Count Witte, 
who was having financial troubles in bringing the Russian artillery 
up to date. 6 The tsar's invitation to the powers proposed two topics 
for discussion reduction of armaments and peaceful settlement of 
international disputes. The first proved to be a complete fiasco. The 
second resulted in establishment of the Hague Permanent Court 
of Arbitration, setting up rules for voluntary arbitration of inter- 
national controversies. 

The Second Hague Conference of 1907, called at the behest of 
President Theodore Roosevelt after the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-05, was no more successful in clinching the cause of general 
peace than its predecessor. Already a European armaments race was 
in full swing, and the new world peace movement notwithstand- 
ing experienced diplomatists knew that the year 1907 was no time 
for disarmament. Sir Edward Grey frankly told the House of Com- 
mons: "The difficulty in regard to one nation stepping out in 
advance of the others is this, that while there is a chance that their 
courageous action may lead to reform, there is also a chance that 
it may lead to martyrdom." T The Second Hague Conference's two 
most important acts were (i) the Porter Convention, which pro- 
hibited forcible collection of international debts except under cer- 
tain conditions, 8 and (2) the decision to create a tribunal to adjudi- 
cate violations of sea law in wartime an international prize court 
thus necessitating codification of belligerent and neutral rights 

6. E. J. Dillon, The Eclipse of Russia (New York, 1918), pp. 269-278. See 
also Thomas K. Ford, "The Genesis of the First Hague Peace Conference," 
Political Science Quarterly, 51 (1936), 354-382. Ford argues that Witte worried 
over money f6r artillery because he wanted to spend available money on the 
navy; and so he favored the conference idea if it might prevent expenditures 
on artillery. 

7. E. L. Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1935), p. 134. The German kaiser declared that King Ed- 
ward VII, during a visit to Germany, had described the disarmament discussions 
prior to convening the Second Hague Conference as "humbug." After this 
disclosure Wilhelm attended the wedding of Fraulein Bertha Krupp, where 
he announced that "To you, my dear Bertha, God has ordained a magnificent 
sphere of influence/' Ibid., pp. 125-126. 

8. If the delinquent state refused arbitration or, after arbitration, refused to 
abide by the award. 


and duties; but the resulting Declaration of London never achieved 
enough ratifications to go into effect. The Second Hague Confer- 
ence, hailed by peace-lovers throughout the world, actually pro- 
duced not plans for peace but rules for war. 

Nor did peace advocates get any further by their promotion of 
arbitration treaties. France and Great Britain in 1903 dubiously 
furthered the cause of peace by bringing forth a new model formula 
for such pacts. This famous formula agreed in advance to arbitrate 
disputes but excluded from arbitration all questions affecting the 
vital interests, independence, or national honor of the contracting 
states, or disputes involving third parties. This was the formula 
used by Secretary of State Elihu Root in a set of well-known and 
much-admired bilateral treaties between the United States and 
other powers. In diplomatic practice these treaties meant that states 
refused to arbitrate the very questions which led directly to war. As 
instruments of peace the numerous arbitration treaties concluded 
on the Anglo-French pattern were of negligible value, "I only 
went into them/' President Theodore Roosevelt told his friend Sir 
Cecil Spring-Rice, "because the general feeling of the country de- 
manded it." * 

The peace movement in the United States did not place all its 
hopes on the Hague Conferences and on the growing network of 
arbitration treaties. 10 Workers for peace sought to advance the 
cause through the manifold activities of privately organized peace 
societies. These societies already had a long history. The New York 
Peace Society and the Massachusetts Peace Society had been or- 
ganized after the Napoleonic Wars. The American Peace Society 
established itself a few years later. By the middle of the nineteenth 
century there were no less than fifty distinct peace societies in the 
United States. But these were all genteel organizations quaint, 
old-fashioned, somewhat stodgy. After the turn of the twentieth 
century there appeared two lusty new institutions: the World 

9. W. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate (Baltimore, Johns Hop- 
kins University Press, 1933), p, 212. 

10, The nations of the world, before the end of 1914, had concluded more 
than one hundred treaties containing the Franco-British formula. 


Peace Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace. Andrew Carnegie, enthusiastic founder of the Endowment, 
gave the express commandment to "hasten the abolition of inter- 
national war, the foulest blot upon our civilization." u Such new 
organizations, cooperating with invigorated old-time peace societies, 
began to work tirelessly for abolition of war. To describe their 
activities there soon arose a new word, "pacifism/' 12 

Thus the years passed and the work of the peace movement 
grew more and more impressive. In Europe the nations were build- 
ing up armaments, but there was no war. 13 In the year 1913 the 
nations dedicated a magnificent Peace Palace at The Hague, built 
by Andrew Carnegie 14 as a home for the Permanent Court of Arbi- 
tration. In the United States there was a brand-new navy and some 
imperialistic accomplishments in the Caribbean and Pacific, but 
most Americans believed the world was better off and even more 
peaceful because of the Philippines, the Canal, and the new navy. 
Perhaps they were right. In the languid summer days of June 1914 
profound peace hung, with a great stillness, over all the world. 

Then, suddenly, in an instant, all Europe burst into flames. 

11. Nor was Carnegie satisfied even with abolition of war: "When . . . 
war is discarded as disgraceful to civilized men . . . the Trustees will pleas 
[Carnegie simplified spelling] then consider what is the next most degrading 
remaining evil or evils whose banishment . . , would most advance the prog- 
ress, elevation and happiness of man, and so on from century to century with- 
out end, my Trustees of each age shall determin how they can best aid man in 
his upward march to ... perfection even here in this life upon erth." An- 
drew Carnegie to the trustees of the proposed Carnegie Endowment for Inter- 
national Peace, Dec. 14, 1910. For text, see any of the Endowment's yearbooks. 

12. Norman Angell, "Pacifism," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, XI, 

13. Other than fighting in obscure corners of the globe: the Transvaal, 
Manchuria and Tsushima Straits, Tripoli, the Balkans. 

14. Andrew Carnegie gave $1,500,000 for building the Palace. All the great 
nations contributed gifts clocks, gates and railings, paintings, candelabra, etc. 
Speaking after the ceremonies of dedication, August 29, 1913, Carnegie mov- 
ingly described "the greatest of all causes, the abolition of war," and "the kill- 
ing of man by man, the greatest of all crimes." A Manual of the Public Bene- 
factions of Andrew Carnegie (Washington, 1919), p. 276. 



To Europeans and Americans alike, outbreak of World War 
brought almost complete astonishment. In the New World par- 
ticularly hardly anyone was prepared, mentally, for such a tre- 
mendous catastrophe. 

Decades of peace, which peace leaders everywhere had heralded 
as a New World Order of Concord, proved mere prelude to war. 
The international peace fabric, with its solemn peace conferences, 
its network of arbitration treaties so laboriously constructed, all 
vanished when Austrian guns flashed and boomed before the Ser- 
bian city of Belgrade. 

In Europe initial astonishment rapidly gave way to surging 
patriotism. Young men en masse flocked to the colors. The war, 
they thought, would end quickly with victory. But in the United 
States astonishment changed to revulsion as the American Govern- 
ment hastily declared neutrality. 

American feeling toward the World War altered only slowly 
as, after the initial rush of the German armies into France, fighting 
bogged down into a war of position. Most Americans, including 
President Woodrow Wilson, persisted in believing that their coun- 
try should remain neutral a Refuge for Civilization driven from 
the Old World to the New. Pacifism was popular. Even ex-President 
Theodore Roosevelt at first was content with neutrality. But as he 
began to feel the realities of the threatened balance of power he 
compared the then-current pacifist song, "I Didn't Raise My Boy 
to Be a Soldier/' with "I didn't raise my girl to be a mother/' His 
published speeches and articles during this period bear the title 
Fear God and Take Your Own Part. 15 At first he received little 
support from the great majority of Americans. 

The war in Europe gave a new impulse to peace organizations 
in the United States. They worked feverishly to keep the country 
out of war and, if possible, to end the war itself. There arose a 
National Peace Federation, advocating "continuous mediation/ 1 
Two of the nation's leading feminists, Miss Jane Addams and Mrs. 
Carrie Chapman Catt, formed the Woman's Peace Party to "enlist 

15. (New York, 1916). 


all American women in arousing the nations to respect the sacred- 
ness of human life and to abolish war." 16 Several American peace 
conferences met during the spring of 1915, among them a notable 
convention at Philadelphia which established a League to Enforce 
Peace. This latter was at once a new peace organization and a new 
proposition: a group of leading Americans proposed that in the 
future the nations of the world enforce peace. 17 

Then there was Henry Ford's "Peace Ship." This odyssey had 
its beginnings when a Hungarian pacifist, Mrs. Rosika Schwimmer, 
and the youthful secretary of the Chicago Peace Society, Louis P. 
Lochner, went to Detroit and persuaded the multimillionaire auto- 
mobile manufacturer to support the National Peace Federation's 
proposal for continuous mediation. 18 Accompanied by Lochner, 
Ford then proceeded to Washington to see President Wilson. 19 
Said Ford to Wilson: "I have today chartered a steamship. I offer 
it to you to send delegates to Europe. If you feel you can't act, I 
will. ... I shall take a shipful of American delegates to Eu- 
rope," Wilson, who had received his conspicuous visitor with every 
courtesy, suddenly grew cold and formal, and Ford and Lochner 
soon found themselves outside the White House grounds. 20 Never- 

16. Marie L. Degen, History of the Woman's Peace Party (Baltimore, Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1939), p. 41. 

17. See Ruhl J. Bartlett, The League To Enforce Peace (Chapel Hill, N.C., 
1944). The League desired that all justiciable international questions not set- 
tled by negotiation should, "subject to the limitations of treaties," be submitted 
to a judicial tribunal; all other questions not settled by negotiation should be 
submitted to a Council of Conciliation. Signatories would use economic and 
military forces against any one of their number who violated the above pro- 
cedure. Codification of international law meanwhile would take place via 
periodic conferences. 

1 8. Years later Mrs. Schwimmer and Lochner again achieved fame, the 
former when in 1929 she was denied American citizenship for refusing to bear 
arms, and the latter as head of the Berlin Bureau of the Associated Press, 
1928-42, and later as translator and editor of the late Joseph Goebbels' diaries. 

19. Ford always was open to new ideas and disdained old ones. "I don't 
read history," he once remarked. "That's in the past. I'm thinking of the fu- 
ture." Louis P. Lochner, America's Don Quixote: Henry Ford's Attempt To 
Save Europe (London, K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1924), p. 18. 

20. Ford's only comment was: "He's a small man." For this interview of 
Nov. 23, 1916, see ibid., pp. 24-25. 


theless, Henry Ford's steamship, the Oscar II, ridiculed by news- 
papermen as the "Peace Ark" and the "floating Chautauqua," 
sailed forth to Denmark. Many unsophisticated Americans un- 
doubtedly sympathized with the voyage and the passengers. But 
instead of "getting the boys out of the trenches by Christmas" 
Henry Ford, having departed for neutral Copenhagen on Decem- 
ber 4, 1916, sailed secretly for home on the day before Christ- 

Woodrow Wilson meanwhile had been re-elected president of 
the United States on campaign slogans such as "He kept us out of 
war," and "War in the East; peace in the West; thank God for 
Wilson!" These were such slogans as to hearten American peace 
workers. But Wilson had quietly changed his views from a year 
before when he had told the world that "There is such a thing as 
a man being too proud to fight." In 1916 he began to advocate 
"preparedness," and while this proposal was not antithetical to 
peace yet it did look in the direction of war. The New York social 
worker, Miss Lillian D. Wald, together with many other workers 
for peace, sought to counteract Wilson's new advocacy by raising 
the specter of militarism. 21 But it was easy to advocate preparedness 
and, at the same time, be against militarism. At the end of 1916 the 
American peace movement was running into difficulty. 

It is impossible to assess the influence of the preparedness cam- 
paign on the martial spirit in the United States. Undoubtedly 
preparedness did the peace movement no good. Yet one safely can 
risk the generalization that at the 'beginning of 1917 Americans 
as a whole did not want their country to enter the European war. 
Only after Wilson's postelection efforts at mediation had failed and 
after German resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, the 
publication of the Zimmermann letter, 22 and the Russian Revolu- 
tion of March 1917, did war gain in popularity. Even then there 
was stubborn opposition. When Wilson proposed arming the 
American merchant marine for defense a small group of "willful 

21. Miss Wald headed the American Union Against Militarism. 

as. In which the German secretary of state sought to coax the Mexican 
Government into the war (not yet declared) against the United States, offering 
Mexico her "lost territories" above the Rio Grande. 

ARMISTICE igi8 11 

men" in the Senate resolutely filibustered against it. When he 
finally asked Congress for war fifty members of the House of Rep- 
resentatives and six senators held out to the end for peace. 


War, at first, was almost exhilarating. To the home front it 
offered parades, campaigns, drives, a wide variety of buttons and 
badges, and, of course, higher wages. To new citizen soldiers going 
overseas it offered adventure, a sort of Grand Tour under highly 
dangerous circumstances. 23 At first, only at first. 

As for President Wilson, it has been said that the war for him 
was no adventure and that he went into it not in the spirit of a 
knight entering the lists but in the spirit of a policeman entering a 
barroom brawl: he was there to break it up. There was some truth 
in this. Wilson however made a superb war leader and infused into 
the American people a will-to-win hitherto unmatched in Ameri- 
can history. Although in 1916 he had solemnly declared that "force 
will not accomplish anything that is permanent/' a year later he 
was demanding "force to the utmost, force without stint or limit, 
the righteous and triumphant force that shall make right the law 
of the world." 24 

Under such inspiring leadership Americans embarked on their 
first "total war." Everyone helped with the fight, for a World War's 
front was everywhere, not merely in the trenches in France. War 
no longer was a simple matter in which Sir Galahad unhooked his 
armor from the wall, mounted his charger, and in forty or fifty 
minutes was answering the summons of his liege lord. Nor was total 
war at all comparable to eighteenth-century war, when although 
war already had become something of a science the army "rep- 
resented a nation only as a football team represents its college." 25 
Even the coming of the "nation in arms" in the days of Carnot, 

23. This was the delightful description given to the Russian soldiery of 
the second World War, in Alexandra Orme's Comes the Comrade (New York, 


24. Speeches in New York, June 30, 1916, and in Washington, Apr. 6, 1917. 

25. Preston W. Slosson, The Great Crusade and After: 1914-1928 (New 
York, Macmillan, 1930), p. 31. 


Napoleon, and Scharnhorst, while requiring many citizens to fight 
in the army yet did not require transformation of national econo- 
mies into machines for war. Only with the World War did total war 


But this World War, we must not forget, was also a "war to end 
war." It was Armageddon, so people said, the final battle of the 
nations. To idealists world peace was its objective. Peace indeed 
became the official raison d'etre of the American war effort. As 
Wilson said when he introduced to the world the Fourteen Points, 
"The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program." 
That program, he added, was "the only possible program." 20 Peace 
leaders in the United States and abroad, although busy with war 
work, thus considered it almost a part of their contribution to the 
struggle that they should help prepare plans for peace. 

It is no exaggeration to say that where there had been relatively 
few peace schemes before the World War, there now were hun- 
dreds and even thousands. Especially in Europe, as the war length- 
ened into terrible years of trench warfare, did seekers after peace 
find unexcelled opportunity in the Allied countries to evolve plans 
and to espouse them before war-weary populations. A telling argu- 
ment, frequently employed, was that peace had broken down in 
1914 because there was no established system for settling inter- 
national disputes: the Hague Tribunal hardly entered into the 
thoughts of diplomatists in the hectic days of July 1914, and ob- 
viously the old Concert of Europe had proved too flimsy an in- 
stitution to survive great international crises. And so it came about 
that thoughtful statesmen together with millions of peace-desiring 
folk everywhere were pondering plans to insure world peace, to 
prevent a repetition of the July 1914 catastrophe. 

Then came the victory. The guns on the western front ceased 

26. Address to Congress, Jan. 8, 1918. 





.he years following the 1918 Armistice have re- 
ceived many appellations: the interbella period, 1 the Long Armis- 
tice, the "twenty years' crisis," 2 the Washington Period, 3 the As- 
pirin Age, 4 the "After" years, 6 the "Fool's Paradise of American 
history." 6 Although there is something to be said for each of these, 
the present writer would prefer to call the decade after the 1918 
Armistice "The Search for Peace/' If one word was repeated more 
often than any other during the years after the poignantly memora- 
ble Armistice, that word was "peace." Peace echoed through so 
many sermons, speeches, and state papers that it drove itself into 

1. Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States ($d 
ed., New York, Henry Holt, 1950). 

2. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1959 (London, 1939). 

3. This refers to the years after the Washington Disarmament Conference 
of 1921-22. S. F. Bemis, "The Shifting Strategy of American Defense and Di- 
plomacy," in Dwight E. Lee and George E. McReynolds, eds., Essays in His- 
tory and International Relations in Honor of George Hubbard Blakeslee 
(Worcester, Mass., Clark University, 1949), pp. 1-14. 

4. Isabel Leighton, ed., The Aspirin Age: 19x9-1942 (New York, 1949). 

5. Preston W. Slosson, The Great Crusade and After: 19x4-1928. 

6. "Never did the Western Hemisphere seem safer, a paradise of peace. 
Perhaps it would be more accurate to call that period the Fool's Paradise of 
American history." S. F. Bemis, "Shifting Strategy," op. cit. During this era, 
writes Bemis, American foreign policy had five postulates: isolation, anti- 
imperialism, disarmament, neutrality, pacifism. 


the consciousness of everyone. Never in world history was peace so 
great a desideratum, so much talked about, looked toward, and 
planned for, as in the decade after the 1918 Armistice. 

Diplomats labored for months at Versailles, seeking in a League 
of Nations and other arrangements a foundation for peace. States- 
men in following years met at Washington and Geneva to talk dis- 
armament. At Geneva in 1924 they examined and rejected a far- 
reaching protocol of peace. They later concluded at Locarno in 
1925 a more limited pact to guarantee peace along the western 
borders of the new German Republic. 

While diplomats thus worked arduously for peace, organiza- 
tions of private citizens sought to help in the great cause. Sometimes 
the labors of these two groups complemented each other. Some- 
times citizens and diplomats much to the disgust of the latter 
found themselves proceeding in opposite directions. The "intru- 
sion" of public opinion into foreign policy nonetheless was a no- 
table fact of the period after the 1918 Armistice, which professional 
diplomats had to reckon with whether they liked it or not. 

This intrusion occasionally resulted in a more open, more 
"Wilsonian," sort of diplomacy, but not infrequently the result was 
a diplomacy more obscure, roundabout, and veiled than ever had 
occurred before the first World War. Diplomats in the old-fashioned 
days of Bismarck and Delcass had called an alliance an alliance, 
but after the World War (caused, many people believed, by alli- 
ances) the word "alliance" went out of fashion. New words ap- 
peared. Diplomacy of the igso's dealt in nonaggression treaties, 
pacts of guarantee, protocols, pledges of perpetual friendship. All 
because public opinion associated the word "alliance" with the 
word "war," rather than "peace." 

This extremely sensitive peace-consciousness did not mean of 
course that people were at last ready to renounce war altogether. 
There were revisionist nations in Europe Germany, Italy, Hun- 
gary and the peoples of those nations were becoming ever more 
strident in their demands for change, peaceful or (they hinted) 
otherwise. Then there were countries such as Czechoslovakia and 
Poland, born out of the World War, whose peoples could hardly 
subscribe to a belief that nothing good ever came out of war. Even 


in nations where desire for peace was strongest the great powers 
of the status quo, France and Britain, which had suffered terribly 
in the World War young men again would have flocked to the 
colors if national existence itself were at stake. And in the United 
States, where nearly everyone wanted peace, most Americans like 
Europeans still would have fought for great questions of national 
honor, interest, independence, and freedom as understood in 
Anglo-American constitutional history. 

This was the climate in which diplomacy had to be conducted. 
Peace, in general terms, was the great popular desire; and many 
diplomats held office by will of the people. There indisputably 
was a "peace psychology" among the citizenry everywhere. Citizens 
were even forming new organizations, and invigorating old ones, 
for the express purpose of propagating peace on earth and good will 
among men. 

What, then, was the general outline of this citizen campaign 
for peace? What was the pattern, if any, of the organized peace 
movement during the twenties? 

Briefly, peace organizations in Europe, while usually much 
smaller and less influential than those in the United States, were in 
general agreement as to their objectives. The leading societies all 
supported the League of Nations. Whatever seemed to bolster the 
League and the cause of peace Washington Conference, for ex- 
ample, or the Locarno treaties they likewise supported. In the 
United States, however, although there was much more powerful 
peace organization, there was much less unanimity as to program. 

The numerous American peace societies believed themselves 
confronted by four peace issues: the World Court, the League of 
Nations, disarmament, and militarism. While generally agreeing 
on the desirability of American adherence (albeit with "appro- 
priate" reservations) to the World Court, most of them accepted 
the League of Nations only with uncertain enthusiasm. And as for 
disarmament and militarism, while peace groups ostensibly agreed 
on the desirability of the former and the evils of the latter, they 
disputed disarmament's particulars and militarism's aspects. It is 
safe to say that by the spring of 1927 no one peace formula had 
appeared in the United States capable of uniting enthusiastically 


all the various American peace groups. Only an exceptionally astute 
individual, with an exceptionally astute formula, could ever have 
brought about such a union. 

Although there were peace societies of various sorts in all the 
European countries, yet aside from certain societies in Britain, 
France, and Germany, the organized peace movement in Europe 
was of very modest proportions. Even the British, French, and 
German peace societies were not as large or important as one might 
have expected, considering popular interest in peace. 7 

There were several reasons for this. Establishment of the League 
of Nations had realized the hopes of a large section of European 
peace workers. The League carried on all its activities in the name 
of peace, and to many persons this made private peace societies 
superfluous. Then again, it is probable that Europeans were not 
as organization-conscious as, say, Americans, 8 Another reason for 
weakness of the peace movement in Europe was the long and ardu- 

7. There is no one book which gives a satisfactory account o the peace 
movement in the x 920*8. Arthur C. F. Beales, History of Peace (New York* 1931) 
and Merle Curti, Peace or War; The American Struggle x6$6-i$36 (New York, 
1936) are extremely general for this period and in fact treat die years 1918-28, 
when the peace movement reached its apogee, as a sort of "epilogue" (Beaks' 
word) to the story of peace. To obtain material for this present chapter I have 
had to rely largely on my own investigations. This involved much reading of 
pamphlet material and study of the office files of peace organizations in the 
Swarthmore College Peace Collection at Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. Often it 
was necessary to search in rather obscure places to discover an organization's 
membership, budget, program, and influence. 

The number of European "peace and kindred organizations 1 ' as listed by 
the National Council for Prevention of War (Great Britain), Peace Year-Book; 
1929 were as follows: Austria, 16; Belgium, n; Bulgaria, 8; Czechoslovakia, 
10; Danzig, *; Denmark, 10; Estonia, 4; Finland, 4; France, 58; Germany, jro; 
Great Britain, 63; Greece, 3; Holland, 13; Hungary, 7; Ireland, 5; Italy, 5; 
Latvia, 4; Lithuania, 2; Luxemburg, i; Norway, 9; Poland, 13; Portugal, 4; 
Rumania, 4; Russia, 2 (both expatriate); Spain, *; Sweden, 9; Switzerland, 20; 
Turkey, i; Ukraine, i (expatriate); Yugoslavia, 4. 

8. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Paths to the Present (New York, 1040) chap 
ii, "Biography of a Nation of Joiners," pp, 23-50, 


cms acquaintance of Europeans with war; such familiarity did not 
lessen desire for maintenance of peace, but it did tend to produce 
a certain sophistication, unfriendly to radical solutions. For these 
reasons the organized peace movement in Europe never gained 
much strength. 

At the head of the various national peace societies stood the 
Bureau International de la Paix, a coordinating agency with head- 
quarters in Geneva. The bureau during the twenties was a de- 
caying organization, managing to stay in existence chiefly because 
of money from a Nobel Peace Prize award in 19 is. 9 It conducted 
its business through a council, but though council meetings oc- 
curred twice or three times a year, only two times since 1920 was 
there a quorum. The average attendance of the fifty members in 
the years 1920-28 was fourteen. Replies to circular letters sent 
from the bureau to council members averaged ten. 10 

Of the national peace organizations, the strongest by far were 
the British League of Nations Union, the German Friedensgesell- 
schaft, and the French Ligue des Droits de THomme. In France the 
Ligue by 1927 had over 120,000 members in more than 600 sec- 
tions. The Ligue championed the League of Nations. In addition 
it took great interest in Franco-German rapprochement. Friendship 
between the two Rhine countries, the Ligue held, would prove one 
of the greatest of all factors for world peace. 11 The Deutsche 

9. Expenses in 1924, for example, were $8,773; receipts, 17,158. Comptes 
du bureau international de la paix pour 1924 . . . (n,p,, n.d.), Swarthmore 
College Peace Collection (hereafter cited as SCPC). 

10. "Confidential Memo. No. i on I.P.B.," Get, 9, 1928, manuscript in 
SCPC. The American compiler of these doleful statistics, one Benjamin Gerig, 
in 1928 was undertaking to breathe some life into the nearly deceased Bureau 
International de la Paix. 

11. In the field of Franco-German rapprochement there also labored the 
Paneuropa Union, an organization for European federation led by Count 
Richard N. Coudenhove-KalergL Coudenhove had impressive qualifications 
for heading such a movement: he was a Czech citizen living in Vienna, born 
of a Japanese mother and an Austrian father; his forbears were Venetians and 
Greeks. Of a somewhat messianic nature, he promised perpetual European 
peace as one among the many blessings which would follow upon European 
federation ("Once Pan-Europe is created a state without boundaries, with- 
out oppression, without wars then astounded Europeans will suddenly realize 


Friedensgesellschaft, founded in 1892, was the oldest and largest 
of German peace organizations. It had 28,000 members as of 1927, 
and 250 local groups. That same year the DFs executive chairman, 
Dr. Ludwig Quidde, received the Nobel Peace Prize. 12 Like the 
French Ligue des Droits de 1'Homme, the DF concerned itself 
chiefly with the League of Nations, envisioning in the League the 
most promising path toward permanent world peace. The British 
League of Nations Union in 1928 had a total membership of 4.77,- 
984 in 2,760 branches and 649 junior branches. 18 The union in 
1928 spent over $200,000 advancing the cause of the League of 
Nations in particular and world peace in general. 14 

There were other, smaller organizations in France, Britain, and 
Germany, but they were not of very great importance. Many were 
international in membership. Among them were the War Resisters' 
International, Fellowship of Reconciliation, Women's Interna- 
tional League for Peace and Freedom, and Oxford Group move- 
ment. The War Resisters' International and the Fellowship of 
Reconciliation were out-and-out pacifist groups. The Women's In- 
ternational League inclined toward pacifism, for its president and 
mainstay was Jane Addams, the uncompromising pacifist of Hull 
House, Chicago. The Oxford Groups were the spawn of another 
American, Dr. Frank N. D. Buchman, known variously as Frank 
or "F.B."; Buchman's organization was predominantly religious, 

that Europe is the long-lost paradise." Paneuropa, 2 [April 1926], 15). His 
movement achieved a short-lived importance when Aristide Briand in 1929 
made an effort toward European union. For details of the Coudenhove pro- 
gram see issues of his movement's monthly, Paneuropa, and also Coudenhove's 
autobiography, Crusade /or Pan-Europe (New York, 1943). 

i*. Dr. Quidde shared the 1927 prize with Professor Ferdinand Buisson of 
Paris, president of the French Ligue des Droits de 1'Homme. 

13. In 1928 there were League of Nations societies in thirty-nine different 
countries, linked together by the International Federation of League of Na- 
tions Societies. The British League of Nations Union was by far the largest. 

14. The British Union provided 4,180 meetings with speakers during 1938. 
The Union's publications had varying circulation, a monthly with 95,000, a 
monthly News Sheet with 60,000, the League News (for children) 35,000. LNU, 
Annual Report: 1928. 


seeking as one devotee put it to establish a Dictatorship of the 
Holy Spirit: each Oxford Group member endeavored to follow his 
own lights, and these lights frequently shone toward pacifism. All 
of these international groups WRI, FOR, WILPF, and the Ox- 
ford Group movement were rather small during the twenties in 
numbers, influence, and budget. 15 

Peace sentiment in Europe seems to have preferred to attach 
itself to other than propagandistic organizations. Trade unions 

15. Each member of the WRI took the following pledge: "War is a crime 
against humanity. We therefore are determined not to support any kind of 
war and to strive for the removal of all causes of war." The WRI in 1930 had 
40 sections in 21 different countries, and members in 53. The International 
itself for the year ending Mar. 31, 1927, spent 596, with income of the same. 
In 1928 the WRI in the United States had 6 affiliates: Association to Abolish 
War (400 members), Women's Peace Society (2,000 members), Women's Peace 
Union, World Peace Association, FOR (4,500 members), War Registers' League 
(400 members). (Membership figures from NCPW, Organizations in the United 
States That Promote Better International Understanding and World Peace 
[Washington, 1927].) In England the WRI affiliated the No More War Move- 
ment (5,000 members) and The Young Anti-Militarists. WRI, War Resisters in 
Many Lands (Middlesex, England, 1928?). 

The FOR was as much a service organization as peace organization. It 
undertook various projects such as aid to children and to stricken areas. The 
British FOR had 7,584 members in 1927. NCPW (GB), Peace Year-Book: 1927. 
The American FOR in Jan. 1928 had 5,551 members; the 1927 receipts were 
$29,801.90. "Minutes of executive committee," Jan. 5, 1928, FOR-US files, 

Jane Addams bore the brunt of financing the WILPF. Of receipts of 
$11,752.20 for the international office in 1928, $6,000 came directly from the 
WILPF's American section, and this was called Miss Addams* Contribution. 
WILPF files, SCPC. The American section as of the annual meeting in 1927 
had a total annual income of $18,039.02, 6,300 members, and a staff of three. 
"Annual Report of the Executive Secretary," WILPF-US files, SCPC. The 
British section of the WIL had 3,500 members in 1927. NCPW (GB), Peace 
Year-Book; 1927. In 1928 the British section had a budget of 2,239. WIL-GB, 
Yearly Report: 1928. According to NCPW, Organizations in the United States, 
the WILPF had a total membership of approximately 50,000. 

For the Oxford Group movement, see Allan W. Eister, Drawing Room Con- 
version (Durham, N.C., 1950), and especially Walter Houston Clark, The Ox- 
ford Group: Its History and Significance (New York, 1951). 


were strongly pacifist, and there was a revival of the prewar belief 
that a general strike could paralyze any warlike manifestations by 
national governments. 16 Many of the postwar political parties, 
moreover, were intensely peace-minded. The British Labor party, 
the Herriot Socialists in France, and the Social Democrats in Ger- 
many made perpetuation of peace a key item of their political 
faith, 17 

It is true of course that announced programs of labor organiza- 
tions and political parties did not always mirror the thoughts and 
interests of all their members. There could not have been anything 
like unanimity when in 19210 the International Miners 1 Congress 
at Geneva, representing 1,500,000 workers, declared for resistance 
to war; when in 1922 the International Trade Union Congress 
at Rome, representing 24,000,000, made a similar declaration; or 
when in 1926 the British Labor party at Margate, representing 
5,000,000, voted against war. 18 Yet undoubtedly there existed strong 
antiwar sentiment among European workers and labor parties. 

The trade unions and political parties had many other aims 
besides peace, aims which were on a national and even local level 
and which occupied most of their time. Only organizations spe- 
cifically organized for peace could so dedicate all their activities. 
During the postwar years in Europe such groups for several rea- 
sons 10 were not strong. The three largest devoted themselves to 
promoting the already established League of Nations* For new 
ideas and vigorous action in behalf of them it was necessary to look 
elsewhere than in Europe. Leading all the nations of the world was 
the organized peace movement in the United States. 

16. A general strike in Germany in 1920 had defeated the Kapp Putsch. 

17. Because of the peculiar class- and interest-structure of European political 
parties, it was much easier for them to take a clear-cut, detailed decision on 
peace than was the case for the two broadly representative parties in the 
United States. 

18. There of course was a tendency on the part of peace enthusiasts to 
count as many noses as possible. H. Runham Brown, Cutting Ice (Enfield, Eng- 
land, 1930), a typical tract put out in the name of the War Resistors' Interna- 
tional, lists (pp. 17-18) an impressive array of antiwar resolutions and declara- 

19. See above, pp. 16-17. 



Foremost among American peace organizations was the Car- 
negie Endowment for International Peace. Organized in 1910, the 
Endowment began life with a Carnegie gift of $10,000,000 in 
five-per-cent first-mortgage bonds of the United States Steel Cor- 
poration; and during the first World War these bonds appreciated 
very considerably in value offering the somewhat anomalous pic- 
ture of a peace organization operating on the profits of war. The 
Endowment in the decade of the twenties eagerly followed the 
progress of peace in Europe and elsewhere in the world. In its 
monthly bulletin, International Conciliation, which it sold at 
nominal subscription rates, it printed texts and commentaries on 
the outstanding international acts of the period. It also sponsored 
International Relations Clubs among college and high-school stu- 
dents and gave away books for International Mind Alcoves in small 
libraries throughout the United States. The Carnegie Endowment 
had many other activities, such as financing smaller peace organiza- 
tions in the United States and abroad, conducting a Paris Center 
for European peace, rebuilding the Louvain Library in Belgium, 
reconstructing the war-devastated French village of Fargniers-sur- 
Aisne, endowing university chairs of international relations, financ- 
ing exchange visits of European and American newspapermen and 
educators, and advancing codification of international law. The 
Endowment had a liberal budget, and in the fiscal year ending 
June 30, 1927, for example, spent a total of $6i3,88i.5o. 20 Ob- 
viously there was no need for niggardliness in paying the salaries 
of the Endowment's president and directors. 2 * Nor were expense 
accounts to be doled out sparingly. When in the summer of 1927 
three trustees attended the Honolulu Conference on Pacific Rela- 

20. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Year Book: x$28, p. 19. 

i. According to Carnegie's letter of Dec. 14, 1910, establishing the En- 
dowment, "The President shall be granted such honoraria as the Trustees 
think proper and as he can be prevaild [sic] upon to accept." President Butler 
is reported to have received $20,000 a year, plus a very generous expense 


tions, each received $2,000 for expenses, of which they later re- 
funded lno.oy. 22 The Endowment's most publicized assets, how- 
ever, were not its $10,000,000 capital and 1613,881.50 annual 
budget. Rather were they two individuals: the Endowment's presi- 
dent, Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, and its director of the Division 
of Economics and History, Professor James Thomson Shotwell. 

Of all the people in the United States, no one worked more 
assiduously for peace during the twenties than did Nicholas Mur- 
ray Butler, president of Columbia University and president of the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. A large, well-built 
man with bristling mustache and searching eyes, Dr. Butler spoke, 
wrote, and traveled the world over in defense of peace, and his 
efforts rallied countless individuals to the banner of the League of 
Nations and the World Court. Butler believed firmly in what his 
opponents termed the "European system" of force. Peace, he re- 
iterated, must have the backing of an international Big Stick; 
otherwise peace could exist only on the limited tolerance of some 
would-be aggressor nation. Dr. Butler was a most redoubtable 
speaker who almost at the drop of a hat could deliver a polished 
oration without any notes. Sprinkling his speeches with impressive 
references to philosophers and events of the past, he had a way 
of sweeping an audience off its feet in approval of whatever he was 
at the time advocating. Nicholas Murray Butler in the 1920'$, pro- 
moting world peace through the League, was a great force wherever 
he went. 28 

22. Year Book: i$28> p. 80; 1929, p. 254. The trustees in question were 
Alfred Holman, Henry S. Pritchett, and James T. Shotwell. 

23. Touring Europe shortly after the World War, Butler everywhere 
found himself heralded as "America's unofficial ambassador/ 1 Proudly he col- 
lated press captions, which read as follows: WAS NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER 
OF ENGLAND. Nicholas Murray Butler, Across the Busy Years (% vols., New York, 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939-40), II, 123. 


As president of the Endowment, Dr. Butler held the purse 
strings to millions, a very strategic position indeed. Needy scholars 
anxious for grants-in-aid, travel in Europe, or money to put their 
books through the press swarmed to the Endowment's exchequer 
for help. Impecunious movements for world peace, or looking 
obliquely in the direction of world peace, importuned the En- 
dowment as a source of life-giving aid. This is in no sense to hint 
that President Butler used the bulging Carnegie strongbox to ad- 
vance his own peace schemes and squelch those with which he dis- 
agreed. It is true however that the general policy of the Endow- 
ment during the twenties was by no means unfavorable to the 
League of Nations. The Endowment's manifold and influential 
activities frequently reflected the views of its president. 

Professor James Thomson Shotwell was Butler's junior by a 
dozen years. He otherwise somewhat resembled his chief in ap- 
pearance. His countenance reflected a shining love of humanity. 
He was and remains a firm idealist. 23 * 1 At one time interested in 
ancient Greek culture, Shotwell turned his attention during and 
after the war to contemporary international problems, and in the 
twenties he edited for the Endowment a monumental Economic 
and Social History of the World War, some two hundred volumes. 
Author of innumerable books on international affairs, Professor 
Shotwell was second only to Dr. Butler himself as a speechmaker. 
His speeches could and did draw tears of sympathy from strong 
men of good will. Shotwell, like Butler, advocated American par- 
ticipation in the League of Nations. 

Yet the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace did not 
possess anything approaching monopoly over the organized peace 
movement in the United States, The World Peace Foundation, 
with a $1,000,000 endowment from the Boston publisher Edwin 
Ginn, sought also to educate Americans for peace; the founda- 
tion was official distributor in the United States for all League 
of Nations publications and worked especially for American ad- 
herence to the World Court. Then there was the Foreign Policy 
Association, founded in New York exactly one month after the 

sga. See James T, Shotwell, "The Faith of an Historian," Saturday Review 
of Literature, 34 (Dec. 39, 1951), 6-7, 34-26. 


1918 Armistice, 24 which had several thousand members and, like 
the World Peace Foundation, carried on the work of education for 
peace. In the busy vineyard of peace labored also the League o 
Nations Non-Partisan Association, organized early in 1923 as a 
reincarnation of the League to Enforce Peace; the Non-Partisan 
Association strove to make the League a great national, non-partisan 
issue, 25 Helping with the heavy task was the Woodrow Wilson 
Foundation, established the same year as the League Non-Partisan 
Association with nearly a million dollars and the mission of per- 
petuating Wilsonian ideals; the foundation worked unsteadily, 
however, drifting from peace award to essay contest to collecting 
a library, and did not seem to produce much. 

In addition to all these secular peace organizations there were 
two church groups. Andrew Carnegie in 1914 started the Church 
Peace Union on its way with $2,000,000, and during the World 
War the union sponsored the World Alliance for International 
Friendship through the Churches. The World Alliance did its best 
to advance the cause of the Prince of Peace, a not inconsiderable 
task even within the disparate confines of Protestant Christianity. 30 
It received much help in the United States from the Federal Coun- 
cil of Churches of Christ, whose busy Commission on International 
Justice and Goodwill was "committed to unremitting activity un- 
til a peace system takes the place of competitive armaments and 
recurring war." 27 

A special sort of peace organization was the American Founda- 

24. The association was known as the League of Free Nations Association 
until Apr. 1921. In 1922 it changed its program to education and research 
rather than action. It had 9,000 members in 1929. 

25. It appears to have had a membership of something under 50,000: the 
Association's League of Nations Herald (a subscription to -which -was included 
in each membership fee) reported a subscription list o $5,000 after its first 
six months. 

26. The alliance sought membership of individuals from all religious faiths 
but appears to have been predominantly a Christian and Protestant organiza- 
tion. Its budget for 1930 was approximately $u 7,000, of which $65,000 went for 
American work. Condensed Outline of the History and Objectives of the Pro- 
gramme of the World Alliance . . . (New York, 1930). 

27. During the postwar years the commission began to take a sizable por- 
tion of the federal council's annual budget. By 1928 the commission was 
spending $121,348.91 (out of the federal council's total budget of 1407,216,01) 


tion, established to administer the Bok Peace Plan Award. Edward 
Bok, the well-known publisher, in 1922 sought to bring peace to 
the world in not more than 5,000 words. He offered f 100,000 to 
the author of a winning peace plan, $50,000 to be paid immediately 
and $50,000 to be paid when either the plan went into operation or 
evidenced an adequate degree of popular support. Organizations 
and individuals could submit plans. Over a quarter of a million 
American citizens wrote to ask for the conditions of the contest. 
Among the 52,165 plans actually submitted were plans from Wil- 
liam Jennings Bryan, the former secretary of state, and Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, unsuccessful candidate for the vice-presidency in the 
election of igso. 28 The winner of the contest was Charles H. Lever- 
more, the elderly secretary of the New York Peace Society, who 
gave to his scheme the latitudinarian title of "Progressive Coopera- 
tion with the Organized World, Sustained by the Moral Force of 
Public Opinion and by Developing Law/' 29 The American Founda- 
tion did not cease to function after Levermore had won the $50,000. 
The foundation continued in existence and undertook an educa- 
tional campaign for American adherence to the World Court. 30 

in unremitting activity for a peace system. Samuel McCrea Cavert, ed., Twenty 
Years of Church Federation (New York, 1929), pp. 280-281. 

28. Roosevelt advocated, in place of the League of Nations, a permanent 
and continuing International Conference to be known as the Society of Na- 
tions. For the plan, see Eleanor Roosevelt, This 1 Remember (New York, 
Harper, 1949), pp. 353-366. Mrs. Roosevelt helped Miss Esther Everett Lape 
organize the Bok Award. "In conversations with Esther Lape in later years," 
she recalls, "Franklin often referred to the peace plan he submitted in the first 
Bok competition. I think he never forgot the ideas that he set down then. The 
writing of this peace plan was proposed largely as something to keep alive his 
interest in outside matters during the first years of adjustment to his ill- 
ness . . ." Ibid., p. 24. 

29. Levermore did not receive the second $50,000, for the Committee of 
Award decided that his plan had not produced evidence of sufficient 
popular support. Most of the ballots sent out by the committee returned with 
favorable marks, but there was much talk about the pro-League attitude of the 
Committee of Award, and this apparently was taken to mean lack of sufficient 
popular support. 

30. Nor was this the end of essay contests. Edward Filene, the Boston 
merchant, after watching the Bok contest decided to offer something similar 
to Europe. Held in 1923 in France, Italy, Britain, and Germany, the Filene 
contest attracted over 15,000 plans. First prize in each country was |io,oop, 


Such were the labors of the American Foundation, the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, the World Peace Foundation, 
Foreign Policy Association, League of Nations Non-Partisan Asso- 
ciation, Woodrow Wilson Foundation, World Alliance for Inter- 
national Friendship through the Churches, and the Commission on 
International Justice and Goodwill of the Federal Council of 
Churches of Christ in America. These groups formed what one 
might call the "conservative" organizations of the American peace 
movement. All of them championed the World Court least con- 
troversial of American peace issues. All, in more or less enthusiastic 
manner, advocated American membership in the League of Na- 
tions (enthusiasm seems to have waned during the later twenties). 
Some of these conservative organizations notably the Carnegie 
Endowment took little interest in disarmament, while others, 
such as the Federal Council of Churches, came to see in disarma- 
ment the hope of the world. As for that other American peace issue, 
militarism, all peace organizations were against it in principle. 
There was a tendency, however, for educational groups such as the 
World Peace Foundation, Foreign Policy Association, and Wood- 
row Wilson Foundation to refrain from discussing militarism. 
Some of the other groups discussed it but disagreed on definitions: 
the Carnegie Endowment usually viewed the United States Gov- 
ernment's army and navy budgets as primarily for "defense/* 
whereas in the same budgets the Federal Council of Churches fre- 
quently espied clear-cut proofs of "militarism." 

The work of the conservative peace groups is only part of the 
history of the organized peace movement in the United States dur- 
ing the igso's. There also were many "radical" peace groups. These 
were the evangelists of the peace movement. Like Paul on the road 
to Damascus each had seen a sign and heard a call. 


The radical peace groups were crusaders. Small in numbers and 
limited in finances, they made up for such deficiencies by excess of 
zeal. This crusading zeal, rather than difference of ultimate ob- 
jective, distinguished the radicals from the more conservative 


groups. The radicals, like the conservatives, tended to agree on 
the World Court, and most of them were somewhat friendly toward 
the League; but they divided over the extent and nature of dis- 
armament and, although uniting to oppose militarism in general, 
split apart in disagreement over its particulars. Unlike the con- 
servatives, however, they worked with a sense of urgency, with a 
feeling that time was of the essence, that a "peace system" must re- 
place the existing "war system" or else civilization would go down 
to ruin in the holocaust of the Next War. 

The conservative peace groups staidly organized against war. 
The radicals wasted no time and veritably scrambled into the fight. 
After the 1918 Armistice scores of new peace groups mushroomed 
into existence. The usual procedure was first to choose an im- 
pressive name and to select appropriate stationery (ordinarily a 
propagandistic, name-studded letterhead). There then began a 
frenzied round of fund-raising, conventioning, writing to congress- 
men. It was truly remarkable the amount of activity these crusad- 
ing peace groups could generate. 

Someone, sometime, will make a careful study of all the radical 
peace groups in the United States during the twenties. 31 Such a 

31. Counting the number of peace organizations in the United States, 
radical and otherwise, is a difficult task, for one encounters the problem of 
categories. Should one count only those organizations working solely for peace? 
engaged in part-time work for peace? working on a national level? on 
a local level? According to Organizations in the United States That Promote 
Better International Understanding and World Peace there were the following 
radical national peace organizations: American Committee for the Outlawry 
of War, American Friends Service Committee (100,000 members), American 
Goodwill Association (5,000), American School Citizenship League, Arbitra- 
tion Crusade, Association for Peace Education, Association to Abolish War 
(400), Catholic Association for International Peace, Committee on Militarism 
in Education, Corda Fratres Association of Cosmopolitan Clubs (1,000), Fel- 
lowship for a Christian Social Order (2,500), Fellowship of Reconciliation 
(4,500), Fellowship of Youth for Peace, Friends General Conference (20,000), 
Intercollegiate Peace Association, National Committee on the Cause and 
Cure of War, National Council for Prevention of War, Parliament of Peace and 
Universal Brotherhood, Peace Association of Friends in America (90,000), 
Peace Heroes Memorial Society, School World Friendship League, Society to 
Eliminate Economic Causes of War (150), War Resisters' League (400), War 


stiidy would prove greatly rewarding as an analysis of organization 
techniques and also should reveal many interesting and hitherto 
obscure exigencies of postwar American diplomacy. 32 In the fol- 
lowing pages it is possible only to examine those radical groups 
which during the late twenties took an especial interest in the re- 
nunciation and outlawry of war. 

Foremost among the radicals stood the National Council for 
Prevention of War. The national council did not consider itself 
a peace group but rather a coordinator of peace groups through- 
out the country. The council nonetheless had its own program and 
during the twenties laid down a barrage of peace propaganda the 
like o which has seldom been seen in the United States. 

At the head of this efficient organization was Frederick J. Libby, 
the council's executive secretary. A pacifist Congregational ist min- 
ister who after the World War became a Friend, Libby in 1921 
inaugurated the council as an emergency peace organization for 
the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference. After the confer- 
ence adjourned he continued the council, working chiefly for 
disarmament but also fighting any and all aspects of militarism, 
Libby's group maintained offices in Washington, where a small 
number of enthusiastic workers tackled the job of peace. The 
NCPW in 1927 had a budget of $113,040, raised mostly by the in- 
defatigable Mr. Libby. 83 In January of that year the NCPW sent 
out more than 430,000 pieces of antiwar literature. 84 

A close second to the NCPW in propagandizing for peace was 
the American Branch of the Women's International League for 

Resisters' International (United States Committee), Women's International 
League for Peace and Freedom (6,000), Women's Peace Society (s,ooo), 
Women's Peace Union of the Western Hemisphere, World Peace Association, 
World Peace Mission (58). Doubtless there were other national radical peace 

32. The Swarthmore College Peace Collection, with its unrivaled facilities 
for such research, remains largely unexploited. 

33. Receipts of the NCPW: 1923, 151,552; 1924* $5 6 6 *4; *9*5> l^37 8 ? 
1926, $77,011, In 1928 there were 12 secretaries and 18 office workers, "Report 
of the Executive Secretary of the NCPW at its Annual Meeting, October 16, 
1928," NCPW files, SCPC. 

34. Miss Mary Winder to C. Altschel, Feb. 34, 1927, NCPW files, SCPC. 


Peace and Freedom. Jane Addams, as mentioned before, was the 
guiding light of the International, and Miss Addams kept a close 
connection with the American branch through her good friend 
(and president of the branch) Miss Emily Balch. 35 The WILPF-US, 
because of Jane Addams' influence, tended strongly toward pac- 
ifism. It went so far as to issue to its membership small stickers, 
to be attached to income tax reports and bearing the legend: "That 
part of this income tax which is levied for preparation for War is 
paid only under Protest and Duress." 86 But although a certain 
amount of the activity of the WILPF-US was rather trivial in im- 
portance such as discussing girls' rifle teams in colleges and in- 
vestigating militaristic tendencies among the Boy Scouts S7 never- 
theless the several thousand members of the WILPF-US battled 
hard and effectively for their conviction that war should not come 
again to the United States. They fondly remembered the words of 
Jeanette Rankin, who during the fateful roll call in the House of 
Representatives, April 6, 1917, had cried: "I want to stand by my 
country but I cannot vote for war!" 

As the WILPF-US was dominated by Jane Addams and the 
NCPW by Frederick J. Libby, so the National Committee on the 
Cause and Cure of War was the creation of Mrs. Carrie Chapman 
Catt. A feminist of renown, Mrs. Catt had watched the Eighteenth 
and Nineteenth 38 Amendments take away the raison d'etre of 
much of her public life. Like many other feminists Mrs. Catt began 
casting about for a new issue, and in 192 1 she found it. In a speech 
before the League of Women Voters in Cleveland she put aside the 
text she had planned to use and instead announced a campaign 
against war. Closing her emotion-filled speech that afternoon, she 
threw out a challenge to her listeners: "The women in this room 
can do this thing! The women in this room can do this thing!" 

35. Miss Balch in 1946 received the Nobel Peace Prize. Jane Addams, in 
1931, had shared the prize with Nicholas Murray Butler. 

36. Jane Addams MSS, deposited in SCPC. 

37. The WILPF-US national board discussed these matters at its meeting 
in Philadelphia, June 9, 1927. Minutes of the national board, WILPF-US files, 

38. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United States or by any States on account of sex." 


For a few years Mrs. Catt sought to do this thing through 
the already existing organization, the WILPF. Somehow she came 
into disagreement with Jane Addams. Mrs. Catt then undertook to 
found her own organization, and there arose the National Com- 
mittee on the Cause and Cure of War, a grand federation for peace 
of nine national women's organizations. 

With this as her stage the indomitable lady set out on her cam- 
paign against war in the same militant manner in which she had 
fought for women's rights. That she would be in some measure suc- 
cessful was hardly matter for doubt. In the twenties women no 
longer heard the raucous antisuffrage cry of "Go home and wash 
the dishes!" The ladies now constituted one half of the electorate. 
They were saying: "Go out and abolish war!" Legislators in Wash- 
ington were excessively sensitive to all women's movements pur- 
porting to represent the new female vote: it was not yet understood 
that equal suffrage would make no noticeable difference in the 
American political balance. 

Radical peace work however was by no means confined to ex- 
suffragists like Mrs* Catt, or to social workers like Jane Addams, or 
to former ministers like Frederick J. Libby. The radicals had in 
their very midst a wealthy corporation lawyer, who had dedicated 
his life to getting rid of war. 

Chapter Three: SALMON o. LEVINSON 


O. Levinson of Chicago, Illinois, had in 
the years before 1914 made a fortune reorganizing decrepit busi- 
ness ventures, but never had given much thought to international 
affairs until he observed at the beginning of the war that the battles 
in Europe were affecting the stock market. 1 From this perception 
of truth he quickly went on to solving problems arising out of the 
war, and by 1918, after American entry into the European conflict, 
Levinson had evolved a plan to "outlaw," i.e., to make illegal, all 
wars. "There was stimulus indeed, there was a kind of inspiration 
in coming in contact with his abounding energy, which sur- 
passed that of any .single person I have ever known . . ."later wrote 
the philosopher John Dewey. 2 A go-getter of the expert sort, the 
stocky Levinson set to work with the greatest determination. Out 
of a dinner party in his Chicago home, December 9, 1921, there 
arose the American Committee for the Outlawry of War. 

Having organized his committee, Levinson drew up a formal 
statement, "A Plan to Outlaw War." This he printed in time to cir- 
cularize all 1,100 members of the Washington Disarmament Con- 
ference, and also sundry other people from the president of the 

1. John E. Stoner, S. O. Levinson and the Pact of Paris: A Study in the 
Techniques of Influence (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 12. 
Professor Stoner has written a definitive account of Salmon O. Levinson's 
influence upon the Kellogg pact. 

2. John Dewey, foreword to J. Stoner, Levinson, p. vii. 



United States and his Cabinet down through the hierarchy at 
Washington, and then out into the grass roots by way of Senator 
Arthur Capper's mailing list. 3 All types of organizations received 
copies of the plan: the Anti-Saloon League, for example, obtained 
parcels of copies for distribution to interested members. Senator 
Borah of Idaho in January 1922 offered the plan for printing in 
the Congressional Record, and after that Levinson had copies 
printed by the Government Printing Office. 4 

He enlisted prominent people in his cause, including in addi- 
tion to John Dewey the Reverend John Haynes Holmes, the paci- 
fist minister of New York's Community Church, and Dr. Charles 
Clayton Morrison, the influential editor of the Christian Century. 
Colonel Raymond Robins, the wartime head of American Red 
Cross activities in Russia and a stalwart crusader for innumerable 
reforms, also took outlawry to his heart and made it his special 

These men who gathered around Salmon O, Levinson were, 
each in his own sphere, powerful advocates of outlawry, or as they 
wrote among themselves, Outlawry. In the pages of the New Re- 
public Dewey scattered philosophic essays on outlawing war; if 
people did not think in terms of war, there might be no war, 
thought America's most famous philosopher. John Haynes Holmes 
advocated Outlawry in the pages of his religious weekly, Unity, 
and preached Outlawry to his congregation. Charles Clayton Mor- 
rison, editing perhaps the foremost religious magazine in America, 
never failed to break a lance for outlawing war and in the spring 
of 1927 was at work on a book which would contain the very essence 
of Levinson's proposal. 

But the greatest power for Outlawry was Colonel Robins, a 
self-made man who began life as a coal digger in Kentucky but soon 
migrated to the Yukon where he dug in quantity a more precious 
mineral. Financially independent, he thereafter employed himself 
with vast effectiveness at all sorts of reforming and social better- 
ment. His speeches, permeated with Biblical phraseology and mil- 

3- Ca PP er senator from Kansas, was publisher of numerous farm journals. 
See below, p. 117. 

4. J. Stoner, Levinson^ pp. 72-73. 


lennial aspiration, frequently raised audiences to near-ecstatic 
heights. Every time the colonel went out on a circuit for Outlawry 
he left a trail of resolutions behind him, and enthusiastic converts 
inundated Levirison's private secretary in Chicago with requests 
for leaflets and other explanatory material. 

A wavering convert to Outlawry was Senator William E. Borah 
of Idaho. Borah's relationship to Outlawry was a most interesting 
one, perhaps because the leonine Idahoan was himself a most in- 
teresting person. William E. Borah had never been outside the 
United States, but by seniority he succeeded to the chairmanship of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, vacated in 1924 by 
the death of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. The Idaho senator 
was a most attractive public figure, especially in the Senate 
chamber. Unlike some of his less engaging confreres, who emptied 
seats as soon as they arose to speak, Borah packed the floor and 
galleries every time. The mere whisper that "Borah is speaking" 
would start crowds of people stampeding toward Capitol Hill. The 
lion of Idaho nevertheless always seemed to touch every question 
and come to grips with none. He never appeared able to transform 
his "attractive provincial insurgency/' 5 his so engagingly * 'pro- 
gressive" outlook, into any sort of coherent national policy, much 
less international concept. Unwilling to promote any peace scheme 
which rested ultimately on physical force, the senator began to 
be accused of obstructionism, of having no program at all except 
being "agin" everything. He became famous for his contrariness. 
One day President Coolidge saw Borah clopping along on horse- 
back. In his best Vermont twang the president commented to some 
intimates sitting on the White House porch: "Well, there is Sen- 
ator Borah riding on a horse, and they are both going the same 
way!" 6 On February 13, 1923, however, after much backing and 
filling, Borah introduced a resolution into the Senate proposing 
the outlawry of war, codification of international law, and creation 
of a world court with "affirmative" jurisdiction. 7 

5. Walter Lippmann, Men of Destiny (New York, Macmillan, 1937), p, 144. 

6. James E. Watson, As I Knew Them (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1936) 
P- *37- 

7. Apparently Borah introduced his resolution partly to counter President 


These three points, Outlawry, Code, and Court, were the com- 
plete Levinson program. 

The first step was to delegalize war, to make a warring nation 
an international outlaw. Levinson talked and wrote incessantly 
about the legal status of war in international law, forgetting that 
war in international law generally was considered neither legal nor 
illegal, but rather nonlegal: although nearly half the law of nations 
dealt with rules of warfare, war itself was not in any way recog- 
nized as legal but as a contingency to be provided against, similar 
to earthquakes and floods in municipal law. 8 Nevertheless, if war 
was nonlegal it was still possible to declare it illegal, and this was 
the heart of Levinson's program. But by declaring all wars illegal 
Levinson did not propose to abolish the right of self-defense. This 
right he held was a kind of police action, really not war at all. In 
advocating Outlawry the Chicago lawyer, turned peacemaker, did 
not often mention his reservation of self-defense; this qualification 
appeared in his expositions only casually or when opponents pinned 
him down. 

As for codification of international law, Levinson thought an 
international conference could produce a code in two years, maybe 
three. The code, he affirmed, should be "comprehensive and the 
wisdom of the ages should be distilled and all good things that 
have been developed in international law should be preserved and 
the evil cast out." 10 Once completed the code would be submitted 
"to each civilized nation and be by it approved. As each of such 
nations will participate in the preparation of the code, general 

Holding's proposal, made a few days later, that the United States join the 
World Court. 

8. Professor Quincy Wright of the University of Chicago examined the 
writings of twenty-two authorities on international law and found that nine- 
teen considered war nonlegal. "Changes in the Conception of War/' American 
Journal of International Law, x8 (1924), 757, n. 15. 

9. He never would have called the right of self-defense a reservation. 
Levinson would have argued that self-defense, not being war but rather a 
police action, did not have anything to do with Outlawry of war. 

10. Levinson to Frances Keller, Mar. 33, 19*3, in J. Stoner, Levinson, 
pp. 100-101. 


harmony may be expected." u And once the world outlawed war 
and codified international law a world court not the World Court, 
for that was all mixed up with the League would almost auto- 
matically begin supervising the rule of law in international rela- 

Most efforts of the American Committee for the Outlawry of 
War went into preaching the first step, Outlawry, from which the 
other two would come as day followed night. The Outlawrists 
sought to inject their program into politics by the Borah Resolu- 
tion of February 19253 and its subsequent renewals. They also at- 
tempted to commit presidential candidates, but with disappointing 
results. From Harding in 1920 came a master "bloviatiori," 12 which 
must be read to be believed: "I have a very clear idea of what I 
think we can do and should do in working out an international 
agreement, but as a candidate of a party I do not want to make my 
plan an issue in a campaign which I am waging upon the theory 
that international agreements ought to be made a concerted agree- 
ment of the executive and the congress." 1S Coolidge in 1934 wrote 
a letter to Colonel Robins which almost matched that of Harding: 
"I trust that our country is in theoretical harmony with the posi- 
tion you are striving to reach. It is exceedingly difficult, in fact 
almost impossible, to get any consideration of international ques- 
tions in Washington at the present time. It would be especially so 
just before the Presidential election. Some of the things that you 
mention I am trying to do, in so far as I can find them practica- 
ble." 14 But the Outlawrists persevered. 

When the famous English peace leader, Lord Robert Cecil, 
came to America in the spring of 1923 Levinson cornered him in 
Chicago and talked Outlawry so hard that he gave Cecil a head- 
ache. 15 Other Englishmen likewise began to hear about the program 

11. From a commentary on Outlawry by Levinson, printed in Senate Docu- 
ment No. 115, 67th Cong., sd Sess., quoted by J. Stoner, Levinson, p. goo. 

is. Adept at coining new words, Harding liked to describe his campaign 
oratory and statement-making as the art of "bloviation." 

13. Harding to Levinson, Sept. 20, 1930, in J. Stoner, Levinson, p. 55. 

14. Coolidge to Raymond Robins, Nov. 13, 1923, ibid., p. 124. 

15. Cecil in the summer of 1933 nevertheless told Judge Florence E. Allen 


to outlaw war, men such as Gilbert Murray, the Oxford professor, 
J. L. Garvin, editor of the London Observer, Philip Kerr, Lloyd 
George's former secretary and later Lord Lothian, and Arthur Pon- 
sonby, a leading Labor M.P. 

In America S. O. (Sol) Levinson never failed to buttonhole as 
many influential people as he could, but he had better success cul- 
tivating the grass roots. Outlawry held great attraction for churches 
and women's clubs. The former were against the "war system" as 
a matter of principle, the latter, too. The incomparable Colonel 
Robins, crusader extraordinary, had an unerring eye for the 
churches and the ladies when he passionately declaimed: "Hu- 
manity is not helpless* This is God's world! We can outlaw this 
war system just as we outlawed slavery and the saloon." 10 

Such were the activities of the American Committee for the 
Outlawry of War, 

Certainly the very heart of Outlawry that war was a crime 
was not a new idea. Andrew Carnegie in 1910, in his letter to the 
proposed trustees of his Endowment for International Peace, had 
described war as a crime. Moreover, one of the basic ideas of the 
wartime League to Enforce Peace was the criminality of war. 
Levinson's contribution was to take the current idea of criminality 
and affix to it a new word: Outlawry. The Chicago lawyer per- 
sonally spent over f 1 5,000 a year to spread the gospel of Outlawry. 17 
If the other parts of the gospel- Code and Court did not enter 

of Ohio that he intended to get Outlawry into the Pact of Mutual Assistance 
then being drafted at Geneva (the statement that aggressive war was a crime 
got into Article i; there were, incidentally, similar terms in the preamble to 
the 19514 Geneva Protocol). Allen to Levinson, Sept. 25, 1923, in J. Stoner, 
Levinson, p. 112. 

16. Raymond Robins, "The Outlawry of War- The Next Step in Civiliza- 
tion," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science t JTSO 
(July 1925), 154. 

17. Professor John E. Stoner estimates that Levinson paid 95 per cent of the 
bills of the American Committee for the Outlawry of War. J. Stoner, Lewnson, 
p. 70. Professor Stoner once asked Levinson about the costs of Outlawry, but 
Levinson refused to tell how much he had spent. 


the public consciousness, surely the idea of outlawing war became 
common in American thought. 18 

Thus during the twenties one sees the Western world search- 
ing for peace. Private citizens, especially in the United States, en- 
thusiastically sought ways to peace. In the United States various 
programs the League of Nations, disarmament, the World Court, 
Outlawry all had advocates. 

What, meanwhile, were the world's diplomats, the professional 
peacemakers, themselves doing about the problem of peace? Were 
they attacking it with vigor and determination? Or were they talk- 
ing rather than doing? 

To the less obvious activities of the diplomats, paralleling the 
peace campaigning of the citizen advocates, we now must turn. 

18. Of the 22,165 plans submitted for the Bok Award, most of them de- 
sired to outlaw war, and perhaps one third of the plans used the phrase. 
Esther Everett Lape, ed., Ways to Peace (New York, 1924), p. 30. 

Chapter lour: THE SEARCH 


the insistence of President Woodrow Wilson 
the victorious Allies after the 1918 Armistice made provision in 
the Versailles treaty for a new organization of the nations, "to 
promote international cooperation and to achieve international 
peace and security." No longer, thought Wilson, should war be 
necessary to resolve great differences between nations; instead, 
statesmen would assemble at Geneva and amicably talk over and 
peacefully settle their differences. Article 19 of the League Cove- 
nant made express provision for this: "The [League] Assembly 
may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of 
the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the 
consideration of international conditions whose continuance might 
endanger the peace of the world/' When statesmen on June 28, 
1919, signed the Versailles treaty, which included the League Cove- 
nant, it was not then evident that the Covenant's Article 19 would 
be neglected in practice, and that the League consequently would 
prove incapable of establishing conditions necessary for lasting 
peace. In 1919 the future was unknown but hopeful; and few per- 
sons would have predicted that twenty-six years later the world 
again would meet vainly this time at San Francisco hoping to 
"save succeeding generations from the scourge of war/' x 

i. The preamble to the United Nations Charter begins: "We the peoples 
of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the 


In addition to Article 19, providing for "peaceful change/' the 
Covenant contained elaborate provisions for preventing resort to 
war. There were only two "gaps" permitting war, both of these in 
Article 15. According to this article nations could fight if the 
League Council failed to reach a unanimous report over a dispute 
brought before it, parties to the dispute not permitted to vote in 
the Council or in the Assembly. War also could result from dis- 
putes declared to be matters of domestic jurisdiction. To close 
these gaps was one of the chief preoccupations of postwar European 
diplomacy. Their existence, however, offered reassurance to all 
nations jealous of their sovereignty. As British Foreign Secretary 
Sir Austen Chamberlain once said, there must needs, be openings 
in every building giving power to breathe, and passages giving 
power to move. 2 

The League of Nations itself thus was hardly an institution 
which could abridge American sovereignty. But the League's op- 
ponents in the United States soon caricatured it as such. As ex- 
Senator Albert J. Beveridge wrote to ex-President Theodore Roose- 
velt, President Wilson had "hoisted the motley flag of international- 
ism. Thank God that he has. That makes the issue, does it not? 
Straight Americanism for us." 8 The Republicans' arch-strategist, 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, wrote Beveridge that it would be a 
mistake to admit that the League was a good thing, but "we should 
[also] make a mistake if we met the proposition with a flat denial. 
The purpose of the League that is, the preservation of world 
peace we are all anxious to see, but what we oppose is the 
method." * 

scourge of war . . ." It is interesting that the word "war," a common word 
in the Covenant of the League of Nations, occurs only twice in the United 
Nations Charter once in the preamble, and once in Article 77 in the phrase 
"Second World War/' The Charter employs euphemisms such as "armed 
attack" and "breach of the peace." 

s. League of Nations, Records of the Eighth Ordinary Session of the As- 
sembly, Plenary Meetings, Text of the Debates (Geneva, 1927), p. 99. 

g, Beveridge to Roosevelt, July 14, 1918, in Claude G. Bowers, Beveridge 
and the Progressive Era (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1932), p. 498. 

4. "Now the strength of our position is to show up the impossibility of 
any of the methods proposed and invite them, when they desire our support, 


When the United States Senate failed to advise and consent 
to the Treaty of Versailles there was great surprise and disappoint- 
ment among the erstwhile European Associates. The "heart of 
the world" was broken. It was simply impossible adequately to 
explain Woodrow Wilson's failure at home to the peoples and 
governments of Europe. They could not grasp the exigencies of 
the American political system. 

Nor could they understand why the United States Govern- 
ment took a firm stand after funding the Allied war debts 
radically down to a capacity to pay in expecting them eventually 
to be paid according to agreement. There was of course no real 
reason why the European governments should have expected to 
go scot-free from paying the war debts, for a good proportion of 
the debts 5 consisted of postwar loans "pump primers/' to use a 
later terminology for starting the European economies on their 
way again. There was truth in the statement of Secretary of the 
Treasury Andrew W. Mellon in a letter of March 15, 1927, to 
President John Grier Hibben of Princeton, that "these were loans 
and not contributions and though not in form in actual effect loans 
from individual American citizens rather than contributions from 
the Treasury of the United States. . . . What we allowed our as- 
sociates to do, in effect, was to borrow money in our investment 
market, but since their credit was not as good as ours, to borrow on 
the credit of the United States rather than on their own/* 6 

The European nations did not see things this way, and only after 

to produce their terms. They cannot do it. My own judgment is that the 
whole thing will break up in conference. There may be some vague declara- 
tions of the beauties of peace . . ." Lodge to Beveridge, December 3, 1918, in 
C. Bowers, Beveridge, p. 500. 

5- $3>273>364>3 2 4-7 of a total of 110,350,479,074.70. Americans gave to 
Europe through the Red Cross 1978,512,225. Congress also appropriated $100,- 
000,000 for European relief, Senator S. P. Spencer, in the Congressional Record, 
Mar. 4, 1921, estimated $490,000,000 (one-half of the Red Cross total) was 
contributed through other channels. See Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic 
History of the United States, pp. 704 ff. 

6. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1927 
(3 vols., Washington, 1942), II, 733-734. This and other volumes of the series 
hereafter cited as FR. 


much bad feeling and mutual recrimination did they enter into 
refunding arrangements reducing greatly the amount of the debts 
and looking toward ultimate payment and extinction of these 
obligations. Even then they vowed among themselves that they 
would pay the United States not a cent more than they extracted 
from Germany in reparations* 7 

With the advantage of hindsight, one must conclude that it 
would have been better had the United States canceled and for- 
gotten the debts, but the historian should realize that the igso's 
were before the days of Lend-Lease; during the twenties, and for 
many years before, good international faith (not to mention credit) 
demanded that a government pay, not repudiate, its debts, and it 
was under this then-prevailing custom that the United States asked 
for payment. Nevertheless the cry went up that the United States, 
by refusing debt cancellation, was refusing to bear its load in the 
organizing of the peace. "A bas 1'oncle Shylock" muttered French- 
men as the Chamber of Deputies in 1927 was still refusing to ratify 
the Mellon-B^ranger debt-funding agreement. Europeans bitterly 
accused the United States of intervening in the Great War only 
after the Germans interdicted American commerce, and then walk- 
ing out on Europe after the war was over, dumping all the enor- 
mous problems of organizing the peace into the laps of Europe's 
statesmen and then coolly demanding, from across the Atlantic, 
that Europe pay back even a part of the cost of the war which 
made the world safe for American commerce. 8 

If there was one question which poisoned international rela- 
tions almost as much as did the war debts, it was the question of 
"Who won the war?" The Americans thought they had won it. The 
French, having made the greatest human sacrifices, justly felt them- 
selves the real victors. Field Marshal Haig announced that the 

7. Only much later did it become evident that the United States, in the 
postwar era, actually lent Germany more money than the latter paid out in 

8. It is important to note that the United States after the World War was 
the only real creditor nation. Although Great Britain had more wartime 
credits than debts, the balance was in defaulted loans to Russia. Other Euro- 
pean nations were debtors for varying sums. Hence there arose the age-old 
spectacle of the debtors combining against the creditor. 


British had won the war. Soon the question degenerated into a 
disgraceful argument. In America the Socialist Victor L. Berger 
declared that all the United States received from the war was the 
flu and prohibition. Many of his countrymen readily agreed. Rud- 
yard Kipling, once the idol of the American reading public, sneered 
at the American war effort and compared the United States to 
the laborer who came at the eleventh hour to the vineyard and 
demanded a full day's wages. Quite a few Americans soon concluded 
that the United States had been wasting beneficence on ingrates. 9 
The European attitude toward the war debts and toward the in- 
dispensable American war effort disillusioned many an American 
who had at first advocated Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations; 
it helped reconcile him to the Senate's rejection of the Covenant. 

One matter at all events was beyond all debate: the war had 
been very costly, both in human lives and in physical resources. The 
physical cost was immense. For years afterward, until the second 
World War made such older calculations wearisome, publicists 
impressed upon the popular mind the number of houses or li- 
braries or colleges or hospitals which could have been purchased 
for the cost of the World War. The human waste was incalculable. 
The fighting had killed ten million men outright one life for 
every ten seconds of the war's duration. No figures could tell the 
cost in stunted and deformed bodies and in dilapidated minds. 10 
Not without some justification, many persons after the war began 
to believe with Norman Angell that the hope of conspicuous na- 
tional gain out of war was the Great Illusion. 11 


The American people, like their European brothers, wanted 
peace after the World War, and a very vocal segment of the Ameri- 
can people wanted peace through American membership in the 
League of Nations. The Harding Administration, however, came 

9. Preston W. Slosson, The Great Crusade and After, p. 295. 

10. Merle Curti, Peace or War: The American Struggle 1636-1:936 (New 
York, 1936), p. 269. 

11. Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (London, 1910). 


into office after a confused electoral campaign 12 and chose to in- 
terpret its mandate to mean abstention from the League. But to 
mollify the powerful bloc of pro-Leaguers within the Republican 
party the new administration had to do something concrete in the 
way of perpetuating the peace of the world, and this exigency 
helped pave the way to the Washington Naval Disarmament Con- 
ference of 1921-22. 

The conference concerned itself primarily with peace in the 
Far East, and its basic achievement was to interrupt the naval race 
then in progress between the United States and Japan. After the 
World War the American Government had resumed its naval pro- 
gram of 1916, in abeyance during the war in order to permit con- 
centration on destroyers and other weapons against submarines. 
Between 1918 and 1921 it laid keels for all the capital ships author- 
ized in the Act of 1916. By 1921 the British Government had not 
actually taken up the challenge, but the Japanese had: the Japanese 
in that year spent one third of their national budget on their navy. 
Perhaps if America had continued to build, the Japanese would 
soon have had to call a halt because of prohibitive costs, but in 
1921-22 it seemed better economy to come to an agreement. Un- 
fortunately the 5-5-3 ratio established by the conference gave the 
Japanese Navy supremacy in the far Pacific to the world's later 

In so far as concerned the future peace of the world, rather than 
the immediate peace in the Pacific and the Far East, the Washing- 
ton conference probably did more harm than good, for among 
other reasons it recognized the Italian Government's claim to 
naval parity with France. This action deeply wounded the latter 
state's pride, made impossible the extension of the ratio of 5-5-3- 
1.7-1.7 to cruisers and auxiliary craft, and especially exacerbated 
Franco-American relations for the French maintained that the 
Americans did not understand France's Mediterranean position. 

is. The presidential campaign of 1930 hardly was a "solemn referendum" 
(as Wilson had proposed) for the League. The Democratic candidate, Gov- 
ernor James M. Cox, advocated the League. The Republican candidate, Sena- 
tor Harding, came out for "an association of nations"; some of his followers 
claimed that this meant the League, and some argued that it didn't. 



The ruffled pride of France took years to soothe, and it had fre- 
quent unfortunate manifestations in later French diplomacy. 13 

After the Washington Disarmament Conference the United 
States did offer to join the Permanent Court of International Jus- 
tice, the juridical organ of the League. Here was an immediate goal 
for American peace advocates, and here was something which the 
new Republican Administration might do to please them and keep 
their votes. Shortly after Senator William E. Borah in February 
19 2g perfunctorily introduced his resolution looking toward the 
universal Outlawry of war, the Harding Administration came out 
for adherence to the protocol of the World Court, Because the 
Court functioned on the basis of a protocol separate from the Ver- 
sailles treaty, and dealt only with "legal" not "political" questions, 
it seemed safe to join. Secretary of State Hughes, together with all 
the proponents of American entry into the League, zealously and 
sincerely espoused the Court and American participation therein. 
The World Court probably had enough friends in the Senate to 
secure American adherence. But the isolationists, as the anti-League 
forces were coming to be known, managed to seize upon the Court's 
right, as defined in its protocol, to render advisory opinions to the 
League Council, and succeeded in placing the following reserva- 
tion in the Senate's advice and consent of January 27, 1926: 
". , . nor shall it [the Court], without the consent of the United 
States, entertain any request for an advisory opinion touching any 
dispute or question in which the United States has or claims an 
interest." American adherence with this reservation proved un- 
acceptable to the forty-eight states signatoty to the Court protocol, 
and at the end of the 1920'$ the question of the World Court still 
was frustrated. Even this modest hope of American supporters of 
the League proved incapable of realization throughout the entire 
interwar period. 

It had taken nearly three years from 1923 to 1926 for the 
Senate to receive, debate, and in the end virtually reject the World 
Court. During this ordeal it was only natural that government 
officialdom in Washington should become more and more chary 

13. See below, p. 68, 


of all projects for world peace. Neither the American people nor 
their representatives in Congress seemed capable of agreeing on 
any one peace program. That oracle of the politicians, Mr. John 
Q. Public, wanted peace with all his heart and soul; that was cer- 
tain. But just how this longing should be translated into a pro- 
gram of action was not evident, and in the face of indecision the 
Administrations of Presidents Harding and Coolidge therefore 
paused and waited. During the pausing and waiting proposals for 
peace received considerate but noncommittal official attention. 

Typical of the government's extreme timidity toward projects 
for international peace was the fear and trembling with which Presi- 
dent Coolidge's secretary, C. Bascom Slemp, received on January 
7, 1925, a communication from a Mrs. William E. Chamberlain, 
requesting that the president meet a delegation of women from the 
forthcoming Conference on the Cause and Cure of War. The gen- 
eral chairman of the conference was to be that indomitable female 
crusader, Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt Mrs. Catt's name appeared 
at the head of the list of Coolidge's proposed visitors. The presi- 
dent's secretary sent Mrs. Chamberlain's letter posthaste to the 
State Department for expert opinion. Secretary Hughes replied 
the same day that it would be difficult for the president to refuse 
to meet the distinguished delegation, and that it would be all right 
for Coolidge "to make some general observations with respect to 
his interest in the prevention of war. This might meet the exigency." 
Across the top of Hughes' letter to Slemp, recommending that the 
president receive the ladies, there then was scrawled the presidential 
decision: "Let 'em call." 14 They called, and that was that. 


Meanwhile statesmen in the Old World labored, amidst intense 
national rivalries, to perfect the organization of peace. The task in 
Europe was enormous. The French Government generally wished 
to hold the lid on German discontent, whereas the British Gov- 
ernment desired rapprochement, by means of concessions, with the 

14. Coolidge MSS, in the Library of Congress. 


new republican government in Germany. 16 To have nursed along 
the German Republic, giving sufficient concessions to satisfy with- 
out whetting hunger for more this would have been an exceed- 
ingly difficult endeavor. The forces of reaction in Germany always 
were strong, and concessions to the Republic might only have ac- 
crued, by a sudden change of government, to the Republic's ene- 
mies. To pursue the French policy of force, however, meant ulti- 
mately to push Germany into the arms of the other great revisionist 
power in Europe, Soviet Russia and this is what finally happened. 
The organisation de la paix after the first World War was one of 
the most difficult problems ever to face the world's statesmen ex- 
ceeded in difficulty only by the even greater task which has arisen 
so ominously after the second World War. 

For seven years after the Armistice of 1918 the German Govern- 
ment remained an outcast from the society of nations, and only 
in 1925, with the signing of the Locarno treaties, did Germany re- 
ceive a welcome back into the fold. Sir Austen Chamberlain in a 
sense was right when he described Locarno as the real dividing 
line between the years of war and the years of peace. 16 It was during 
these years after 1918 and prior to Locarno that there occurred the 
German currency inflation, followed by the defaulting of repara- 
tions payments and French occupation of the Ruhr Valley. Passive 
German resistance in the Ruhr broke down under the crippling 
effect of the Ruhr's detachment from the German economy; Chan- 
cellor Stresemann had to admit defeat. Yet the consequences to 
France were also severe, for mounting military costs of occupation 
brought on a financial crisis, and British displeasure at Premier 
Poincar's use of force against Germany nearly brought about a 

15. The basic Franco-British difference lay in their respective attitudes 
toward German power: Britain, farther away from Germany than France, 
advocated more armament for Germany than France was willing to concede. 
In attempting to resolve this basic conflict the two allies eventually defeated 
each other. For a good exposition of these rival policies see Arnold Wolfers, 
Britain and France between Two Wars: Conflicting Strategies of Peace since 
Versailles (New York, 1940). 

16. London Times, Oct. 24, 1935. Locarno made no distinction between 
Germany and France; theoretically, sanctions might have been applied to 


Franco-British diplomatic rupture. The next year, 1924, the Brit- 
ish Government took its revenge by refusing to sign the so-called 
Geneva Protocol an ambitious project for prohibiting war in 
Europe, closing by arbitration and conciliation the two gaps in the 
League Covenant's Article 15. 1T 

The Geneva Protocol remained for long afterward the darling 
of French diplomacy, the hope of all French statesmen. 18 Neverthe- 

17. The main provisions of the protocol were as follows: signatories might 
resort to war only in case of resistance to acts of aggression, or when acting in 
agreement with the League Council or Assembly; signatories bound themselves 
to sign the optional clause of the World Court; all disputes to be settled by 
judicial decision, arbitral award, or report of the Council; the World Court 
would decide whether or not disputes were matters of domestic jurisdiction; 
before or during proceedings for pacific settlement states would not increase 
their armaments or effectives in any way; "Every State which resorts to war 
in violation of the undertakings contained in the Covenant or in the present 
Protocol is an aggressor' 7 (Art. 10); sanctions, if ordered by the Council under 
the provisions of the protocol, were mandatory only in the degree which a 
state's "geographical position and its particular situation as regards arma- 
ments" allowed; signatories might deposit with the League secretariat, for regis- 
tration and publication, detailed military plans to go into effect in case of 
breach of the protocol; signatories undertook to participate in a disarmament 
conference; the protocol would come into force only when planned measures 
of disarmament had (i) been accepted and (2) carried out. For a convenient 
text, see International Conciliation, No. 205 (Dec 1924). 

18. It is quite doubtful however if the French demand for security could 
have been satisfied even with the Geneva Protocol. As Leon Blum once said, 
"If the Protocol were more than a mere matter of hope and regret, it would not 
satisfy us any more than all the rest [of the post-igiS treaties and agreements]." 
For the protocol would have bound a signatory state "to cooperate loyally and 
effectively in support of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and in re- 
sistance to any act of aggression, [only] in the degree to which its geographic 
position and its particular situation as regards armaments allow." (See above, 
note 17.) This hardly constituted an airtight promise of assistance. As Eduard 
Benes* complained, "Many states would require to know what military support 
they could count on." Austen Chamberlain in 1925 realized that the French 
would not accept the protocol as adequate solution for the problem of security 
unless the protocol were reinforced by a supplementary pact of military assist- 
ance. Knowing also that the British public would not support any military 
alliance, Chamberlain therefore suggested the more limited agreement con- 
cluded at Locarno. W. M. Jordan, Great Britain, France, and the German 
Problem; 1018-1939 (London, 1943)* P- * 8 - 


less half a loaf was better than none, and the group of treaties 
concluded at the little Swiss town of Locarno in the fall of 1935 
did apply the rejected protocol's principles at least to the Franco- 
German and Belgo-German frontiers. The German Government, 
persuaded by Gustav Stresemann who was now its foreign minister, 
freely" 19 signed the Locarno treaties, and peace-lovers through- 
out the world rejoiced at the end of Germany's diplomatic isola- 
tion from the West and forthcoming return to the League of Na- 


There quickly arose the "Locarno spirit." "The days after the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Locarno, and the admission of Germany 
to the League/' Stresemann later wrote to a friend, "were in some 
sort Sundays in the life of nations." 20 These were the golden days 
of the League. For years afterward men of peace took pleasure in 
recalling the manner in which Aristide Briand, the foreign minister 
of France, presided at an emergency meeting of the League Coun- 
cil in 1925 and by the sheer weight of the League's authority forced 
the squabbling governments of Greece and Bulgaria to halt a re- 
cently broken-out war. The men of peace, mesmerized by this dis- 
play of the League's authority, did not know that simultaneously 
Sir Austen Chamberlain called the Greek minister in London on to 
one of the numerous carpets in the Foreign Office and tendered him 
some "most urgent advice/' of a nature which quickly induced the 
Greek Government to change its attitude. 21 Nonetheless it was true 
that during the days after Locarno there existed a profound feeling 

19. As opposed to the Diktat of Versailles. 

20. To Dr. Gebhart-Opladen, Oct. 3, 1928, quoted in Eric Sutton, ed., 
Gustav Stresemann: His Diaries^ Letters and Papers (London, Macmillan, 

21. According to Cadamanos, the Greek minister, Sir Austen gave "most 
urgent advice" to withdraw the Greek forces. "Greece, Sir Austen added, was 
surrounded at this time by rivals rather than friends, and her disinterested 
friends and protectors were too far from the spot to give an effective support." 
In a dispatch immediately afterward to Athens, Gaclamanos called this a "grave 
warning." The Greek Government backed down immediately, and the Paris 
proceedings were in fact a mere ratification of Chamberlain's work. See 
Caclamanos's letter to the London Times, Mar. 19, 1937. 


of peace in Europe, a Sabbath in the life of nations, brought on by 
the Locarno spirit. 22 

In reality the Locarno treaties had some very bad effects on the 
peace of Europe. Firstly, they had the effect of grading frontiers in 
Europe into those which were guaranteed (the western frontiers of 
Germany) and those which were not guaranteed (namely, Ger- 
many's eastern frontiers). Sir James Headlam-Morley, the historical 
advisor of the British Foreign Office, put the case sharply when 
Britain was considering entering into the Locarno treaties. "We 
can, as is proposed," wrote Sir James, "give a guarantee against Ger- 
man aggression on the Rhine or through Belgium. But in the future 
the real danger may lie, not here, but rather on the eastern frontiers 
of Germany Danzig, Poland, Czechoslovakia for it is in these 
districts that the settlement of Paris would be, when the time came, 
most easily overthrown." 23 The Locarno treaties, with their classi- 
fication of frontiers in Europe, really opened as many, perhaps more, 
gaps in the structure of European peace than they closed. 

A second untoward result of Locarno was to reopen the disarma- 
ment question. It will be recalled that the Allies had justified Ger- 
man disarmament under the Versailles treaty as merely the first 
step in a general, all-around disarmament of the nations. 2 * The 
members of the League recognized in Article 8 of the Covenant 
"that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national 

2%. The Locarno spirit, even in the era of its greatest influence, did not 
convert all the sophisticates in European foreign offices. One day soon after 
conclusion of the Locarno treaties Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, then a 
member of the British Embassy in Paris, went to the Quai d'Orsay to urge a 
certain concession to Germany. He was to argue that this would be in keeping 
with the Locarno spirit. He saw Ren6 Massigli, at that time in an important 
position at the French Foreign Office. Massigli was not sympathetic to Huges- 
sen's approach. "Mon cher Hugessen," he said, "il y a trois choses, le Locarno 
spirit, 1'esprit de Locarno, et le Locarnogeist" Sir Hughe Knatchbull- 
Hugessen, Diplomat in Peace and War (London, J, Murray, 1949), pp. 52-53. 

23. J. W. Headlam-Morley, Studies in Diplomatic History (London, Me- 
thuen, 1930), p. 156. 

24. The preamble to Part V of the Versailles Treaty declared that Ger- 
many undertook to disarm "in order to render possible the initiation of a gen- 
eral limitation of the armaments of all nations." 


5 U 

armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and 
the enforcement by common action of international obligations." 
After the Locarno treaties and Germany's entrance into the League 
it was agreed that a Preparatory Commission, looking toward a 
future disarmament conference, should begin its labors. The com- 
mission labored hard. One of its officials, the Spanish publicist- 
diplomatist Salvador de Madariaga, later asserted that a subcommit- 
tee alone used 3,750,000 sheets of typescript, enough to permit the 
League's Polish or Swedish delegations to walk home on a path 
made of League paper. 25 The deliberations of the Preparatory 
Commission, to which, incidentally, the United States sent a dele- 
gation, brought into the open the difficult problem of Allied dis- 
armament vis-i-vis Germany's great industrial potential for war: 
Germany desired the erstwhile Allies to disarm, to reduce them- 
selves to a German par from which in some future contingency re- 
armament might begin again, to German advantage. The problem 
of disarmament was further complicated by an Anglo-French ri- 
valry: the British wished to disarm the French Army, and the 
French countered by requesting the disarmament of the Royal 

Disarmament, as the French persistently stated, was quite impos- 
sible until the nations had solved the question of security (presum- 
ably by resuscitating the Geneva Protocol). Without first meeting 
the problem of security the disarmament confabulations took on 
the color of unreality. The British Government during the twenties 
absolutely refused to consider reviving the protocol. Disarmament 
discussions might well have then relegated themselves to some 
limbo of the League's activities at Geneva had there not been a 
vociferous demand for disarmament from taxpayers and peace devo- 
tees the world over. As the Survey of American Foreign Relations 
for 1927 optimistically put it: "We may be confident that decrease 
in armaments is an indication of stability and peace; the level of 
armaments is a thermometer which all can read; every reduction 
means a waning of the war-fever, an approach to the reestablish- 

25. Alfred Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law; 19x8- 
(London, 1936; sd ed., 1939), P- 377- 


ment of health and peace.'* 26 And so the European statesmen, 
plagued by a thousand other difficulties of maintaining the peace, 
had also to meet a deafening demand for disarmament from mil- 
lions of their unrealistic fellow-countrymen. Organizing the Pre- 
paratory Commission, incident to Germany's signature of Locarno, 
did not advance the cause of peace. The futile disarmament discus- 
sions at Geneva poisoned European international relations. In such 
an atmosphere of distrust, ally versus ally, and Allies, versus Ger- 
many, the Locarno spirit soon withered and died. 

With this brief appreciation of the peace efforts and problems of 
governments in Europe and the United States during the period 
1 9 1 8-27, it is now perhaps advisable to observe closely a very special 
aspect of the diplomatic search for peace and security. For out 
of the French Republic's new postwar system of alliances, nego- 
tiated to maintain the peace of Europe, there eventually came the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact. 

26. Charles P. Rowland, Survey of American Foreign Relations: 1928 (New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1928), p. 499. 



Curing the years after the first World War the 
French Government maintained an army of impressive size and 
strength. This large standing army, Frenchmen avowed, was for 
their country's security. 

There were of course means other than arms, i.e., diplomatic 
means, for achieving securite. These the French experimented with, 
for what they were worth. At times there appeared a possibility of 
rapprochement with Germany. Then there always was the alternate 
hope of making the League of Nations in effect an alliance against 
any resurgence of German power. For a while it seemed that the 
Geneva Protocol might bring success. But the French never aban- 
doned the army as a means of security. In spite of loud international 
cries of militarism, and popular pleas for disarmament Frenchmen 
continued to stick to their guns. 

It should be emphasized here although this has already been 
remarked in the previous chapter that Frenchmen had every right 
thus to seek security for their country. It was one of the greatest 
tragedies of the interwar period that so many people, especially in 
Britain and America, statesmen as well as citizens, minimized the 
French need for security. Not until the terrible days of June 1940 
did Britishers and Americans really begin to appreciate France's 
plight her perilous situation in living beside a nation not only 
twice her size but a nation which, historically, was highly proficient 


in war. The French search for scurit was in every sense of the 
term a vital quest. Few people today will blame the French for 
maintaining a large army during the years after the first World 

Because a basic means of French security during the twenties 
and thirties was the army, it followed that the Republic of France 
should also have as many military allies as possible. Alliances would 
serve a double purpose. They would impress the neighboring 
German people with the number and strength of France's friends; 
and, secondly, if the Next War came the more allies the better. 
But, peace-lovers asked, and so did others during the twenties from 
quite different motives, were not alliances out of fashion in the 
post-i 91 8 world? Had not the terrible World War resulted from 
the evil competition of Triple Alliance and Triple Entente? Was 
not the balance of power an evil thing, ' 'forever discredited/' in 
Woodrow Wilson's words? In a sense these questionings were right. 
But in the postwar world, the balance of power, although dis- 
credited, could yet be made to serve French security if the balance 
could indeed be arranged against Germany. 

This more favorable shift in the balance of power French 
diplomacy set out to achieve. 

In many ways it was not an easy matter, after 1918, to create a 
new system of alliances. 

France's old prewar ally, Russia, labored with highly uncertain 
revolution. France's other principal ally, Britain, soon after the 
Armistice began to follow her own counsels; although British 
statesmen occasionally proclaimed the Anglo-French entente of 
1904 as still in effect, there were no more military "conversations" 
between the French and British General Staffs. A French attempt at 
Versailles to conclude a postwar "guarantee alliance" with the 
United States (and also Britain) failed to obtain the advice and 
consent of the American Senate. Although Britain actually ex- 
changed ratifications of her guarantee alliance with France, the 


British instrument contained a stipulation that it should not go 
into effect until ratification of the American alliance. 1 

As if the defection of Russia, the initial aloofness of Britain, and 
the apparent disinterest of the United States were not enough ob- 
stacles toward constructing a new system of alliances, the French in 
their desire for a postwar series of definite, unequivocal, and auto- 
matic defense agreements confronted also as we have seen a 
hostile public opinion. People in many countries had become con- 
vinced that alliances caused wars rather than prevented them; want- 
ing no more war, they likewise wanted no more alliances. 

People with a fervor almost equaling their ignorance of inter- 
national relations especially condemned secret diplomacy an es- 
sential adjunct of most alliance-making because of the necessary 
secrecy of prearranged military plans. Postwar public opinion con- 
sidered secret diplomacy undemocratic. The first World War had 
been fought, President Woodrow Wilson had said, to make the 
world safe for democracy. Wilson had voiced a popular mood in 
the very first of his Fourteen Points: 2 "Open covenants of peace 
openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international 
understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always 
frankly and in the public view." 3 

1. For the ill-fated guarantee treaties, see J. Paul Selsam, The Attempts To 
Form an Anglo-French Alliance: i$i$-i$24 (Philadelphia, 1936). 

2. Enunciated after the Russian Bolshevik Government's untimely pub- 
lication of a number of Allied secret World War treaties. 

3. Wilson did not mean that all negotiation should be public. ". . . cer- 
tainly when I pronounced for open diplomacy," he wrote Secretary of State 
Robert Lansing, "I meant, not that there should be no private discussion of 
delicate matters, but that no secret agreements of any sort should be entered 
into, and that all international relations when fixed should be open, above- 
board, and explicit." Wilson to Lansing, Mar. 12, 1918, in David Hunter 
Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (2 vols., New York, G. P. Putnam's, 1928), 
I, 19 n. 

It is not generally realized that Colonel House, rather than Wilson himself, 
was directly responsible for inclusion of the "open covenants" declaration as 
Point i of the Fourteen Points. See Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers 
o/ Colonel House (4 vols., Boston and New York, 1956-28), III, 326. The House 
diary, presently in the House Collection at Yale and now open to historical 
students, indicates moreover that the colonel was a very ardent disciple of 


Wilsonian dislike of secret diplomacy found its way into the 
Covenant of the League of Nations. According to Article 18, "Every 
treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any 
Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Sec- 
retariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such 
treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so reg- 
istered." If this blunt declaration required any interpretation, it 
could be found in an official memorandum approved by the Council 
of the League of Nations during a meeting in Rome, May 19, 1920. 
Material to be registered in accordance with Article 18, the Council 
stipulated, "comprises not only every formal Treaty of whatsoever 
character and every International Convention, but also any other 
International Engagement or Act." 4 

It would seem perfectly clear from the first of Wilson's Four- 
teen Points, from the eighteenth article of the Covenant, and from 
the memorandum of May 1920 that old-style alliances, with their 
secret military provisions, no longer were possible among League 
members. Language itself could not be more explicit. 

Nor could language itself scarcely be more foolish. To ask the 
French nation to abide by such arbitrary and legalistic rules was to 
ask the impossible: idealists in Britain and the United States and 
realists in Germany and Italy actually were proposing to isolate 
France, to cut her off from any chance of military alliance. France 
should not, could not, and of course would not have submitted to 
such a proposition. Less than four months after the Council so 
strictly interpreted the registration provisions of Article 18, the 
governments of France and Belgium signed a secret military alli- 

Here was the first in the new, postwar system of French alliances. 
Its provisions were never registered with the League of Nations. An 
exchange of notes between the Belgian and French Governments, 

open diplomacy, perhaps more so than the president This is a point which 
needs investigation. 

4. "The Registration and Publication of Treaties as prescribed under 
Article 18 of the Covenant of the League of Nations: Memorandum Approved 
by the Council of the League of Nations, Meeting in Rome, on May 19, 1920." 
League of Nations, Treaty Series, i, 7-13. 


dated September 10 and 15, 1920, merely announced that the object 
o the two countries* "understanding" was to reinforce the guaran- 
tees of peace and security found in the Covenant. 5 Spokesmen for 
the two governments stated that, because of the technical character 
o the understanding, it would not be submitted to the Belgian and 
French parliaments. 6 Over ten years later, in 1931, Paul Hymans, 
then Belgian foreign minister, publicly admitted what everyone 
had known all along that the alliance contained military measures 
to be taken "in the event of common action being necessary . . . 
against an unprovoked attack by Germany." 7 No further details 
were ever revealed. 

Negotiation of the secret Franco-Belgian military understand- 
ing provoked a storm of indignation from liberals all over the 
Continent. Especially of course in Germany. At the League Assem- 
bly in the fall of 1920 there was much talk about the terms of the 
Covenant's Article 18. A committee of jurists was appointed to look 
into the matter. Several months later they diplomatically recom- 
mended a formula to the effect that purely technical or administra- 
tive instruments, not political in nature, defining or carrying into 
effect another instrument already registered, should be excepted 
from compulsory registration. 8 While the jurists were formulating 
their opinions the French Government, February 19, 1921, signed 
a second alliance, this time a "political agreement" with Poland. 

The Franco-Polish accord politiquej the text of which became 

5. The letters contained a covert reference to "the eventuality contem- 
plated by the present understanding." League of Nations, Treaty Series, 2, 

6. London Times, Sept. 3, 1920. 

7. New York Times, Mar. 5, 1931. The alliance underwent a change in 
1936 when Premier Paul van Zeeland announced in the Belgian parliament 
that the military agreement had been reduced to a simple arrangement for 
only military staff consultation. Ibid., Mar. 12, 1936. 

8. League of Nations, Records of the Second Assembly, II, Meetings of the 
Committees, I (Geneva, 1921), 169-170. Regarding the jurists' report, League 
Assembly subcommittee number five of the First Committee "unanimously 
concurred in the spirit of this suggestion, which, without affecting in any way 
the lofty aim underlying Article 18, is calculated greatly to facilitate its prac- 
tical application." Ibid., p. 169. 


public two and a half years later when it was registered with the 
League of Nations, consisted of several articles, some commercial 
and some political the latter calling for nothing more objection- 
able than consultation if "notwithstanding the sincerely peaceful 
views and intentions of the two Contracting States, either or both 
of them should be attacked without giving provocation." The two 
governments promised to take concerted measures for defense of 
their territory and protection of their legitimate interests. All con- 
certed measures were to be "within the limits specified in the 
preamble." The preamble was composed of rather uninteresting 
verbiage, and vaguely said something about Franco-Polish security 
and "common political and economic interests/* 9 Probably there 
was a secret military annex to this second French treaty, the Franco- 
Polish political agreement of 1921. The Polish Army at that time, 
we recall, was filled with French military advisors, the chief of 
whom, General Maxime Weygand, recently had saved Warsaw from 
the invading hordes of Bolshevist Russia. 

When the League of Nations assembled in the fall of 1921 
there occurred another debate on registering treaties. Viscount 
Cecil declared registration was "really a question of very great 
importance and one upon which . . . public opinion is very sensi- 
tive. . . . we have to consider, not only what we believe will be the 
operation of a particular provision, but what the public, looking at 
it, will think would be a fair provision." 10 Cecil seemed to be 
saying, diplomatically, that the public had to be pleased. Cecil's 
colleague, Lord Balfour, agreed that the subject of Article 18 was 
one of "very great difficulty and complexity," Balfour mentioned 
financial arrangements as coming within the category of treaties 
which often could not be published. Then he mentioned "other 
treaties, not of a financial character," i.e., the Franco-Belgian treaty 
of alliance. To register such a treaty, said Balfour with some irrita- 
tion, was "impossible, and cannot, and will not, be done." u The 

9. For the text of this treaty, see League of Nations, Treaty Series, 18, 11-13. 

10. League of Nations, Records of the Second Assembly, Plenary Meetings 
(Geneva, 1921), Oct. 5, 1921, p. 844. 

11. Ibid., pp. 847-848. 


Assembly duly passed a resolution deferring further debate on 
Article 1 8 for another year. 12 

So much for Article 18, registration of treaties, in the 1921 As- 
sembly of the League of Nations. The French were safely over that 
barrier. But there was another obstacle in the Covenant. A difficulty 
had arisen in connection with the casus foederis of the two new 
French alliances, the military understanding with Belgium, and the 
political agreement with Poland. Would not resort to war, in ac- 
cordance with the terms of the alliances, have to await execution of 
the complicated provisions of the Covenant's Article 15, which 
required a certain amount of time before quarreling states could 
maneuver themselves down to the Article's two gaps 1S that tacitly 
allowed for war? Would not the automatic, immediate nature of 
the new French alliances be frustrated when, after a breach of the 
Covenant, the Council in accordance with Article 15 debated and 
debated over whether or not there had been an act of unwarranted 
aggression, justifying measures of defense? As if to answer, the 
League Assembly in 1921 passed a resolution: "It is the duty of 

12. There was a curious situation in regard to this resolution. As originally 
proposed by Balfour, the resolution read as follows: "The Assembly, taking 
note of the proposal for the amendment of Article 18 contained in the report 
of Committee No. i [namely, for exception from registration of all agreements 
of a "purely technical or administrative nature"], decides to adjourn further 
consideration of this amendment until the third Assembly, it being understood 
that, in the meantime, Members of the League are at liberty to interpret their 
obligations under Article 18 in conformity with the proposed amendment." 
Italics inserted. The Assembly, before passing the Balfour resolution, divided it 
into two sections. The nonitalicized part passed unanimously. The italicized 
section passed by a vote of 28 for, 5 against. League of Nations, Records of 
the Second Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Oct. 5, 1921, pp. 851-852. Later the 
same day the vote on the second section was challenged on a point of order, 
and the president of the Assembly ruled that the second section had not passed, 
because resolutions, to pass, required unanimity. Nonetheless the second sec- 
tion was declared not to have been defeated by the Assembly for it obviously 
had received a majority vote. Vittorio Scialoja (Italy) in explaining this compli- 
cated situation implied that the Assembly had approved Balfour's second sec- 
tion, although the approval did not take the form of a resolution, Ibid., p. 

13. For which, see above, p. 39. 


each Member of the League to decide for itself whether a breach 
of the Covenant has been committed/' u 

The prime minister of Great Britain, Lloyd George, early in 
January 1922 offered France an alliance with Britain in case of 
"direct and unprovoked aggression against the soil of France by 
Germany." The French Government endeavored to extend the 
British offer to include cooperation in eastern Europe with 
France's ally Poland. Suddenly, however, as is the wont in French 
politics, the cabinet fell; and after the change of ministers the 
Franco-British alliance negotiations languished. 15 In the meantime 
the new republican government of Germany concluded at Rapallo 
an economic and political treaty with Soviet Russia which con- 
tained military implications. 16 

Of the making of alliances there thus was no end. When the 
League of Nations assembled again in September 1922 the First 
Committee reported on the problem of Article 18, registration of 
treaties* The rapporteur, C. T. Zahle of Denmark, informed the 
Assembly that Article 18 was one of the banners at the very top of 
the palace of the League of Nations and should not be hauled down, 
unless absolutely necessary. Zahle did not lower the banner. He 
asked a resolution again to postpone the question of Article 18. 
The resolution passed, unanimously. 17 A few days later in a flurry 

14. League of Nations, Records of the Second Assembly, Plenary Meetings, 
Sept. 27, 1921, p. 453. Italics inserted. 

15. J. P. Selsam, The Attempts To Form an Anglo-French Alliance. Lloyd 
George's proposed treaty had a time limit of ten years. It is interesting that 
this period approximately equaled the time which, according to rumor, the 
British General Staff considered as possessing the best prospects of peace a 
time during which the General Staff believed there would be no threat to the 
British position. In other words the British offered a treaty when they didn't 
think they would be called upon to honor it. 

16. The Russian delegation at the Genoa conference promptly denied 
specifically that there were any unpublished articles, or that the treaty had 
been accompanied by a secret military convention. Later events were to show 
however that Rapallo inaugurated a long period of German-Russian military 
cooperation, lasting unbroken until Hitler in January 1934 concluded a non- 
aggression pact with Poland. 

17. League of Nations, Records of the Third Assembly, Plenary Meetings 
(Geneva, 1922), Sept. 23, 1922, p. 281. 


of resolution making the Assembly decided that: "In the present 
state of the world many Governments would be unable to accept the 
responsibility for a serious reduction of armaments unless they 
received in exchange a satisfactory guarantee of the safety of their 
country. Such a guarantee can be found in a defensive agreement, 
which should be open to all countries, binding them to provide im- 
mediate and effective assistance in accordance with a prearranged 
plan in the event of one of them being attacked . . ." 18 

Here, indeed, was something new. States, no longer were being 
silently allowed to make alliances, but were even declared to be 
in special need of such alliances. The door of League approval, 
long so apparently shut, now was wide open. But the public of 
whom Lord Cecil had spoken, that public which was 'Very sensi- 
tive" to secret alliances, undoubtedly never noticed this remarkable 
League resolution. The resolution appeared within a long series of 
sixteen resolves. Permission having at long last been granted, the 
French Government, January 25, 1924, signed an outright "Treaty 
of Alliance and Friendship 1 ' with Czechoslovakia. 

According to "official statements," the Czech treaty contained 
no secret military clauses. 19 But their absence did not exclude an 
accompanying, although separate, military agreement. There were 
bitter comments in Germany when, March 18, 1924, the Berliner 

18. Ibid., Sept. 27, 1922, p. 291. Italics inserted. 

19. London Times, Jan. 26, 1924. The treaty \vas duly registered. It con- 
tained a preamble and eight articles. The preamble claimed the treaty was 
for the purpose of "certain mutual guarantees . . . indispensable for security 
against possible aggression and for the protection of their [the signatories'] 
common interests." Most of the articles called for consultation under various 
contingencies. Important were Articles 2 and 6: 

"Article 2. The High Contracting Parties shall agree together as to the 
measures to be adopted to safeguard their common interests in case the latter 
are threatened." 

"Article 6. In conformity with the principles laid down in the Covenant of 
the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree that if in future any 
dispute should arise between them which cannot be settled by friendly agree- 
ment and through diplomatic channels, they will submit such dispute either to 
the Permanent Court of International Justice or to such other arbitrator or 
arbitrators as they may select." 

For the complete text, see League of Nations, Treaty Series, 13, 163-169. 


Tageblatt published its alleged text. Foreign Minister Eduard 
Benes of Czechoslovakia is reported to have denounced this revela- 
tion as foolish and false and without foundation, 20 which perhaps 
it was. There was, of course, no available way of making certain. 

After the treaty of alliance and friendship with Czechoslovakia 
France found her energies occupied by what could have been the 
grandest alliance of all, the Geneva Protocol. 21 The protocol might 
have turned the League of Nations into an alliance against all re- 
visionist states. As has been seen in the previous chapter, France 
signed the watered-down Locarno agreements with reluctance. 
Notable among the several Locarno treaties, however, were two 
treaties of "mutual guarantee," between France and Poland and 
between France and Czechoslovakia. The two treaties were, mutatis 
mutandis^ identical. In case Poland or France (or Czechoslovakia or 
France) suffered from a failure to observe the undertakings of the 
Locarno treaties between them and Germany, and if "such a failure 
is. accompanied by an unprovoked recourse to arms," the casus 
foederis arose immediately. There were no detailed military pro- 
visions. 22 

Thus the years 192025 had witnessed some remarkable achieve- 
ments in France's quest for allies. Bravely, in the teeth of foreign 
public opinion, she had set up a new system of European alliances 
to compensate for the loss of her prewar ally, Russia, and the un- 
certain support of Great Britain and the United States. There was 
the secret military understanding with Belgium (1920), the political 
agreement with Poland (1921), the outright treaty of alliance and 
friendship with Czechoslovakia (1924), and two treaties of mutual 
guarantee with Czechoslovakia and Poland (1925). All but one of 
these instruments, it is important to note, bore pleasant, pacific- 
sounding titles, omitting the ominous word "alliance." Diplomats 
in the postwar years were adept at such verbal substitutions, which 
made their diplomacy more palatable to public opinion. To the un- 
initiated this new verbiage seemed like a basic change in the aims 

20. New York Times, Mar. 20, 1924. 

21. For a summary of the protocol's provisions, see above, p. 4711. 

22. For the treaties., see League of Nations, Treaty Series, 54, 353~357> 359- 



and methods of international relations, and came to be known, 
rather unappropriately, as the "new diplomacy." 

Conclusion o the mutual guarantee treaties of Locarno did 
not mark the end of French alliances in the postwar era. French- 
men, it has often been remarked, suffered from "pactomania." 
Observing their restless neighbors across the Rhine, they desired 
all the written assurances they could obtain. It therefore was an 
enormous piece of good fortune for France when in the spring of 
1935 a master of the art of diplomatic agreement, a Frenchman 
magnificently skilled in the verbal techniques of the new diplomacy, 
assumed control of the Quai d'Orsay. Once the Locarno ceremonies 
were out of the way the new French foreign minister, Aristide 
Briand, began anew the search for allies. 


Aristide Briand was a most striking personality. 

He was, first and foremost, a consummate politician. For years 
he had held portfolios of one sort or another in various French 
cabinets. Often nine times already he had possessed the premier- 
ship itself. Briand could conduct the most difficult of political nego- 
tiations with flawless perfection. He achieved, moreover, a great 
popular following in his capacity as a superb orator. He could 
charm League audiences for hours with the splendid vacuities of 
his peace speeches. 

There was another, considerably more interesting and much less 
public, side to Briand. This was Briand the individual, a grand 
character indeed. Paris gossip had it that he was a cynical, fast-living 
old bachelor. In appearance Briand stood of medium height, with 
broad, stooping shoulders, an untidy shock of graying hair crown- 
ing his massive head. "A heavy drooping moustache half hid a 
slightly crooked, full-lipped mouth, whose ugliness was redeemed 
by an enchanting smile that matched well the bright eyes dancing 
with an often slightly malicious wit." Sir Austen Chamberlain 
found him "indeed, incorrigibly witty . . . Tell me Briand's lat- 
est/ was the greeting with which Lord Balfour used to receive me 
on my return from my visits to Geneva . . ." 28 

23. Austen Chamberlain, Down the Years (London, Cassell, 1935), p. 180. 


This, then, was the charming, brilliant, capable, experienced, 
realistic old gentleman who, as foreign minister of France, took 
up the French post-Locarno quest for alliances. 

Briand noted that all the important countries bordering on 
German territory (Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia) already 
were allied with France against the Germans. Obviously, there was 
little value in making overtures to such military nonentities as 
Holland, Denmark, Switzerland, and Austria. Briand turned there- 
fore to the Balkans. 

The problem was to secure France's .southern flank, the French- 
Italian border along the Riviera, in the event of war with Germany. 
Ideally it would have been best to have made friends with Italy, 
but the Mussolini government was not especially to be trusted; it 
also had designs on French territory: Nice, Corsica, Tunis. There 
remained enlistment of some of the east European countries so that 
they, by threat of military action, would tie Italy down, keeping 
the Italian Army away from the French border in case of war. What 
nations should be chosen? Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugo- 
slavia, the so-called Little Entente, already united out of fear of 
Hungarian and Bulgarian revisionism, fearing also Italian ambi- 
tions in Albania and elsewhere, naturally tended to gravitate toward 
friendship with France. Czechoslovakia had already sealed her 
friendship by reason of her German frontier. There remained the 
two obvious candidates, Rumania and Yugoslavia. 

For purposes of his new Balkan courtship Briand decided that 
he required a new treaty formula. There was one at hand, offered, 
of all states, by the Kingdom of Siam, the neighbor of France's 
eastern colony of Indo-China. The Siamese Government in 1935 
had concluded arbitration treaties with several European nations: 
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark, and Sweden. Now 
no one in Europe in 1925 was thinking much about attacking 
Siam. Probably for that reason the Siamese arbitration treaties, 
contrary to usual European custom, had no loopholes no gaps at 
all. The treaty between Siam and France, for example, contained 
an unequivocal Article i : "There shall be constant peace and per- 
petual friendship between the French Republic and the Kingdom 
of Siam." Article 2 provided, albeit in several long, involved para- 
graphs, for settlement of all disputes whatsoever by pacific means. 


Although the treaty had many other articles they merely filled in 
the details of the important Articles i and 2. 24 

Briand lost little time, after Locarno, in negotiating his Balkan 
treaties. Rumania and France, June 10, 1926, signed a "treaty of 
friendship." The treaty's preamble declared for "fresh guarantees 
of peace, goodwill, and friendship." There were nine articles. 25 
Most interesting were Articles i and 2, which appeared as if they 
might have come from Siam: 

Article I. France and Rumania mutually undertake that they 
will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war 
against each other* . . . 

Article II. In view of the undertakings entered into in Ar- 
ticle I of the present Treaty, France and Rumania undertake to 
settle by peaceful means and in the manner laid down herein all 
questions of every kind which may arise between them and 
which it may not be possible to settle by the normal methods 
of diplomacy. . . , 26 

Simultaneously with the negotiation of this Franco-Rumanian 
treaty, Briand had sought a treaty with Yugoslavia. The French 
foreign minister and Momfilo Ninotf, the foreign minister of Yugo- 
slavia, initialed a new pact in the spring of 1926. Signature could 
occur at the request of either party; and in the meantime the 
initialed treaty although the text itself, as was to be expected, 
contained no specific military agreements did not have to be 
registered with the League of Nations. As. eventually signed and 
published the Yugoslav treaty, in the new Style of Siam, was identi- 
cal with the Rumanian treaty, mutatis mutandis, except that it was 
for five years instead of ten and bore the title "Treaty of Friendly 
Understanding." 27 

24. For the "Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation" between 
France and Siam, signed February 14, 1925, see League of Nations, Treaty 
Series, 43, 189-209. 

25. Also an annexed protocol in which Rumania disclaimed any intention 
of attacking Russia, 

26. League of Nations, Treaty Series, 5$, 225-231. 

27. For events surrounding signature of the Yugoslav treaty, see below, 
p. 125. The treaty's text is in Treaty Series, 68, 373-379. 


Such was the development and status of France's new system of 
alliances by the spring of 1927. These alliances could never have 
been made had Frenchmen taken seriously Wilson's declaration 
for "open covenants . . . openly arrived at." Even when this popu- 
larly acclaimed dictum had received legal expression in Article 18 
of the League Covenant, which called unequivocally for registration 
of all international agreements, the French realistically and right- 
fully, as we now see gave little attention to it and soon afterward 
concluded the first of their postwar alliances, an avowedly secret 
military understanding with Belgium. Confronted with a fait ac- 
compli, statesmen in the Assembly of the League of Nations, alive 
to the inevitability if not the necessity of French alliance-making, 
avoided express amendment of Article 18 but instead unobtrusively 
changed its meaning by passing compromising resolutions. Mean- 
while the French Government, skillfully using the unoffensive 
wording of the new diplomacy, continued to negotiate more po- 
litical agreements, treaties of friendship, and treaties of friendly 

Precisely in what manner, we may well inquire, were these new 
French alliances of the igso's in essence different from those of pre- 
war days? Surely the friends of France virtually surrounded Ger- 
many in 1927 as they had in 1914. Russia, of course, was out of the 
picture, but Poland had taken her place. England appeared disin- 
terested, 28 but then there was the new Czechoslovakia, an armed 
salient into the very heart of German territory. Although Italy 
acted noisily unfriendly, she was neutralized by the new Yugoslavia 
and the enlarged Rumania. Altogether, the alliance situation in the 
spring of 1927 looked rather favorable for France. 

Yet the search for security never ended. No Frenchman could 
ever be certain that his country had sufficient guarantees. 

Aristide Briand, in his capacity as French foreign minister, ever 
cognizant of the latent menace of a German rearmament, undoubt- 
edly asked himself again and again what more he could do to en- 
hance France's new system of alliances. 

28. Locarno, we recall, stipulated British armed support of cither France 
or Germany, whichever was victim of aggression. 




ne day in June 1926 Dr. Nicholas Murray But- 
ler, visiting in Paris, was congratulating Aristide Briand at the 
Quai d'Orsay on the steady and hopeful progress which he was 
making in the cause of international peace. 

"What could we do next?" Briand suddenly asked Butler. 

"My dear Briand/ 1 the president of Columbia replied, "I have 
just been reading a book. ... Its title is Vom Kriege, and its 
author was Karl von Clausewitz ... I came upon an extraor- 
dinary chapter in its third volume, entitled 'War as an Instrument 
of Policy/ x Why has not the time come for the civilized govern- 
ments of the world formally to renounce war as an instrument of 

"Would not that be wonderful if it were possible?" responded 
Briand. "I must read that book." 

Briand's reading of Clausewitz's Vom Kriege, Butler concluded 
many years later, was the origin of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 2 

Just how Dr. Butler arrived at this conclusion is obscure. There 
is not the least shred of evidence that the French foreign minister 
read the writings of a nineteenth-century German military theorist 
to learn how to conduct twentieth-century French diplomacy. 

1. Actually, "DerKrieg ist ein Instrument derPolitik" is Bk. VIII, chap, vi, 
sec B. 

2. Nicholas Murray Butler, Across the Busy Years, II, 202-203, 


Briand, moreover, never enjoyed a reputation for bookishness. He 
preferred to develop his ideas in conversation, or in extemporane- 
ous speechmaking, vis-a-vis, where he could carefully watch his 
auditors' response. According to a then current quip, Briand's su- 
perior, Premier Poincare, "read everything and understood noth- 
ing/' whereas the subtle and sensitive foreign minister "read noth- 
ing and understood everything." 

It is not impossible, however, that Briand, listening courteously 
to Dr. Butler's suggestion for renouncing war, recalled silently the 
new French postwar system of alliances. The very month he was 
conversing with Butler the foreign minister signed a pact of friend- 
ship with Rumania, and he had initialed another pact with Yugo- 
slavia. Would it not be wonderful, if it were possible, to make an 
alliance with the United States? 

Briand did not pursue the thought of renouncing war with the 
United States until several months later, early in 1927, when Pro- 
fessor James Thomson Shotwell arrived in Europe. 

Professor Shotwell in March 1927 served as Visiting Carnegie 
Professor of International Relations at the Hochschule f iir Politik 
in Berlin. 8 For his inaugural address he chose the challenging topic, 
"Are We at a Turning Point in the History of the World?" The 
address received the highest official attention. The German chancel- 
lor and his cabinet attended. The chief justice of Germany presided. 
Also present were members of the War Office staff, appearing so 
someone told Professor Shotwell for the first time after the war in 
a public assembly with all their wartime decorations. The main 
thesis of the inaugural address was that, in the complex and inter- 
related modern world, war no longer profited a nation: conse- 
quently the time had arrived when nations should abolish war as a 
means, of policy. 4 It is not recorded precisely what the reaction was 

3. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace had endowed two 
chairs at the Hochschule, one for a German historian and one for visiting 

4. James T. Shotwell, Lesson of the Last World War: A Brochure (New 
York, 1942), p. 12. 


to Professor Shotwell's startling thesis, but it would seem that to 
advocate the abolition of war in front o members of the German 
War Office staff, wearing all their wartime decorations, was an am- 
bitious performance. 

The American professor after his address at the Hochschule 
believed his thesis might be more welcome elsewhere, perhaps at 
Paris. He consequently journeyed to the French capital and with 
the help of his friend Albert Thomas, director of the International 
Labor Organization at Geneva, obtained an interview with Briand. 

Shotwell and Thomas on March 22, 1927, were ushered into the 
French foreign minister's office at the Quai d'Orsay. Professor Shot- 
well there stood face to face with Aristide Briand. Shotwell, trans- 
parently sincere, eager to promote the cause of international peace, 
fondly cherishing Andrew Carnegie's ringing injunction to "hasten 
the abolition of international war, the foulest blot upon our civili- 
zation/' Briand, one of the wisest French statesmen of his genera- 
tion, engrossed in the tragic quest for French security, unwearily 
searching for ways to increase the number of France's faithful allies 
in the not impossible event of the Next War. Briand probably 
smiled as he shook hands with his guest, the professor from the 
United States. 

Professor Shotwell found Briand depressed over the misunder- 
standing in the United States of what Americans called French 
militarism. 5 France had just refused an American invitation to a 
disarmament conference. President Coolidge recently had proposed 
a five-power naval disarmament conference to be held at Geneva in 
the early summer of 1927 and the French Government, still smart- 
ing over its treatment at the Washington conference * (where 
Briand, incidentally, had headed the French delegation), had not 
seen its way clear to enter another conference. "This naturally," 
Shotwell wrote later, "carried us over to the question of war re- 
nunciation, and I suggested that the best way for M, Briand to 
meet such suspicion of French militarism would be for him, in the 
name of France, to propose renunciation of war as an instrument of 

5. The following account is from Shotwell's Lesson of the Last World War, 

6. See above, pp. 43-44. 


national policy and that a treaty should be made along that line." 
Briand responded that all his efforts had been to that great end. He 
affirmed, however, that he was ready to proceed to a more definite 
statement, and it was agreed that he should address a letter to the 
American people on April 6, 1927, the tenth anniversary of Amer- 
ica's entry into the World War. 

Before examining Briand's public message of April 6 we should 
mention a current irritant of Franco- American relations other than 
French refusal to attend the Geneva Naval Conference. In the 
spring of 1927 the war debt question had reached an impasse. Am- 
bassador Myron T. Herrick wrote from Paris to Secretary of State 
Frank B. Kellogg on January 19, 1927, that as a result of "buck- 
passing" between Premier Poincar and the Chamber of Deputies' 
Commission on Finance, the Chamber had indefinitely shelved 
ratification of the Mellon-Branger debt-funding agreement. Her- 
rick, the suave, polished doyen of American diplomats abroad, did 
not believe the Chamber would lift the debt question off the shelf 
until Poincare gave the word, and that might not occur until after 
the French elections in igs&V The American ambassador on 
March i did receive a letter from Poincare with a signed annex 
promising to pay ten million dollars on June i5. 8 But simultane- 
ously the French Government was expressing its desire to refund 
in the United States the eight-per-cent loan issued by France in 
1920; the French treasury insisted that a lower interest rate was 
necessary. This wish to refund the eight-per-cent loan, when 
coupled with the shelving of the Mellon-B6ranger agreement, 
raised a delicate problem, for the United States Government had 
placed a ban on all loans to countries failing to refund and to 
begin payment on their war debts.. 9 It is not impossible, there- 

7. Herrick to Kellogg, Jan. 19, 1927, 800.5 iWBg France/46o, records of the 
Department of State now deposited in the National Archives. Hereafter all 
documentary citations followed by file numbers refer to the records of the 
Department of State. 

8. Herrick to Kellogg, Mar* i, 1937, 8oo.5iW89 France/477. 

9. During the Harding Administration the State Department made a volun- 
tary arrangement with American bankers permitting die Department to scan 
foreign loans. From this arrangement arose the ban on loans to countries failing 
to refund and to begin payment on war debts. For a lucid exposition of Ameri- 


fore, that when Shotwell found Briand depressed over Franco- 
American relations not only the matter of the Geneva conference 
but also the problem of the war debts weighed heavily on Briand's 
thoughts. 10 (And did not Briand also think of the new system of 
French alliances, and the desirability, if it were possible, of a pact 
with the United States?) 

As April 6 drew near, France's determination to stay away 
from the Geneva conference became more evident. Ambassador 
Herrick on April 3 sent to Secretary Kellogg a note verbale of the 
French Government, dated April 2, in which France deferred send- 
ing even an observer to the forthcoming conference. 11 This disap- 
pointing news appeared in the New York Times of April 5. 


Salmon O. Levinson and family left Chicago for New York on 
Wednesday, April 6, 1927, preparatory to sailing the following 
Saturday on the Leviathan for a long-awaited trip to Europe. 12 One 
can only imagine Levinson's great surprise when, as the train 
neared Cleveland, he nonchalantly took up a newspaper purchased 
from a train newsboy and beheld a proposal to outlaw war, made by 
no less a personage than Aristide Briand, foreign minister of France! 

In a message addressed directly to the American people Briand 
proposed to renounce and outlaw all war between France and the 
United States. "The discussions over disarmament/' he affirmed, 

can postwar lending policies, see Herbert Feis, The Diplomacy of the Dollar: 
First Era 1919-1932 (Baltimore, 1950). 

10. But see Professor Shotwell's vigorous denial: "The charges made in a 
part of the conservative American press that M. Briand was merely playing with 
the formula of peace in order to secure better terms of debt settlement is not 
ionly unworthy but untrue." James T. Shotwell, War as an Instrument of 
National Policy: And Its Renunciation in the Pact of Paris (New York, Har- 
court, Brace, 1929), p. 49. Shotwell reasoned that Premier Poincare" had charge 
of the debt negotiations, not Briand. But did the French Government so utterly 
compartmentalize its activities? 

u. FR: 1927, 1, 31-32. 

12. As early as March 17 Levinson had taken reservations on the Leviathan 
for April 9, 


. . . have served at least to make clear, politically, the common 
inspiration and identity of aims which exist between France 
and the United States. ... If there were any need between 
these two great democracies to testify more convincingly in 
favor of peace and to present to the peoples a more solemn ex- 
ample, France would be ready publicly to subscribe, with the 
United States, to any mutual engagement tending, as between 
those two countries, to 'outlaw war/ to use an American ex- 
pression. The renunciation of war as an instrument of national 
policy is a conception already familiar to the signatories of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Treaties of Lo- 
carno. Any engagement subscribed to in the same spirit by the 
United States with another nation such as France would greatly 
contribute in the eyes of the world to broaden and strengthen 
the foundation upon which the international policy of peace 
is. being raised. Thus two great friendly nations, equally de- 
voted to the cause of peace, would give the world the best illus- 
trations of this truth, that the accomplishment most immedi- 
ately to be attained is not so much disarmament as the practice 
of peace. 13 

Here was success! Outlawry, full of promise for world peace, 
had entered into the calculations of the foreign minister of France! 
Salmon Levinson, "Captain General" 14 of the Outlawry cohorts, 
must have been speechless with joy as he read the message from his 
new supporter. After nearly ten years of ceaseless propagandizing 
Levinson suddenly had met with success. 

More careful readers of Briand's proposition perhaps noticed 
its preoccupation with France's, failure to attend the Geneva Dis- 
armament Conference. Reference to the conference ran like a 
thread through Briand's entire message. A few readers may have 
observed, moreover, the extremely clever way in which Briand 
juxtaposed Outlawry of war (the Levinson program) with renun- 
ciation of war as an instrument of national policy (ShotwelFs. thesis). 

13. FR: 192*], II, 611-613. This is a translation of a copy received by the 
Department of State from Paul Claudel, the French ambassador, May 28, 

14. So Colonel Robins frequently addressed him. 


But the most astute phrasing of Briand's message was the studied 
casualness with which he introduced his proposal of friendship: 
"If there were any need between these two great democracies to 
testify more convincingly in favor of peace and to present to the 
peoples a more solemn example . . ." 

This message of April 6, 1927, to the American people might 
well rank as one of Briand's most felicitous compositions and 
Briand was famous as a master of the apt phrase. Professor Shotwell, 
however, in a recent conversation with the writer, declared he 
wrote the Briand message himself and that the French foreign 
minister, after insignificant verbal changes, obligingly released it 
to the press. 15 Shotwell said nothing publicly at that time about 
the real authorship of the message. 16 

Senator Borah nonetheless learned of it through an American 
living in Paris, Joseph Agan, who volunteered the news in a letter 
of May 7, igs?. 17 Briand, Agan wrote, had agreeably repeated on 
April 6 Shotwell's draft, word for word. 18 Borah promptly replied 
to his correspondent in Paris that he, Borah, now knew from Agan's 
letter what Briand had done. In fact, the senator thought so highly 
of Agan's letter that he instructed his secretary to make a number 
of copies to send out to friends. 10 Borah the isolationist must have 
enjoyed knowing that he had learned about the activities of his. 
foe, the League advocate ShotwelL 

Agan also told Borah that, concerning Briand's proposition to 

15. Conversation of Dec. 6, 1949, in Professor Shotwell's office in New York 
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (Having retired from 
Columbia, Professor Shotwell was then president of the Endowment.) 

16- Privately Shotwell told John Dewey that he had written Briand's mes- 
sage. Dewey to Salmon O. Levinson, Feb. 29, 1928, Levinson MSS, deposited in 
the Library of the University of Chicago. 

17. Agan was no ordinary informant. An accomplished scholar, he was the 
author of The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Brazil, Vol. I, 
The Portuguese Court at Rio de Janeiro (Paris, xg?6). His untimely death pre- 
vented publication of sequent volumes* 

18. Joseph Agan to William E. Borah, May 7, 1937, Borah MSS. 

19. There are carbon copies in the Borah MSS. Borah's official biographer, 
Claudius O, Johnson, in Borah of Idaho (New York, Longmans, Green, 1936), 
PP- 397-398, quotes extensively from the Agan letter and describes it as "exact 


outlaw war between France and the United States, when French- 
men did not laugh at the proposal they considered it an offer of 
alliance, for Frenchmen believed that Americans owed such an 
offer to France. This, too, Borah accepted as the truth. Indeed, 
Briand's proposed pact did resemble a negative military alliance: 
in any future war in which France engaged say a war with Ger- 
many the United States Government, having adhered to an anti- 
war treaty with the French Government, would in effect have an- 
nounced its neutrality in advance; France would hold the assur- 
ance that under no circumstances even if France grossly violated 
American neutrality, as Britain had done in the World War 
would the United States enter the war against France. Furthermore, 
such a pact would be of inestimable prestige value to France even 
in times of peace. "Look here," Frenchmen could say to their rest- 
less German neighbors, "We have a pact with the United States." 
France already possessed an impressive array of alliances with 
European countries. To this grand design for her security she 
could add the most powerful of non-Continental nations, the 
United States of America. That this was Briand's purpose would 
seem evident from (i) his announced desire to outlaw war be- 
tween France and the United States, and (2) the fact that the most 
recent French alliances themselves actually resembled bilateral 
Outlawry treaties. According to Article i of the Rumanian treaty: 
"France and Rumania mutually undertake that they will in no 
case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other." 
Professor Shotwell nevertheless ever since he talked with Briand 
on March 22, 1927 has reiterated, in his books and speeches that 
Briand had no such scheme in mind. "... I owe it to the memory 
of M. Briand/* wrote Shotwell during the 1930*5, "to deny cate- 
gorically the statement that he fathered this proposal with an eye 
to enticing the United States into a disguised alliance with France. 
. . . He could not speak for any other nation and therefore lim- 
ited his offer for the outlawry of war to the United States and 
France . . ." 20 Recently Professor Shotwell vigorously assured the 

20. James T. Shotwell, On the Rim of the Abyss (New York, Macmillan, 
1936), pp. 132-134. As for the interpretation of a negative military alliance, 
Professor Shotwell wrote in his earlier War as an Instrument of National Policy, 


present writer that Briand was by no stretch of the imagination 
angling for a negative alliance. 21 No one would gainsay Shotwell's. 
veracity on this point, least of all this writer: Shotwell believed 
Briand, and we believe he believed him; but no experienced diplo- 
matist would do so. 


The message of April 6, 1927, appeared on page five of the 
New York Times, and on page twelve of the Herald-Tribune. A 
search in some other American newspapers indicates even more in- 
difference to Briand's truly notable proposal, 22 Much more news- 
paper space went to the now-forgotten Butler-Borah debate on 
prohibition held April 8 at Boston: Borah wished to outlaw rum 
rather than war, but Butler maintained that was too difficult. 23 

There followed after Briand's proposal a nineteen-day lull dur- 
ing which Professor Shotwell was sailing across the ocean to New 
York and Salmon O. Levinson by sheer coincidence was proceeding 
in the opposite direction to Paris. 

p. 116: "This argument subsequently gained credence from its constant itera- 
tion and ultimately became an accepted part of what may be called the 
mythical history of the Briand peace proposal/' In support of Professor Shot- 
well's views stands the opinion of David Hunter Miller, who for many years 
was the treaty expert of the Department of State. In his Peace Pact of Paris: 
A Study of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), 
p. 16, n. 2, Miller wrote: ". . . the view advanced in some quarters that such 
a treaty with France would have been in the nature of a 'defensive alliance' is 
wholly untenable and mistaken." 

21. Conversation of Dec. 6, 1949. 

22. The Washington Post displayed the story on page four. The Chicago 
Daily Tribune and the Los Angeles Times ignored it altogether. 

23. Butler championed repeal and Borah opposed. Prohibition, said Butler 
that night, "raises issues more important, as I view it, than any which the Ameri- 
can people have been called upon to face since our fathers and our grandfathers 
had to deal with the issue of slavery and secession." The exciting Butler-Borah 
contest reminded some spectators of the Lincoln-Douglas debates. Six of the 
nine "unofficial" judges selected by the Boston Herald four wet, four dry, and 
one neutral gave the verdict to Borah. For a good account, see "The Butler- 
Borah Debate on Prohibition," Literary Digest, $3 (Apr. 23, 1927), 10. 


Suddenly on the morning of April 25, 1927, there appeared in 
the New York Times a letter to the editor from Nicholas Murray 
Butler. The president of Columbia pointed out that the Briand 
proposal of April 6 had "every merit of practicability and prac- 
ticality/' and that such a proposition, coming from the foreign min- 
ister of France, must have been offered with the consent of the 
French Cabinet. A pact renouncing war between France and the 
United States would be "progressive and constructive/* Butler 
wrote. "The adhesion and cooperation of other powers would, 
of course, be secured later on, but the first thing is to act, and unless 
the American people are both physically and morally deaf, they 
will hear and will act quickly/' Butler mentioned "those moral 
forces" which, when aroused, stir and compel governmental action. 
"M. Briand's mind is thoroughly practical/' he reminded the Times 
readers; Briand asked not for American membership in the League, 
or Locarno, or the World Court; all he asked was a Franco-American 
renunciation of war. "M. Briand, speaking the voice and express- 
ing the soul of France/' Butler concluded, "has called out to us 
across the ocean. What answer is he to hear?" 24 

Briand had not called out in vain. The New York Times,, with 
which President Butler must have had some intimate connections, 25 
spoke up for renunciation of war the very day it printed Butler's 
letter. In an editorial, "Ending Wars One by One/' the Times 
noticed how odd it was that Senator Borah had kept silent after 
Briand's demarche of April 6, for Borah was "a passionate advocate 
of outlawing war/' The Times thought that outlawing war uni- 
versally would be difficult, but outlawing one war at a time _ war 
between France and the United States would be a step forward. 

It is altogether remarkable how President Butler's letter to 
the New York Times awakened interest in Briand's proposal. Be- 
fore April 25 almost no one gave attention to the April 6 message. 
But after the 25th there suddenly began a rush for the band wagon, 
hitherto so empty. Upon reading Butler's letter Senators Norris and 

24. New York Times,. Apr. 25, 1937. 

25. The Times throughout the campaign which followed the printing of 
Butler's letter was extremely cooperative, keeping the fires of renunciation of 
war burning either with editorials or by printing letters to the editor. 


Copeland were reported as saying that "We should jump at the 
chance, 1 ' Senator Shipstead declared Briand was "entitled to the 
gratitude of the world." Senator King avowed that "the noble sug- 
gestion should be promptly accepted." 26 But Senator Borah main- 
tained stony silence. 

Edwin L. James, the New York Times astute and exceptionally 
well-informed Paris correspondent who often voiced opinions of 
the French Foreign Office, 27 soon reported that not a single French- 
man would oppose a nonaggression pact with the United States. 
Butler's letter, James wrote, was widely commented upon in par- 
liamentary and diploma tic circles: in Paris some persons even raised 
the possibility of a three-cornered peace compact, with England as 
the third partner; for according to Briand's friends the French for- 
eign minister for some time past had been nursing the idea of an 
Atlantic Locarno. Briand, reported James, had hoped the sugges- 
tion might come from Washington, for there was somewhat of a 
natural timidity among European statesmen about suggesting any- 
thing to Washington. It was believed that a private citizen from 
America, however, had offered a scheme close to that of Briand. 
The dispatch concluded by alleging that if President Coolidge 
should inject Briand's offer into the deliberations of the Naval 
Disarmament Conference the French would be very happy and 
might even send a delegate to Geneva. 28 

The New York Times London correspondent reported British 
opinion as cool toward Briand's proposal. The British press was 
virtually ignoring the French foreign minister's new offer. Stu- 
dents of world politics, reported the London correspondent, were 
reluctant to see France and America join hands perpetually. 28 

Beating the drum in front of the band wagon, the New York 

*6. New York Times, Apr. 26, 1927. 

27. William R, Castle, in 1927 assistant secretary of state in charge of 
western European affairs, recently told the writer that the Quai d'Orsay under 
Briand consistently "leaked" information through James' Paris dispatches to 
the New York Times. Hence James* dispatches often had a semi-official char- 

28. New York Times, Apr. 27, 1937. 

29. New York Times, Apr. 29, 1927. 


Times on May 2 again wondered editorially why Borah had not 
yet "found his voice" regarding Briand's remarkable offer. The 
Times did not know that Borah had found his voice several days 
before in a private letter to Sherwood Eddy. Confidentially, the 
senator told Eddy, Briand's. idea of Outlawry was so utterly differ- 
ent from his and Eddy's that he could not seriously and conscien- 
tiously take any stand on the matter. ". . . I wish I knew/' the puz- 
zled Borah mused, "of some way by which to apply Briand's 
statement as a practical proposition to the Chinese situation [the 
civil war then raging in China]." 30 

On the evening of May 2 the League of Nations Non-Partisan 
Association held a dinner in New York, and Professor Shotwell 
spoke. The association adopted a resolution approving the Briand 
proposal and sent copies to President Coolidge, Secretary of State 
Kellogg, and every member of the Senate. In a letter of reply ad- 
dressed to the association's chairman, Raymond B. Fosdick, Senator 
Borah finally made his first public statement. Borah trusted that 
Briand would reduce his suggestions to the form of a draft treaty, 
so that the United States Government could deal "intelligently" 
with the subject of Outlawry. 81 

Meanwhile the Coolidge Administration remained officially 
silent. When Secretary Kellogg on May 12 duly made his reply to 
Fosdick and the League Non-Partisan Association, he simply took 
pleasure in conveying "an expression of appreciation of your 
courtesy" in transmitting the association's resolution. 82 Unlike 
Senator Borah, the secretary of state speaking, as he had to, as 
a representative of the United States Government did not make 
even the slightest hint to the association that the French foreign 
minister should offer, for purposes of negotiation, a draft treaty. 
Rumor had it that the president and Secretary Kellogg were piqued 

30. Borah to Sherwood Eddy, Apr. 29, 1927, Borah MSS. To Professor 
Jerome Davis of Yale Borah wrote on May 3: "I do not know just how much 
politics and how much outlawry there is in this [Briand] statement . . ." 
Borah MSS. 

31. Borah to Raymond B. Fosdick, May 4, 1927, in the New York Times, 
May 6, 1927. 

32. Kellogg to Fosdick, May 12, 1927, 711.5112 France/2* 


because Briand had addressed his message to the American people 
instead of through proper diplomatic channels. 88 

President Coolidge indeed was piqued. Dr. Henry S. Pritchett 
of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching 
wrote to Coolidge on May 7 soliciting a presidential interview for 
Professor Shotwell. Shotwell, Pritchett wrote, had had three weeks 
ago a highly informative conference with Briand, and Coolidge 
might be interested in it. After consulting the president, Coolidge's 
secretary noted at the bottom of Pritchett 's letter that "Pres ad- 
vised no suggestion from French Govt has come to State Dept. Un- 
til such suggestion is made by French to Am govt Pres sees, no 
advantage in conferring with volunteers," 34 

Perhaps Coolidge, speaking of volunteers, remembered a cer- 
tain famous incident in American diplomatic history. During the 
United States' undeclared maritime war with France at the end of 
the eighteenth century a well-meaning but naive American Quaker, 
one George Logan, had approached the French Minister Talley- 
rand with suggestions for amicable adjustment of Franco- American 
relations. His volunteer mission led Congress in 1799 to P ass *he 
celebrated Logan Act, stipulating that if any American citizen 
"shall, without the permission or authority of the government of 
the United States, directly or indirectly, commence, or carry on, 
any verbal or written correspondence or intercourse with any for- 

33. The State Department truly maintained a studied silence. On May 12 
J. Theodore Marriner, chief of the Department's Division of Western European 
Affairs, wrote a memorandum to Assistant Secretary William R. Castle pro- 
posing that, because of the pressure on the Department to do something about 
the Briand proposal, one of the correspondents be primed to ask Kellogg a 
question on the proposal at the next press conference, at which time Kellogg 
would be primed to mention the Bryan and Root treaties and state that he 
thought they sufficed for what Briand had in mind. Castle bucked this proposal 
of Marriner's to Michael J. McDermott, the Department's press officer, who 
asked Kellogg about it. Kellogg replied that it would be better to let the matter 
drop and not to bring it up and bear the responsibility o gracing Briand's pro- 
posal transmitted through the press only with an official explanation. 711.- 
5112 France/45- 

34. Coolidge MSS. The secretary then wrote to Dr. Pritchett the president's 
thanks and recommendation that Pritchett take up the matter with the secre- 
tary of state. 


eign government . . . with an intent to influence the measures or 
conduct of any foreign government ... in relation to any dis- 
putes or controversies with the United States, or defeat the meas- 
ures of the government of the United States . . . [he] shall be 
punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, and by 
imprisonment during a term not less, than six months, nor exceed- 
ing three years." 85 

President Coolidge, although he may well have desired to, 
probably never would have attempted to invoke the Logan Act 
against Professor Shotwell, Dr. Butler, et al. Public opinion would 
not have permitted such action although Shotwell, Butler, and 
other peace leaders probably had incriminated themselves. Small 
wonder, however, that Coolidge, dictating letters, to his stenog- 
rapher, was irritated at the prospect of American citizens taking 
delicate diplomatic negotiations into their own hands, making it 
easy for the foreign minister of France to use their inexperience to 
advance his own arrangements. 36 

And how did Secretary Kellogg regard this situation? 

Physically a small person with gnarled and shaking hands, 
white-haired, seventy years, of age in 1927, Frank B. Kellogg was 
at the end of a long and successful public career. He had risen to 

35. U.S. Statutes at Large, I, 313. 

36. Coolidge's annoyance at the diplomatic activities of Shotwell and Butler 
may also have had another basis. Was there not an underlying antagonism be- 
tween the president of Columbia and the president of the United States, an 
antagonism which reflected itself throughout all their relations? 

Butler, a prominent Republican, was a perennial dark horse candidate for 
the Republican presidential nomination. From examination of the Butler MSS 
at Columbia, it appears that Butler at times even cultivated his candidacy, al- 
though in carefully sheltered ways such as modestly encouraging his friends to 
activity, or himself making speeches or advocating issues at strategic moments. 
Shortly after Coolidge, anent the Briand negotiations, referred to Butler and 
Shotwell as volunteers, Butler in the New York Times of May 21, 1927, volun- 
teered the opinion that Coolidge would not run for a third term in 1928. It 
has always been a controversial question as to whether Goolidge desired the 
1928 nomination. Although Coolidge eventually did not choose to run, he 
perhaps would have liked to have been drafted. If so, then Butler's volunteer 
opinion of May 21, 1927, made the president of Columbia definitely persona 
non grata at the White House, if he had not been so before. 


the third highest office in the government of the United States. 
In many ways Kellogg's life was a classic example of the triumph 
of the "American dream" the success, in American democracy, 
of sheer ability. As a boy, Kellogg had migrated with his parents 
from New York State to Minnesota, just after the Civil War. In a 
Rochester, Minnesota, law office the future secretary of state re- 
ceived his formal education. Kellogg never attended a grade school 
or yet a high school. He never went to college. 87 But as a young 
lawyer he rose rapidly, achieving fame as a trust-buster under 
President Theodore Roosevelt; he prosecuted the Standard Oil 
Company. Kellogg then turned corporation lawyer (surrendering 
himself, according to some critics, to the interests he hitherto had 
fought). In 1917 he entered the Senate, but at the end of his first 
term he met electoral defeat at the hands of a Farmer- Laborite 
opponent, an erstwhile dentist and extraordinarily competent poli- 
tician, Henrik Shipstead. Soon thereafter Kellogg became Ameri- 
can ambassador at the Court of St. James. In 1925 he was translated 
to the high office of secretary of state. 

At the State Department Frank B. Kellogg became noted for 
his industry and also his explosive and often profane temper. Espe- 
cially the temper. The secretary of state would arrive at his office 
at approximately 8:45 A.M. On his desk was a keyboard with buttons 
which summoned the various officers of the Department. If Kel- 
logg had read something irritating in the morning paper before 
he reached his office, he would strike the keyboard like a piano 
concertmaster, all fingers at once, and summon everybody he could 
think of. As Department officers scurried into the secretary's office 
he would greet them with a storm of rage. 88 One can thus realize 
the Kellogg humor on the morning he read Nicholas Murray But- 
ler's letter to the New York Times. 

Kellogg quickly let Butler know how he felt. The secretary of 

37. Occasionally, as secretary of state, Kellogg revealed certain minor gaps 
in his education. Reading his speeches, the secretary would encounter the 
phrase "M. Briand," and likely as not would pronounce the "M" as if it were 
Briand's first initial. 

38. Hugh R. Wilson, Diplomat between Wars (New York, Longmans, 
Green, 1941), p. 174. Wilson for a while was Kellogg's press officer, 


state sent word through a mutual friend, George Barton French 
of New York. 

French met Kellogg in Washington at the Mayflower, and the 
secretary immediately started talking about Butler's peace activi- 
ties. At no time during the conversation did he mention Butler 
personally, although the implication remained altogether clear. 
Kellogg angrily asserted that Butler and French were a set of 

" fools" making unworkable suggestions which could 

have no issue except temporarily to embarrass the State Depart- 
ment and himself. The secretary of state added, by way of emphasis, 

that if there was one thing in the world he hated, it was the " 

= pacifists." In later recalling this incident for the edification 

of Butler, French remarked on Frank Kellogg's having a doctor's 
degree in profanity and invectives and being given when excited 
to raising his voice. Mrs. French, trying to visit with Mrs. Kellogg 
at the other end of the Mayflower salon, therefore easily heard 
much of the talk between her husband and the secretary of state. 
When the Kelloggs departed she advised her husband to telephone 
Butler at once and tell him that the State Department opposed his 
peace activities and that Frank Kellogg undoubtedly was going to 
fight them. 39 

With this heavy note of official disapproval there ended one 
of the most notable chapters in the history of what later became 
the Kellogg-Briand multilateral treaty for the renunciation of war. 
Briand's suggestion for renunciation of war between France and 
the United States manifestly had received a very mixed reception 
in America. Although peace leaders such as Dr. Butler, Professor 
Shotwell, and Salmon O. Levinson found Briand's proposal an 
answer to their fondest hopes, the Coolidge Administration, in the 

39. French orally reported this conversation to Butler immediately upon 
returning to New York, Butler's reply to Kellogg was, "We must let public 
opinion have something to say about that." Nicholas Murray Butler, Across 
the Busy Years, II, 208. Butler, ever with an eye to posterity, later (Jan. 20, 
1930) wrote to French asking "for my personal files, an exact record of the hap- 
pening when Frank Kellogg called upon you in Washington and made his 
statement about the principle of what is now become the Pact of Paris." 
French replied the next day, Jan. 21, 1930. Butler MSS, deposited in the Library 
of Columbia University. By permission of Columbia University. 


words of Secretary of State Kellogg, regarded the enthusiastic peace 

leaders as a set of " fools'* making foolish suggestions. 

" Volunteers/ ' snapped Coolidge to his stenographer. " 

pacifists/' Kellogg shouted to French. Surely the peace 

leaders and the Coolidge Administration disagreed violently over 
Briand's proposal. 

This of course is precisely the type of situation which con- 
stantly arises in the diplomacy of a democracy: public opinion 
imperatively demanding a course of action which, in the considered 
opinion of the government, is impossible to pursue. Ill this particu- 
lar instance the foreign minister of France, Aristide Briand, had 
gone over the heads of the American Government to send his 
subtle message to the American people. Garbed in the alluring 
rhetoric of friendship and peace, the foreign minister's proposal 
soon attracted the American peace workers. They espied a new 
highway to peace, untraveled. Down it they rushed joyously. And 
what could the Coolidge Administration say publicly to these good 
people who were also voters? Could Secretary Kellogg baldly an- 
nounce Briand's real objectives? Briand would only, in a very 
hurt and most sincere manner, deny them. Could the administra- 
tion coldly reject the French foreign minister's, overture? Such 
rejection would indicate lack of interest in world peace and just 
around the political corner waited the Democrats, athirst for pub- 
lic office, eager to find the Republicans inattentive to proposals for 
world peace. 40 What course of action, then, was politic? Obviously 
the American Government, confronting Briand's new proposition, 
confronting also the American electorate, would not be able to 
speak frankly in public; and, if it had to act, must employ the 
devious wordings and tactics of the new diplomacy. 

Perhaps there was no need for action. President Coolidge and 
Secretary of State Kellogg had not yet embarked on official negotia- 
tions with the French Government. The Briand proposition still 
was only an unofficial affair between the foreign minister and the 
American people to whom, as Dr. Butler put it, Briand had 
"called out across the ocean." Suppose the American people should 
forget Briand's call to renunciation and Outlawry? Disillusioned 
40. The next year, 1928, was a presidential election year. 


by the World War Americans had not exhibited much regard for 
Frenchmen, and the war debts and forthcoming Geneva Naval 
Disarmament Conference could be counted upon to keep the kettle 
of mutual animosity simmering. Perhaps the Coolidge Administra- 
tion thus would not have to answer Briand's embarrassing proposal. 

Unfortunately for the administration, and providentially for 
Aristide Briand and the peace forces, there now occurred an ad- 
ventitious event of breath-taking interest to the entire world, an 
event which tightened remarkably the hitherto loose bonds of 
Franco-American amity. 

On May 21, 1927, Lindbergh landed at Le Bourget. 



vet a hundred thousand wildly cheering French- 
men saw the silvery Spirit of St. Louis slip from the evening sky 
as if by a miracle and land at Le Bourget after a nonstop flight all 
the way from New York. France joyously and unreservedly took 
the boyish Lindbergh to her heart. Ambassador Herrick soon was 
writing Secretary Kellogg that Lindbergh had done more to im- 
prove Franco-American relations than years of effort by the pro- 
fessional diplomats. 1 In like manner the American people took 
vicarious pleasure in their Lindbergh's gracious reception in 
France, and much of the hard anti-French feeling in America be- 
gan at last to disappear. Truly, this ' 'airplane diplomacy" was 
effective. 2 

1. "... the arrival of Captain Lindbergh in Paris and the week's visit 
which he spent here have created an entirely new atmosphere in the relations 
between the two countries. . . * A small example of the feeling which exists 
is the fact that the crowds outside the Hotel de Ville, upon the occasion of 
Lindbergh's reception there, cheered not only for Lindbergh but for the United 
States." Herrick to Kellogg, June 2, 1927, 800.5 iWSg France/495 1/2. 

An incentive for Lindbergh's flight to Paris was the {25,000 prize offered by 
Raymond Orteig, a Frenchman. Orteig was filled with a burning desire to in- 
crease Franco-American amity. See John Lardner, "The Lindbergh Legends," 
in Isabel Leighton, ed., The Aspirin Age, pp. 198-199. 

2. A few days before Lindbergh successfully flew the Atlantic the French 
aviators Nungessor and Coli left Paris for New York. As the hours passed and 
no news came from the two gallant Frenchmen there began a frantic search 
of the Atlantic for telltale wreckage. President Lebrun of France exchanged 


There was another, almost intangible but yet exceedingly im- 
portant, result of Lindbergh's magnificent flight to Paris. Lind- 
bergh had valorously shown that the "impossible" was possible. 
Idealists everywhere began to take heart. Workers for world peace 
received new courage. People all over the world felt like doing, 
rather than talking a spirit which the following little dialect verse 
so well catches: 

Vile udder folks talkin' 

An 9 vunderin' how, 
An' ban gettin' ready 

Purty soon but not now, 
By yiminy, Lindbergh, 

He yumped up an* vaded 
Right out in the air 

An', by yingo, he made it. 8 

Briand gave a lunch for Lindbergh on May 26, and the French 
foreign minister seized the occasion to inform Herrick that he 
wished to talk with him in a few days about the suggested pact be- 
tween France and the United States. Briand said that the reception 
of the idea was so favorable that it ought to be studied, but that he 
did not desire to move unless he was in entire agreement with 
President Coolidge. 4 This seemingly casual conversation with Her- 
rick marked the first time Briand had mentioned his proposal to 
an American diplomat. 

The next development did not come from the professionals like 
Briand and Herrick, but rather from those two irrepressible vol- 
unteer diplomats, Nicholas Murray Butler and James T. Shotwell. 

Shortly after his letter appeared in the New York Times Dr. 

messages with President Coolidge, and the tragedy already was bringing to- 
gether the peoples of France and the United States when Lindbergh flew out of 
New York toward Paris. 

3. From a poem by James W. Foley, "How Lindbergh Did It," in the New 
York Times, May 31, 1927. 

4. Herrick to Kellogg, May 27, 1927, FR: xyzj* II, 613. 



Butler went to Washington to attend the annual meeting of the 
trustees of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. While 
in the capital he visited the State Department and saw Under- 
secretary Robert E. Olds, who was himself a trustee of the Endow- 
ment. Butler inquired what action the Department intended to 
take in reference to Briand's proposal. "To my astonishment," 
wrote Butler later, "the answer of Mr. Olds was that they did not 
propose to do anything. I criticized this attitude most sharply, point- 
ing out its impoliteness and its lack of vision." After such sharp re- 
proof Colonel Olds asked Butler what he thought the Department 
should do. Butler replied that since they had neglected to act 
promptly they should draft a treaty and offer it for discussion with 
Briand. "What sort of a treaty?" countered Colonel Olds. "Why 
do you not yourself outline what you have in mind?" So Butler 
journeyed back to New York and summoned his colleagues, Pro- 
fessors Shotwell and Joseph P. Chamberlain, the latter a professor 
of law at Columbia. The two professors set to work on a draft 

treaty. 5 

When a draft was ready Shotwell showed it to Olds at the State 
Department. According to Shotwell the undersecretary approved 
it and desired it to be put up as a trial balloon. 6 Shotwell sent 
Colonel Olds a copy of the final draft of the proposed treaty on 
May 25 with the news that he was releasing the draft to the Ameri- 
can and European press on the following Tuesday. He told Olds 
he sincerely hoped "the test of public opinion which should come 
from the publication of this treaty will help you." 7 

Professor Shotwell presented his draft during Memorial Day 
exercises at Columbia University, May 30, 1927. Both he and Dr. 
Butler made speeches. The next day the text of "An American 
Locarno" appeared in the press. 8 

Briefly, the draft treaty had three parts : Renunciation of War, 
Arbitration and Conciliation, and Ratification. Specifically ex- 

5. Nicholas Murray Butler, Across the Busy Years, II, 207. 

6. James T. Shotwell to Nicholas Murray Butler, May 18, 1927, Butler MSS. 

7. Shotwell to Robert E. Olds, May 25, 1927, 711.5112 France/7- 

8. For the text of the Shotwell-Charnberlain draft, see Shotwell's War as an 
Instrument of National Policy, pp. 271-278. 


cepted from Part I wqre self-defense and the Monroe Doctrine. In 
case of a breach of the treaty the parties recovered full liberty of 
action. Part II reserved from arbitration or conciliation all mat- 
ters of domestic jurisdiction. Reserved from arbitration also were 
questions of vital interest, independence, or national honor, or dis- 
putes involving third parties. Each case to be arbitrated required 
as did the Root treaties advice and consent of the United States 
Senate. Indeed, the Shotwell-Chamberlain draft was only a com- 
posite of the Bryan 9 and Root treaties. The Foreign Policy Asso- 
ciation announced after studying the new draft treaty that it showed 
few innovations when compared to the existing treaties with France. 
But the draft treaty's proposal for the renunciation of war, the asso- 
ciation believed, "introduces a new feature never applied previ- 
ously in the case of an American treaty." 10 

Professor Shotwell in his history of the negotiation of the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact has written that his. draft treaty became "an 
item of national and even international news," copied from paper 
to paper and greatly commented upon. 11 He may be right, although 
it is doubtful if a long and complicated draft treaty drew much at- 
tention from the man in the street. The Shotwell-Chamberlain draft 
probably appealed only to a few conscientious newspaper readers 
and to students of various sorts. It may have had an influence in 
another respect, however, which shall be noted later. 12 

9. The "cooling-off" conciliation treaties negotiated by Woodrow Wilson's 
secretary of state. These treaties forbade during a cooling-off period any out- 
break of hostilities between signatories. In the meantime a conciliation com- 
mission would investigate and bring in a report. 

10. New York Times, May 31, 1927. 

1 i. James T. Shotwell, War as an Instrument of National Policy, p. 54. 

12. Below, pp. 96-97, 162. There were at least two competitors to the 
Shotwell-Chamberlain draft treaty. The Women's International League for 
Peace and Freedom and the American Arbitration Crusade made public on 
June 2, 1927, a draft treaty by Dr. Francis E. Sayre, professor of law at Harvard 
and Woodrow Wilson's son-in-law. Sayre proposed to turn over all justiciable 
questions (as defined in Article 36 of the World Court protocol) to the World 
Court; a Permanent Conciliation Commission would deal with all remaining 
questions that is, with political questions of vital interests, independence, or 
national honor. New York Times, June 3, 1927. 

The American Foundation made public a draft treaty on May 28. Article i 


Memorial Day is the traditional occasion in the United States 
for innumerable sermons and speeches on war and peace, and so 
it was fitting that Ambassador Herrick on May 30, 1927, should 
deliver a Memorial Day oration at the American military ceme- 
tery at Suresnes, France. There were high hopes he would discuss 
the Outlawry of war. Salmon O. Levinson had arrived on the Con- 
tinent a week or so after Briand's message of April 6, and among 
other activities of which more later he importuned Herrick to 
speak about Outlawry on Memorial Day. At Herrick's request 
Levinson prepared for him a paper setting forth the full Outlawry 
program. When the day finally came the ambassador, to the disgust 
of Levinson, devoted himself instead to the Red Peril and the 
"scourge of Bolshevism." He mentioned Briand's demarche of 
April 6, but only as evidence of the world's quest to get to the bot- 
tom of war. 13 

President Coolidge in his Memorial Day address 1 spoke before 
more than three thousand people in the marble amphitheater at 
Arlington. Hundreds more stood outside the enclosure and about 
the tomb of the unknown soldier, where they heard his speech 
through amplifiers. The president spoke into a microphone which 
carried his address to distant points by radio in a national net- 
work. The United States Government, he declared, desired to dis- 
card the element of force and compulsion in international agree- 
ments and conduct, relying rather on reason and law. This vision, 
the president added, would not of course be realized immediately, 
yet "little by little, step by step, in every practical way," Americans 

provided for conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement of disputes be- 
tween states (these three provisions in general terms only), reserving the right 
of self-defense; Article a allowed for settlement by other peaceful means; Article 
3 dealt with appointment of members to conciliation commissions and also 
with the commissions' procedure; Article 4 provided for arbitration through 
the Hague Court or otherwise, each case requiring a compromis advised and 
consented to by the United States Senate; Article 5 provided for judicial settle- 
ment by the World Court, each case also requiring a compromis as in Article 
4; Article 6 concerned formation and procedure of special arbitral tribunals, a 
compromis again being necessary in each case; Article 7 dealt with ratification. 
New York Times, May 59, 1927. 

13. New York Times f May 31, 1927. 


should show their determination. The president said that the 
United States never had gone to war for aggression, and that in all 
its history had resorted to war always for a "justifiable cause," He 
pictured the United States in possession of great wealth and high 
place, with nearly every civilized nation its debtor. 14 

Memorial Day was a Monday, and the following Thursday after- 
noon Briand informed Ambassador Herrick that that morning he 
had received authorization to inquire whether the United States 
would enter into diplomatic conversations looking toward a pact 
renouncing war between France and America. Briand believed that 
discussions should begin before outsiders created complications. He 
nevertheless would make no move without the approval of Coo- 
lidge. 15 

The-very day Briand talked with Herrick the New York Times 
carried a dispatch from Paris reporting that if ever Briand received 
the least hint that the United States would accept his proposal, or 
was willing to discuss it, then Briand would use the occasion to 
develop his idea and make every possible effort to conclude a defi- 
nite treaty. According to the Times Paris correspondent Briand had 
in mind something less complicated than the Shotwell-Chamberlain 
draft treaty. Although it was entirely open to the American Gov- 
ernment to apply any Atlantic peace compact to nations other than 
France, Briand was for the present solely for conclusion of such an 
accord between France and the United States. Even a three-cornered 
arrangement, adding Britain, although favored by the French Gov- 
ernment was not its immediate concern. Briand, wrote the Times 
correspondent, thought that the more public discussion devoted to 
the Outlawry proposal the easier it would be for the governments 
concerned to act. 16 

But did not Briand speak differently to Herrick, saying that 
discussions should begin before outsiders created complications? 
The State Department had reason to suspect that the French for- 
eign minister was playing a double game, informing the Depart- 
ment that the peace enthusiasts were forcing his hand, all the 

14. New York Times, May 31, 1927. 

15. Herrick to Kellogg, June 2, 1927, FR: x 9 zj, II, 613-614. 
l(5 t New York Times, June *, 1927. 


while urging the peace advocates to force the Department's hand. 
Even among the peace workers themselves, Briand did not allow 
the right hand to know what the left was about. On the one hand 
he encouraged Butler and Shotwell, helping them to feel that they 
were in the midst of great events and playing an important role 
therein. Briand gave the impression that the rival Levinson Out- 
lawry group annoyed him. Shotwell received from Dr. Earl B, 
Babcock, the Carnegie Endowment's Paris representative, the fol- 
lowing cable on May 13: LONG TALK LEGER [Alexis Leger, Briand's 
confidant and chef de cabinet] DISTURBED BECAUSE LEVINSON GROUP 


NEW FORMULAE FOR STATEMENT HERE. Shotwell cabled back im- 

Babcock again on May 18, having learned of Levinson's presence in 
LEVINSON. 18 Clearly, the Butler-Shotwell group believed that they 
alone were Briand's intimates and that the Levinson group were 
on the outside. 

Little did Shotwell and Butler suspect that Leger had a differ- 
ent story for Salmon O. Levinson in Paris. In a diary of his Eu- 
ropean trip Levinson recorded on May 23, 1927, that Ldger "told 
us he had spent [a] two-day week end with M. Briand at the latter' s 
country place and that M. Briand was in full accord with every 
thing we were doing in developing and offering to America an 
Outlawry Treaty by France/' And later, on June 4, Levinson wrote 
that "we met L^ger at his office at 1 1 o'clock. He told us that he and 
Briand had been very much disturbed by the outside interference 
of Shotwell and others at Columbia University prematurely and 

17. In Briand's Apr. 6 message. 

18. Shotwell to Robert E. Olds, May 25, 1927, 711.5112 France/7. Professor 
Shotwell did not send these cables from animus against Levinson personally, 
but rather from fear that Levinson's arduous activity in Europe would influence 
the Quai d'Orsay against renunciation of war. Professor Shotwell to the writer, 
Sept. 20, 1951. 


without warrant offering a form of Outlawry Treaty burdened with 
many complicated promises, etc. Leger spoke with a great deal of 
feeling and quite at length/' 19 

Levinson, unaware of the thin ice of French intrigue over which 
he skated, made a remarkable performance of his several weeks' 
stay in Europe. What a coincidence that the founder of the Out- 
lawry movement planned a trip to Europe during the very period 
when Aristide Briand began to talk about Outlawry! Levinson 
dedicated his vacation to the cause. Drew Pearson and Constantine 
Brown later wrote in their American Diplomatic Game 20 that 
Levinson pursued his mission with "all the irrepressible fervor 
of a howling dervish." Paris, London, and Berlin soon echoed to 
the arguments of the Chicago lawyer. In his numerous conversa- 
tions with influential people Levinson refused to receive no for an 
answer. His life motto was "to turn liabilities into assets." 21 No 
amount of lukewarmness toward Outlawry could affect his en- 
thusiasm. Only once did he feel personally hurt. That was when 
Harrison Brown, an enterprising young Englishman who for sev- 
eral years had done odd jobs in Europe for Levinson's Outlawry 
committee, sought an interview for his employer at the British 
Foreign Office, only to be told curtly that "the outlawry of war is 
all buncombe." 22 

The Captain General of Outlawry nonetheless fought on. In 
England he saw Arthur Ponsonby, J. L. Garvin, and Norman 
Angell. The Independent Labor party called a special meeting for 

19. J. Stoner, Levinson, pp. 221, 229-230. It might seem at second glance 
that Lger and Briand became aroused at Shotwell and Butler only after the 
Shotwell-Chamberlain draft appeared. Lger, however, told Levinson that 
Shotwell had given him a copy of the draft treaty early in May (J. Stoner, 
Levinson, p. 232), that is, considerably before Memorial Day when Shotwell 
published it. Hence if Ldger really had wanted to stop Shotwell's drafting 
activities he easily could have done so. Levinson, it is true, might have discerned 
this himself, but he appears to have been so elated at Lager's ingenuous pique 
toward the Shotwell-Butler group that he did not notice the incongruity of 
Lager's statements. 

20. (New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1935), p. 20. 

21. J. Stoner, Levinson, passim. 

22. Levinson to Commander Ken worthy, June 5, 1928, ibid.; p. 216. 


him. In Paris he talked to editors such as Stephen Lauzanne, who 
appeared to reconsider a previously skeptical attitude toward Out- 
lawry of war. Motoring to Geneva with Senator Walsh of Montana 
he there talked with Norman Davis, Arthur Sweetser, and others. 
He arrived on May 25 in Berlin where he saw officials of the Ger- 
man Foreign Office and also conversed with Jacob Schurman, the 
American ambassador. While in Berlin Levinson had in mind the 
coupling of an Outlawry treaty with a deletion of Article 231 23 
from the Treaty of Versailles, together with a comprehensive settle- 
ment of all war debts and reparations. Finally, before sailing back 
to America he again visited Leger, During the leavetaking Briand's 
chef de cabinet put his arm on Levinson's shoulder and said: "I 
don't know what we would have done without you in this critical 
situation. You have been of splendid service to us. I hope we will 
be able to continue our mutual relations." * 4 


In the early days of June 1927 as sentiment impelled by the 
French Foreign Office, by the volunteer diplomatists, and by air- 
plane diplomacy was rising in the United States for conclusion 
of a pact of friendship with France, the State Department, perhaps 
in imitation of the Quai d'Orsay, began issuing backdoor com- 
ments to the press. The New York Times Washington correspond- 
ent reported on June 7 a belief in governmental circles that a re- 
newal of the expiring 26 Root arbitration treaty with France would 
be all that was necessary in answer to Briand's proposal of April 6. 
On June 8 the Department announced this time by the front door 

that Secretary Kellogg would be very glad to discuss anything 

that looked toward preservation of international peace. The same 
day the Times Washington correspondent obtained the impression 
"somewhere" that the Briand proposal amounted to a negative mili- 
tary alliance. The thought was current, he reported, that all the 

23. The "war guilt" article. 

24. J. Stoner, Levinson, p. 230. 

25. In the spring of 1928. 


great powers would have to sign an Outlawry proposal to make it 
acceptable to the American Government. 26 

But on Friday, June 10, Nicholas Murray Butler debarked at 
Le Havre. In Paris he brushed aside impatiently the arguments 
against a proposed Franco-American treaty, arguments such as the 
need for a debt settlement, the superfluity of a new treaty because 
of existence of the Bryan and Root treaties, and the difficulty of 
American neutrality after conclusion of an Outlawry treaty in 
case France should go to war, "We'll never get anywhere if we are 
going to talk about the possibility of war whenever we meet with 
differences of opinion/' he sputtered wrathfully. "As to America's 
interests in the event of a European war, her position would remain 
juridically exactly the same, regardless of the peace pact, and her 
recourse would be through juridical channels." 27 

Aristide Briand himself denied the talk about negative alli- 
ances. The same day Dr. Butler gave his juridical explanation 
Briand was reported in the press as saying that his proposed treaty 
for the renunciation of war should not be regarded as a treaty of 
alliance or even as a defensive entente. Such a compact as he had 
in mind woutd be only a consecration of the hitherto unbroken 
peace between France and America. According to Briand the pro- 
posed treaty should be as simple as possible, containing only a 
solemn declaration not to resort to war, but to keep the peace always. 
Such a compact he regarded as infinitely preferable for the moment 
to any other more grandiose scheme. 28 

On the Friday that Butler arrived in Paris Secretary Kellogg in 
Washington read in his New York Times that Briand, a week before, 
had given Ambassador Herrick a note proposing how the treaty 
renouncing war should be framed. The Times also declared that 
Herrick had sent the note off to Washington. 29 Apparently the Quai 
d'Orsay was putting up another trial balloon. Kellogg cast down 
his New York Times in disgust and irritation and cabled Herrick; 

26. New York Times, June 9, 1927* 

27. Ib id., June 11. 

28. New York Times, June 10, 1927. 

29. Ibid. 


the ambassador cabled back the next day that he had received no 
note and had given no information to the press. 30 

"While Herrick was cabling back to Kellogg, the secretary of 
state was sending still another cable to his ambassador in Paris, this 
time paying back with interest the Quai d'Orsay's latest maneuver. 
Kellogg instructed Herrick to inform Briand orally that the Ameri- 
can Government would be pleased to enter into diplomatic con- 
versations with respect to Briand's proposal. Herrick then was to 
add that these conversations at first ought to be of an informal na- 
ture and that they should be carried on through the French am- 
bassador in Washington when he returned to America (he then was 
in France). 31 By this skillful counterstroke Secretary Kellogg in 
effect proposed to stall for weeks the unwanted negotiations, for a 
bilateral antiwar treaty. 

But Kellogg could not stop the irresistible march of public 
opinion. On Thursday, June 16, having been in France not quite a 
week, Dr. Butler made a speech before the American Club in Paris. 
Butler now proposed an agreement between France and the United 
States, which would be short and plain, a proposal in marked con- 
trast to the involved provisions of the Shotwell-Chamberlain draft. 
There should be only three paragraphs declaring: (i) that France 
and the United States renounced war as an instrument of their pol- 
icy in dealing with each other; (2) that both accepted the Lo- 
carno definition of an aggressor; 82 (3) that each agreed not to aid 
an aggressor in case of war. The club members and their guests, 
who filled Langer's restaurant on the Champs lyses and over- 
flowed onto the terrace, received the speech enthusiastically. "That's 
all ," said Dr. Butler, "three short paragraphs, each of which can 
be learned by children in school." 8S 

Interesting in the light of Butler's new advocacy was the report 

30. Kellogg to Herrick, June 10, 1927; Herrick to Kellogg, June u, 1927, 
FR: 1927, II, 614. 

31. Kellogg to Herrick, June 11, 1957, ibid., 614. 

32. According to Locarno the aggressor was that state which went to war 
in violation of its pledge to submit disputes to peaceful settlement. 

33. New York Times, June 17, 1957. Probably no one will ever know exactly 
what Dr. Butler had in mind. He apparently never elaborated on paper or 
otherwise his new, simplified proposition. 


of an interview with Leger which Harrison Brown, Levinson's Eu- 
ropean lieutenant, sent to his chief in Chicago. "I mentioned But- 
ler," Brown wrote, "and Leger said that Briand had not intended to 
see him but that he (Lger) had insisted. Butler was talking a lot 
of bunk about his mile long effusion. Briand had him up and 
changed his whole tone so that after the interview Butler was stress- 
ing the need for simplicity, and saying that only two articles were 
necessary!" S4 

For the remainder of the week after the Thursday on which 
Butler spoke to the American Club, there were no noteworthy de- 
velopments in respect to the proposed Franco-American treaty. 
Dr. Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, professor of international 
law at the University of Hamburg and one of the editors of the no- 
table publication, Die Grosse Politik der Europdischen Kabinette, 
arrived in New York the day of Butler's Paris speech and told the 
press that Germany hoped for a treaty with the United States to 
outlaw war. He declined to elaborate. 35 That same day the Danish 
minister, going to Bar Harbor for the summer, called at the State 
Department and asked Secretary Kellogg about the propositions 
of France for outlawing war. The secretary said he had no informa- 
tion other than what already had appeared in the press. 36 Little 
did the secretary and the Danish minister know that there soon 
would be much more information. 


Philippe Berthelot, secretary general of the French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, sent for Sheldon Whitehouse, the American charg6 
d'affaires in Paris, on the evening of June 2 1. He informed White- 
house that Secretary Kellogg's suggestions as to conversations on 
the proposed antiwar pact were very pleasing to his chief, Aristide 
Briand. But as the French ambassador to the United States would 

34. Harrison Brown to Levinson, July 15, 1927, in J. Stoner, Levinson, 

P- *33- 

35. New York Times, June 17, 1927. 

36. Memorandum by Kellogg of a conversation with the Danish minister, 
June 16, 1927, 124.93/1*3. 


not reach Washington until the end of August Briand thought 
that was too long a time to delay doing anything about the proposed 
pact. Briand had, therefore, drafted a suggested text. 37 Clearly 
Briand had outmaneuvered Secretary Kellogg, who had believed 
he had stalled off the unwelcome French negotiations. 

There was nothing to do except for Ambassador Herrick to take 
the French text back with him to the United States (Herrick was 
about to return to America). Charge Whitehouse meanwhile cabled 
a translation to Washington. Next day the Quai d'Orsay obligingly 
informed the press that the French Government had offered a draft 
treaty to the United States, that the treaty was quite simple, a 
compact between two countries only, and would not be enlarged to 
include any other country.* 8 

Briand's draft, dated June 20 (the very day the Coolidge Naval 
Disarmament Conference opened in Geneva), bore the official title 
of 'Tact of Perpetual Friendship." It contained two substantive 
articles and a third article of ratification. 

Article i provided that "The high contracting powers solemnly 
declare in the name of the French people and the people of the 
United States of America that they condemn recourse to war and 
renounce it, respectively, as an instrument of their national policy 
towards each other." 

Article 2 avowed that "The settlement or the solution of all 
disputes or conflicts 6i whatever nature or of whatever origin they 
may be which may arise between France and the United States of 
America shall never be sought by either side except by pacific 
means." 89 

There were thus two short paragraphs, each of which might be 
learned by children in school. 

The draft treaty was short and simple, as Briand had been 
advocating ever since he had seen the long, complicated Shotwell- 
Chamberlain draft. But if one peered more closely at Briand's 
draft treaty one detected the skeleton of the Shotwell-Chamberlain 
draft. For the latter, underneath all its words, had had three parts: 

37. Whitehouse to Kellogg, June zz, 1-927, FR: 1927, II, 615-616. 

38. New York Times, June 24, 1927. 

39. The Whitehouse translation, printed in FR: i$2j, II, 616. 


Renunciation of War, Arbitration and Conciliation, and Ratifica- 
tion. So also did Briand's draft have three similar parts. Perhaps 
the French foreign minister had borrowed his idea from Messrs. 
Shotwell and Chamberlain. 

The similarity between Briand's proposed treaty and the Shot- 
well draft was more apparent than real. Actually, Briand's pro- 
posed Pact of Perpetual Friendship bore a marked resemblance to 
the Rumanian and Yugoslav alliances the treaties of friendship 
and of friendly understanding negotiated by France in the spring 
of 1926. Those treaties, it will be recalled, in their first and second 
articles had borrowed the formula of the Siamese treaties of arbi- 
tration: Article i renounced all war; Article 2 promised to settle 
all disputes by peaceful means. Briand's new draft pact with the 
United States hence had a' striking similarity to the latest of 
France's Continental alliances. 

It is not recorded what Secretary Kellogg did or said when he 
first saw Briand's proposed text. Certain it is that Briand had placed 
Kellogg in an embarrassing diplomatic position. Should Kellogg 
give in to the rising popular demand in the United States for a 
treaty with France? And if not, what other course of action lay 



lolonel Raymond Robins lunched with President 
Coolidge in the early summer o 1927, and during the mealtime 
conversation the colonel asked the president about Outlawry of 

"Mr. President/' said Robins, "you have immortality lying all 
around you in this proposal to outlaw war and you are doing noth- 
ing about it." 

"Well," responded Coolidge, "the people are not interested in 
that proposition: they probably think it is impractical." 

"They ought to be interested," replied Robins, "and it is prac- 
tical . . ." 1 

American peace leaders enthusiastically approved of Briand's 
proposed bilateral Outlawry pact. This in spite of the marked hesi- 
tancy toward Outlawry which continued to flourish in high gov- 
ernmental circles. In fact it soon was evident that Aristide Briand's 
new proposition had united the American peace movement as it 
never had been united before. All varieties of peace leaders began 
to campaign for Franco- American perpetual friendship. This is not 
to say that sweetness and light now reigned between such confirmed 

i. Claudius O. Johnson, Borah of Idaho, p. 399. Robins himself told 
Professor Johnson this story when the latter met the colonel during the summer 
of 1935 at the Carleton Hotel in Washington. 


rivals as the Butler-Shotwell group which always had advocated 
the League of Nations and the Levinson group which definitely 
was anti-League. There was still many a thrust and jab between 
them. The fact remained that Briand, by proposing his Pact of 
Perpetual Friendship, had succeeded in engineering an unprece- 
dented coalition of the peace forces in the United States thus to 
place popular pressure on the State Department to accept a treaty 
that would be an American bulwark to France's system of alliances 
in Europe. 

Nicholas Murray Butler touched off the campaign to arouse 
public opinion. His first addresses he delivered in Denver, one be- 
fore the chamber of commerce and the second to a crowded audi- 
ence in the huge auditorium where William Jennings Bryan once 
had received nomination for the presidency. Bryan had refused to 
crucify mankind on a cross of gold. Butler sought to save his fellow 
men from the cross of war. The president of Columbia later remi- 
nisced: "From Colorado I came east through Kansas, Nebraska and 
Missouri, speaking at various points, and then into Illinois, In- 
diana and Ohio. After one or two speeches in Pennsylvania and 
three or four in New England, I closed my campaign ... at Au- 
gusta, Georgia." 2 

Salmon O. Levinson, arrived back in Chicago after his whirl- 
wind tour of Europe, immediately threw himself into the great 
American battle for Outlawry. The Chicago lawyer's partner, Ben- 
jamin V. Becker, was a director of the Chicago Daily News and per- 
sonal counsel of Walter A. Strong who controlled the paper. The 
Daily News came out for Outlawry. Through the News European 
service, subscribed to by over a hundred papers in the Midwest, 
Levinson's campaign soon received excellent coverage. The two 
Mowrer brothers, Paul Scott and Edgar Ansel, wrote columns of 
stories on Outlawry's European progress, and these articles ap- 
peared almost automatically in papers in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, 
Michigan, and neighboring states. 

Levinson on June 16 had a forty-five-minute conference with 
Secretary Kellogg, "We had a splendid talk," Levinson later in- 
formed Harrison Brown, "although I found him quite unac- 

3. Nicholas Murray Butler, Across the Busy Years, II, 208. 


quainted with the theory of Outlawry and considerably in the dark 
as to what M. Briand really wanted. ... he was convinced that 
the adjustment of the debt had nothing to do with Briand's pro- 
posal." 3 Kellogg asked Levinson to prepare a draft treaty based on 
his experiences and contact with the French Foreign Office, and 
Levinson duly made up a draft and forwarded it to the secretary of 
state on June 24."* 

Then on Sunday afternoon, June 26, Bill Borah arrived in 
Chicago. Sol Levinson spent two hours that day with him and saw 
the senator the next morning before he departed for Denver. The 
two Outlawrists held a most pleasing discussion. Among other 
things, Borah informed Levinson that Kellogg had sent for him, 
and while he thought it concerned another matter it was only to 
discuss the Briand proposal and an Outlawry pact. This private in- 
terview, according to the senator, offered opportunity to expound 
to Kellogg the gist of Outlawry. 5 

In those June days when the army of Outlawry was marching 
so irresistibly onward there occurred a disturbance in the ranks. 
The Reverend Dr. Charles Clayton Morrison was placing the finish- 
ing touches to his volume on Outlawry of war and had added a 
section on the Briand proposal. Now it happened that Dr. Morri- 
son held his own opinions on outlawing war, although he belonged 
to the inner circle of Levinson' s group. Late in June the captain 
of the Outlawry cohorts viewed the work of his lieutenant. Levin- 
son threw up his hands in horror: Morrison's last section was "per- 
fectly insulting to France/' 6 Not only would the book, if printed 
as written, have a harmful effect on public opinion; Levinson 
feared even more that Morrison, whom Borah greatly respected, 
would convert the senator to his heresy. After much effort Levinson 
persuaded Morrison to hold out the objectionable addendum on 

3. Levinson to Brown, June 28, 1927, J. Stoner, Levinson, p. 236. 

4. Levinson's draft contained six articles, Article 2 excepting from the treaty 
any question concerning the Monroe Doctrine, and Article 4 reserving the 
right of self-defense. J. Stoner, Levinson, p. 225, 

5. Levinson to Harrison Brown, June 28, 1927, in J. Stoner, Levmson, 
V* 238- 

6. Levinson to Raymond Robins, June 30, 19217, J, Stoner, Levinson, p. 242. 


France until Colonel Robins could get to Chicago for a conference; 
and when the colonel arrived he sided with Levinson and outvoted 
Morrison. The latter, at last reduced to submission, removed his ad- 
dendum and substituted a new one favorable to the Briand pro- 
posal. Levinson must have sighed with relief after quelling this 
incipient mutiny. 7 

Meanwhile Senator Borah had written to Morrison, advising 
that he omit in his book any addendum touching in any way the 
Briand proposal, Borah vowed he did not desire Morrison to com- 
promise his book's dignity and force by discussing "Briand's ges- 
ture." The senator preferred to wait and "see what that thing is he 
[Briand] is talking about." 8 To Levinson Borah soon wrote that 
he had not heard anything from Secretary Kellogg in regard to the 
Briand proposal. "In my opinion/' Borah added, "we will never 
hear anything from Briand's proposal that amounts to anything. 
The more I study the Briand proposal, the more I think it a piece 
of dynamite for outlawry." The senator, moreover, had just read 
Morrison's revised addendum and could not agree with it: "My 
opinion is that a two-power treaty is not an aid to outlawry but a 
distinct hindrance and embarrassment." 9 

Borah's pronouncement on Briand's Outlawry proposal mo- 
mentarily stunned Levinson. The Chicago lawyer recently had 
toured Europe. Now his champion, Senator Borah, seemed to be 
deserting the cause. From an asset Borah suddenly had become a 
liability. "I am beginning to feel a sense of helplessness . . ." 
Levinson confided to Colonel Robins. 10 But soon he recovered and 
sent a cheerful letter to the senator affirming that the publicity and 
general interest in Outlawry caused by the Briand proposal and 

7. It appears that Morrison was not against the bilateral Briand proposal 
because it might be a negative military alliance, but simply because he thought 
a bilateral pact would be of limited value. Morrison thus as a matter of prin- 
ciple, rather than politics, preferred a multilateral pact. See Charles Clayton 
Morrison, The Outlawry of War: A Constructive Policy for World Peace 
(Chicago, Willett, Clark and Colby, 1927), pp. 283-300. 

8. Borah to Morrison, July 8, 1927, Levinson MSS. 

9. Borah to Levinson, July 12, 1927, in J. Stoner, Levinson, p. 243. 

10. Levinson to Raymond Robins, July 15, 1927, ibid., p. 243. 


subsequent developments could not have been had for $5,000,000 
worth of advertising. 11 

The scene in the campaign for Outlawry now shifts to Hono- 
lulu. Professor Shotwell was attending the second conference of 
the Institute of Pacific Relations. 12 The conference lasted from 
July 15 to July 28, 1927, with delegates in attendance from China, 
Japan, Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. The 
day before the conference ended Shotwell in a general forum pre- 
sented a draft of a proposed treaty for permanent peace in the Pa- 
cific 'regions between the United States and an unnamed power. 
He then admitted that he had drawn the treaty with Japan in 
mind and declared such a compact would be "peace insurance" for 
the Pacific area. 18 The Japanese delegates to the conference viewed 
Shotwell's proposal with favor but explained politely that their 
public had not as yet given much thought to such an international 
undertaking. They queried whether Japan's regional policies should 
not receive the same consideration as the Monroe Doctrine, and 
they doubted the wisdom of entirely excluding from the field of 
international conciliation, as Professor Shotwell's draft suggested, 
all issues regarded as domestic. 14 

In spite of this chilly Japanese welcome to Shotwell's draft 
treaty for Pacific peace insurance, his proposal did result in a Japa- 
nese study group which met once a fortnight during the autumn 
and part of the winter of 1927-28, its sessions attended by an of- 
ficial of the Japanese Foreign Office. This study group opened its 
meetings to the public and was. quite active in preparing and dis- 
seminating essays and newspaper articles. 15 

During the summer of 1927 there remained some recalcitrant 

11. Levinson to Borah, July 21, 1927, ibid., p. 244. 

12. The Carnegie Endowment paid all of Shotwell's expenses to Honolulu 
and back. For details, see above, pp. 21-22. 

13. New York Times, July 28, 1927. 

14. An oblique reference to oriental immigration. 

15. Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs: 1928 (London, 
1929)^ PP- 22-23. For an account of the conference, see George H. Blakeslee, 
"Results of Honolulu Conference on Problems of the Pacific," Current History, 
27 (Oct. 1927), 73. The conference published its proceedings in J ,B. Condliffe' 
ed., Problems of the Pacific (Chicago, 1928), 


individuals in the United States whom the peace forces could not 
convert. Dr. David Jayne Hill, an expert international lawyer, 18 
wrote an article in the Saturday Evening Post 17 asserting that to 
outlaw war was contrary to the Constitution of the United States. 
Soon Professor Albert Bushnell Hart of Harvard lashed out at a 
certain amateur diplomat who, he warned, threatened to com- 
promise American national interests. There were, Hart wrote, some 
questions which the United States would never arbitrate: did Shot- 
well wish to arbitrate the Monroe Doctrine, or the question of 
oriental immigration, or war debts? 18 Professor Shotwell, in Hawaii, 
was not able immediately to reply to Professor Hart, but when 
ShotwelFs answer finally came it was spirited indeed. "It is not 
often," he declared, "that one is privileged to read an article which 
contains a 100 per cent, misstatement of the subject with which it 
deals. Yet Professor Albert Bushnell Hart succeeded in achieving 
this remarkable feat . . ." 19 Professor Shotwell was not going to 
permit his fellow academician at Harvard to take any potshots dur- 
ing the fight for renunciation of war. 

While sentiment in the United States during the summer months 
unmistakably was rising in favor of a treaty with France, Salmon 
O. Levinson was paying thousands of dollars to spread the gospel 
of Outlawry in Europe. In return for a liberal salary and expense 
account Harrison Brown buttonholed statesmen and their secre- 
taries in London, Paris, Berlin, and Geneva, sent them Outlawry 
literature, wrote them letters, and gave copies of Dr. Morrison's 
book, The Outlawry of War: A Constructive Policy for World 
Peace, to all who promised to read it. As for Morrison's book, how- 
ever, Brown after a while began to harbor doubts of its effective- 
ness in Europe: the independent-minded Morrison spelled "League 
of Nations" as "league of nations" all the way through the book; 
and the entire work contained a we-Americans-are-better-than- 

16. And a trustee of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

17. David Jayne Hill, "Briand's Proposal of Perpetual Peace," Saturday 
Evening Post, 200 (July 30, 1927), 27, 112. 

18. Albert Bushnell Hart, "Amateur Diplomacy," Current History, 26 
(July 1927), 623-624. 

19. James T. Shotwell, "The Movement to Renounce War as a Diplomatic 
Weapon," Current History, 27 (Oct. 1927), 62-64. 


you-Europeans. flavor most unpalatable to sensitive European 
readers. 20 To add to Brown's trouble with Morrison's book the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts chose the summer of 1927 to 
electrocute two aliens convicted of murder, Nicola Sacco and Bar- 
tolomeo Vanzetti. For a short time there was an ugly feeling on 
the Continent, and Brown and his wife, visiting in Amsterdam, 
found themselves among murmurs and even leaflets. 21 Brown wrote 
to Levinson that he met much difficulty talking law in Europe dur- 
ing the Sacco- Vanzetti affair. 22 He nonetheless continued his work. 
His. labors, probably won some converts to the Levinson program 
but were more efficacious in creating in Europe a feeling that Ameri- 
cans, if unpredictable in many matters, were at least exceedingly 
anxious to outlaw war. 

While the great battle for renunciation of war raged in the 
United States, the New York Times in the East and the Chicago 
Daily News in the Midwest almost every day broke lances for the 
cause. Outlawrists and League supporters, joined in coalition, 
marched steadily forward. They loosed salvos of speeches, articles, 
and resolutions, bringing consternation into the emptying camp of 
the foe. 

Busy with the battle, the hitherto rival peace groups of Butler 
and Shotwell and of Levinson had little time for berating each 
other as. of old. Yet there were occasional discordant sounds in the 
peace forces' all but unanimous battle song. John Dewey learned 
that President Butler in London had made a long speech in the 

so. Reviewing Dr. Morrison's book the British historian Professor Charles 
K. Webster wrote: "It is difficult to read it without some amusement and impa- 
tience ... Dr. Morrison is quite ignorant of international politics, but he 
knows and shares the emotions of a large portion of his countrymen and can 
generally appeal to their mixture of idealism and nationalism with as sure a 
touch as Senator Borah himself." Morrison's advocacy of codifying interna- 
tional law, wrote Webster, was "a simple task, in his [Morrison's] opinion, if 
the lawyers do not interfere too much. Nothing is more delightful in the book 
than Dr. Morrison's treatment of this question, which must be read to be be- 
lieved." Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 7 (1928), 339. 

21. Harrison Brown to Levinson, Aug. 25, 1927, enclosing a leaflet, Levin- 
son MSS. 

23. Brown to Levinson, Aug. 11, 1927, Levinson MSS. 


course of which he remarked "those admirable and amiable per- 
sons who would outlaw war admirable and amiable but quite 
hopeless." Butler had concluded that it would be as easy to outlaw 
war as to pass a resolution to outlaw pride, vainglory, and hypocrisy. 
Dewey wrote to Levinson that Butler's pronouncement was only to 
be expected, for Butler had been born with a reserved seat on the 
band wagon. 23 

Leaving the band wagon of Outlawry to roll down the road to 
peace, let us note the activities of Secretary of State Kellogg in 
Washington during that hot summer of 1927. 


The lie de France sailed up New York harbor on June 28, 1927, 
bringing to the United States many notable persons, among them 
Myron T. Herrick, American ambassador to France. Asked by re- 
porters about the proposed Briand treaty, Herrick sagely replied 
that it would be both impolitic and indelicate for him to comment. 
The State Department, he said, would give out information in due 
course. 24 

While Herrick still was on the high seas, Briand had asked Secre- 
tary Kellogg through the American charg in Paris, Sheldon White- 
house, if it were all right to make a statement about the proposed 
pact on July 4- 26 For Briand the anniversary of American independ- 
ence obviously was a strategic occasion; the French foreign min- 
ister on July 4, 1927, could say to the American people that France 
and the United States, once allied in the great cause of American 
independence, should again join hands this time for the equally 
great cause of peace, "No," Kellogg cabled Charg6 Whitehouse. The 
secretary of state added that Briand should discuss his treaty through 
regular diplomatic channels, in an orderly manner; public state- 
ments by no one would stampede the American Government. 26 

By the time Herrick landed in New York the State Department 

23. Dewey to Levinson, Sept i, 1927, Levinson MSS. 

24. New York Times, June 29, 1927. 

25. Whitehouse to Kellogg, June 26, 1927, FR: 1923, II, 618. 

26. Kellogg to Whitehouse, June 27, 1927, ibid., 618-619. 


had made up its mind about Briand's proposal. J. Theodore Mar- 
riner, chief of the Department's Division of Western European Af- 
fairs, by June 24 had prepared an official memorandum. This docu- 
ment is so plain spoken, so utterly undisguised by diplomatic 
euphemisms, that it deserves almost full quotation: 

The text of Mr. Briand's proposals for a Treaty . . . should 
be carefully considered from every point of view. 

Mr. Briand's insistence that negotiations should begin at 
once without awaiting the arrival in this country of M. Claudel 
[the French ambassador] would seem to indicate that he was 
most anxious to keep this topic in the public eye most prom- 
inently during the meeting of the Naval Conference at Geneva 
in order to draw attention away from the fact that France is not 
there represented in a constructive step towards World Peace. 

The vague wording and lack of precision in the draft seems 
also intended to give the effect of a kind of perpetual alliance 
between the United States and France, which would certainly 
serve to disturb the other great European Powers, England, 
Germany and Italy. This would be particularly true as it would 
make the neutral position of the United States during any 
European war in which France might be engaged extremely 
difficult, since France might deem it necessary to infringe upon 
our rights as a neutral under this guaranty of non-aggression. 
A further point which Mr. Briand has not touched on is the 
question of France's obligations under the Covenant of the 
League of Nations to aid the League in the punishment of an 
aggressor state. It might likewise be used internally in France 
to postpone the ratification of the Debt Settlement and to 
create a feeling that payment was unnecessary. 

In order to avoid this interpretation, it would be incumbent 
on the United States at once to offer a treaty in the same terms 
to England and Japan, more especially as we are negotiating 
with them at the present moment [at the Geneva Naval Confer- 
ence] and could hardly wish them to feel that we were enter- 
ing into an alliance at the same time with another Power. 

Certainly a single treaty of this nature, and, according to 
press despatches, France desires that it be an absolutely unique 


instrument, would raise the question of an alliance with a coun- 
try outside the American hemisphere. A series of such agree- 
ments, unless it were absolutely world wide, would raise the 
same objections. All this tends to indicate that it would be 
best to keep the subject in abeyance at least until the conclu- 
sion of some agreement in Geneva. However, when the time 
comes actually to negotiate, it would seem that the only answer 
to the French proposition would be that, as far as our relations 
with France were concerned, adequate guarantees were con- 
tained in the Bryan Treaty, and that if any step further than 
this were required, it should be in the form of a universal under- 
taking not to resort to war, to which the United States would at 
any time be most happy to become a party. Before such a time, 
treaties of the nature which France suggests become practically 
negative military alliances. 27 

Secretary Kellogg immediately wrote to President Coolidge, 
then on vacation in the Dakotas. His letter indicated he had com- 
pletely digested Marriner's memorandum. Kellogg stated he was 
satisfied, from Briand's desire to make a speech on July 4 and from 
the fact that he was giving out to the press the substance of every 
communication he made to the State Department, that all he was 
doing was seeking to create a public sentiment during the session 
of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. "... I do not think/' 
Kellogg wrote, "we ought to play into his hands, in that way. . . . 
Of course, the public can see no reason why the United States 
should not agree with Great Britain and Japan or any other coun- 
try not to make war. ... I shall make no answer to France at 
this time . . ." 28 

From the Dakotas the president sent his approval of Kellogg's 
conclusions in two sentences and twenty-two words: "Thank you 
for your letter of the syth, which I have read with care. I approve 
of the conclusions you have reached." 29 

Secretary Kellogg received the Japanese ambassador and in- 
formed him the United States would not make any new arrange- 

27. FR: 1927, II, 617-618. 

28. Kellogg to Coolidge, June 27, 1927, FR: lyzy, II, 619-621. 

29. Coolidge to Kellogg, June 29, 1927, ibid., 621. 


ment with France which it would not be willing to make with 
Japan. The ambassador expressed gratification at the secretary's 
statement, adding that the Japanese delegates at the Geneva con- 
ference had denied in the press that they had instructions to ask 
for an antiwar pact (there had been rumors that they had such in- 
structions). 30 The ambassador said it was gratifying to know that 
the United States contemplated no special alliance. 31 

The New York Times a few days later carried a Paris dispatch 
that the French Government viewed the proposed peace pact as 
peculiarly proper between the French and American peoples; if 
it were extended to other nations the pact would lose much of its 
sentimental value. 32 

Sir Esme Howard, the British ambassador in Washington, called 
at the State Department on July 6 and received Secretary Kellogg's 
assurance that the United States Government would make no treaty 
with France which it would not be willing to make with any other 
country. Kellogg asked Howard if the British Government would 
be willing to discuss the renewal of its soon expiring Root treaty. 
Howard then asked Kellogg if that was at the same time the United 
States discussed the renewal of the similarly expiring Root treaty 
with France, and Kellogg said yes. 83 The secretary of state further 
said, concerning Briand's proposal, that he would be glad to sup- 
port such a treaty if it were of a general nature, but that he could 
not favor signing such a pact with one country only because that 
would be in his opinion tantamount to an indirect alliance, depriv- 
ing the United States of its liberty of action in case of that country 
being at war with a third party. 84 

30. The chairman of the American delegation to the Geneva Naval Dis- 
armament Conference, Hugh Gibson, to Kellogg, June 24, 1957, 5oo.Ai5Ai/3S3. 
The ambassador in Japan, MacVeagh, to Kellogg, June 30, 1927, 500.Ai5Ai/- 

31. Memorandum by Marriner of a conversation between the Japanese 
ambassador, Tsuneo Matsudaira, and Kellogg, June 30, 1927, 711.511? 

3$. New York Times, July 3, 1927. 

33. Kellogg to the American ambassador in London, Alanson B. Houghton, 
July 15, 19*7, FR: 192?, II, 624. 

34. Sir Esme Howard, Theatre of Life (Boston, 1935-36), II, 5*3. Kellogg 


The day before Sir Esme talked with Secretary Kellogg, the 
American ambassador in London, Alanson B. Houghton, had an 
informal conversation with Sir Austen Chamberlain concerning 
renewal of the Root treaty. Sir Austen said the British Government 
favored renewal but thought something else might be desired. 
Houghton replied that it was true Briand had made some proposals 
toward a new treaty but all the ambassador wished to ascertain was 
Chamberlain's attitude toward renewal of the Root treaty; he would 
discuss the Briand proposals later. But after having so craftily 
broached the subject of the Briand proposals Sir Austen refused to 
let Houghton entice him away. Chamberlain said that Briand un- 
doubtedly put forth his proposals in good faith, but that he, Cham- 
berlain, had discovered from his own experience that Briand did 
not always work out his propositions beforehand in practical form, 
and hence, as after Thoiry, 35 he sometimes found that his ideas led 
into unanticipated difficulties. 86 Sir Austen did not go on to tnen- 
tion the difficulties which Briand would have to face on this new 
occasion, but presumably one difficulty was the British Govern- 
ment's determination that France alone should not reap the bene- 
fits of an antiwar treaty with the United States. 37 

apparently made no memorandum of this conversation with Howard. What he 
said must be reconstructed from Kellogg's later July 15 cable to Houghton and 
from the account in Howard's memoirs. 

35. The famous Briand-Stresemann Thoiry conversations, wherein the two 
foreign ministers sketched an ambitious program of Franco-German rap- 
prochement. Briand shied away from the Thoiry propositions after he dis- 
covered French opinion was not backing him. 

36. Houghton to Kellogg, July 6, 1927, 711.4112/175. 

37. The British foreign secretary faced a demand for an Anglo-American 
antiwar treaty during a House of Commons debate of July 1 1. Arthur Ponsonby 
and Commander Kenworthy, two Opposition M.P/s, interrogated Chamberlain. 
208 H.C. Deb. t 5 s., cc. 1764, 1793. Chamberlain cagily replied that Franco- 
American negotiations were about to take place; he wished them well, but it 
would be an impertinence, and worse than an impertinence, if he were to 
indicate any opinion as to the lines on which such conversations should pro- 
ceed. "For ourselves," he concluded, "I hope between the United States and this 
country war is already outlawed, not on paper but in the heart and soul of 
every citizen." (c. 1777) George Trevelyan, another Opposition M.P., later got 
the floor and angrily snapped back at Chamberlain: "We have abolished war in 


Back in America, Ambassador Herrick and Secretary Kellogg 
conferred over the Briand draft treaty. Both men afterward de- 
clined comment. Someone in the State Department intimated, how- 
ever, that because of the time Department experts would require 
for examining the Briand proposal it would not be necessary for 
Herrick to see the president on the subject for some time. 38 So 
while the experts leisurely examined the draft treaty Herrick de- 
parted for Cleveland, underwent a serious operation, and easily had 
several months remaining in which to recuperate. 

Three weeks before Herrick and Kellogg conferred over the 
Briand draft in fact, on the very day Briand had finished prepar- 
ing his proposed text (June 20) the Coolidge Naval Disarma- 
ment Conference had opened in Geneva. "It was a distressing con- 
ference," wrote one of the American delegates, Hugh Wilson. 89 
Wilson believed that Rear Admiral Hilary Jones, another of the 
American delegates, was much at fault for the conference's failure. 40 
Admiral Jones during the session disagreed with his British oppo- 
site, Walter Bridgeman of the Admiralty. Actually the problem 
was not one of personalities but of cruisers: should cruisers be 
above or below 8,000 tons* displacement, and have 6-inch or 8-inch 
guns? The Americans desired large cruisers and the British insisted 
on small cruisers. Although the British Government conceded 
there should be parity between the British and American fleets, 
the British in reality desired superiority and artfully disguised 
their desire by stipulating for small cruisers which Britain could 
employ to great advantage because of her many naval bases all over 
the world, and which the United States could use to small advan- 
tage because of lack of naval bases. With the Japanese looking 

our hearts. Well, then, why cannot we abolish it in the terms of Treaty?" 
(c 1877). 

38. New York Times, July 8, 1927. 

39. Hugh R. Wilson, Diplomat between Wars, p, 218. 

40. "He was a man of simplicity and of an honesty so limpid that a glance at 
his clear eyes convinced you of his character. He was one of the most lovable 
men that I have encountered and every member of the delegation felt deep 
affection for him. His idea of debate, however, might be said to lack variety. He 
made an affirmation, he listened politely to the other man, he restated his 
affirmation." Ibid., p. 218. 


politely on, the British and Americans came gradually to deadlock. 
The conference adjourned, very much a miserable failure, on Au- 
gust^ 19^7. 

This failure paved the way for the largest American naval bill 
since the World War. "... I think there is a pretty strong feeling 
that we should extend our building program," Secretary Kellogg 
wrote to Coolidge. 41 The navy's General Board promptly began 
to prepare plans for an ambitious program of naval construction, 
so that members of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs might 
place it before the forthcoming session of Congress. 

It is impossible to measure precisely the repercussions on the 
Briand proposal of the ill-fated Geneva Naval Conference. The 
conference's failure disgusted the Coolidge Administration. It was 
humiliating to have European diplomats whispering to each other 
that the conference failed because of "lack of preparation" in 
other words, Coolidge's and Kellogg's ignorance of European affairs. 
Surely the dismal end of the conference left Secretary Kellogg 
irritated at France for not attending, and at Britain for failing to 
cooperate. If the conference achieved anything it convinced Secre- 
tary Kellogg that the farther he kept away from European vicissi- 
tudes the better. In effect, the conference's failure threw Kellogg 
into the arms of isolationists such as Senator Borah. If peace ad- 
vocates in the United States, supposed that Secretary Kellogg was 
beginning to favor a scheme with France looking toward the peace 
of the world, they were utterly mistaken. 

The State Department on August 19 announced that Ambassa- 
dor Herrick, recuperating from his operation in Cleveland, was 
too weak to travel to Washington to confer with Secretary Kellogg 
on Briand's peace proposal. 42 Herrick was still recuperating on 
September 14 when Kellogg conversed with the newly returned 
French ambassador, Paul Claudel. And not only had he been un- 
able to speak with Herrick, Kellogg said, but he had had no op- 
portunity to talk with Coolidge; since the president returned from 
the Dakotas Kellogg had been busy with matters "exceedingly 

41. Kellogg to Coolidge, Aug. 10, 1927, FR: 192*], I, 157-159. 

42. New York Times, Aug. 20, 1927. Presumably Kellogg was also unable to 
travel to Cleveland. 


pressing.'* Furthermore, the secretary of state told Claudel, he 
would be unable to discuss the Briand proposal with the president 
until about the first of October, after returning from his forthcom- 
ing trip to St. Paul, Minnesota. 43 

What did Paul Claudel think of Secretary Kellogg's elaborate 

Paul Louis Charles. Claudel had had a long and illustrious 
career in the French foreign service. He had spent twenty years in 
the Orient. Devoting his leisure there to writing poetry and phi- 
losophy, he had achieved considerable success and acclaim in literary 
circles. Indeed, he distinguished himself as one of the foremost 
French writers of his generation. The fame of Paul Claudel, mys- 
tic poet and Catholic philosopher, already in 1927 was beginning 
to transcend even the fame of Paul Claudel, professional diplomat. 
Claudel, personally, was a somewhat difficult individual to know. 
As French ambassador to the United States, he gained a reputation 
as the most silent, the most depressing dinner companion in Wash- 
ington, always appearing as if he were longing for a houseboat at 
Foochow, or the pale pearl of the tropic sea where, as he once 
dreamily wrote, "V&ius, telle qu'une lune toute tremp^e de plus 
purs rayons, faisait un grand reflet sur les eaux. Et un cocotier, se 
penchant sur la mer et I'&oile, comme un etre accabl d'amour, 
faisait le geste d'approcher son coeur du feu celeste/' 44 But if 
Claudel appeared absent-minded to casual Washington observers, 
at the State Department he quickly won another reputation as, 
easily, the most astute member of the Washington ambassadorial 
corps. It required little insight for a man of his experience to see 
that Kellogg was not in much of a hurry to further negotiations on 
the Briand treaty. 

43. Memorandum by Kellogg of a conversation with Claudel, Sept. 14, 
1927, FR: 192?, II, 626. 

44. Paul Claudel, Connausance de I'Est (Paris, Mercure, 1913), p. 9. 




.arrison Brown, English publicity agent for Out- 
lawry employed by S. O. Levinson, called on the Honorable John 
Bassett Moore one day in the late fall of 1927 at the Hague Peace 
Palace. For more than an hour young Mr. Brown and the elderly 
American justice of the World Court talked over the outlawing 
of war. Pondering the conversation afterward, Brown remembered 
that "old Moore" had made his life work the history of arbitration. 
In 1898 Moore had written eight volumes, in 1908 another six 
volumes or so; and now he was seeking to publish some thirty 
more concerning the history of arbitration in ancient and modern 

Brown had difficulty talking to the elderly scholar. He believed 
that he had taken Justice Moore a long way, but it required much 
persistence and quick slipping in, for Moore wandered off con- 
stantly into reminiscences of long past congresses and conferences 
and details of past conventions in which proceedings had been 
nullified by reservations inserted after the convention and before 
ratification by individual states. 

Brown asked Moore if perhaps making rules for war was a hope- 
less job. 

No, no, rejoined Moore. Not if you could persuade everyone to 
sign them. 

Brown went into some details, mentioned the World War, 
and asked if it did not seem that the time had come for a radical 


attack upon the whole war system; the problem threatened civiliza- 
tion's very existence. 

Moore replied that Brown would be up against human nature 
which does not change. 

It did change, countered Brown. He offered Moore some ex- 

No! No! 

Brown expounded with fervor his idea about the contribution 
of America to the world, her faculty for tackling old problems in 
new ways and freed from old traditions. 

Old Moore merely lay back in his chair and smiled at young 
Mr. Brown. 1 

The month of October came and passed. Ambassador Paul 
Claudel still awaited the convenience of Secretary Kellogg. 

" The peace forces could not understand such dalliance. As the 
National Council for Prevention of War complained bitterly in 
one of its October News Bulletins, "Why is the State Department 
silent on this truly great [antiwar] proposal? . . . Does anyone 
doubt that it would be a popular measure?" 2 Paul Scott Mowrer of 
the Chicago Daily News sought to explain Outlawry of war to the 
sophisticated J. Theodore Marriner of the State Department. 
Mowrer employed Levinson's analogy of the extinction of dueling 
and the extinction of war. The skeptical Marriner asked if any 
armaments, would be necessary after war had become an inter- 

1. Harrison Brown to Levinson, Nov. 9, 1927, Levinson MSS. 

2. NCPW, News Bulletin, 6 (Oct. i, 1937), 2. Dr. Charles Clayton Morrison's 
recently published book clearly had pointed up the inevitable conclusion to 
be drawn if diplomats refused to advocate Outlawry: "Could there be any more 
vivid lighting up of the hypocrisies of peace diplomacy, of the deceptions which 
lie hidden in all die peace rhetoric of our international statesmen, of the thrall- 
dom by which the nations are chained to the war system?" "The high-flown 
peace talk of the diplomats/' Morrison had concluded, "would then be known 
for the mere froth that it would thereby be proved to be." C. C. Morrison, 
Outlawry of War, pp. 55-56. 


national crime. Yes, Mowrer replied blandly, just as swords and 
pistols had survived the outlawry of dueling, to ward off illegal 
attacks. 3 

The Outlawrists were especially busy during these days. The 
Reverend John Haynes Holmes saw Borah early in November, and 
the two men had a delightful time discussing Mexico, Russia, Pro- 
hibition, and Outlawry. Holmes felt immeasurably pleased to 
observe Borah so emphatic in his arguments, for the senator now 
had a different attitude toward the Briand proposal. Borah de- 
sired a series of bilateral agreements, which he regarded as steps 
toward the ultimate goal of Outlawry, Code, and Court. 4 

Until this time Borah, as Senate spokesman on foreign policy, 
could have been glad that his fellow senators refrained from parad- 
ing in front of the Band Wagon of Peace. Aside from a few pro- 
nouncements after Butler's letter to the New York Times, the 
senators had left foreign policy to the chairman of the foreign rela- 
tions committee. But Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas now stepped 
out in front by giving to the press the text of a resolution which 
he announced he shortly would introduce into the Senate. 5 The 
Capper resolution stated that the United States should (i) con- 
clude renunciation of war treaties with France and other like- 
minded nations; (2) accept the Locarno definition of an aggressor; 
(3) by treaty with France and other like-minded nations declare that 
nationals of the contracting governments should not, in giving aid 
and comfort to an aggressor nation, receive the protection of their 

Capper had previously written Nicholas Murray Butler and 
offered his services in proposing an antiwar resolution. 6 Butler 
promptly sent the text of "a very carefully drawn Joint Resolu- 
tion." Capper, "delighted," promised to introduce it. 7 The presi- 

3. Memorandum by JMarriner of a conversation with Mowrer, Oct. 6, 1927, 
711.511? France/Go. 

4. Holmes to Levinson, Nov. 9, 1927, Levinson MSS. 

5. He introduced it Dec. 8. 

6. Letter of Sept 26, 1927, Butler MSS. 

7. Butler to Capper, Oct. 20, 1927; Capper to Butler, Oct. 25, Butler MSS. 


dent of Columbia, also delighted, offered use of the Carnegie En- 
dowment's news service to spread knowledge of the resolution 
abroad. 8 

Capper tactfully also had sought Levinson's advice before pre- 
senting his antiwar resolution* Levinson had given advice (take out 
the "European" aggressor clause), only to discover that Capper 
rejected it. Levinson then hurried to Washington, but arrived 
after Capper had given the text of his proposed resolution to the 

In the course of corresponding with Senator Capper, Levinson 
was unable to resist intriguing against his pro-League rival, the 
president of Columbia University. He warned Capper against the 
machinations of Butler's peace group and of the dangerous fellow- 
ship in which Capper would involve himself by following Butler. 
Capper forwarded the letter to a stately address on Morningside 
Heights. 9 The fat was in the fire. Dr. Butler was at the moment tour- 
ing the West, but when he returned he advised Senator Capper as 

I am back this morning from a notable trip as far as Denver, 
where I have advocated your [sic] joint resolution before great 
meetings in Colorado, in Missouri and in Indiana ... On re- 
turning I have your correspondence with Mr. Levinson. He and 
his group are, in my judgment, absolutely wrong-headed on this 
subject, and will always prove an obstacle to any practical step 
forward. His proposal is wholly visionary and is so considered by 
every one who has any knowledge on the subject. A recent book 
on the outlawry of war by the editor of a religious journal pub- 
lished in Chicago contains more misstatements of historical and 
legal fact and exhibits more ignorance of the whole subject than 
one would think it possible to get between two covers, 10 

8. Butler to Capper, Nov. 7, 1927, Butler MSS. 

9. Levinson to Capper, Dec 5, 1927; Capper to Butler, Dec. 9, Butler MSS. 

10. Butler to Capper, Dec. 17, 1927, Butler MSS. But there were other opin- 
ions of Morrison's book. A certain "C.W.R." had reviewed the Outlawry of 
War in the Nov. 10, 1927, issue of the Christian Register. Concluded C.W.R.: 
"The fact is that no person is now competent to speak or write on the subject 
of peace and war unless he has read this book -and read it on bended knees." 


The real significance of the Capper resolution lay, however, not 
in its piquant "secret history" but rather in the fact that it indicated 
the West awakening to the peace campaign. Senator Capper verily 
was a farmer of the farmers. He was publisher-proprietor of the 
Topeka Daily Capital, Capper's Weekly, Farmers 9 Mail and Breeze, 
Household Magazine, Capper's Farmer, Missouri Ruralist, Ohio 
Farmer, Pennsylvania Farmer, and Michigan Farmer. He also was 
president of the Board of Regents of Kansas Agricultural College 
and director of the Farmers National Bank of Topeka. Like no one 
else, Capper knew the temper of his constituents; an extremely as- 
tute politician, people said he kept his ear so close to the ground that 
the grasshoppers often bit it. The administration had to take notice 
of the Capper resolution. 

And the administration took notice. A White House spokesman 
on November 25 stated that President Coolidge believed that there 
was no short cut to peace any more than to any other form of salva- 
tion. Outlawing war was something to be approached with fear and 
trembling. The president held that the chief obstacle to the plan of 
outlawing war was the provision of the Constitution which gave to 
Congress the sole power to make war. In the presidential mind the 
United States had demonstrated in many ways its love of peace and 
international understanding: its small army, its small navy in com- 
parison with the length of coastline it had to defend, and its general 
distaste for interferences in the affairs of other nations all testified 
to America's love of peace. 11 

But when Dr. Charles Clayton Morrison read the newspaper ac- 
counts of how Coolidge had poured cold water on Briand's proposal 
he hurriedly sent the president a telegram. Friends of peace in 
Chicago, Morrison affirmed, wished to know if it was true that 
Coolidge considered Outlawry unconstitutional. The president's 
secretary coolly wrote an acknowledgment, stating that Coolidge- 
assumed no responsibility whatever for newspaper interpretations 
of his views; whenever the president had definite statements to 
make he made them either in public addresses or messages to Con- 
gress. 12 

11. New York Times, Nov. 26, 1927. 

12. Telegram and acknowledgment both dated Nov. 26, 1928, Coolidge MSS. 


It was nonetheless obvious that Coolidge had said Outlawry 
was unconstitutional. Reporters, following the custom of never 
quoting the president directly, merely had transferred his remarks 
into indirect discourse and attributed them to that mythical per- 
sonage known as the "White House spokesman." According to 
the official verbatim transcript of Coolidge's press conference of 
November 25, 1927 (transcripts of all his press conferences are 
now available at The Forbes Library, Northampton, Massachu- 
setts), the president had said: "I have given some thought to the 
suggestion for the outlawry of war. Any treaties made on that sub- 
ject are somewhat difficult under our Constitution. Those difficul- 
ties were quite clearly set out some months ago by Dr. David Jayne 
Hill in an article that was, I think, in the Saturday Evening Post. 
I don't know that they are insuperable, but they are certainly very 
great . . . There isn't any short cut to peace. There is no short 
cut to any other salvation. I think we are advised it has to be worked 
out with fear and trembling." 

The afternoon that Coolidge made this unofficial pronounce- 
ment on Outlawry Senator Borah informed reporters that because 
of its crowded schedule of domestic measures he doubted if the 
Congress would have sufficient time to focus attention on any 
permanent peace or antiwar plan. 13 But the senator reconsidered, 
for the next day he was saying that the plan to outlaw war did not 
take away the constitutional power of Congress to declare war; it 
merely created a condition where it never would be necessary to 
exercise that power. "It was gathered from what Mr. Borah said," 
wrote the New York Times Washington correspondent, "that he 
believed there was an opportunity for some one to come forward 
with a declaration that war was a crime and lead a crusade. He men- 
tioned no names." w 

In Chicago on November 27 Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, the famous 
leader of American Jewry, spoke at the Downtown Forum and dis- 

13. New York Times, Nov. 26, 1927. 

14. Once, said Borah, slavery was legal, but William Lloyd Garrison fought 
against it, declaring it a crime; thirty years later it was made a crime. New York 
Times, Nov. 27, 1927. Borah was exceedingly sensitive to public opinion, and 
he knew full well that Outlawry had public support. 


cussed the "Best and Worst in America." Under the Best he in- 
cluded Outlawry of war and mentioned Levinson's name two or 
three times. Wise's advocacy augured well for Outlawry. Only re- 
cently the Capper episode had shown that the Levinson Outlawrists 
and Butler renunciationists cherished a deep mutual dislike which 
lay only beneath the surface. Rabbi Wise, however, well known as 
a proponent of the League of Nations, was a leading worker in But- 
ler's camp. And now Wise had declared Outlawry among the Best 
in America. 

Representative Hamilton Fish Jr. introduced a resolution into 
the House of Representatives on December 7, 1927, requesting 
the secretary of state to furnish the House with a copy of the French 
proposition for an antiwar treaty. Fish pointed out that the proper 
way to approve an antiwar covenant was by joint resolution, for an 
Outlawry proposal involved the constitutional powers of the 
House. 15 This effort came to nothing, for Secretary of State Kel- 
logg replied privately to Fish in a letter of December 13 that it 
would not be in the public interest to reveal the terms of Briand's 
proposal to the United States. 16 

The peace forces marched on. President Coolidge on December 
10 had to assure Jane Addams, president of the Women's Interna- 
tional League for Peace and Freedom who headed a delegation 
calling at the White House, that strong efforts would take place to 
obtain the adoption of a treaty between the United States and 
France outlawing war between the two nations. Coolidge, accord- 
ing to Miss Addams, said that upon the return of Ambassador 
Herrick to France conversations would take place with the French 
Government relative to Briand's proposal. 17 Miss Addams pre- 
sented the president with a petition containing 30,000 signatures 
urging him to take the initiative. (Miss Addams may also have told 
the president that the Chicago Branch of the WILPF-US had writ- 
ten to Aristide Briand, informing the French foreign minister 
about the petition and enclosing a copy. In due course Briand had 

15. New York Times, Dec. 8, 1927* 

16. 711.5112 France/68. 

17. Such was Miss Addams' report after the interview. New York Times, 
Dec. 11, 1927. 


replied, thanking the ladies for their efforts and expressing his in- 
terest.) 18 

Thus American peace leaders by December 1927 were excited 
over the Briand proposal. Nonetheless, whatever move the Coolidge 
Administration made it would have to be done in the light of cer- 
tain realities of the European political scene. Those realities the 
peace enthusiasts tended to overlook or underestimate. 

Let us therefore examine closely the proceedings of the Eighth 
Assembly of the League of Nations, which in the fall of 1927 con- 
vened at Geneva. There could be no better way to bring ourselves 
back into touch with the great international problems and policies 
of Europe, or to observe the artful way that a proposal for the re- 
nunciation of war could affect, and be affected by, those problems 
and policies. We shall have reason to remember the activities of 
the Eighth Assembly later in our narrative, when we see how the 
original Briand proposal for a Pact of Perpetual Friendship be- 
tween France and the United States took on more ambitious pro- 


The second day after the League Assembly opened, namely on 
Tuesday, September 6, 1927, the Dutch Foreign Minister Beelaerts 
van Blokland made a speech. "We must realise," he said, "that pub- 
lic opinion in different countries is moving . . . [toward a strong 
organization of the peace], and that, particularly in overseas coun- 
tries, there is a growing current of opinion which has adopted as its 
watchword 'the outlawry of war.' Has not the moment come, I ask, 
to resume our efforts to bridge the gap in Article 15 of the Cove- 
nant by excluding legitimate warfare in the future and by stig- 
matising a war of aggression as an international crime?" 19 Blok- 
land then proceeded to reintroduce the Geneva Protocol. 

18. WILPF, British Section, Monthly News Sheet (Dec. 1927). 

19. League of Nations, Records of the Eighth Ordinary Session of the As- 
sembly, Plenary Meetings, Text of the Debates (Geneva, 1927), p. 40. How did 
Blokland learn of Outlawry? Perhaps through Harrison Brown, who had 
contacted Blokland's governmental colleague, Loudon. One of Brown's ac- 


He o course suggested to the Assembly only a reconsideration 
of the "general principles'* which underlay the protocol not re- 
consideration of the protocol itself. Yet one could not discuss the 
protocol's general principles without reference to the protocol. 
Blokland's purpose was clear to everyone. 

The next development in the Assembly occurred the following 
Friday when M. Sokal of Poland proposed a resolution: 

The Assembly 

Recognising the solidarity which unites the community of 

Being inspired by a firm desire for the maintenance of gen- 
eral peace; 

Being convinced that a war of aggression can never serve as 
a means of settling international disputes and is, in consequence, 
an international crime; 

Considering that a solemn renunciation of all wars of ag- 
gression would tend to create an atmosphere of general con- 
fidence calculated to facilitate the progress of the work under- 
taken with a view to disarmament; 


(1) That all wars of aggression are, and shall always be, pro- 

(2) That every pacific means must be employed to settle dis- 
putes, of every description, which may arise between States. 

The Assembly declares that the States Members of the League 
are under an obligation to conform to these principles. 20 

Here was astonishing similarity to Briand's proposed Pact of 
Perpetual Friendship with the United States. Not to mention that 
proposal's illustrious forebears, the Rumanian and Yugoslav alli- 

quaintances, a Mrs. Kluyver of the Dutch delegation at Geneva, also had spoken 
to Loudon and had persuaded him to read some o the Outlawry literature. J. 
Stoner, Lev'mson, pp. 254-255. 

20. L. of N., Debates of the Eighth Assembly, p. 84. 


ances. Why did the Polish delegate, Sokal, who represented a na- 
tion allied with France, propose such a resolution? 

That is not a difficult question, although it necessitates an in- 
volved answer. 

After Sokal's speech and resolution, Vittorio Scialoja (Italy) 
remarked that the Assembly must not seek to escape its respon- 
sibilities by means of phrases. The public, he thought, should not 
be led to believe that the Assembly was finding immediate solutions 
for problems of an immense gravity. Consideration for the credit of 
the League of Nations should prevent the Assembly from making 
useless demonstrations. 21 

The next day Briand in the morning made one of his famous 
speeches. Beyond physical tribunals and established codes, he said, 
there were moral rules, and there was a tribunal constituted by the 
universal conscience. Its judgments had weight. After a solemn en- 
gagement not to resort to war no country, Briand believed, could 
let war loose upon the world without preparing for itself an im- 
possible future, even though it should gain what was called a vic- 
tory. Who could say after the last war in what a victory consisted? 
The country which committed aggressive war, Briand concluded, 
would receive the brand of Cain. 22 

Sir Austen Chamberlain that afternoon welcomed the motion 
of the honorable delegate from Poland, not because it said anything 
new, but because once again it invited all to join in the solemn 
resolution to pursue the ways of peace and to eschew the path of 
war. With this perfunctory introduction Chamberlain turned to 
the Dutch proposal. Great Britain, he said, was being asked to take 
for every country and for every frontier the guarantee which she 
had taken for one frontier only by the Treaty of Locarno. To ask 
that was to ask the impossible. Concerning the talk about gaps in 
the Covenant, he reminded the Assembly that there were openings 
in every building giving power to breathe, and passages giving 
power to move. 23 

21. I bid., p. 86. 

22. Ibid., p. 93. 

23. Ibid., pp. 95-99. 


After this unenthusiastic speech the Assembly sent the Dutch 
and Polish resolutions to the Third Committee. 

What now occurred is not very clear. Nothing happened in the 
Third Committee its debates were dull and uninformative but 
there must have been an attempt in an unofficial way to line up 
support for a combination of the two resolutions. Apparently the 
new resolution would have contained the rhetoric of the Polish 
resolution backed by sanctions resembling the Geneva Protocol. 
Chamberlain, however, seems to have blocked this scheme by re- 
fusing to accept the protocol in any form. 24 In the end there was 
left only the Polish resolution, which bereft of sanctions and hav- 
ing only the force of a recommendation no one considered worth 
very much. 

On September 24 Sokal as rapporteur for the Third Committee 
informed the Assembly that its committee had taken the view that 
in the present circumstances a resolution, voted solemnly by the 
Assembly, declaring that wars of aggression must never be resorted 
to as a means of settling disputes between states, and branding them 
as an international crime, would exercise a salutary influence on 
public opinion and would contribute to the future development 
of the work of the League in respect of security and disarmament. 
While agreeing that the draft resolution did not in itself constitute 
a definite legal instrument, self-sufficing or increasing security in 
any practical manner, the Third Committee had unanimously 
agreed as to its great moral and educational value. Sokal then 

24. Wrote Stresemann from Geneva to Chancellor Marx, Sept. 31, 1927: 
". . . we could only nullify the Polish project which would have developed 
into an Eastern Locarno by the aid o England and France ... In this busi- 
ness our personal relations with Chamberlain and Briand stood the test ad- 
mirably. Chamberlain told me in advance that he would not admit any proposal 
that placed him and myself in opposing camps, and that to him the collabora- 
tion of the Locarno Powers was of more value than all the resolutions of the 
League. . . . The proposal of the Poles for an Eastern Locarno is rejected/' 
Eric Sutton, ed., Gustav Stresemann: His Diaries, Letters, and Papers, III, 
209. Probably Briand, observing Chamberlain's displeasure with the Polish 
project, sought to give the appearance of unity with Chamberlain and Strese- 


offered his resolution against aggressive war. The Assembly, in ac- 
cord with the dignity of the resolution, voted by roll call, and the 
president announced that the resolution had passed unanimously/ 



Although a resolution mutually to renounce aggressive war 
actually held little attraction for European nations, it was possible 
to discover and offer other, more fetching, propositions- The famous 
former editor of the London Times, H. Wickham Steed, while 
visiting in the United States in the autumn of 1927, advocated an 
interesting scheme. 

Sensing the rising American feeling against war, Steed pro- 
posed that the United States Government issue a unilateral pro- 
nouncement, similar to the Monroe Doctrine, that "the United 
States abhors aggressive war, and that it will never weaken the 
hands of other nations which may band themselves together for the 
purpose of deterring an aggressor or of compelling him to desist 
from aggression/* 26 Here was generalization to all nations of part 
of the benefits France might have expected from the Pact of Per- 
petual Friendship: the United States would pledge that American 
neutrality would not follow automatically upon every outbreak in 
Europe. Furthermore, the Steed proposal would have helped the 
League administer sanctions; it would condition the United States 
to aid with the "quarantine/' But although Steed engaged in a brief 
tour of the United States, explaining his plan in public and semi- 
public addresses, and although he even enjoyed an interview with 
President Coolidge, his proposal sounded "European** to Ameri- 
cans, and it did not seem to come off. 

Another proposal, current in Great Britain in the autumn of 
1927, was an "all-in" arbitration treaty between Britain and the 
United States. After the failure of the Geneva Naval Disarmament 
Conference, Viscount Cecil resigned from the British Cabinet and 
launched a great campaign for such an all-in treaty. As Cecil told 

25. L. of N., Debates of the Eighth Assembly, pp. 155-156. 

26. H. Wickham Steed, "A Proposal for an American Doctrine of World 
Peace," Current History, 27 (Dec. 1927), 347-349. 


Harrison Brown, he was not opposed to Outlawry of war but he 
believed it would require many years. The problem of stopping 
war could not be delayed, said Cecil, and he hoped he could obtain 
all-in arbitration in time to prevent another large European war. 
Cecil saw little likelihood of the Conservative government's pro- 
posing a Briand pact to the United States, but believed that if the 
United States Government offered one public opinion in Britain 
would force its acceptance. 27 

Actually, an all-in arbitration treaty was a pact of perpetual 
friendship with a different name. The British League of Nations 
Union candidly advised in its "Notes for Speakers" that, if deemed 
advisable, speakers could press either for an all-in treaty or a simple 
antiwar pact. The difference, of course, was only verbal. 28 

The Republic of France on Armistice Day 1927 did finally sign 
its alliance, hitherto only initialed, with Yugoslavia. Signature in 
Paris of the Treaty of Friendly Understanding provided occasion 
for much ceremony. There were many banquets for the Yugoslavs 
and a considerable distribution of crosses of the Legion of Honor. 
The Yugoslav Foreign Minister Nincic announced reassuringly that 
the treaty was "a compact of peace. If otherwise, neither of the two 
Governments would sign it." 29 In a speech delivered immediately 
after the signing Briand himself protested that the treaty contained 
no spear point directed against any third party whatsoever. It was, 
he said, oriented entirely toward peace. 80 In Rome, however, this 
so apparently peaceful Treaty of Friendly Understanding aimed 
at no third party whatsoever, oriented entirely toward peace cre- 
ated a surprising amount of unfriendly misunderstanding. Eleven 
days later Italy signed a defensive alliance with Albania. Premier 
Mussolini declared simultaneously that the Italo- Albanian treaty 
had no connection whatsoever with the Franco-Yugoslav treaty. 

27. Brown to Levinson, Nov. 17, 1927, Levinson MSS. 

28. The Union first had championed only an all-in treaty. When Arnold 
Forster told Harrison Brown that he had also included advocacy of a simple 
antiwar pact in the "Notes for Speakers" Brown joyfully envisioned a new 
advance for Outlawry. Brown to Levinson, Nov. 22, 1927, Levinson MSS. 

29. New York Times, Nov. 10, 1927. 

30. London Times, Nov. 12, 1927. 


In Europe in the fall of 1927 there were available, as we have 
seen, several schemes for organizing the peace. Bilateral treaties of 
friendly understanding appeared to have a certain efficacy at least 
bilaterally. As for all-in arbitration treaties, simple antiwar pacts, 
and a New Monroe Doctrine such projects offered perhaps feasi- 
ble ways to bring the United States into some sort of participation 
in European affairs. But mere resolutions to renounce aggressive 
war seemed to Europeans hardly worth serious consideration (un- 
less the resolutions disguised something akin to the Geneva Proto- 
col). 31 

The Search for Peace was no simple matter. Attempting to ex- 
plain its complexity Aristide Briand, from his office in the Quai 
d'Orsay, sent a 1927 "Christmas message to the American people." 
The French foreign minister, as was his custom, did not send the 
missive to Secretary Kellogg for proper transmission; it seemed that 
Briand preferred the method of direct approach, perhaps because 
he was not unmindful of his numerous supporters among the Ameri- 
can peace movement. In his message Briand remarked that during 
the past year Europe had been close to grave dangers. On several 
occasions it was obvious, he said, that the European situation had 
not acquired a stability and balance which would permit statesmen 
to suspend their efforts and watchfulness. "It is an immense task," 
the foreign minister added, "and a long-range one, really to re- 
establish peace on a continent which has been so shaken." He de- 
scribed the then current Polish-Lithuanian dispute and said that 
"In the east of Europe, where some frontiers are not recognized 
by the countries concerned ... it is entirely likely, as has often 
been the case in the Balkan Peninsula, that war, once started, 
would spread." Briand stressed the value of frequent international 
meetings at Geneva. 'There is no need," he continued, "of my 

31. The governments of Europe paid no attention to a proposal advanced 
on Nov. 30, 1927, by the Soviet Russian Government. The Russian delegate 
to the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament proposed the immediate and 
total abolition of all armies, navies, and air forces, the sinking of all warships, 
the scrapping of all war material, and the demolition of all arms factories! A 
few weeks later the French Chamber of Deputies voted instead 150,000,000 
francs for construction of one io,ooo-ton cruiser, six destroyers, five first-class 
submarines, one mine-sowing submarine, and two dispatch boats. 


saying that it would be precious help if the United States o America 
would join this work of concord and peace." 82 

Europe, Briand had said, needed the help of the United States. 
The French foreign minister was not thinking of mere international 
resolutions to renounce aggressive war. The organisation de la paix 
was a sophisticated undertaking; as was evident at the proceedings 
of the League of Nations' Eighth Assembly, diplomats cared little 
for gestures. Briand, searching anxiously for ways to peace on the 
Continent, beholding simultaneously in the United States an im- 
mense amount of naive peace enthusiasm, obviously desired to at- 
tach that enthusiasm firmly to European realities. 

32. New York Times, Dec. 25, 1927. 

Chapter Ten: DENOUEMENT 


.s the summer of 1927 turned into fall and then 
into early winter the foliage around the White House changed 
from green to brown-and-tan, and then dropped to the ground. 
There it drifted until men came with baskets and rakes and gathered 
it up. Each day the president, a thin, wizened figure in tightly fit- 
ting business suit and starched collar, took his early morning walk 
about the grounds and environs. Calvin Coolidge scuffed along 
among the dead leaves. Occasionally he would kick at them im- 
patiently or step on them heavily. Perhaps at such times he was 
thinking about Aristide Briand's proposed Pact of Perpetual Friend- 
ship between France and the United States. 

Across the way from the White House stood the old post-Civil 
War pile known as the State, War and Navy Building. Each morn- 
ing Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg hurried nervously along 
Seventeenth Street to the side entrance, through the doors, up the 
elevator to his office. Some days he was quiet and kindly, in excel- 
lent humor, at peace with himself and with the world. On other 
days with flushed face and angry, snapping eyes the secretary 
pounded his desk, pounced with both hands on his row of buzzers, 
and swore at everyone unfortunate enough to open his office door. 
Perhaps at such times he was thinking of the " paci- 
fists" with their Outlawry of war, and of Aristide Briand making 
use of them to open the door of American foreign policy to France's 
system of European alliances. 

The secretary of state and the president were in perfect agree- 


ment regarding Briand's proposal for a bilateral pact of friend- 
ship. They knew what it in reality meant. To them such a pact was 
impossible because of its inherent nature as a negative military alli- 
ance. At the same time Coolidge and Kellogg were beginning to see 
that the United States Government would have to do something to 
mollify the American peace movement, which Briand was astutely 
exploiting to bring more and more pressure upon the administra- 
tion. Briand's proposal of bilateral friendship made necessary a 
substitute gesture of some sort toward the cause of peace. 

This was the background for the crucial diplomatic negotiations 
of November and December 1927. Let us now follow the denoue- 
ment of Briand's proposal as the Coolidge Administration cau- 
tiously searched for the right course of action, and as the Quai 
d'Orsay ingeniously maneuvered for bilateral renunciation of war 
as an instrument of national policy. Sometimes the French Foreign 
Office moved with great energy. At other times it appeared willing 
to make startling compromises. Always it sought to extract the very 
utmost from the diplomatic situation of the moment. 

The White House announced on November 4, 1927, that the 
president believed the time would soon be ripe for further discus- 
sion of Briand's draft treaty. Just what this meant was unclear, 
for Coolidge a few days later, according to "guarded comment," 
took the position that the government's chief desire should be so to 
conduct its foreign relations as to avoid participation in contro- 
versies affecting other governments. 1 

Meanwhile Senator Borah was planning a public pronounce- 

i. New York Times, Nov. 5, 9, 1927. Coolidge on Nov. 8 had told his press 
conference: "I had a short talk with Mr. Steed, Wickham Steed, the editor o the 
London Review of Reviews when he was here. I didn't have a chance to go into 
much of the development o the suggestion that he is making relative to some 
position that should be announced by the United States as to what it might do 
in certain contingencies, so I have never come to any definite conclusion about 
it I told him I thought it could be assumed that our main desire was to keep 
out of controversies that affected other nations." Transcripts of press confer- 
ences, deposited in The Forbes Library, Northampton, Mass. 


ment for a multipower Outlawry pact in a speech at the Hotel Astor 
in New York, November 10. When Mrs. Borah became ill the sen- 
ator sent a telegram to the Reverend Sidney Gulick, secretary of 
the Federal Council of Churches and chairman of the meeting, 
canceling his engagement. But he managed to incorporate in his 
message the gist of his planned proposal: "M. Briand has suggested 
the first step. Let us suggest the second and include Great Britain, 
Japan, Germany, and Italy. That would furnish a real foundation 
for Outlawing War sincerely/' 2 One wonders what Ambassador 
Claudel in Washington thought when he read this public utter- 
ance by the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- 

Claudel made two speeches in the next few days, models of 
diplomacy, a different proposal in each speech. At a banquet in 
Washington, November 14, he said the United States was the arbiter 
of war or peace in the world. "If she vetoes war, there can be no 
war, and ... all by herself, she can do more for the cause of 
peace, only by opening or by closing her doors, than any continent 
and than any league of nations." 3 This sounded like Wickham 
Steed's proposition. The next night at the Sherry-Netherland in 
New York Claudel told a meeting of the Foreign Press Association 
that France hated war. "A new word has been coined in America 
'to outlaw the war/ It is a splendid word and a good idea. France is 
as ready to try it as any other [idea?] . * /' 4 This sounded like 
Briand's proposal. 

While the French ambassador maneuvered so astutely, and 
while Senator Borah pointed the way to the future, the Coolidge 
Administration made one last effort to tip over the careening Peace 
Wagon. Using the same argument he had offered "unofficially" in 
answer to Senator Capper's resolution, President Coolidge now 
pushed hard in his Annual Message to Congress on the State of the 
Union, December 6, 1927. "In general/' said the president, 

2. New York Times, Nov. 11, 1927. Levinson took Borah's place at the 

3. New York Times, Nov. 15, 1927. 

4. Ibid., Nov. 16. 


our relations with other countries can be said to have improved 
within the year. ... we can afford to be liberal toward others. 
Our example has become of great importance in the world. It 
is recognized that we are independent, detached, and can and do 
take a disinterested position in relation to international affairs. 
Our charity embraces the earth. . . . Our financial favors are 
widespread. . . . Proposals for promoting the peace of the 
world will have careful consideration. But we are not a people 
who are always seeking for a sign. We know that peace comes 
from honesty and fair dealing, from moderation, and a generous 
regard for the rights of others. The heart of the Nation is more 
important than treaties, . , , We should continue to promote 
peace by our example, and fortify it by such international cove- 
nants against war as we are permitted under our Constitution 
to make. 5 

Coolidge's thrust had no effect. Few people noticed it. The 
peace movement busily continued its campaign for perpetual peace 
between France and the United States. 


William R. Castle, assistant secretary of state for western Eu- 
ropean affairs, had an office adjoining that of Secretary Kellogg. 
It was to Castle's office rather than to the secretary's that many of 
the Washington ambassadors and ministers liked to come to talk 
over their troubles. Scion of an illustrious Hawaiian family, the 
assistant secretary of state was a handsome, genial man, who once 
had been an English professor at Harvard. Bill Castle had a way of 
disarming people. When he fixed his friendly eyes upon a minister 
or ambassador the envoy often would completely forget diplomacy 
and pour out his heart. But behind the friendly eyes lurked a razor- 

5. FR: 192*], I, xxiv-xxv. Italics inserted. The quoted passages are all from 
the section on "Foreign Relations," In making up the Annual Message on the 
State of the Union, it is customary for the Department of State to prepare this 
section, which then must obtain presidential approval. 


sharp mind which soon afterward mercilessly recorded all confes- 
sions in official State Department memoranda. Not without rea- 
son did the French journalist Pertinax characterize the American 
assistant secretary of state as the "subtil Mons. Castle." 

Now whenever the equally subtil Paul Claudel came to confess 
there was bound to be interesting conversation. Claudel came on 
December 10, 1927. The conversation was interesting and even 
startling for Claudel sought to scuttle the antiwar negotiations. He 
proposed to combine all the recent peace formulas into a renewal of 
the Franco-American treaty of arbitration. 

He began by saying that the French Government thought it very 
important, since the Franco- American Root treaty was soon to ex- 
pire, that France and the United States either renew this treaty 
or sign a more comprehensive treaty. 

I asked him in this connection [said Castle] whether he was 
referring to the draft of a treaty outlawing war submitted 
through Mr. Herrick by M. Briand. He said that this, of course, 
was to be taken into consideration. He said that M . Briand was 
much impressed with the phrase invented in this country "out- 
lawry of war" and felt that the phrase was exceedingly popular 
in the United States, that to embody the idea in a treaty might 
be very valuable. The Ambassador went on to say, however, 
that he thought the world was obviously not yet sufficiently ad- 
vanced to make a treaty of this nature acceptable. I told him 
that it seemed to me that, although such a treaty would do no 
harm and might be of some use in its appeal to sentiment, it 
could easily be of very real harm if it were a treaty concluded 
between two countries only, and that I could not see any par- 
ticular harm in a treaty of this nature if it could be concluded 
between a great number of countries, but that even so in the 
present stage of world sentiment, these treaties would hardly 
be more than words. 

The Ambassador said he entirely agreed, but that after all 
I should not minimize the importance of words, that I probably 
remembered the phrase "In the beginning was the word" and 
said that, if the word was the foundation of the world, it must 


also be considered sometimes as the basis o facts. He then 
said that next February will be the isoth anniversary of the 
first treaty between France and the United States, that he 
thought we ought to produce a document which would appeal 
to sentiment, as well as insure the arbitration of all questions 
which can appropriately be arbitrated. He said that he knew 
the Senate would never agree to a treaty of general arbitration 
and that, after all, if we could have a really strong preamble 
we should have done what we could with words and satisfied 
public sentiment and that it would then do no harm to have 
what some people would call a "weak treaty." 

I told the Ambassador that this seemed to me an admirable 
suggestion and asked him what he would think of putting into 
the preamble. His words as I remember were about as follows: 
"The United States of America and France, looking confidently 
to the time when arbitration, conciliation and respect for in- 
ternational law shall eliminate the possibility of war, have 
agreed," etc. He pointed out that the actual treaty might well 
be substantially the present arbitration treaty. He said that this 
would be entirely satisfactory to his Government and he sup- 
posed would be satisfactory to the Government of the United 
States. I told him it would be, but I felt there should be some 
changes in the treaty in order not to make the whole thing an 
obvious trick. 

I told the Ambassador that I should be very glad imme- 
diately to take the matter up with the Secretary and to report 
progress. 6 

What, then, is to be concluded from this document? One may 
conclude that at least by December 10, 1927, Claudel felt uncer- 
tain about his chances of extracting a Pact of Perpetual Friend- 
ship from the American Government. That Castle and Claudel 
knew the meaninglessness of a multilateral treaty renouncing war. 
That hence the two diplomatists planned to appease public opinion 
by changing slightly, "in order not to make the whole thing an 

6. Memorandum by Castle of a conversation with Claudel, Dec. 10, 1927, 
711.5112 U.S./1. 


obvious trick/* the forthcoming new Franco-American arbitration 
treaty; among the changes, they proposed to renounce war in the 
treaty's nonbinding 7 preamble. 

Here, incidentally, lies the very origin of what later came to 
be known as the "Kellogg arbitration treaties/' as distinct from the 
Root arbitration treaties. The new Kellogg treaties, in addition to 
renouncing war as an instrument of national policy in their pre- 
ambles, changed ("in order not to make the whole thing an obvious 
trick") the formula of the Root treaties: 8 the Kellogg treaties ex- 
cepted from arbitration all disputes (i) within the domestic juris- 
diction of the signatories; (2) affecting third parties; (3) involving 
the Monroe Doctrine; (4) involving the League Covenant. The 
loophole of the Kellogg formula was the reservation of all questions 
of "domestic jurisdiction," and this loophole made American arbi- 
tration treaties continue to be of questionable value. In the Ameri- 
can Journal of International Law Professor Manley O. Hudson of 
Harvard, one of the country's leading experts on international law, 
wrote disgustedly anent the new Kellogg domestic jurisdiction 

7. Is a preamble binding? It is a popular view, and one held even by the 
State Department during negotiation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, that a 
treaty's preamble legally is not binding. It would be more accurate, however, 
to say "not as binding as the treaty's substantive text." Whenever there are 
ambiguities in the text itself judges or other inquirers must look elsewhere for 
the sense of the treaty, and a good place to look is, of course, the preamble. 
One also would consult statements, written or oral, made contemporaneously 
during negotiation of the treaty. In case ambiguity remained one would search 
for the sense of the treaty in other, more remote, declarations. In other words, 
for interpretative material one would begin with that nearest the instrument 
itself, and then work gradually into more peripheral matter. 

Diplomatists from time immemorial nevertheless have used preambles as 
verbal dumping grounds, filling them full of discarded ideas and saccharine 
international flattery. Perhaps we may conclude that, in a narrowly legal sense, 
a treaty's preamble has weight; but because of time-honored international 
custom the preamble usually has as much weight as, say, the platforms of the 
Democratic and Republican parties* 

Part of the preamble to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, however, was binding in 
a special manner, for many of the pact's interpretive notes referred to the 
preamble clause denying the benefits of the treaty to a transgressor. 

8. Vital interests, independence, or national honor, or disputes affecting 
third parties. See above, p. 6. 


formula that "It is a common process in human affairs to throw 
away an expression which has acquired an unpleasant 'psychic 
fringe/ and to substitute a new expression of similar content." 9 
But the authoritative interpretation of the dropping of the Anglo- 
French formula was Secretary Kellogg's own judgment in a letter 
to Elihu Root: "Strictly speaking/' Kellogg wrote, "I do not know 
that the dropping out of this proviso has much practical im- 
portance." 10 When the time arrived for signing the new Franco- 
American arbitration treaty Secretary Kellogg discovered that he 
had planned a trip to Canada, and so Ambassador Claudel on Feb- 
ruary 6, 192:8 the one-hundred-fiftieth anniversary of the sig- 
nature of the Franco-American alliance of 1778 signed the 
new treaty at Washington with Undersecretary of State Robert E. 
Olds. As if Kellogg's indifference were not sufficiently evident, the 
French Government later learned that the secretary of state had 
so carelessly drafted the treaty that an exchange of notes was neces- 
sary to clarify its terms. 11 

This excursion into the origin of the Kellogg arbitration treaties 
has taken us somewhat ahead in time and away from our chief in- 
terest, the impending denouement of the negotiations for Briand's 
Pact of Perpetual Friendship. 

Unaware of Assistant Secretary Castle's exceedingly frank con- 
versation with Claudel, Sir Esme Howard called on Secretary Kel- 
logg a few days later and asked about the negotiations with France. 
Kellogg truthfully said there was nothing definite yet 12 although 

9. Manley O. Hudson, "The New Arbitration Treaty with France," Am. J. 
of Int. L., 22 (1928), 371. 

10. Letter of Dec. 23, 1927, Elihu Root MSS, deposited in the Library of 

The American peace forces in the summer and fall were campaigning 
against the Franco-British formula. Wrote Frederick J. Libby to Esther Everett 
Lape, July 2, 1927: "I am very glad that you are campaigning against the 
phrase Vital interests and national honor.' I believe that phrase to be the neces- 
sary crux in our campaign next fall." NCPW files. 

11. As originally drawn, the treaty seemed to abrogate the Bryan treaty 
with France. 

12. Howard saw Kellogg on Dec. 15. The secretary seems to have made no 
memorandum of the conversation but recalled it later in a cable to Charg^ 
Atherton in London, Dec. 28, 1927, FR: 192*], II, 628* 


from another point of view the secretary could have said that very 
much was definite. 

The same day that Howard was visiting Secretary Kellogg, 
Claudel was again chatting with Assistant Secretary Castle. 

The French Ambassador came to see me [Castle wrote afterward] 
about his conversation with the Secretary [of which there is no 
record] on the subject of a new treaty of arbitration. He said 
that he was delighted with the suggestions made by the Secre- 
tary [whatever they were] as to the form of the treaty. The am- 
bassador then said that, as this treaty would be possibly the first 
step to be taken toward the outlawry of war, an idea which 
seemed to be exceedingly popular in the United States, the sig- 
nature would appear to be the occasion for the blowing of a 
certain number of trumpets. He said that he thought M. Briand 
would be very glad to come to America to sign the treaty, but 
that he did not want to make this suggestion officially because 
he certainly did not wish to appear to be pushing the whole 
situation too hard. He said that he would be very grateful for 
an expression of my reaction to this suggestion. 

I told him that I should like to think it over, but that off 
hand it struck me as a probably unnecessary formality, that it 
was quite clear that whatever treaty we finally signed would 
obviously not be a treaty outlawing war and that it would be 
a poor habit to get started to have ministers of foreign affairs 
running around the woild signing arbitration treaties. I said, 
however, that I should be very glad to think the matter over 
and let him know later. 

The Ambassador said in any case he hoped the treaty might 
be signed on February 6th. 

A few minutes before the Ambassador came Mr. Herrick 
talked with me about the Briand treaty suggestion. He said that 
when Briand gave him the draft it was perfectly obvious to him 
from what Briand said and from what he did not say that his 
main purpose in making the suggestion was for the political 
value it would be to him personally. It is quite clear to me that 
the suggestion that Briand should come over to America has 
precisely the same basis. He has the halo of Locarno still over 


his head and if he could add the halo of negotiating and sign- 
ing a treaty looking toward the outlawry of war between France 
and the United States, his political position would certainly be 
greatly strengthened. 13 

This document scarcely requires comment. 

Two days later the State Department told the press that Secre- 
tary Kellogg would adapt Briand's plan in part in renegotiation of 
the Root treaty with France. The new arbitration treaty would 
serve as a model for similar treaties with other nations. Briand's 
proposal to outlaw war between France and the United States, the 
New York Times reported, had raised difficulties, for it might 
have proved a 'left-handed alliance" which would give France 
a free hand in Europe under assurance that she never would have 
to face restraint from the United States. The Times heard rumors 
that the new arbitration treaty with France would contain a state- 
ment in the preamble giving voice to Briand's antiwar proposal. 14 

For the next few days things were fairly quiet in the State 
Department. So wrote the "subtil Mons. Castle" in his diary. 15 The 
assistant secretary did have a long talk with Claudel and again ex- 
plained the impossibility of a bilateral Outlawry-of-war treaty, how 
it would take away the right of Congress to declare war, and how it 
would be "playing into the hands of the pacifists." 16 Although 

13. Memorandum by Castle of a conversation with Claudel, Dec. 15, 1927, 

14. New York Times, Dec. 18, 1927. 

15. Castle diary, Dec. $1, 1927. 

16. "He [Claudel] said that he had just received the first official telegram on 
the subject [the new arbitration treaty] from Briand himself, that Briand said 
he had made himself the sponsor of the phrase 'outlawry of war' and asked 
whether I personally thought it impossible in the treaty to use that phrase; in 
other words, impossible to say that France and the United States hereby and 
forever outlaw war. ... I said, furthermore, that, in my opinion [Claudel had 
asked for Castle's "totally unofficial reaction"], it would be unfortunate and 
might cause very serious criticism to put through such a treaty with France 
alone, that this might well cause very serious international comment and would 
give the appearance of protecting France, so far as America was concerned, in 
any warlike adventure against other countries on which it might decide to 
embark. ... I thought,, for example, that he himself would be sorry if, before 
the World War, we had had a treaty with Germany which would have made it 


Castle told the French ambassador he was only speaking unof- 
ficially Claudel evidently cabled his remarks to the French Foreign 
Office, for the next day when Castle picked up his New York Times 
he saw them reflected in a dispatch from the Times well-connected 
Paris correspondent, Edwin L. James. 17 

Such was the status of the Briand Pact of Perpetual Friendship 
when the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a closed 
meeting on December 252, 1927. 


Drew Pearson and Constantine Brown, in their surprisingly 
accurate American Diplomatic Game, have drawn an arresting 
picture of this meeting. 18 Secretary Kellogg, appearing before the 

impossible for us to enter the War even though we felt our vital interests were 
concerned. I said there was a third reason which was purely a matter of internal 
concern, which made me personally rather shy away from the phrase 'outlawry 
of war.' This reason was that the people wfto made up the organization in 
favor of the outlawry of war were, to a very large extent, pacifists of the most 
rabid kind, many of them people who had been bitterly opposed to the entrance 
of the United States into the World War and many of them people who had 
done everything in their power to prevent participation by the United States. 
I said that it seemed to me that the adoption of this phrase might well look at 
the moment like capitulation to the pacifists. The Ambassador said he fully 
understood the soundness of this reasoning and that he entirely sympathized 
with it." 

Claudel, however, was concerned with the appearance of the new arbitra- 
tion treaty. He thought it might be top-heavy. "He said that to add a few para- 
graphs to the treaty might be very useful." He then proposed a paragraph 
declaring for codification of international law. Castle thought that a good (and 
harmless?) idea. Memorandum by Castle of a conversation with Claudel, Dec. 
19* 1 927, 711.5112 France/ii2. 

17- "* . to whom the French Foreign Office always leaks." Castle diary, 
Dec. 21, 1927. 

18. The entire Pearson and Brown account reflects much inside informa- 
tion. Apparently it came from Borah: the senator knew what happened at the 
Dec. 22 meeting of the foreign relations committee and also knew the details of 
Levinson's Outlawry campaign; Borah, moreover, never enjoyed a reputation 
for being reticent with the press. The present writer wrote to Pearson about 
the sources used in the American Diplomatic Game, but received no answer. 

Duff Gilfond, The Rise of Saint Calvin: Merry Sidelights on the Career of 


committee, explained his new arbitration treaty. The committee 
members showed no very great interest in it, and Borah as chair- 
man said that he assumed their silence meant consent. "But, Mr. 
Secretary/' he added, "all this does not dispose of the proposal 
to outlaw war." Kellogg, shifting nervously, replied that such a 
treaty as Briand proposed meant nothing less than an alliance be- 
tween the two countries. Then Borah allegedly advocated a counter- 
proposal of extending the treaty to include all the nations of the 
world. Borah began to poll the leading members of the committee. 
Senator George H. Moses of New Hampshire, famous for his icono- 
clastic wit, opined that Borah's suggestion was the best way "to get 
rid of the damn thing" (the Briand proposal). 19 The other members 
were affirmative or noncommittal. "I think, Mr. Secretary, you may 
consider it the sense of this committee," Borah concluded, "that 
you go ahead with the negotiation of a pact to include all coun- 
tries." 20 

Mr. Coolidge (New York, Vanguard, 1932), pp. 262-266, contains an account o 
the December 22 foreign relations committee meeting which is substantially 
the same as the Pearson and Brown account. Gilfond adds a later private con- 
versation between Kellogg and Borah. It hardly seems possible that Kellogg 
would have retold this conversation, for it was not flattering to the secretary. 
Borah therefore must have been the source at least for Gilfond. 

19. According to Duff Gilfond, The Rise of Saint Calvin, Senator Moses 
said: "Put the baby on their [France's] doorstep. A multilateral proposal is a 
good idea. It will include Germany, and France will never include Germany 
in an outlawry-of-war treaty." 

20. Drew Pearson and Constantine Brown, American Diplomatic Game, 
pp. 27-28. Secretary Kellogg told Assistant Secretary Castle about the committee 
meeting, and Castle recorded the conversation as follows: "The Secretary had 
a successful talk with the Foreign Relations Committee yesterday on the sub- 
ject of the new French arbitration treaty. It was successful in that the Com- 
mittee was pleased that he talked with them and especially in that they seemed 
to think that it would not be necessary to put matters of 'vital interest and 
national honor* as among those which could not be arbitrated, it being of 
course understood that matters of purely internal concern were clearly speci- 
fied. . . . The Committee also agreed with the Secretary that a treaty outlaw- 
ing war, as suggested by Briand, could not possibly be made with a single nation. 
The Secretary thinks it might be a good idea to write the French that we cannot 
stand for such a treaty with France alone, but that the United States is quite 
willing to sign such a treaty with all the principal nations if they will do the 
same between each other/* Castle diary, Dec. 22, 1927. Italics inserted. 


It may however be incorrect to give to Senator Borah so much 
credit for extending Briand's proposal. Secretary Kellogg himself 
has disputed such an interpretation. "The suggestion [of extending 
Briand's proposal]/' Kellogg wrote several years later, "came to me 
as I pondered on the confused condition of the world, and the rela- 
tion to it of United States policy. I did not discuss it with any one 
until I had fully satisfied myself that the idea was sound . . ." 21 

Perhaps neither Kellogg nor Borah should be credited with sole 
responsibility for the idea of extension. It had a more complex 

Soon after Briand's original message to the American people 
rumors began to appear in the press that the Coolidge Administra- 
tion could only consider Outlawry in a multilateral form. It is pos- 
sible but doubtful that Kellogg or Borah inspired these rumors. 
Kellogg's assistants at the State Department must have had a hand 
in the matter. Assistant Secretary Castle wrote in his diary as early 
as May 11, 192^: "If we made similar [bilateral] pacts with other 
nations France would lose interest immediately because it [the pro- 
posed Franco- American pact] would give no particular advantage." 
The succinct Marriner memorandum of June 24, 1937, which so 
devastatingly analyzed Briand's draft Pact of Perpetual Friendship, 
had suggested that the United States might perhaps be able to re- 
nounce war in a multilateral instrument. Only after the Marriner 
memorandum does there appear the first definite sign that Kellogg 

21. ". . . and until I was prepared to make it public at the opportune 
moment. It seemed to me the only way to attempt to break the deadlock which 
international negotiations had reached." From a memorandum by Kellogg, 
in David Brynjones, Frank B. Kellogg: A Biography (New York, G. P. Put' 
nam's Sons, 1957), p. 230. 

But see J. Stoner, Levinson, p. 268 n: "One story from a most trustworthy 
source has it that Kellogg went one evening late in the fall to the Borah home 
and knocked persistently until the Senator, who was alone, finally opened the 
door. The Secretary related how he had mulled over what to do with the Briand 
proposal until the answer came to him in a flash in the middle of the night, 
'Why not make it a multilateral agreement?' The astonished Borah was shocked 
into silence that the Secretary should claim to him the authorship of an idea 
that Borah himself had been advocating for months/' The writer asked Pro- 
lessor Stoner about this story, and Stoner replied that Levinson was his source 
of information. 


himself had thought of a multilateral treaty: Kellogg told Sir Esme 
Howard July 6 that he would support an antiwar treaty if it were 
of a general nature. The multilateral idea did not, moreover, con- 
fine itself to sophisticated diplomatic circles. During the summer 
of 1927 many of the peace leaders envisioned Outlawry spread over 
the world, either in a series of bilateral pacts or in one grand all- 
embracing treaty. When Borah finally counseled multilateral re- 
nunciation to the Reverend Sidney Gulick, November 10, 1927, 
the idea of extension was no longer new. 

Who first thought of the idea? May we not conclude that, al- 
though it had early currency among Secretary Kellogg's assistants 
at the State Department, the idea of extension came at different 
times to many other people, for various reasons. 

Once Secretary Kellogg, for his own good reason, had decided 
upon a multilateral treaty proposal he promptly informed Ameri- 
ca's distinguished elder statesman, Elihu Root. Regarding the pro- 
posed arbitration treaty with France, Kellogg admitted to Root 
that the preamble was "a little elaborate," but such, he wrote, was 
the desire of the French ambassador, Glaudel. The thing that most 
interested Briand, Kellogg wrote, was the French foreign minister's 
proposition for the United States and France to renounce war as a 
means of settlement of international disputes. But from several con- 
versations with Senator Borah and after a long consultation with 
the full foreign relations committee, Kellogg was quite sure the 
Senate would not ratify a treaty such as Briand had proposed. "But 
the suggestion was made that I propose to France a renewal of the 
Root Treaty and also by note to France propose that the United 
States would be willing to sign a treaty along the lines of the Briand 
proposal if all the leading Powers would join in it." Kellogg had 
drafted a proposed note to Briand and enclosed a copy for Root's 
examination. "You know, of course," concluded the secretary of 
state, "that there is a tremendous demand in this country and prob- 
ably in foreign countries for the so-called outlawry of war. No- 
body knows just what that means. ... I think this would an- 
swer . . ." 22 

22. Kellogg to Root, Dec. 23, 1927, Root MSS. Kellogg added that Under- 
secretary Olds, who was fully informed as to the antiwar negotiations and 


The "so-called outlawry of war" had sorely tried the patience 
of the secretary of state. For months peace workers had been im- 
portuning the Department, pestering, beseeching, indeed demand- 
ing that the United States stand for the cause of peace. Kellogg 
fully understood that behind the men of peace encouraging them, 
spurring them on for his own purposes was Aristide Briand. Kel- 
logg knew that Briand, offering his bilateral Franco- American Pact 
of Perpetual Friendship, actually was proposing a negative military 
alliance with the United States to fit into France's design for her 
own security in Europe. The secretary of state had been maneuver- 
ing for months to avoid this clever proposition. 

After long and thorough examination Kellogg finally had hit 
upon a most promising new maneuver. Perhaps an acute observer 
during those last days of December 1927, watching the white-haired 
Minnesotan each morning hurry along Seventeenth Street to the 
side entrance of the State, War and Navy Building, would have re- 
marked a new confidence and buoyancy in the secretary's brisk 
gait. Kellogg, within the sanctity of his private office, might have 
leaned back in his chair and rubbed his sturdy hands in quiet con- 
templation. He was again at peace with himself and with the 
world. He had prepared a masterly note to Briand. 

For transmitting it, he was awaiting a suitable occasion. But he 
had to act more quickly than he intended. 


From his office in the French Embassy in Washington, Am- 
bassador Paul Claudel on December %8, 1927, rang up the State 
Department and said he had received a most important note from 

problems, was going to New York Saturday morning (Dec. 24) and would 
be glad to come to Root's house any time Sunday or Monday. Olds would 
communicate with Root on Sunday morning. Consequently, Root did not have 
to reply in writing to Kellogg. 

Hunter Miller's Peace Pact of Paris, p. 134, states that contemporary press 
reports indicated Kellogg had consulted both Elihu Root and Charles Evans 
Hughes. The Hughes MSS in the Library of Congress at present are not avail- 
able for historical research. 


Briand which his Embassy was then decoding. He would bring 
it down to Secretary of State Kellogg's office at four o'clock that 
afternoon. Secretary Kellogg immediately took the note he had 
ready for Briand and called on the president of the United States. 23 

Kellogg informed Coolidge he would like to send the note to 
France at once. The president read the note with care. 

"We can do that, can we not?" he asked. 

"Yes/' responded Kellogg. "... I wish to send this to France 
immediately and send a copy to the French Ambassador before 
four o'clock." 

Coolidge asked his secretary of state what the hurry was, and 
Kellogg explained that he expected to receive a note from Briand 
at four o'clock and desired the French Government and the French 
ambassador to have his note before that time. 
"All right," said the president. "Go ahead." 

Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg promptly cabled the Ameri- 
can note to France, and sent a copy to ClaudeL 

He never received the French note, whatever it was. The secre- 
tary of state had beat Briand to the draw, for peace. 

23. This and the following is from Kellogg's memorandum in D. Bryn- 
Jones, Kellogg, p. 232. 

Chapter Eleven: BRIAND'S DILEMMA 



.he idea o a treaty outlawing war, once wrote 
Sir Austen CKimberlain, "was first broached by that great French- 
man and friend of peace, Aristide Briand, but it is not, I think, 
too much to say that the French were surprised and even alarmed 
when they saw their bantling presented to them in its American 
clothes." * 

It is of course true that Briand probably knew several weeks 
and perhaps months before the denouement the afternoon of De- 
cember 28, 1927, that the American Government would not accept 
a bilateral treaty with France. From what Ambassador Claudel was 
saying during November and December 1927 it appears almost cer- 
tain that the French Government was backing down on its pro- 
posal of perpetual friendship. Claudel and Assistant Secretary Castle 
had even put their heads together on the new Franco-American 
arbitration treaty and embodied (should we say embalmed?) Out- 
lawry in its preamble. 

Just what Briand had in mind in his uncommunicated note of 
December 28 probably will not be known until the Quai d'Orsay 
opens its archives. 2 Perhaps in this withheld note Briand merely 
was proposing another way to scuttle Outlawry, instead of via the 
arbitration treaty. But Kellogg thought Briand was about to out- 
maneuver him. Hence the Kellogg counterthrust of December 28. 

Kellogg's proposal was bland in its professions. ". . . it has oc- 

1. Austen Chamberlain, Down the Years, p. 234. 

2. The French Foreign Office archives at present are open only to 1877. 


curred to me," wrote the American Secretary of State, "that the two 
Governments, instead of contenting themselves with a bilateral 
declaration of the nature suggested by M. Briand, might make a 
more signal contribution to world peace by joining in an effort to 
obtain the adherence of all of the principal Powers of the world 
to a declaration renouncing war as an instrument of national 
policy." s 

Aristide Briand did not welcome so signal a contribution. A 
multilateral pact renouncing war without reservations for Kel- 
logg had not mentioned reservations would have disarranged the 
entire picture of power and politics in Europe and elsewhere: it 
would have shattered the French alliance treaties with Belgium, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia; transformed the 
Locarno treaties; put a new and negative aspect on the League of 
Nations. For the postulate behind all these arrangements so vital 
to French security was, in certain contingencies, war. It had been 
to strengthen these treaties, by making sure that the United States 
would never make war on France should she have to go to war by 
the terms of her European defensive alliances, that Briand had 
taken advantage of the peace movement in the United States to 
propose his bilateral treaty for renunciation of war between the 
United States and France, a negative military alliance. France could 
not strengthen her position in Europe by signing a multilateral 
treaty renouncing all war as an instrument of national policy. 

Had there been no other complication than the above, Briand 
could have abruptly turned down Kellogg's multilateral proposal. 
There was another complication. Very much at stake was BriancTs 
renowned reputation as a man of peace a "Locarno prophet," * 
holder of the Nobel Peace Prize. How could the French foreign 
minister maintain his prestige in the world and publicly spurn a 
great offer for all the nations to renounce war as an instrument of 
national policy? 

3. Kellogg to Claudel, Dec. 28, 1927, FR: 1927, II, 627. Kellogg's note 
differed only slightly from the draft he had sent to Elihu Root on Dec. 23. 

4. Ambassador Myron T. Heirick's phrase. Herrick to Kellogg, Feb. 27, 
1928, Herrick MSS, deposited in the Library of the Western Reserve Historical 
Society, Cleveland, Ohio. 


Briand could neither accept nor refuse Kellogg's offer. The 
French foreign minister was nicely caught between his conflicting 
duties as a great Frenchman and friend of world peace. All because 
of his proposal of perpetual friendship, now so unbecomingly 
dressed in its American clothes. Ambassador Claudel consequently 
called on Secretary Kellogg, December 30, and began what proved 
to be three months of diplomatic maneuvering. 

Claudel, undoubtedly under instruction from his superior in 
Paris, declared that France wanted a bilateral treaty, that he doubted 
if Briand would consider a multilateral treaty unless Kellogg could 
explain clearly why the United States could not conclude a bilateral 
treaty, Kellogg candidly replied that he had always favored a multi- 
lateral treaty; the United States, he was sure, could not conclude 
a bilateral treaty with Germany without arousing French public 
opinion. American opinion, Kellogg said, would view a two-power 
treaty unfavorably because it looked too much like an alliance and 
too short a step toward universal peace. 5 A multilateral treaty, he 
thought, would have a profound and world-wide influence in pro- 
moting the cause of peace. 8 

Although Secretary Kellogg thus was rather frank with Claudel, 
Assistant Secretary Castle was even more so. As Castle afterward 
wrote in his diary, the French ambassador came into the assistant 
secretary's office and said "that Briand had been 'ruffled' because 
of the frank talks he had had with me on the subject of a possible 
treaty and that he was sure Briand was not yet ready to accept the 
idea of a multilateral treaty. He asked me why a bilateral treaty 
would not be acceptable. I told him . . . that such a treaty would 
inevitably have more the appearance of a treaty of alliance than a 
treaty to advance the cause of world peace. ... He asked why 
and I countered by asking him what effect he thought a treaty be- 

5. But on June 27, 1927, Kellogg had written to Coolidge that "the public 
can see no reason why the United States should not agree with Great Britain 
and Japan or any other country not to make war." See above, p. 107. 

6. Kellogg to Whitehouse, Dec. 30, 1937, FR: 192*] , II, 629. 


tween the United States and Germany outlawing war would have 
in France. He admitted that it would have a very exciting ef- 
fect . . ." In his diary Castle concluded that it was "more and 
more evident" that Briand had made his bilateral suggestion "for 
political reasons solely and that he has now got a bad case of cold 
feet. They will be positively frozen when we drive him into the 
open and make him do something, or refuse to do something . . ." 7 

Sheldon Whitehouse, the American charge in Paris, saw Briand 
and reported to Kellogg, December 31, that the French foreign 
minister objected to the word "treaty." Briand said he did not in- 
tend the proposed pact to take such a form. If America and France 
should solemnly declare their condemnation of recourse to war on 
the occasion of renewal of the Root arbitration treaty, it would 
promote the cause of peace. If at the same time Kellogg desired to 
draft a "protocol" outlawing war, for signature by all the nations, 
Briand would be agreeable. He hoped, however, that Kellogg would 
not make public the note of December 28 to Ambassador Claudel 
without a previous understanding between the American and 
French Governments as to what should be given to the press. 8 
Whitehouse concluded from his conversation that Briand now un- 
derstood the situation and was ready to accept what Kellogg could 
offer him. 9 

But while Briand through Sheldon Whitehouse was pleading 
for no press releases until after prior confabulation between Wash- 
ington and Paris, someone in the French capital gave out the sub- 
stance of Kellogg's counterproposal. As usual with such press leaks, 
the Quai d'Orsay garbled the presentation, giving an erroneous 
idea of the State Department's position. This left Kellogg no alter- 

7. Castle diary, Jan. i, 1928. 

8. In a speech several months later (Nov. 11, 1928) Kellogg said it was 
doubtful if the then concluded antiwar treaty "could have been negotiated 
between the ministers of the different governments in secret. I did not attempt 
it. Neither did Monsieur Briand.*' Frank B. Kellogg, The Settlement of Inter- 
national Controversies by Pacific Means (Washington, Government Printing 
Office, 1938), p. 3. 

9. Whitehouse to Kellogg, Dec. 31, 1927, FR: 1927, II, 630. A friend at the 
Foreign Office privately told Whitehouse that Briand was much disappointed 
at the nature of the Dec. 28 note, as he had hoped for a bilateral convention. 


native but to give to the press the entire text of his proposal to the 
French Government. 10 

Kellogg's move had an immediate effect. James, the Paris corre- 
spondent of the New York Times, noted that spokesmen for the 
French Foreign Office had dropped their daily criticisms of a multi- 
lateral compact outlawing war and announced flatly that the French 
Government was in favor of the American plan "now and for- 
evermore." u The serious French press swung glibly into line with 
the newly assumed attitude of the Foreign Office. Le Temps, for 
example, which only the day before thought Kellogg was seeking 
to torpedo the League of Nations, discovered the next day that, 
after all, such an interpretation was wrong. 12 

Short-lived contrition! Almost as if to counter the publication 
of Kellogg's famous note of December 28 Briand prepared an im- 
mediate answer. 13 Although he began his missive by a show of 
affability, expressing his government's great approval of Kellogg's 
new multilateral Outlawry idea, the French foreign minister 

10. Kellogg decided for publication on Wednesday morning, Jan. 4. Kellogg 
to Herrick, Jan. 3, 1928, 711.5112 France/8*. When apprised by Whitehouse 
of the note's forthcoming release, Lger appeared perturbed and surprised. 
The Foreign Office, he said, had presumed there would be no release until after 
further discussion between the two governments concerning such release. White- 
house to Kellogg, Jan. 5, 1938, 711.5113 France/85. 

Kellogg also had stated to Herrick, Jan. 3, that he would make an announce- 
ment on Jan. 4 that he had proposed a new arbitration treaty to France and 
that identic treaties were being submitted to other countries which had expir- 
ing Root treaties. (On Dec. 29, 1927, Kellogg had addressed a note to the 
British ambassador proposing a treaty, mutatis mutandis identical with that 
proposed the day before to France, except for inclusion of certain reservations 
in Article 2 relative to the Empire.) 

11. Dispatch from Paris, Jan. 4, 1928, in New York Times, Jan. 5. Initial 
press reaction to Kellogg's release of the Dec. 28 note had been unfavorable. 
Although almost every morning paper had published the note, Whitehouse 
reported to Kellogg on Jan. 5 that its reception was cool indeed. The prevailing 
thought, wrote the American chargS, was that the note had "distorted" Briand's 
original suggestion. 711.5112 France/84. 

12. Dispatch from Paris, Jan. 5, 1928, in New York Times, Jan. 6. 

13. Dated Jan. 5, 1928, and transmitted by Claude! to Kellogg, Jan. 6, 1928, 

, 1-2. 


quickly got to the point which was sharp indeed. Briand thought 
it would be "advantageous" for France and the United States to 
sign the proposed multilateral treaty first and immediately. He 
dropped the Shotwellian phrase, "renunciation of war as an instru- 
ment of national policy/' and declared instead for renouncing "all 
wars of aggression." Why these changes? Undoubtedly the sign-first 
suggestion would have been highly advantageous for French diplo- 
matic prestige; 14 and the new word "aggression" subtly pointed the 
way to accepting the Locarno definition of an aggressor, which in 
turn opened the whole wide and to the security-conscious French, 
most pleasurable vista of the Geneva Protocol! 

Washington's reaction to this performance was instantaneous. 
State Department officials may have wished to applaud Briand's 
cleverness, but they had nothing but objection to the content of his 
note. Claudel already on January 4 two days before he delivered 
the French note had in Briand's name asked Assistant Secretary 
Castle whether the United States would object to signing the anti- 
war treaty first with France, and Castle had replied that Claudel 
must "well understand" why the United States Government could 
do no such thing. 15 But either Claudel had not relayed this informa- 
tion to Briand, or Briand had chosen to ignore it, or perhaps it came 
too late. Anyway, the French ambassador now had to bear the brunt 
of the State Department's displeasure. Claudel, announced the New 
York Times, was told plainly, "as he has been from the first," that 
the United States would enter into no bilateral arrangement smack- 

14. Also, if the United States and France signed first and if by chance no 
other nations signed afterward, then Briand would have achieved his negative 
military alliance. 

Hunter Miller in his Peace Pact of Paris, p. 20, finds it "very difficult" to 
understand why the French note of Jan. 5 suggested France and the United 
States sign first. "If a multilateral treaty were to come into force, it was certainly 
in the interest of France that the discussions regarding its terms should be 
participated in at least by the other Great Powers." From a legal viewpoint, yes; 
from a political, no. 

15. "I said ... he could well understand that we would not want to sign 
with France unless we knew that the others were going to sign also." Memo- 
randum by Castle of a conversation with Claudel, Jan. 4, 1928, 711.5112 U.S./g. 


ing of a negative military alliance. As tor Briand's new word aggres- 
sion, it was a source o "amazement" to Washington officials. 16 ("I 
had an informal press conference ... and talked pretty freely," 
wrote Assistant Secretary Castle in his diary, January 7, 1928. "The 
result is that we have a good press on the whole this morning.") 17 

16. Dispatch from Washington, Jan. 6 in New York Times, Jan. 7, 1928. 

17. ". . . there was Briand's answer to our note about outlawing war. The 
French Government said it was delighted with our note, etc. and that it would 
be glad to sign a treaty immediately with us, renouncing resort to 'aggressive* 
war, which treaty could later be signed with other nations. Of course we cannot 
accept any such thing. It is a new proposition. We shall not sign anything -with 
France unless we know very well that the other nations will sign it also and we 
shall not be willing to include the phrase 'aggressive war' because that im- 
mediately links the thing up with the League of Nations and makes a defini- 
tion of aggression necessary." Castle diary, Jan. 7, 1928. 

It is interesting to recall that President Coolidge, Dec. 3, 1934, in his Annual 
Message to Congress came out for outlawing aggressive war: "Much interest 
has of late been manifested in this country in the discussion of various pro- 
posals to outlaw aggressive war. I look with great sympathy upon the examina- 
tion of this subject. It is in harmony with the traditional policy of our country, 
which is against aggressive war . . ." FR: 1924, 1, xxi-xxii. Ever since Coolidge 
had become President, the Outlawrists had been importuning him to outlaw 
war. The formula he used in his Annual Message, however, was "to outlaw 
aggressive war." The Levinson group never used this word "aggression," for it 
was "European." It is quite probable that Coolidge took his idea of outlawing 
aggressive war from a certain Samuel Colcord of New York. As head of the 
Committee for Educational Publicity, which listed a number of impressive 
names on its letterhead, Colcord prior to the 1924 November election fairly 
peppered Coolidge with letters and telegrams asking for outlawry of aggres- 
sive war. On Oct. 20, 1924, for example, Colcord reported to Coolidge that he 
had given much thought as to how to bring back into the Republican fold 
those erring brothers who departed in 1922 because the Republicans had done 
nothing about the League. The answer, declared Colcord, was to outlaw 
aggressive war. Coolidge MSS. Although the president's secretary, C. Bascom 
Slemp, was rather cautious in replying to these Colcord letters, one must con- 
clude that Coolidge took notice; for he mentioned outlawry of aggressive war, 
first in his acceptance speech before the Republican convention, then (in a 
letter to Colonel James A. Drain, printed in the New York Times, Nov. 3, 1924) 
in connection with Armistice Day, 1924, and finally in his Annual Message to 
Congress on the State of the Union. Had Aristide Briand, in 1928 himself 
advocating outlawry of aggressive war, known of Coolidge's prior commitments, 
he could have cited them with embarrassing effect. 


Claudel appears to have been somewhat ashamed o delivering 
the * 'amazing" French note. He consequently called on Castle for a 
confidential tete-a-tete. 18 The ambassador said he felt perhaps every- 
one had put the wrong emphasis on the antiwar negotiations in that 
all the discussion centered about war and the Outlawry of war. 
Agreeing that everybody hoped to see war outlawed, he nonetheless 
believed that the phrase, as used by "the sentimentalists," might 
bear within itself great dangers. If the different governments should 
sign a pact outlawing all war, he feared it would be the greatest 
stimulus to "bolshevists and socialists and cranks of all varieties." 
He could not escape the feeling that in some cases war was not only 
not immoral but was absolutely moral and necessary for example, 
what the United States then was doing in Nicaragua. 19 Claudel then 
proposed, strictly as his own idea, a joint declaration of principles, 
which Castle at the time agilely managed to memorize almost word 
for word and afterward put down in a Department memorandum. 
Claudel evidently hoped to see this innocuous declaration 20 sub- 
stituted for the proposed antiwar treaty. Castle received the ambas- 

18. The following account is from Castle's official memorandum of the 
conversation, Jan. 7, 1928, 711.5112 France/in. 

19. American marines were policing the strife-ridden republic. 

20. Although Castle afterward wrote down the main points of Claudel's 
proposal, the French ambassador over two months later (Mar. 24) presented 
Undersecretary Olds with a copy. 711.5112 France/225, which follows, is the 
official State Department translation: 

"The Signatory States declare that in their reciprocal relations they under- 
take to be guided by the following principles. 

(1) Justice and law, which is the expression of it, must be the sole rule of 
conduct between the States as between individuals. 

(2) In case of conflict of interests, juridical means only are permissible for 
settlement of differences. 

(3) States which shall have recognized these principles are entitled to count 
upon the council [sic] and upon the support of the other Signatory States in 
order to help them regulate these differences by means other than violence in 
conformity with justice and law. 

(4) Each of the Signatory States retains the right of legitimate defense. 

(5) Any State having recourse to war in order to obtain a settlement of 
its differences with the other Signatories shall ipso facto place itself beyond 
the pale of the present Treaty." 


sador's suggestion courteously, but nothing ever came of it. That 
Briand had a hand in Claudel's proposition is virtually certain, for 
Claudel two months later proposed his declaration to Undersecre- 
tary Olds. 21 It is of course a regular diplomatic practice for am- 
bassadors, under instructions, to offer suggestions as "strictly per- 
sonal" ideas. 

In spite of Claudel's new and professedly personal idea, the 
State Department outwardly continued to wear a look of amazement 
toward the French replique; and here, with astonishment written 
on the faces of high Washington officials, we may momentarily leave 
the Franco- American negotiations. Aristide Briand in his note had 
startlingly demonstrated the strange vagaries of what many Ameri- 
cans often described as the "European mind." Having acquainted 
ourselves with the French aspects of that mind we may now profit- 
ably probe the European mind, British model. 


Officially, Britain had not yet entered into the antiwar discus- 
sions, but Outlawry already was a word to conjure with in the Brit- 
ish Isles. The Foreign Office, while perhaps still believing Outlawry 
of war was buncombe, never again would make such an admission 
openly, Harrison Brown therefore had little trouble in obtaining 
an interview for Wednesday, January 4, 1928, with Lord Cushen- 
dun, Sir Austen Chamberlain's principal assistant at the Foreign 
Office. 22 

Brown found Cushendun sitting before a fire, flicking cigarette 
ash into it from the depths of a deep chair. He struggled up to wel- 
come his visitor. Brown noticed that His Lordship was large and 
bovine, and reserved his smile exclusively for entering and depart- 
ing visitors. Asked about the Briand proposal, Cushendun said he 
would have done the same thing as Briand in regard to the original 
offer had he been representing France, and he would feel the same 
way as the French felt now about the American attempt to extend 
the pact to other countries. Cushendun said that he decidedly had 

21. For Claudel's conversation with Olds, see below, pp. 168-169. 

22. Who later, as acting foreign secretary, signed at Paris the antiwar treaty. 


no use for gestures, that they meant nothing and would not be 
worth the paper they were written on; any country, he observed, 
would break such a contract i the national interest required it. 

Brown, astonished, ventured the remark that even though the 
Outlawry proposals remained merely resolutions they at least would 
have value if they broke the connection between militarism and pa- 

Cushendun stared. Hmmm, well, perhaps so some day, but the 
time had not yet come. 

Brown countered that at least there was an incentive for helping 
it come namely, that if it did not appear soon then civilization 
would wipe itself out. 

Well, yes, that might happen. 

Cushendun thought that he had read Morrison's book he 
fancied that Lady Astor had given it to him. If not he would let 
Brown know. 

His Lordship thereupon shook hands very warmly and beamed 
upon his visitor. 

Harrison Brown did not beam when he afterward wrote to 
Levinson. How, he asked, could salvation come from such people 
as the Cushenduns? 2S 

All was not lost, for salvation suddenly appeared at the Ameri- 
can State Department. Secretary Kellogg came to the rescue of Out- 
lawry. In a new note, dated January 11, 1928, and given to Am- 
bassador Claudel two days later, Kellogg said he was gratified by 
the French Government's acceptance of the multilateral idea "in 
principle.' 1 But the secretary did not think France and the United 
States should sign first. A treaty, even though acceptable to France 
and the United States, Kellogg declared, might for some reason be 
unacceptable to one of the other great powers. In such event the 
treaty could not come into force and "the present efforts of France 
[sic] and the United States would be rendered abortive. ... I 
have no doubt that your Government will be entirely agree- 
able . . ." As for the "aggression" idea, Kellogg noticed that the 
French draft of June 20, 1927, did not so stipulate but provided 
rather for unconditional renunciation of war as an instrument of 

23. Brown to Levinson, Jan. 8, 1928, Levjpson MS, 


national policy; the secretary adhered to Briand's original sugges- 
tion. 24 Kellogg stood firmly by his proposal of December 28, 1927. 
He would not budge. 

To the Quai d'Orsay the American secretary of state's new- 
found zeal for renunciation of war was proving very embarrassing. 
For good and sufficient reasons Briand could neither refuse nor 
accept a multilateral treaty. Kellogg abruptly had turned down 
Briand's proposition of sign-first and stipulation for renouncing 
wars of aggression. What further course of action was available to 
the harassed French foreign minister? 


It was not a simple matter for Briand to decide what next to do. 
For a short time he seemed without any plan at all. 

Meanwhile Ambassador Claudel spoke in New York at the 
Union League Club during a dinner in honor of Ambassador Her- 
rick. The American ambassador was about to return to France. 
Claudel used the occasion to say that "no country in the world is 
able to do war" if the United States disapproved. He then de- 
clared that France and the United States must take the leading part 
in the new international era of peace which was just beginning. 
"My dear Ambassador," said Claudel to Herrick that night, 
". . . You have many times explained France to America, you will 
have once more to explain America to France. She will believe you, 
for, to use an American expression, she knows that Myron Herrick 
is the man 'who delivers the goods.' " Herrick, however, refused to 
make any affirmations that evening about delivering the goods and 
spoke rather on the pressing problem of making America's for- 
eign service a career service, a service of dedicated experts instead 
of volunteers. 25 Perhaps Herrick, speaking of volunteers, thought of 
certain individuals whom President Coolidge not so long before 
had called by that term. 

34. Kellogg to Claudel, Jan. n, 1928, FR: 1928, I, 3-5. Wrote Castle, 
apropos this note: "Wednesday [Jan. 11] -was largely taken up with discussions 
with the Secretary and Olds about an answer to the latest Briand note. This 
was finally sent on Friday and was pretty good . . ." Castle diary, Jan. 14, 1928. 

25. New York Times, Jan. 14, 1928. 


The morning after the Union League dinner there appeared 
an indication that the State Department might be thawing out. 
The Department, for some reason, on January 14, 1928, lifted its 
ban against flotation of French industrial securities in the United 
States, a ban which had been in force for more than three years as a 
result of the failure of France to refund her war debt. This an- 
nouncement followed recent notification to France that the Depart- 
ment would place no obstacle in the way of the French Govern- 
ment's plans to refund in the United States its old eight-per-cent 
bonds so as to permit a lower interest rate. Perhaps these moves 
permission to refund, and also to float industrial securities were 
only a quid pro quo, for observers noticed that recent French tariff 
discriminations against American goods were temporarily in abey- 
ance. Perhaps also the improvement in Franco-American relations 
occasioned by airplane diplomacy and Briand's overtures of friend- 
ship an improvement which if not noticeable in the State Depart- 
ment was evident among the American people in general made 
this move expedient. 26 

While financial experts speculated on the changing pattern of 
Franco-American refunding operations and while Ambassadors 
Herrick and Claudel were thinking about delivering the goods, in 
Washington there convened the Third Conference on the Cause 
and Cure of War. Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, graying in the serv- 

26. The effectiveness of governmental bans on foreign loans evidently was 
slight, for they were honored mostly in the breach. It was a simple matter to 
export funds by roundabout means. This certainly had occurred in the United 
States in spite of the State Department. 

The French money market at this time, moreover, was very easy; Poincar 
only a few days before the American move had raised the then existing ban 
on French capital export abroad (the ban had been in effect since the war). 
France probably had no need of American industrial loans. In the spring of 1928 
the Republic had upwards of a billion dollars in credits in the United States, 
and this huge balance hardly indicated need of French companies for American 


French governmental circles appear to have welcomed the new American 
attitude because sooner or later there might follow a lifting of the ban 
against new French Government flotations in the American market. This 
action might prove highly important if the French Government decided to 
stabilize its currency after the May 1928 elections. Hence the State Department 
announcement of Jan. 14 held important promise. 


ice of women's rights but still brimful of energy, presided at the 
conference's deliberations. When Mrs. Catt's formidable figure 
appeared at any gathering those in attendance knew they were in 
for action that she would have some kind of goods of her own to 
deliver. There was no pussyfooting about Mrs. Catt. 27 To the hun- 
dred delegates from nine national women's organizations she now 
declared war on the war system. Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis, 
Admiral Frank H. Schofield, and Assistant Secretary of State Wil- 
liam R. Castle spoke to the conference. All three speakers were 
unanimous in asserting that there was no nation more instinctively 
opposed to all thought of war than the United States. 

Particularly interesting was Assistant Secretary Castle's speech. 
He declared that peace, to be real, must be a state of mind. Con- 
cerning the antiwar treaty with France, Castle became specific. 
"We felt," he said, "that an agreement that under no circumstances 
would we attack France might cause irritation and unrest in other 
nations. It would almost inevitably have been looked upon by 
them as something closely approaching a defensive alliance." Castle 
then illustrated to his audience with some bravery, considering 
the recent activities of that audience how professional peace 
makers and agitators had sought to influence the State Department 
in favor of the Briand treaty. One person called Castle on the tele- 
phone and said: "It is an outrage that our Government should 
hang back in a matter of this kind. I am going to make speeches 
about it and I warn you that I shall attack the Department of State 
as it deserves. I am absolutely in favor of the Briand treaty. Will 
you tell me what is in it?" 2S ". . . let me assure you," Castle warned, 
"that there is far more danger in peace pacts based on muddled 
thinking than there is in refusing to sign new pacts at all." 29 

The following day Mrs. Catt addressed the delegates. She told 

27. Mrs. Catt never allowed any shillyshallying by her followers in respect 
to whatever issue she was advocating. In personal relations she was an awesome, 
revered figure. No one ever called her "Carrie." The women always referred to 
her as "Mrs. Catt" or, if on terms of relative intimacy, "C.C.C." 

28. Evidently this incident occurred before publication of Kellogg's note 
of Jan. 11, 1928, which revealed the text of Briand's original proposal. 

29. New York Times, Jan. 16, 1928. 


them the next war was moving down upon them with the pitiless 
certainty of an avalanche. Unless there were "rock-ribbed" treaties 
pledging the civilized nations, led by the great powers, to agree 
to renounce war among themselves, peace would not last. Mrs. Catt 
predicted that a rock-ribbed treaty such as the Kellogg proposal 
would break the backbone of present-day war. 30 

A slight commotion upset the fervor of the conference. Miss 
Annie Matthews of New York stood up and declared Secretary 
Kellogg insincere in his peace efforts, and that his proposal to France 
was a futile gesture, equivalent to the project for universal dis- 
armament which Russia recently had presented to the League of 
Nations. 81 But Miss Matthews had hardly sat down when Mrs. Catt 
went into action, squelched Miss Matthews properly, and steered 
through the conference a resolution endorsing the Kellogg pro- 
posal. 32 

During these days the diplomatic picture went out of focus 
and blurred. It began to clear up again as the Quai d'Orsay pre- 
pared a new French note to answer Kellogg. The Havana Inter- 
national Conference of American States was in session, and the 
French press had a field day scoring United States imperialism. Re- 
ports from Paris indicated an anti- American press assault more 
harsh than even the Sacco-Vanzetti campaign during the summer of 
1927. Appropriately, Charge Sheldon Whitehouse during these 
critical days told the members of the Paris American Club at their 
regular Thursday luncheon that "too much soft soap" did not help 
Franco-American relations. 33 Certain it was that the French Foreign 
Office had issued no press instructions for soft soap. 

In this acrimonious setting Ambassador Claudel delivered 84 
Briand's latest reply to Secretary Kellogg. 

Perhaps Poincare himself had collaborated with his foreign min- 
ister, for Briand this time seemed to have lost all his usual literary 
flair. The note was stiff and irritable. "The American Govern- 

30. New York Times, Jan. 17, 1928. 

31. See above, p. 126 n. 

32. New York Times, Jan. 19, 1928. 

33. New York Times, Jan. 20, 1928. 

34. Ibid., Jan. 21, 1928. 


ment," it announced, ". . . considered . - . for reasons of its own 
which the French Government has not failed to take into account, 
that it would be opportune to broaden this manifestation against 
war . . . The Government of the Republic was not opposed to 
this expansion of its original plan, but it could not but realize . . . 
that the new negotiation as proposed would be more complex and 
likely to meet with various difficulties." As for the question of the 
two countries signing first, suggested by Briand, this according to 
the new note was simply a matter of procedure; France offered to 
sign first "only because of its desire more speedily and more surely 
to achieve the result which it seeks in common with the United 
States." As for the question of renouncing wars of aggression, 
France's commitments under the Covenant and Locarno had in- 
spired this formula. The French Government also reminded the 
United States of the League resolution of September 1927 against 
wars of aggression. In conclusion the note doggedly affirmed that a 
bilateral pact still would be best. 35 

This frigid note appeared to mark the end of negotiations. The 
New York Times reported S6 the virtual death of the antiwar treaty. 
Even so well-disposed a critic as Professor Shotwell, in his notable 
study of the antiwar pact written during the summer of 1928, felt 
moved to declare that this French reply appeared to be "an effort 
to withdraw from the whole negotiation." s7 


Washington bided its time. In a few days the French Govern- 
ment shifted to a new line. The Franco- American arbitration treaty 
was being prepared for signature on February 6, the one-hundred- 

35. Claudel to Kellogg, Jan, 21, 1928, FR: 1928, I, 6-8. "Another French 
note on the Briand proposal came in this morning," wrote Castle in his diary. 
"It gets us no furtherer. The Ambassador, in talking with me about it, said that 
he thought we ought to stop note writing and talk things over. He is entirely 
right, especially, as I reminded him, as the French Foreign Office leaks always 
even before we receive the notes. The note had not a single new argument but 
made the French position a little more precise." Castle diary, Jan. 21, 1928. 

36. New York Times, Jan. 22, 1928. 

37. James T. Shotwell, War as an Instrument of National Policy i , p. 133. 


fiftieth anniversary of the first Franco- American treaties, and the 
French decided to make the most of the occasion. Briand hoped 
to head off the Outlawrists and remmciationists, now so zealously 
led by Secretary Kellogg toward a multilateral treaty, by blowing 
trumpets for the bilateral arbitration treaty. 

The French Embassy sounded the first blare by indicating to 
the press that because of the arbitration treaty's preamble there 
now would exist a moral obligation between France and the 
United States not to go to war. The preamble read as follows: 
". . . Eager by their example ... to demonstrate their condem- 
nation of war as an instrument of national policy in their mutual 
relations . . ." 3S Someone at the State Department, however, 
stopped this music by insisting that the preamble was not legally 
binding. 39 

The Department seems indeed to have been well aware of Bri- 
and's attempt to play up the arbitration treaty and perhaps make 
it the substitute for his proposed bilateral treaty for the renuncia- 
tion of war between the United States and France. Herrick on 
February i had talked with Briand, who then remarked that nego- 
tiations for the arbitration treaty were proceeding satisfactorily. 
While the preamble, the foreign minister said, did not cover in the 
form he had wished his original proposal of a bilateral treaty, 
nonetheless the preamble would contain the essentials of the pro- 
posed pact. 40 Herrick concluded that this undoubtedly was,Briand's 
face-saving line which he would take in the Chamber of Deputies 
and elsewhere. The ambassador suggested some friendly comment 
on Briand by the Department at the time the treaty was signed so 
as to aid in the face-saving process. 41 

Secretary Kellogg uncooperatively went to Canada before the 

38. FR: 1928, II, 817. 

39. New York Times, Feb. 3, 1928. For discussion of the binding nature of 
treaty preambles, see above, p. 134 n. 

40. The Quai d'Orsay earlier had made an attempt to cut out of the arbitra- 
tion treaty's preamble Shotwell's phrase, "condemnation of war as an instru- 
ment of national policy." Briand on Jan. 7 had omitted the phrase in a French 
draft arbitration treaty. Kellogg's revised draft, transmitted to Claudel on 
Feb. i, again embodied Shotwell's words. See FR: 1928, II, 811, 813, 817. 

41. Herrick to Kellogg, Feb. i, 1938, 711.5112 U.S./15. 


signature of the arbitration treaty, but the ceremony in Washing- 
ton was impressive. The two signatories, Claudel and Olds, seated 
themselves at the long ebony table in the diplomatic reception 
room of the Department of State. A dozen motion picture cameras 
surrounded the table. 42 Claudel in signing spoke of the arbitration 
treaty as being in the same category as the Franco- American treaty 
of alliance of 1778. He also sought to make it appear like a treaty 
for the Outlawry of war. "The first treaty [of 1778]," he said > "g 3 ^ 
a start to a new nation; the second treaty gives the start to a new 
idea. Outlawry of war is a specifically American idea . , ." * 3 After 
the ceremony Olds and Claudel, together with Jules Henry of the 
French Embassy, Spencer Phenix, 44 and Assistant Secretary Castle 
all posed solemnly standing about the arbitration treaty, and pho- 
tographers took pictures. 

That night in New York there was a dinner at the Waldorf, 45 
Messages arrived from Coolidge, Poincare, Herrick, and others. 
Claudel had hurried up from Washington, and his after-dinner 
address gave Senator Borah credit for "the grand word, outlawry 
of war/' He remarked that after this phrase had been enunciated 
and heard in France it only remained for diplomats to frame the 
new principle in a treaty of arbitration. Outlawry, said Claudel, 
was a word the inborn virtue of which literally compelled diplo- 
mats to make way for it in the complicated game of international 
relations. Concerning the new arbitration treaty, Claudel asserted 
that "No negotiations were ever conducted in a more open light 
and in a freer air, an air so free and so fresh that it makes old diplo- 
macy quiver." 4S 

In Paris there was a gala fete for the new treaty. Briand and Her- 
rick had luncheon, and with mingled emotions looked at and read 
the old alliance treaty of 1778 which Briand had had brought out of 
the Quai d'Orsay archives. The two men made informal speeches. 

42. ". . . such a phalanx o cameras as I have seldom seen." Castle diary, 
Feb. 8, 1928. 

43. New York Times, Feb. 7, 1928. 

44. Secretary Kellogg's special assistant. 

45. Held under the auspices of three leading French societies in the United 
States: The France-American Society, La Fdration de 1' Alliance Fran^aise, 
and the American Society of the French Legion of Honor. 

46. New York Times, Feb. 7, 1928* 


Briand said that many treaties had been signed during the past few 
years and some of them might and probably would suffer the ulti- 
mate fate of Benjamin Franklin's treaty, dying in so far as the letter 
was concerned. But if the spirit survived, of what avail the letter? 
Herrick in reply stressed the dignity, reason, and deliberation 
which always had characterized the settlement of any small differ- 
ences between France and the United States. 47 "This long experi- 
ence we have had in handling the difficulties and the problems 
which naturally arise between two friendly nations/' he main- 
tained, "is itself sufficient to banish all fears of possible recourse to 
a brutal adjustment of our affairs by war/' 4S 

Two days after these flattering exchanges, however, newspaper- 
men uncovered dissatisfaction at the Quai d'Orsay. It seemed that 
members of the Foreign Office staff the evening of February 8, 
seeking diversion, had endeavored in vain to find any subject for 
arbitration which could by any stretch of the imagination come 
within the scope of the new treaty. A report of the evening's dis- 
covery appeared in the New York Times 49 and came to the atten- 
tion of Secretary Kellogg. At a State Department press conference 
the secretary discussed it vehemently and for the record. The treaty, 
he snapped, was purely an arbitration treaty of judicial questions, 
"the only questions I think any Government can arbitrate." The 
treaty was an advance over treaties hitherto made by the United 
States. This arbitration treaty, Kellogg proclaimed, "is not intended 
to take the place of the Briand proposal for an antiwar treaty/' 50 


During all the discussion preceding and following signature 
of the arbitration treaty the proposed antiwar treaty remained up- 
permost in the mind of Senator Borah. The New York Times Maga- 

47. He overlooked the acrimony which preceded and followed the Rives 
Convention of 1831. 

48. New York Times, Feb. 7, 1928. 

49. Feb. 9, 1928. 

50. Interview of Feb. 11, in New York Times, Feb. 12, 1928. Kellogg on 
Feb. 2 had told Sir Esme Howard that the arbitration treaty had "nothing to 
do with" the antiwar treaty. Memorandum by Kellogg of a conversation with 
Howard, Feb. 2, 1928, 711.5112 France/144. 


zine of February 5 printed a front-page article by the senator en- 
titled "One Great Treaty to Outlaw All Wars." Written to a large 
extent by Levinson, 51 this article appearing under the name of the 
chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations became 
important in the later history of the antiwar negotiations. For the 
Levinson-Borah article suggested to France a way to honor her 
Continental alliances and sign the Kellogg treaty. A breach of the 
proposed multilateral treaty, Borah argued, 52 automatically would 
release the signatories from their obligations thereunder. France's 
commitment to Belgium, for example, would only be in suspended 
animation, not abrogated, so long as no nation violated the multi- 
lateral treaty. But upon violation say by Germany France be- 
came automatically released from the antiwar treaty and might pro- 
ceed to the aid of Belgium under the terms of the Franco-Belgian 

Strangely enough Ambassador Claudel a month earlier, in one 
of his private tete-a-ttes with Assistant Secretary Castle, had also 
suggested this very idea of release in case of breach. In his "strictly 
personal" five-point proposal Claudel had included as point five: 
"Any State having recourse to war in order to obtain a settlement 
of its differences with the other Signatories shall ipso facto place 
itself beyond the pale of the present Treaty." Perhaps Levinson, 
who kept in close touch with the French Embassy in Washington, 
obtained the idea of release-in-case-of-breach from Claudel himself. 
And supposing that Claudel's five-point proposal in reality was 
Briand's: Briand could have obtained the idea of release from 
Part I, Article 3 of the almost-forgotten Shotwell-Chamberlain 
draft treaty. Then what a tortuous route this release idea may have 
taken: Shotwell to Briand to Claudel to Levinson to Borah. 53 

Reports from Borah's office said he had received scores of tele- 
grams commending his Times article and that a friend had ar- 
ranged for printing three thousand copies. 54 The article received 

51. See J. Stoner, Levinson, pp. 347-350. Stoner prints Levinson's draft and 
Borah's article in parallel columns. 

52. This idea was Levinson's. 

53. And later to Kellogg (see below, pp. 173-174, 187., 

54. New York Times, Feb. 7, 1958. 


wide distribution, appearing abroad in British and Continental 
periodicals. Even Professor Shotwell could not contain his enthu- 
siasm for Borah's new formula and in a long letter to the editor of 
the New York Times declared "Senator Borah has cleared away 
much of the obstruction in the path of negotiations." Outlawry and 
the League of Nations envisaged the same goal, Shotwell wrote: 
the community of nations should outlaw a nation which ran amok; 
and self-defense was always justifiable, individual or collective. 55 

In spite of the favorable response to Borah's Times article three 
weeks elapsed with almost no development in the Franco- American 
negotiations. Each side seemed to be watching the other to see who 
would make the first move. Finally Secretary Kellogg grew tired 
of waiting and on February 27 gave Ambassador Claudel a new 
American note. 

"A Government free to conclude ... a bilateral treaty," Kel- 
logg held, "should be no less able to become a party to an identical 
multilateral treaty since it is hardly to be presumed that members 
of the League of Nations are in a position to do separately some- 
thing they cannot do together." 56 Kellogg declared he desired no 
definitions of aggression in the treaty, for such might virtually de- 
stroy the antiwar proposal itself; definitions would lead to reserva- 
tions, and thus the governments would be only "recording their 
impotence, to the keen disappointment of mankind in general." 
Kellogg for the third time December 28, January 11, and now 
February 27 proposed a multilateral treaty. 57 

It was evident that up to this point Briand had achieved noth- 
ing in his maneuvering with Secretary Kellogg. In two formal 
notes 5S he had failed to break off the antiwar negotiations. Attempt- 
ing next to shift Outlawry and renunciation on to the Franco- 

55. Ibid., Feb. 6, 1928. 

56. Kellogg had wanted to put in his note a statement that if the French 
believed a multilateral antiwar treaty was contrary to the ideals of the League 
it would prove that the League was a military alliance. Wrote Castle in his 
diary, Feb. 17: "I think we have got him to give up the phrase which would 
certainly lead to an outburst. We can intimate the same idea without saying 
it in that blunt fashion." 

57. Kellogg to C^udel, Feb. 27, 1928, FR: 1928, I, 9-11. 

58. Those of Jan, 5 and Jan. 21. 


American arbitration treaty, he failed again. Briand then received 
the new note from the United States Government insisting upon 
Kellogg's original multilateral proposal. 

Kellogg's persistent antiwar diplomacy by now had very much 
discomfited the French foreign minister, who apparently was go- 
ing to have to choose between his loyalties as a Frenchman and his 
public reputation as a man of peace. As Assistant Secretary Castle 
summed up the situation, "I do not think the French will agree 
[to the multilateral treaty proposal], but I think they will have 
an awful time not to agree." 59 


At approximately this time there appeared a certain transforma- 
tion in Secretary Kellogg's attitude toward the proposed multi- 
lateral antiwar treaty. One of the reasons Kellogg originally had 
made his multilateral proposition was to appease the American 
peace movement, enthusiastic over Briand's suggestion for Franco- 
American perpetual friendship. This had been achieved. As Assist- 
ant Secretary Castle on February 28, 1928 wrote in his diary with 
obvious satisfaction: "After all we have done what we set out to do. 
We have made a big, peaceful gesture and we have public opinion 
fairly solidly behind us." In proposing his multilateral treaty Kel- 
logg also undoubtedly looked forward to placing Aristide Briand 
in a diplomatic dilemma. The French foreign minister had highly 
embarrassed Kellogg by offering a bilateral treaty between the 
United States and France, and we may be certain that Kellogg 
enjoyed Briand's equal embarrassment at the prospect of a multi- 
lateral treaty. But having accomplished all this the American secre- 
tary of state began to undergo a momentous change of heart: he 
began to believe that a multilateral treaty really would be a great 
gift to the world. 

Not that Kellogg was ready to advocate such a treaty unre- 
servedly. 60 There were certain contingencies when the secretary 
deemed the United States Government might need to resort to 

59. "We have Monsieur Briand out on a limb and we might just as well 
keep him there." Castle diary, Feb. 28, 1928. 

60. See below, Chapter XII. 


force for instance, self-defense, or the Monroe Doctrine. But even 
with these reservations Kellogg began to feel that a multilateral anti- 
war treaty would constitute a magnificent boon to world peace. The 
secretary of state was an elderly man, at the end of a long public 
career. He was planning to retire on March 4, igag. 61 What better 
than to grace his final months in office with signature of a grand 
treaty renouncing war as an instrument of national policy? Such 
a treaty might become the consummation and crown of his life's 
work. 62 

When he observed this change in Kellogg's attitude Assistant 
Secretary Castle was flabbergasted. As he wrote in his diary: "For 
weeks the press has chorused approval of F.B.K/s exchange of notes 
with Briand on outlawing war . . . actually it is futile. It ap- 
pealed enormously to the Pacifists and the Earnest Christians but 
... I think it is about time for the correspondence to stop. The 
political trick has been turned and now we should take a well de- 
served rest. The funny thing is that Olds and the Secretary seem 
to take it all with profound seriousness . . /' fl3 

Such was the new prospect when the foreign ministers of France, 

61. Kellogg to Herrick, Mar. 19, 1928, Herrick MSS. 

62. Such it became. In Professor Bryn- Jones' biography of Kellogg, written 
with Kellogg's approval and active assistance, there occurs the following 
passage: "And of all the experiences and recollections of those years [of public 
service], none shine out more brightly in retrospect than those that were con- 
nected with the project which Mr. Kellogg always regarded as the consumma- 
tion and crown of his labors the Pact of Paris." Kellogg, p. 251. 

Below the Kellogg window at the National Cathedral in Washington, where 
Kellogg's ashes are buried, is the following inscription: 










63. Castle diary, Mar. 6, 1928. Italics inserted. 


Britain, and Germany gathered at Geneva early in March for a 
meeting of the League Council. Rumor had it that to the ministers 
Kellogg's proposal appeared, with the help of Borah's Times ar- 
ticle, in a new light. Instead of continuing to exchange polemical 
notes between Paris and Washington, the new policy was to ascer- 
tain just what Kellogg wanted and thus what reservations would be 
necessary to make his proposal acceptable. 64 On the train back from 
Geneva to Paris the ubiquitous James of the Times asked Briand 
for a statement on the Kellogg peace plan. ' 'There is every pos- 
sibility," Briand said, "of the conclusion of this treaty suggested 
by the United States, provided we can find a formula which is fair 
and square. I am convinced we shall be able to find it. And such is 
the sentiment of other European nations." 65 

What Briand had told his colleagues at Geneva was rather in- 
teresting. Upon Stresemann's return to Berlin, Ambassador Jacob 
Schurman inquired just what had happened. Stresemann responded 
that the big five (Germany, France, Britain, Italy, and Japan) had 
discussed the war-prevention treaty only once, and then informally: 
Briand had said to his colleagues, in a lighter vein, that when he 
had proposed to America a treaty providing that France and the 
United States should renounce war as an instrument of their na- 
tional policy toward each other he had meant it rather as a ges- 
ture, but now that the secretary of state's reply had invested it with 
importance he might wish in the future to consult them on the sub- 
ject; that in the meantime he wished only to ask them one ques- 
tion, Had the American Government communicated with their 
governments in regard to it? To this inquiry Chamberlain, Adachi 
(the Japanese representative on the League Council), and Strese- 
mann said that it had. 66 

Meanwhile Secretary Kellogg had given in New York a speech 
before the Council on Foreign Relations. 67 Kellogg made his posi- 

64. Edwin L. James, Geneva, Mar. 6, in New York Times, Mar. 7, 1928. 

65. Dispatch from Paris, Mar. 11, in New York Times, Mar. 12. 

66. Schurman to Kellogg, Mar. 16, 1928, FR: 1928, 1, 15. Kellogg on Jan. 6 
authorized communication to the great powers of the text of Briand's June 20, 
1927, draft and the American counterproposal of Dec. 28. FR: 1928, 1, 3. 

67. An eminent organization with headquarters in New York whose avowed 
purpose was to study international aspects of American political, economic, and 


tion very clear as he already had done in three previous notes and 
numerous conversations and interviews. "... I cannot state too 
emphatically/' he said, "that . . . [the United States] will not 
become a party to any agreement which directly or indirectly, ex- 
pressly or by implication, is a military alliance.'* He added that the 
American Government always was ready to conclude "appropriate " 
treaties for arbitration, for conciliation, and for the renunciation 
of war. 68 

Kellogg strengthened the effect of his speech by citing a reso- 
lution renouncing war as an instrument of national policy which 
seventeen American members of the League of Nations recently 
had signed at the Havana Inter-American Conference. 69 The secre- 
tary of state in his speech stressed in three different places the fact 
that League members had signed this antiwar resolution. If seven- 
teen American members of the League could sign such a statement, 
contended Kellogg, then why all the hesitation and talk in Europe 
about squaring the proposed peace treaty with the obligations of 
the League? 

Perhaps it was not exactly to the point for Kellogg to chide 
France by citing the Havana resolution. The resolution renounced 
war only in its preamble, and moreover the resolution had no more 
binding effect than had the Polish resolution at the Eighth As- 
sembly of the League of Nations in September 1927. The American 
states, meeting periodically in conference, never failed to release a 
shoal of pious resolutions which often were not worth the paper and 
ink necessary to print them. 70 It may be, however, that Secretary 

financial problems. Formed after the World War the Council soon began pub- 
lishing a quarterly Foreign Affairs, a Political Handbook of the World, a yearly 
survey of American foreign relations, and other individual volumes on special 
international questions. 

68. For this speech of Mar. 15, 1928, set American Journal of International 
Law, 22 (1928), 253-261. 

69. For the text of this resolution of Feb. 18, 1928, see Carnegie Endow- 
ment for International Peace, The International Conferences of American 
States: 1898-1928 (New York, 1931), p. 437. 

70. Intervention of the United States in Latin American affairs was the 
principal issue at the Havana conference. The Latin-American governments 
sought valiantly to persuade the United States to renounce such intervention. 


Kellogg in citing the Havana resolution was hinting ever so deli- 
cately to European statesmen that, after all, he was not interested in 
unreservedly renouncing war, but rather in what one of his detrac- 
tors, Miss Annie Matthews, so improperly had termed a "futile ges- 
ture" and what a skeptical American senator 71 later was to describe 
as an "international kiss/' 

Just how fervent an international kiss should properly be was a 
matter for the Emily Posts of diplomacy. Senator Borah gave his 
own opinion in an interview to Kirby Page, editor of The World 
Tomorrow. Talking with the senator soon after Secretary Kellogg's 
speech, Page reported Borah's eyes "glistening with enthusiasm" 
as he watched him at the private luncheon table in the Senate 
building. Borah said he had spent hours seeking to find a defini- 
tion of aggression, but failed. Outlawry, of course, did not mean 
disarmament. But to attack the war system by outlawing war was 
"an incalculable contribution" to the security of the nations. In 
telling the joys of Outlawry Borah quite forgot the bowl of milk 
toast before him. He declared (and this declaration was the cause 
of some later embarrassment) that it was inconceivable that the 
United States should stand idly by in face of a flagrant viola- 
tion of an Outlawry agreement. 72 "Of course, in such a crisis 
we would consult with the other signatories and take their judg- 
ment into account. But we should not bind ourselves in advance 
to accept their decision if it runs counter to our own conclu- 
sion." 73 

Ambassador Claudel called on Undersecretary Olds and again 
made an offer again a "strictly personal" onie to sink the antiwar 
negotiations with an international declaration of principles. Claudel 
this time gave Olds the actual text of the five-point declaration 

Renouncing war as an instrument of national policy probably was one means 
to this end. 

There was another resolution, also dated Feb. 18, 1928, declaring aggression 
illicit and prohibited. For the text, see ibid., pp. 441-442. 

71. Reed of Missouri, Congressional Record, Jan. 5, 1929, p. 1186. 

72. In the Senate, Jan. 7, 1929, he denied having said this. Congressional 
Record, Jan. 7, 1929, pp. 1281-1282. 

73. New York Times, Mar. 25, 1928. 


previously mentioned. 74 Olds told Claudel that public opinion in 
the United States would insist in the long run upon everything 
possible being done to outlaw war in other words the American 
Government was not simply building a perfunctory official record 
on this subject but meant business. Claudel protested that his chief, 
Briand, was equally earnest and sincere and meant business, but 
that there were difficulties. The ambassador said that in the end 
a declaration of principles might be best. Olds insisted that public 
opinion the world over would regard anything short of a treaty as a 
confession of failure. 75 And so the dejected Claudel left the text of 
his own five-point declaration and gave up the struggle against Out- 

As the month of March drew to a close Aristide Briand surveyed 
the last three months of diplomatic maneuvering and knew that, 
although he had not yet lost, he was very close to losing. Perhaps the 
time had come to accept, at least nominally, Kellogg's suggestion for 
a multilateral antiwar treaty. Simultaneously it would be possible 
to add reservations to Kellogg's multilateral proposal, and the 
maneuvering then could commence again. Ambassador Claudel, 
March 30, presented a new note to the American secretary of state. 
"If Your Excellency really believes that greater chances of success 
may be found in this [multilateral] formula," Briand painfully be- 
gan, ". . . the French Government would hesitate to discuss longer 
the question of its adherence to a plan which the American Govern- 
ment originated and for which it is responsible." Briand would in- 
sist only on "three fundamental points": (i) the treaty must be uni- 
versal; (2) a breach would release the signatories; (3) the treaty 
would not prejudice the right of self-defense. France, averred its 
foreign minister, was "always ready to associate itself without am- 
biguity or reservation [sic], with any solemn and formal undertak- 
ing tending to ensure, strengthen or extend the effective solidarity 
of the Nations in the cause of peace." 76 

74. Above, pp. 151-152. Claudel in January had only read the declaration to 

75. Memorandum by Olds of a conversation with Claudel, Mar. 24, 1928, 
711.5112 France/225. 

76. Claudel to Kellogg, Mar. 30, 1928, FR: 192$ , I, 15-19. 

Chapter Twelve: MODIFICATIONS, 



ter three months of evasive delay Aristide 
Briand finally had accepted the principle of a multilateral treaty 
renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. Briand, how- 
ever, had no intention of omitting reservations in the proposed pact. 

Nor did Secretary Kellogg himself desire an unconditional 
treaty. The secretary at about this time was becoming enamored 
with the grand idea of renouncing war; but Frank B. Kellogg could 
be counted upon never not for even one moment to lose sight of 
American national interests. Those interests required American 
reservations to any antiwar treaty. Kellogg knew this. 

The reader should not conclude that Briand and Kellogg were 
now in perfect agreement, that in a short time they could come to- 
gether and decide on the nature and form of their respective reser- 
vations, Briand remained intensely annoyed that the American 
secretary of state had jockeyed him into so embarrassing a position 
that he was forced to consent to the principle of a multilateral anti- 
war treaty. The French foreign minister undoubtedly would have 
been most happy at any time to withdraw from the negotiations. 
Kellogg, in turn, had been enormously disgusted by the manner in 
which Briand had placed pressure upon him for a bilateral pact of 
perpetual friendship. And now that the American secretary of 
state had with new zeal begun to advocate a multilateral treaty he 


felt deeply offended by Briand's almost undisguised efforts to stop 
the negotiations. Clearly, although both Kellogg and Briand wished 
reservations, it would be no easy task for them to agree as to pre- 
cisely how the conditions should be attached to the proposed treaty. 
Kellogg, taken with the idea of renunciation of war, perhaps would 
not want to see too many reservations attached too obviously. 
Briand, disliking the entire affair, probably would continue his 
covert attempts at sabotage. 

The first step in this new, "reserving" phase of the negotiations 
required some sort of new draft treaty over which to negotiate. 
Secretary Kellogg had not yet proposed an actual text of a multi- 
lateral antiwar treaty. Neither had Briand. 

Kellogg submitted to Italy, Japan, Germany, and Great Britain 
on April 13, 1927, an official invitation to enter the antiwar discus- 
sions, and the invitation took the form of a draft treaty. The draft's 
two substantive articles were almost the same as those of Briand's 
original Pact of Perpetual Friendship offered nearly a year before. 
What changes appeared were only those necessary to transform the 
original bilateral pact into a multilateral instrument. The pream- 
ble had suitable amendments, as did the third article of ratifica- 
tion. 1 

Exactly one week later Aristide Briand made a countermove. 
He offered the powers a new, French-style draft of a multilateral 
antiwar treaty. 

The French draft in Article i reserved legitimate self-defense, 
together with action under Locarno or the Covenant. Article 2 was 
almost identical with Article 2 of Briand's draft of June 20, 1927 
(providing that settlement of international disputes never should 
be sought except by peaceful means). Article 3 was similar to 
Claudel's fifth "personal" suggestion of January 7, 1928; it released 
all signatories in the event of a treaty breach. Article 4 reserved 
rights and obligations of prior international agreements (meaning 
French treaties of alliance with Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 

i. For text, see FR: 1928, 1, 23-24. 


Rumania, and Yugoslavia). Article 5 provided that the treaty to 
be binding must secure accession of all the nations unless there 
should be specific agreement to the contrary. Article 6 contained 
details, of ratification. 2 

2. Following are the substantive articles of Briand's draft, dated Apr. 20, 


The High Contracting Parties without any intention to infringe upon the 
exercise of their rights of legitimate self-defense within the framework of 
existing treaties, particularly when the violation of certain of the provisions 
of such treaties constitutes a hostile act, solemnly declare that they condemn 
recourse to war and renounce it as an instrument of national policy; that is to 
say, as an instrument of individual, spontaneous and independent political 
action taken on then* own initiative and not action in respect of which they 
might become involved through the obligation of a treaty such as the covenant 
of the League of Nations or any other treaty registered with the League of 
Nations. They undertake on those conditions not to attack or invade one 


The settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or 
origin which might arise among the High Contracting Parties or between any 
two of them shall never be sought on either side except by pacific methods. 


In case one of the High Contracting Parties should contravene this treaty, 
the other Contracting Powers would ipso facto be released with respect to that 
Party from their obligations under this treaty. 


The provisions of this treaty in no wise affect the rights and obligations 
of the Contracting Parties resulting from prior international agreements to 
which they are parties. 


The present treaty will be offered for the accession of all Powers and will 
have no binding force until it has been generally accepted unless the signatory 
Powers in accord with those that may accede hereto shall agree to decide that it 
shall come into effect regardless of certain abstentions. 

The complete text is in FR: 1928, 1, 32-34. 


Ambassador Claudel felt abashed by having to deliver such a 
draft treaty. He later confided to Assistant Secretary Castle that 
the draft was utterly stupid. The ambassador explained that Bri- 
and evidently had told the Quai d'Orsay's legal expert, Henri 
Fromageot, to prepare something, and that he had produced noth- 
ing but fromage.* 

When Secretary Kellogg saw this projet an fromage he became 
quite excited. No one has recorded what he said at the time, but 
as he held a doctor's degree in profanity 4 it would not be espe- 
cially difficult to guess the substance of his remarks. Even when he 
had cooled a little he still considered the French draft wholly 
unacceptable to the United States: ". . . it cannot in any respect 
be regarded as. an effective instrument for the promotion of world 
peace. It emphasizes war, not peace, and seems in effect to be a 
justification rather than a renunciation of the use of armed force. 
... if the present draft represents the limit to which the French 
Government is prepared to go in renouncing war by treaty, it is 
idle for the United States to endeavor to seek an agreement with 
France, the respective positions of the two Governments in that 
event being totally irreconcilable," 

It is most curious to discover that Kellogg made the above 
strictures in a dispatch of April 23 to American embassies in Paris, 
Tokyo, London, and Rome, and later in this same dispatch ac- 
cepted, almost point for point, the French reservations. 5 This 
though he had castigated the French draft as not in any respect 
an effective instrument for world peace, that it emphasized war, 
and that it was idle for the United States to seek such an agree- 
ment. Kellogg of course did not refer to French reservations. The 
secretary avowed rather that the United States Government was 
willing to discuss modifications 6 or qualifications 6 to the antiwar 
pact, and he undertook to deal seriatim with what seemed to be 
the six major considerations 6 which the French Government had 

3. Castle diary, May i, 1928. 

4. See above, p. 81. 

5. For text of Kellogg's acceptance of the French reservations, see FR: 1928, 
I, 36-38. 

6. Kellogg's word, used in the note of Apr. 23. 


emphasized in its correspondence and in its draft treaty: (i) self- 
defense; (2) the Covenant; (3) the Locarno treaties; (4) certain un- 
specified treaties of neutrality (the alliances); (5) release in case of 
breach; (6) universality. There was nothing in his proposed treaty, 
Kellogg argued, which conflicted with the first five of these vital 
points. In the case of (i) self-defense he declared such a right "in- 
herent in every sovereign state" and "implicit in every treaty"; 
"Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions 
to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is com- 
petent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in 
self-defense." 7 One by one Kellogg discussed and accepted the 
other French considerations. The League Covenant, the French 
point (2), imposed no "affirmative primary obligation" to go to 
war; hence there could be no conflict between the Covenant and 
an antiwar treaty. Resort to war by any state in violation of the 
Locarno treaties (3) and the French alliances (4) would also be a 
breach of the multilateral antiwar treaty; and the parties to the 
latter treaty would thus be automatically released from their obliga- 
tions thereunder, free to fulfill their Locarno and alliance commit- 
ments. There could be no question about relations with a treaty- 
breaking state (5), Kellogg repeated, for violation of a multilateral 
treaty against war would release the other signatories from their 
obligations to the treaty-breaking state. Only in the case of (6) uni- 
versality that the treaty before going into effect should include all 
the nations did the secretary dissent; some obstructionist state, 
he contended, might block agreement or delay ratification in such 
a way as to render abortive the efforts of all the other powers. With 
this sole exception of universality, Kellogg thus managed to inter- 
pret the position of the United States Government so as to agree to 
all the considerations found in the French draft treaty of April 20. 

7. It appears that as early as Apr. 21 Kellogg had prepared his views on 
self-defense if not on the other points of Briand's draft. The secretary on that 
date told Sir Esme Howard that "there was nothing in the treaty which Briand 
had originally proposed to me and which is the one I proposed to the five other 
powers in any way restricting the right of self-defense; that that right of self- 
defense was inherent in every sovereign state and implicit in every treaty." 
Memorandum by Kellogg of a conversation with Howard, Apr. 21, 1928, 
711.5112 France/8o. 


The secretary's dispatch, however, was for the personal information 
of the American ambassadors, and only for oral communication to 
the respective foreign ministers if deemed necessary. 

Ambassador Houghton soon afterward cabled the substance of 
a conversation with Chamberlain. The latter had confessed he had 
not yet been able to give the proposed multilateral treaty any real 
study, but was sympathetic of course. He thought a meeting of the 
foreign secretaries might be necessary at some later date and hoped 
to meet Kellogg. Chamberlain asked about the Monroe Doctrine 
and assumed that he and Kellogg were agreed on the necessity of 
self-defense. Houghton repeated to Sir Austen his instructions from 
Kellogg: "That right [of self-defense] is inherent in every sovereign 
state ..." Houghton in his cable to Kellogg suggested that the 
secretary give to the press the six-point discussion of April 23, 

The day after Chamberlain gingerly asked about self-defense 
Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann in Berlin handed to Am- 
bassador Schurman an official note formally accepting, in the name 
of the German Government, the American antiwar proposal. In 
the course of his note Stresemann deftly inserted three reservations 
self-defense, release after violation, universality as the ultimate 
goal but the German note if read uncritically sounded like an un- 
conditional acceptance. 9 Chamberlain had cabled Stresemann ask- 
ing the latter to hold back his reply until Chamberlain could discuss 
it with him; but Stresemann had answered that the government's 
reply had been accepted by the German Cabinet and could not 
be delayed. 10 Germany, by a skillful diplomatic stroke, thus had 
wasted no time in accepting the proposed treaty against war, Ameri- 
can version. By moving speedily Stresemann had associated Ger- 
many with the United States, against the other great powers, in the 
campaign against war. 

No less startling was the next development. Secretary Kellogg 
spoke in Washington April 28 at a dinner of the American Society 
of International Law. He had planned to speak extemporaneously. 

8. Houghton to Kellogg, Apr. 27, 1928, FR: 1928, 1, 39-41. 

9. Stresemann to Schurman, Apr. 27, 1928, ibid., 42-44. 

10. Houghton to Kellogg, May 3, 1928, FR: 1928; I, 50. 


But after reading Ambassador Houghton's cable of the day before 
he decided to use in his speech practically word for word the six 
numbered paragraphs of his April 23 cable. 11 Kellogg in such man- 
ner proclaimed publicly, if not officially, his acceptance of the 
French reservations. The secretary of state had not actually ac- 
cepted the French draft treaty itself, but he had accepted what 
amounted to the same thing the American draft with addition of 
certain interpretations: 12 self-defense, the League Covenant, the 
Locarno treaties, the French alliances, release in case of breach. 

Kellogg thus had made it quite plain to his French opposite that 
there was no essential difference between them regarding what 
reservations should be placed in the antiwar treaty. It remained, 
however, to get Briand's express consent and to determine the exact 
form in which the conditions, if consented to, should appear. And 
perhaps some of the other invited powers Britain, Germany, Italy, 
Japan might have ideas of their own. For Secretary Kellogg there 
was. much difficult negotiation yet ahead. 

But no worries troubled American peace workers in the early 
spring of 19258. These were halcyon days for the cause. 


". . . my inside information/' Levinson wrote exultingly to 
Harrison Brown, "is that everybody [in Washington], from the 
President on, is i8K fine on Outlawry. Oh, the miracle of it!" 13 

The National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War sent 
forth a call for forty-eight state conferences with a view to influenc- 
ing the Senate in favor of renunciation of war. Numerous local con- 
ferences would precede the state meetings. Twelve million women, 

11. Kellogg used the six paragraphs verbatim except the last sentence in 
paragraph two concerning Germany; this sentence he omitted, for Stresemann 
had desired the German Government's views on the proposed pact to be 

12. Kellogg's word, used in an address delivered at a banquet in New York 
City, June 11, 1928. New York Times, June 12. Already the secretary had 
spoken of modifications and qualifications and considerations. 

13. Apr. 27, 1928, J. Stoner, Levinson, p. 293. 


the committee announced, had affiliated to study war's cause and 
cure. 14 

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom on 
May 5, 1928, adopted a resolution commending Secretary Kellogg 
for his peace activities. President Coolidge later received Jane Ad- 
dams, president of the League, with a delegation representing ten 
states. 15 

At the annual meeting of the trustees of the Carnegie Endow- 
ment for International Peace President Nicholas Murray Butler 
told of the "literally enormous progress" which the antiwar treaty 
had just made, progress which showed the power of public opinion. 
The trustees re-elected Dr. Butler as president of the Endowment. 18 

The American Peace Society, meeting in Cleveland at its Cen- 
tennial Conference, passed a resolution commending Coolidge and 
Kellogg for the multilateral antiwar negotiations. The two states- 
men were admonished to continue their labors. A copy of the so- 
ciety's resolution went to every member of Congress. 17 

Meanwhile as Levinson's hopes surged higher and higher 
the diplomatic temperature at the Quai d'Orsay suddenly reached 
boiling point over an incident in Germany at Heidelberg Univer- 
sity, May 6, 1928. 

On that day Ambassador Jacob Schurman and Foreign Min- 
ister Gustav Stresemann had received honorary degrees, and the 
two statesmen had made short and, they believed, felicitous ad- 
dresses. The eminent visitors, dressed in morning coats (academic 
costume was for faculty only), obtained a thunderous greeting as 
they took their places on the platform in the great assembly hall 
of the university. The ovation, one should add, was really thunder- 
ous, for in accord with Heidelberg tradition the students pounded 
their feet on the antique floor. Stresemann spoke inspiringly and 
felicitously on "New Ways to Understanding among the Nations/* 
Ambassador Schurman emphasized the proposed pact against war; 

14. New York Times* Apr. 8, 1928. 

15. New York Times, May 6, 

16. Ibid., May 11, 1938. 

17. Ibid., May 12, 19*8. 


and noting that of all the nations Germany alone had accepted the 
American proposition, Schurman managed to step heavily on what 
at that time was probably the French Foreign Office's most sensitive 
nerve: he orated that, apropos the antiwar negotiations, Germany 
and the United States together were "marching forward in a great 
and noble adventure in the cause of humane civilization." 18 

The Quai d'Orsay winced in pain. Germany and America lead- 
ing France and the other nations down the road to peace! And how 
would the French have felt had they known that Schurman in com- 
posing his speech had thought of picturing Germany and the United 
States marching "hand in hand"? 19 For some reason the ambassador 
avoided this familiarity. 

Responding to French entreaties Secretary Kellogg told a press 
conference that the State Department had had nothing whatever to 
do with the ambassador's speech. Kellogg declined further com- 
ment. But officials at the Department simultaneously made it known 
that the American Government was glad that Germany quickly 
and unreservedly had responded to the antiwar proposal. 20 

The French Foreign Office having been humbled for its lax 
interest in peace, the turn now came for the British Foreign Office 
albeit Sir Austen Chamberlain underwent his ordeal in Parlia- 
ment at the hands of the Labor and Liberal opposition. 

Lloyd George during a debate on May 10 declared that after 
Kellogg's speech of April 28 he did not see any point in making 
reservations. The astute wartime premier deemed the antiwar pro- 
posal especially valuable because it came from America: "America 

18. For Schurman's and Stresemann's speeches, see Addresses at the Cere- 
mony of Conferring Honorary Degrees upon the Foreign Minister Dr. Strese- 
mann and the Ambassador ojf the United States Dr. Schurman in the Convoca- 
tion Hall of Heidelberg University May 5, 1928 (Heidelberg, 1938). 

19. Schurman MSS, in Cornell University's Collection of Regional History. 
30. New York Times, May 8, 1928. All this maneuvering disgusted the 

sophisticated French journalist, Stephen Lauzanne. In an article in the May 9 
Bulletin des Actualites he regretted the day when Briand proposed an antiwar 
compact to the United States. Lauzanne found that the idealists had gotten 
their dreams all entangled in practical international politics, and the result 
was confusion. Edwin L. James, dispatch from Paris, May 8, 1928, in New York 
Times, May 9. 


is the only great country let us say it quite frankly that has in- 
creased its Army and its Navy in comparison with what they were 
before the war, and, when a country that does that actually comes 
and offers to outlaw war, we ought by all means to accept it the 
very first time it is done; and it might have a very useful effect, 
because, having outlawed war, we surely ought to have no difficulty 
in making arrangements about cruisers." 21 Ramsay MacDonald, 
the head of the Labor party, believed Britain's attitude toward the 
Kellogg peace note was going to influence Anglo-American rela- 
tions for a long time to come. "Supposing it is all nonsense so far 
as the avoidance of war is concerned," MacDonald also wanted no 
British reservations. 22 

Chamberlain began his reply for the government distinctly on 
the defensive, and he bumbled it almost at the beginning. Great 
Britain, he announced defiantly, "never has. treated war as an in- 
strument of policy." 

The honorable members cried "Never?" Commander Ken- 
worthy asked about the Boer War. 

Replied Chamberlain: "This country did not declare war. I 
repeat that war has never been an instrument of the policy of this 
country within any time which we contemplate when we are dis- 
cussing the Europe of to-day. I will not go back to the Crusades." 2S 

As he elaborated his subject Sir Austen grew more apologetic. 
The government, he said, had received the American proposal on 
April 13. The evening before he had left the Foreign Office for a 
twelve-day holiday. On returning he tackled the antiwar treaty 
but had to consult the Dominions. Also he considered most care- 
fully Britain's prior commitments under the Covenant and Lo- 
carno, The "remarkable and very interesting" speech delivered 
by Secretary Kellogg before the American Society of International 
Law in Washington had greatly helped the government in its con- 
sideration of the proposal. 24 

But a few days after this debate, on May 19, when Chamberlain 

21. 217 H.C. Deb., 5 s., cc. 474-475- 

22. Ibid., cc. 444-446. 

23. 2/7 H.C. Deb., 5 s., cc. 454~455- 

24. Ibid., cc. 455-458. 


sent to Washington Britain's official acceptance of the Kellogg pro- 
posal, the British foreign secretary no longer was on the defensive 
or apologetic. Taking cognizance of Kellogg's new zeal for peace, 
Sir Austen acidly remarked that European diplomacy had been 
engaged for several years in the very work which now attracted 
Kellogg. Yet more important than such diplomatic thrusts was 
numbered-paragraph 10 of Chamberlain's note: 

... I should remind Your Excellency that there are certain 
regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which con- 
stitute the special and vital interest for our peace and safety. 
His Majesty's Government have been at pains to make it clear 
in the past that interference with these regions cannot be suf- 
fered. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire 
a measure of self-defense. It must be clearly understood that His 
Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new treaty 
upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their 
freedom of action in this respect. . . , 28 

Here was a reservation indeed. "Certain regions," said Sir 
Austen. His note did not specify. "The Government of the United 
States/' he had added, as if in explanation, "have comparable in- 
terests . . ." But the Monroe Doctrine, Kellogg could have replied, 
explicitly limited itself in theory to the American continents, and 
in practice to North and Central America and the Caribbean. 

What did Chamberlain mean by certain regions? In the House 
of Commons, Mr. Thurtle asked the foreign secretary to define the 
regions referred to. Sir Austen evaded the question. The British 
reply, he said, was then under consideration of the American Gov- 
ernment, and His Majesty's Government would at the proper time 
be prepared to offer "any explanations which may be required to 
facilitate the negotiation of the proposed pact." 2e 

Chamberlain's certain regions appear to have had something to 

25. FR: 1928, 1, 68. Italics inserted. 

26. 217 H.C. Deb., 5 s., cc 1855-1856 (May 23). On June 5, June 6, and 
June 12, 1928, Godfrey Locker-Lampson, undersecretary of state for foreign 
affairs, refused to define the British "certain regions." 218 H,C, Deb., 5 s v cc, 
18, 162-163, 815. 


do with Egypt. Chamberlain on May 24 dined with Ambassador 
Hough ton at his own suggestion and spent a long evening with the 
American ambassador. Sir Austen that night said he had set forth 
his. "British Monroe Doctrine" as the press was beginning to call 
it only to reassure Parliament over Egypt. 27 But why, one might 
ask, did not Chamberlain refer specifically to Egypt instead of 
vaguely to certain regions? 

The answer lies in Chamberlain's cold dislike for Outlawry in 
general and particular, and in his determination not to sacrifice one 
iota of British imperial interests just to please what he deemed a 
politician-secretary of state. Sometime during the spring of 1928 
Chamberlain wrote in his diary that "I can see many disadvantages 
in doing anything which Mr. Kellogg may regard as a rebuff, but 
I confess that I don't think the world will gain anything by merely 
helping Mr. Kellogg over his, electoral fence. How to deal with his 
proposals in these circumstances is as knotty a problem as he could 
have found for us." 2S The way to deal with this knotty problem was 

27. Houghton to Kellogg, May 25, 1928, FR: 192%, I, 72-74. The Egyptian 
problem recently had been in the forefront of British diplomacy. Just three 
weeks before Chamberlain sent to Kellogg the British note of acceptance, the 
British Government handed the Egyptian Government a forty-eight hour ulti- 
matum demanding withdrawal of a public assemblies bill. The Egyptian na- 
tionalists were intensely anti-British, and Chamberlain had great difficulty 
seeking to maintain the semblance of native government in Egypt while at the 
same time safeguarding Britain's thoroughfare at Suez. 

In addition to Egypt there was the problem of the optional clause to the 
World Court protocol. By adhering to Article 36 of the protocol, nations under- 
took to submit all legal controversies (as defined in that article) to the Court. 
The British Government was almost ready to adhere to the optional clause and, 
in adhering, intended to make reservations of sufficient latitude to allow escap- 
ing the Court's jurisdiction if any embarrassing case might arise. Chamberlain 
feared being forced, by means of the antiwar treaty, into submitting to the 
Court's jurisdiction with no reservations. When he dined with Houghton his 
final statement was that at any time he might be brought before an international 
court where his treaty obligations would be interpreted technically and in a 
purely legal way; for his protection a correct phraseology in the antiwar treaty 
was an absolute necessity. Nothing could be taken for granted. 

28. Diary, n.d., requoted from Sir Charles Petrie, The Life and Letters of 
the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain (2 vols., London, Cassell, 1940), II, 322. 
And again: "I do not think that there is any reality behind Kellogg's move. 


a British Monroe Doctrine. And if it was true 29 that Secretary 
Kellogg, pushing his antiwar treaty, merely was endeavoring to 
get over an electoral fence, then certainly no one would say that 
Austen Chamberlain gave Kellogg much of a boost. 

While Chamberlain in London was defending himself before 
Parliament, setting forth in his note to Kellogg a British Monroe 
Doctrine, and confiding his more intimate thoughts to his diary, 
Secretary Kellogg went ahead with the treaty against war. In Cham- 
berlain's certain-regions note there was a request that the United 
States Government invite the British Dominions and India to be- 
come original signatories of the treaty. Kellogg quickly assented. 30 
The Government of Poland intimated to the American minister 
in Warsaw, Stetson, that Poland as an ally of France should be an 
original signatory, and Stetson transmitted this request to Wash- 
ington with the suggestion that Kellogg include the Locarno pow- 
ers. 31 Kellogg replied s2 that he had no objection (Poland, Czecho- 
slovakia, and Belgium on June 23 officially received invitations to 
become original signatories). And on May 26 came acceptance from 
the Japanese Government, with reservations of self-defense and 
"agreements guaranteeing the public peace." 8S 

So ended another stage in the complicated negotiation of the 

His long delay in replying to Briand's proposal, as well as the character of his 
answer when made, combined to produce upon my mind the impression . . . 
that Kellogg's main thought is not of international peace but of the victory of 
the Republican party. It is one more instance of the common practice of the 
State Department to use foreign politics as a pawn in the domestic game/' 
Chamberlain diary, Feb. 13, 1928, ibid. 

29. It does not appear so. See above, pp. 164-165. 

30. Invitations went on May 22, directly to Ottawa and Dublin, indirectly 
(by means of Houghton and Chamberlain) to Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa, and the Government of India. 

31. Stetson to Kellogg, May 14, 1928, FR: 1928, 1, 63-64. 

32. Kellogg to Stetson, May 15, 1928, ibid., pp. 64-65. 

33. Tanaka to Ambassador MacVeagh in Japan, May 26, 1928, ibid., 75. 
The Italian Government had replied on May 4, mentioning no reservations 

but merely offering, although "very willingly," its "cordial collaboration to- 
wards reaching an agreement." Mussolini to the American ambassador in Italy, 
Henry P. Fletcher, May 4, 1928, ibid., pp. 55-56. The Italian reservations came 
in a later note (see below p. 19011.). 


multilateral treaty outlawing war. After three months of argument 
January, February, and March France finally, and with bad 
grace, gave in. But the French insisted on reservations which they 
put down succinctly in a draft treaty dated April 20. Although Kel- 
logg found this draft "entirely unsatisfactory/* he soon accepted 
the French position, albeit in the strange form of the American 
draft treaty with the addition of certain interpretations. 84 The task 
then was to get the powers' acceptance of the American draft and 
interpretations. Germany had accepted even before Kellogg had 
time to interpret. Britain on May 19 accepted with a reservation 
which almost amounted to rejection. Japan agreed a few days later, 
with two strings attached. Kellogg sent invitations to the members 
of the British Commonwealth and Empire. Meanwhile, during all 
this inviting and accepting, Aristide Briand he whom Sir Austen 
Chamberlain characterized as "that great Frenchman and friend 
of peace" said not a word. 


Briand had been silently maneuvering from the Quai d'Orsay, 
seeking to bring together a conference of jurists to examine the 
proposed antiwar treaty. There was even thought of a conference 
of foreign ministers. 35 And whatever sort of conference Briand 
should manage to convene, there was a good chance that the treaty 
against war, going into conference in one piece, would come out in 

Kellogg learned about this activity when the British ambassador 
in Rome told his American colleague, Ambassador Henry P. 
Fletcher, that Britain had suggested to the Italians that the meet- 
ing of juristic experts include an American expert, to avoid the 
appearance of a united European front against the United States. 36 
The American secretary of state testily commented, in a dispatch 
to Herrick in Paris, that if Germany and the United States could 

34. Those in the explanatory dispatch of April 23. 

35. Chamberlain on Apr. 27 had broached the subject with Houghton. See 
above, p. 175. 

36. Fletcher to Kellogg, May 2, 1928, ft R: 1928, 1,. 45. 


come out for an antiwar treaty without a conference, he failed to 
see why Britain and France could not do likewise. 37 Meanwhile the 
French ambassador in Tokyo called at the Japanese Foreign Office 
and officially requested that the Japanese Government send a legal 
expert for the ensuing conference; the ambassador added that he 
understood the American Government was favorable to the pro- 

Secretary Kellogg, alive to the dangers of conference, quickly 
told Ambassadors Claudel, Howard, and Prittwitz 88 that he de- 
sired no such thing. The German ambassador was very agreeable 
and said to Kellogg that his government meant to cooperate fully 
with the United States. But in London Chamberlain soon was tell- 
ing Houghton that he was highly gratified to be advised by Howard 
that Kellogg did not wholly exclude a conference of jurists. 
Houghton quickly set Chamberlain right on this point. 39 So ended 
Briand's fond hopes to smother the proposed treaty in the disputa- 
tions of an international conference of jurists. 

The month of May passed into June before Briand made an- 
other move. First Germany, then Britain, then Japan had accepted 
the treaty against war. New Zealand accepted on May 30 as did 
Canada and the Irish Free State, Australia on June 2, India on 
June 1 1, and the Union of South Africa on June 15.* France still 
had not entered the procession. 

The increasing number of acceptances made Secretary Kellogg 
more and more confident of the final success of his antiwar treaty. 

37. Kellogg to Herrick, May 2, 1928, 711.5112 France/294. 

38. The German ambassador, Friedrich W. von Prittwitz und Gaffiron. 

39. Houghton to Kellogg, May 9, FR: 1928, 1, 57. Kellogg, however, did not 
categorically refuse a conference. In reply to Houghton's cable the secretary said 
he thought a jurists' conference neither necessary nor desirable, but had been 
careful to refrain from stating flatly that the United States would decline rep- 
resentation at such a conference. Kellogg to Houghton, May 9, 1928, ibid., 
PP- 57-58. 

40. New Zealand accepted with no reservations; Canada, the Covenant; 
Irish Free State, the Covenant; Australia, no reservations; India, no reserva- 
tions; Union of South Africa, self-defense, release in case of breach, Covenant. 
For texts, see FR: 1928, 1, 76, 77, 87-90. New Zealand, Australia, and India 
made their reservations later (see below, p. 190 n.). 


Day by day his deeply lined face became more radiant with enthu- 
siasm, and his occasional irascibility was less frequent. But at least 
two of Kellogg's subordinates did not share their chief's, optimism. 
Ambassador Houghton, home on leave from London, early in June 
dined with Assistant Secretary Castle in Washington. As Castle 
recorded in his diary, "Houghton and I talked until nearly mid- 
night. He had a great deal to say about the multilateral treaties 
and doubts very much whether negotiations are as near completion 
as. F.B.K. thinks. He will remind the Secretary that the British 
acceptance at the moment does not go beyond the actual words of 
the British note and that it is not likely to accept the American 
proposition as drafted unless or until the French accept it. In other 
words, he does not agree with Kellogg's idea that everybody is 
straining at the leash to sign up." 41 

Perhaps Houghton was too pessimistic. Sir Austen Chamber- 
lain, on his way through Paris to Geneva, stopped off to see his 
good friend Aristide Briand, whom illness prevented from attend- 
ing the forthcoming meeting of the League Council. Afterward 
Briand received reporters. Asked if he and Chamberlain had dis- 
cussed the proposal to outlaw war, the French foreign minister 

41. Castle diary, June 4, 1928. A few days before, on a Sunday, Castle had 
gone to his State Department office "to clear up a few things." There he found 
Kellogg in the adjoining office discussing multilateral treaties. Somewhat an- 
noyed, Castle immediately set down the following entry hi his diary: "They 
think that they are remaking the world and actually it is nothing but a beautiful 
gesture while the Jugoslavs tear down Italian consular flags and the Chinese 
fight and the Japanese stand at attention. The gesture is worth while if it is 
made just right and with a little guidance in wording the Secretary would make 
it right. . . * [But otherwise it] may seriously tie our hands, as the originators 
of the plan, if the time comes when as honorable people we must step in with 
force. . . . words can never take the place of actions . . . the only way to 
achieve peace is by quietly and steadily standing for the right and the air thing. 
We could change the whole sentiment of Latin America toward the United 
States by getting other nations to cooperate with us in our police measures. We 
have stood for moderation in China and we can be careful not to suspect and 
offend the Japanese. We can learn courtesy in our dealings without losing any 
of our firmness. We cannot remake humanity in a day. We cannot abolish 
war with a pen but we can take the lead in making war unnecessary/' Castle 
diary, May 30, 1928. 


made a most interesting, if somewhat disingenuous, declaration. He 
thought that regarding renunciation of war the powers were border- 
ing upon success. "What did we [France] propose at the beginning 
of this question? We proposed a bilateral compact which could 
serve in some way as a preamble to our new treaty of Franco- 
American friendship." But because Kellogg had enlarged the scope 
of France's initial propositions, "the most elementary integrity 
commands us to express certain reservations . . . This end aimed 
at has been attained. The powers consulted since and Mr. Kellogg 
himself, one need only to read his recent speech, have come to our 
point of view." All that remained was to find a formula. Briand 
was certain there would be no delay. 42 

The foreign minister next expressed to Ambassador Herrick 
his satisfaction with Kellogg's speech of April 28; he thought it 
gave all the desired appeasement not only to France but also to 
other countries. Briand believed it would be comparatively easy to 
cast this general harmony of views into concrete form either by 
way of a protocol accompanying the treaty, or through a "more 
matured*' preamble, or by some other method. 43 

And Briand soon found a way to "mature" the preamble. M. de 
Fleuriau, French ambassador in London and reportedly a close 
friend of Briand, asked Chamberlain that Sir Esme Howard in 
Washington support the following proposal: the French reserva- 
tions (i) maintenance of existing treaties and (2) release in case 
of breach should appear in the treaty's preamble; and then (for 
the sake of greater clarity, said Fleuriau) Article 2 of the proposed 
treaty should receive an additional phrase, "in conformity with the 
principles enunciated in the preamble/' The French Government, 
Fleuriau declared, preferred that its reservations appear in the 
body of the treaty; if this were impossible, then in a protocol of 
equal value with the treaty; and if this were not acceptable, then as 

Receiving the Briand-Fleuriau suggestion in the form of an 

42. New York Times, June 3, 1928. 

43. Herrick to Kellogg, June 6, 1928, FR: 1928, 1, 79-80* 

44. Aide-Meinoire by the British Embassy in Washington to the Department 
of State, June 18, 1928, FR: 19*8, I, 86-87. 


aide-memoire from the British Embassy in Washington, Kellogg 
acted with dispatch. On June 20, two days after the date of the 
memoire, he cabled a circular note to London, Brussels, Prague, 
Berlin, Dublin, Rome, Warsaw, and Tokyo. 45 For communication 
to the respective governments, the note contained verbatim the 
explanations in Kellogg's speech of April 28, 46 thus making Kel- 
logg's public explanations official. 47 

Kellogg enclosed in his note a new draft treaty. The new Ameri- 
can proposal had a revised preamble which named individually the 
British Dominions, India, and the Locarno powers as signatories, 
and also contained a clause denying the benefits, of the treaty to any 
violator. 48 In Kellogg's long six-point explanatory dispatch of April 
23, 1928, this suggestion of release in case of breach of the treaty 
had figured as point (5). The secretary of state had at that time in- 
sisted that, "as a matter of law," such release was implicit in the 
proposed antiwar treaty. "Any express recognition of this princi- 
ple," Kellogg added, "is wholly unnecessary." But the unnecessary 
now had proved necessary, apparently because Briand so deemed 
it. This idea of release in case of breach, of course, cleared the way 
as Kellogg in his explanatory note had pointed out for resort 
to war under terms of the Covenant, Locarno, or the French alli- 
ances. Briand, insisting upon express recognition of the idea of 
release, was taking no chances with France's vitally important in- 
ternational commitments. Nothing must in any way harm the cher- 
ished instruments of French securit. 

But if the American secretary of state believed he now had 

45. Dated (and for communication on) the 2$d, the note was for publica- 
tion on the 25th. 

46. Which in turn were the almost verbatim explanations of Kellogg's 
confidential note, dated Apr. 33, to Herrick, Houghton, et al. 

47. FR: 192,8, I, 90-95. Borah, rarely able to keep a State Department 
secret, wrote to Levinson June 23 (two days before Kellogg's date of publica- 
tion) and announced "There may be an expression in the preamble to satisfy 
the situation in regard to one particular matter." Levinson MSS. 

48. ". . . any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its 
national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by 
this treaty . . ," For the possible ancestry of this idea of release, see above, 
p. 162. 


allayed Briand's fears, he was wrong. The French foreign minister 
was not that easy to deal with. Kellogg ever since December 28, 
1927, had been talking treaty to Briand, and on several occasions 
it seemed that Briand was. ready to agree. Each time, however, 
something happened. Now it was a matter of incorporating reserva- 
tions in the treaty. Kellogg patiently explained to Claudel, June 
29, that he would not put any interpretations into a preamble or 
into an exchange of notes as part of the treaty. 49 A few days later 
Briand blandly told Herrick that he desired a separate protocol to 
the effect that the antiwar treaty did not conflict with the obliga- 
tions of existing treaties. 50 

Meanwhile Briand had busily arranged an informal meeting 
of legal experts of foreign offices. Sir Cecil James Barrington Hurst 
(Britain), Henri Fromageot (France), and Dr. Friedrich Gaus (Ger- 
many) met at the latter's home in Berlin and earnestly examined 
the antiwar pact. The London Times of July 13 asserted the three 
jurists had agreed that Kellogg's note of June 23 covered almost 
every possible eventuality, and this seems to have been the sub- 
stance of their conclusions. 51 

49. Kellogg to Herrick, June 29, 1928, FR: 1928, I, 100. Kellogg told the 
British charg the same. 

50. Herrick to Kellogg, July 5, 1928, ibid., 101-102. Briand said he had read 
the note of June 23 to the Council of Ministers. The government approved in 
principle but could not give too much attention because of preoccupation with 
the parliamentary situation. 

As for the separate protocol, the diplomatic correspondent of the London 
Daily Telegram reported July 3 that the French Government was asking Great 
Britain about a separate protocol which might be treated as an annex to the 
Kellogg pact. The correspondent understood that Britain was somewhat 
friendly to the proposition. 

51. A German diplomat chummily told Atherton, the American charg in 
London, that at the jurists' meeting Gaus had argued against the necessity of a 
protocol of interpretation of existing commitments (Locarno, League, et al.). 
This diplomat gave Atherton to understand that the German Foreign Office 
would be embarrassed vis--vis German public opinion if any further changes 
in the proposed treaty were made in deference to Anglo-French conversations. 
Atherton added that he had heard from "well-informed sources" that Philippe 
Berthelot, secretary general of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
ministry's eminence grise, in a recent London conversation with Chamberlain 


Apparently the three powers represented had made a gentle- 
men's agreement to withhold acceptance o the new Kellogg draft 
until after the Berlin meeting. Sir Cecil Hurst returned to London 
on Monday, July 9, and by the following Saturday Sir Austen's 
draft reply to Kellogg was complete. But on July 1 1, while Sir Aus- 
ten still was fussing over his reply, Germany became the first power 
to accept the new Kellogg draft. Again Germany and the United 
States together were, to use Ambassador Schurman's phrase, inarch- 
ing forward, almost hand in hand, in a great and noble adventure 
in the cause of humane civilization. 52 

So stirring a scene was too much for Ambassador Paul Glaudel 
and his chief, Aristide Briand. Claudel hurried to the State De- 
partment, called on Secretary Kellogg, and announced that the 
French Government, within a few days, would itself transmit a 
favorable reply to the antiwar proposal. Kellogg must have sighed 
in anticipation. 

In three days it came. Considering the general tenor of accept- 

had pointed out to Sir Austen that British influence over Europe was much 
greater with France as a friendly medium, and that Fiance and England might 
in the future be bound by economic ties against United States competition in 
world markets. Atherton to Kellogg, July 11, 1928, 711.0013 Anti-War/77. The 
secretary of state at the Wilhelmstrasse, Schubert, talked with Ambassador 
Schurman July 22 and told the latter that Fromageot and Hurst had made 
"the most astonishing proposals" in regard to the reply which the European 
governments should send to Kellogg on the antiwar pact. Gaus, however, 
according to Schubert, represented the German view (of no formal reserva- 
tions) so effectively that he converted his two colleagues. Schurman to Kellogg, 
July 23, 1928, 711.0012 Anti-War/84 1/2. 

Briand, talking with Herrick, said that Hurst and Gaus had recognized the 
Tightness of the French view of the pact, and that consequently there was no 
possibility that Germany, sometime in the future, might contend that the pact 
formed a novation of existing treaties (that is, Versailles; the French had pro- 
fessed to fear that the Germans might claim the Rhineland occupation no 
longer necessary after German signature of the antiwar pact). Herrick to Kel- 
logg, July 12, 1928, 711.5112 France/368. 

52. That the German Government was endeavoring to group itself with the 
United States was perfectly obvious, Schubert told Schurman on the day Ger- 
many accepted the new draft that he thought there was evidence that the 
British and French Governments were coming nearer to "our" position on 
the antiwar pact. Schurman to Kellogg, July 11, 1928, 711.6212 Anti-War/5o. 


ances received from the other powers, 53 the French note was quite 
reasonable. France, Briand avowed, was in accord with the new 
stipulations found in the preamble of the American revised draft 
of June 23. The Government of the Republic observed that the 
following points were not contrary to the proposed pact: self- 
defense, the League Covenant, Locarno, the treaties of neutrality 
(the French alliances), automatic release in event of violation, sig- 
nature to be as near as possible to universality. Briand then paid 
homage to the generous spirit of the Government of the United 
States and to the treaty against war, that "long-matured project," 
that "new manifestation of human fraternity." 54 

But the reservations were still there despite the seductive twang 
of Briand's lyre. It is now proper to pause and examine the mean- 

53. The British reply, dated July 18, recalled the certain-regions doctrine: 
"As regards the passage in my note of the igth May relating to certain regions 
of which the welfare and integrity constitute a special and vital interest for our 
peace and safety, I need only repeat that His Majesty's Government in Great 
Britain accept the new treaty upon the understanding that it does not prejudice 
their freedom of action in this respect." Chamberlain to Atherton, July 18, 
1928, FR: 1928, I, 113. 

The Japanese Government, July 20, repeated its qualifications to Kellogg's 
first draft (self-defense, Covenant, Locarno, and "agreements guaranteeing 
the public peace"). FR: 19*8, I, 123-124. 

The Italian reply of July 15 declared that the Italian Government would 
sign the antiwar treaty on the premise of the interpretation in Kellogg's June 
23 explanatory note. FR: 1928, 1, 108. 

Belgium, July 17, reserved the Covenant and Locarno. Poland, July iy(?): 
self-defense, release in case of breach, Covenant. Czechoslovakia, July 2o(?): 
Covenant, Locarno, the neutrality treaties, "the obligations contained in exist- 
ing treaties which the Czechoslovak Republic has hitherto made," release in 
case of breach, self-defense. FR: 1928, 1, 117-118, 119, 121-122. 

New Zealand associated itself, July 18, with Chamberlain's reply of the same 
date (see above). India, July 18, adhered also to the British reply. Australia, 
July 18, reserved self-defense, release in case of breach ("the preamble in this 
respect is to be taken as a part of the substantive provisions of the treaty itself"), 
and the Covenant. FR: 1928, 1, 1 14-115, 116-117. 

Canada, July 16, reserved the Covenant. The Irish Free State, July 16, re- 
served self-defense and the Covenant. The Union of South Africa, July 18: 
self-defense, release in case of breach, treaty open to accession by all powers, 
Covenant. FR: 1928, 1, 109, 111,1 15-1 16. 

54. Briand to Herrick, July 14, 1928, FR: 1928, 1, 107-108. 


ing of those reservations. For Secretary Kellogg soon would be 
strangely writing that "this [pretreaty] correspondence does not in 
any way limit the application of the treaty." 55 

55. Kellogg to John Bakeless, editor of the Living Age, Oct. i, 1928, 71 1,0012 
Anti-War/424. Bakeless had asked if the reservations had been officially com- 
municated to all signatory powers. Kellogg replied that since there were no 
reservations his question was answered. 




"ecretary of State Kellogg always held that the 
notes received from the various governments were only unilateral 
declarations, lacking the force of formal reservations because, al- 
though communicated, the other governments did not expressly 
accept them. 1 In a very technical sense this was a good argument. 

Uninformed folk in America and Europe nonetheless read only 
the two-article text of Kellogg's proposed antiwar treaty and 
thought that the treaty meant what it said. The unsophisticated, 
and there are many in this world, began to believe the millennium 
was approaching. So the result of Kellogg's argument good 
though it might be in theory the result was confusion, close to 
delusion, among broad masses of the American people. When post- 
masters hung up the great red, white, and blue texts of the treaty in 

i. Kellogg had telegraphed Levinson July 23 concerning the British Monroe 
Doctrine: "I note your telegram about the so-called indefinite Monroe 
Doctrine reservations proposed by British. I have not been asked by them to 
make any reservations in the treaty and am not going to make any reservations 
in the treaty at all and the British notes are only unilateral declarations. . . . 
Great Britain does not ask us to change the treaty or to make any specific 
declaration to her note ... I do not think it is necessary for us to pay any 
attention to this discussion or any of the other discussions which appear in the 
various notes since they call for no change in the simplicity of the treaty itself." 
J. Stoner, Levinson, pp. 303-304. 


post offices all over the United States, 2 they did not affix to the texts 
the numerous notes exchanged during the spring and early sum- 
mer of 1928. To do so would have papered the post-office walls. 

As a result of this official stressing of the antiwar treaty's two 
substantive articles, the importance of the interpretive notes was 
lost from sight. If anyone sought to acquaint the general public 
with the import of those notes, he met with disbelief. Carrie W. 
Ormsbee of Brandon, Vermont, wrote to Senator Frank L. Green 
of Vermont that she had participated in a discussion group at the 
Williamstown Institute of Politics and there heard Professor Bor- 
chard of Yale. Borchard, she said, had asserted that the British and 
French interpretations of the antiwar treaty constituted an integral 
part of the treaty, greatly changing its meaning; but she was certain 
that Professor Borchard erred, for Secretary Kellogg had said the 
opposite in a statement of August 8. 8 (Kellogg then had said that 
the interpretations to the multilateral treaty were in no way a part 
of the pact and could not be considered as reservations.) Carrie 
Chapman Catt, who likewise was at the Williamstown meeting, 
wrote her friend Laura Puffer Morgan that, having watched Pro- 
fessor Borchard's mental reactions on other matters, she considered 
him one of those legalistic individuals who always saw legal flaws 
in every question. When a normally conservative point of view was 
added to a legalistic attitude, Mrs. Catt affirmed, the result was 
precisely such empty talk as Borchard's. 4 

But there can be no doubt that the meaning of the treaty lay 
not in its two grand substantive articles, but in those two articles 
together with the exchanged notes and also the treaty's preamble 
(for many of the notes referred to the clause in the preamble which 
denied the treaty's benefits to a transgressor). It did not make much 
difference whether the exchanged notes technically were reserva- 
tions or mere unilateral declarations. David Hunter Miller, long 

2. This was a private venture in public post offices. The National Council 
for Prevention of War obtained authorization from the Post Office Department. 
Arthur Charles Watkins of the NCPW designed the poster and attended to the 
printing and mailing. 

3. Letter of Sept. 29, 1928, NCPW files. 

4. Letter of Sept 20, 1928, NCPW files. 


the Department of State's treaty expert, has asserted flatly that "The 
explanations and statements of the Parties are as much a part of 
the meaning of the agreement among them as is the text of any 
one of the Articles of the Treaty proper. . . . Whether it be called 
explanation or interpretation or qualification or reservation, every- 
thing that the Parties themselves agreed that the Treaty means, it 
does. mean. Any suggestion to the contrary is erroneous." 5 As Dr. 
Philip Marshall Brown, professor of international law at Prince- 
ton, wrote in the pages of the American Journal of International 
Law, no rule of international law was more firmly established than 
the rule of interpretation of treaties in the light of the intent of 
the negotiators. That intent, emphasized Brown, might appear in 
any interpretations, clarifications, understandings, constructions, 
qualifications, or actual conditions set forth during the negotiations 
prior to ratification. 6 Brown's opinion received support from no less 
an authority than John Bassett Moore, the dean of American inter- 
national lawyers. In a letter to Raymond L. Buell, Judge Moore 
declared the "immemorial and constant practice of governments," 
including that of the United States, was to recur to the diplomatic 
correspondence as a means of explaining and determining the na- 
ture and extent of mutual obligations under treaties. 7 

5. David Hunter Miller, Peace Pact of Paris, pp. 95-96. Professor Borchard, 
who in the interpretation of many international matters was at the opposite 
pole from Hunter Miller, nevertheless agreed exactly on this point: "Govern- 
ments do not make such declarations or reservations as idle gestures not to be 
taken seriously; on the contrary, the reservations constitute the frank and 
honest avowal of the governments' understanding of the obligations contracted. 
They constitute as inherent and essential a part of the treaty obligations as if 
they had been written into Article I of the Pact." E. M. Borchard, "The Multi- 
lateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War," American Journal of Interna- 
tional Law, 23 (1929), 117. 

6. Philip Marshall Brown, "The Interpretation of the General Pact for the 
Renunciation of War," Am. J. of Int. L. f 23 (1929), 378. 

7. "It cannot be supposed that the governments, in making to the United 
States the official communications above mentioned [that is, the antiwar com- 
munications], considered themselves to be performing an idle and empty act, 
which, according to international law, would have no international force. The 
vital import of some of the declarations would preclude such a supposition, 
even if common sense and international practice would permit us to indulge 
it." John Bassett Moore to Raymond L. Buell, Sept. 29, 1928, NCPW files. 


In the annals of American diplomacy, moreover, there was 
precedent for considering pretreaty correspondence as binding. The 
American Government on November 25, 1850, concluded a treaty 
of commerce with Switzerland. Nearly fifty years later, in 1898, 
the Swiss Government contended that the clauses of the treaty pro- 
viding for most-favored-nation treatment were to be considered as 
unlimited, although this, was contrary to the settled American rule 
of construction of such clauses. 8 When the United States Govern- 
ment then examined the pretreaty correspondence it discovered 
that there actually had been an understanding waiving in favor of 
Switzerland the restrictive construction. This understanding had 
been communicated to both the governments in 1850. Under these 
circumstances the United States in 1898 accepted the contention of 
Switzerland. Secretary of State John Hay wrote to the Swiss min- 
is.ter on November 21, 1898: "Both justice and honor require that 
the common understanding of the High Contracting Parties at the 
time of the executing of the Treaty should be carried into effect." 9 

All this notwithstanding, Secretary of State Kellogg in nego- 
tiating his multilateral antiwar treaty steadfastly refused to con- 
sider the pretreaty correspondence as, in any sense, in the nature 
of reservations. As we have seen, xo he chose to denominate it rather 
as. modifications, qualifications, considerations, and interpretations. 
It is interesting though to observe that Kellogg slipped on at least 
one occasion and used the word "reservation." Putting down for 
State Department records an account of a conversation on June 27, 
1928, with Ambassador Claudel, Kellogg wrote that "I impressed 
on him that I could not make any farther reservations ... in the 
matter." But then the secretary reverted to his customary words: "I 
told him [Claudel] ... we had taken care of the two points" (re- 
lease after breach, and the Locarno and alliance treaties). Kellogg 
concluded that "I certainly made it plain that we could not make 
any further concessions." lx 

8. With very few exceptions the United States until the year 1923 con- 
strued its most-favored-nation treaty-clauses as limited that is, as operative 
only in case of exchange of a specific quid pro quo. 

9. Hay to the Swiss minister, Pioda, Nov. 21, 1898, FR: 189$, p. 748. 

10. Above, Chapter XII. 

11. Memorandum by Kellogg of a conversation with Claudel, June 27, 1928, 


Perhaps out of solicitude for Secretary Kellogg, the other sig- 
natories to the antiwar treaty also avoided the word ' 'reservation' * 
and in the main adopted Kellogg's alternate wording. Sometimes 
they even improved upon it. From London in August 1938 Harri- 
son Brown wrote Levinson that the Foreign Office fondly was call- 
ing the British reservation of certain regions its "caveat." 12 

Secretary Kellogg seems actually to have considered that his own 
interpretation the long, numbered exegesis which he prepared in 
April 1928 and communicated two months later 1S was the treaty's 
one true interpretation (not, of course, a reservation), and that if 
the other powers adhered to this they then could "unconditionally" 
accept the antiwar treaty. For example, when the German Govern- 
ment accepted the antiwar proposal by referring to Kellogg's ex- 
planatory note, the secretary of state wired President Coolidge that 
"Germany accepted the multilateral treaty yesterday without con- 
dition." 14 And even when powers in their "unconditional" accept- 

711.5112 France/352- Italics inserted. On another occasion Kellogg almost 
called the interpretive notes "reservations." At a hearing of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations, Dec. 7, 1928, someone asked Kellogg about the 
reservations. "As to the reservations/' replied the secretary of state, "of course 
I can not go over all the discussions on this treaty . . ." U.S. Sen., yoth Cong., 
2d Sess., Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, on the General 
Pact for the Renunciation of War (Washington, 1938), I, 4. 

12. Brown to Levinson, Aug. 19, 1928, Levinson MSS. The British Govern- 
ment early in August sent the antiwar correspondence to the League of Na- 
tions which in a sense registered it as binding. Kellogg, interestingly enough, 
himself also transmitted the correspondence to the League. In a conversation 
with the Italian ambassador on Aug. 13, 1928, he explained that while the 
United States Government did not file its treaties with the League officially, it 
always sent treaties to Geneva for the League's information. The League, said 
Kellogg, did the same with the United States. The Secretary added that he had 
no objection to Britain's sending the correspondence. Memorandum by Kellogg 
of a conversation with the Italian ambassador, Nobile Giacomo de Martino, 
Aug. 13, 1928, 711.0012 Anti-War/252. 

13. For this, see FR: 1928, 1, 36-38. 

14. Kellogg to Coolidge, July 13, 1928, 711.6212 Anti-War/55- Once during 
the negotiations Sir Esme Howard remarked to Kellogg that he did not see 
any reason why, as the secretary of state had expressed his understanding of 
the treaty, the other countries could not do likewise, and all this then could be 
made a part of the treaty itself. "I said," wrote Kellogg afterward, "that the 


ances ventured to mention matters other than those with which 
Kellogg had dealt specifically in his long interpretive note, such 
matters easily could be considered and Kellogg himself always 
so considered them as mere aspects of what the secretary of state 
in his note had termed the "right of self-defense." 

For Kellogg, we recall, had defined that right in a very latitudi- 
narian way. 15 The secretary's definition in fact was so general that 
one could well assume that all the pretreaty correspondence was 
only a long, complicated explanation of self-defense. Professor 
Charles Cheney Hyde, a most distinguished student of international 
law, has written that "Examination of the preparatory work [of 
the treaty] reveals what is equivalent to an additional explanatory 
article, in a definite acknowledgment that the agreement should not 
curtail the freedom of the parties to have recourse to defensive 
measures." 16 

Self-defense, however, although stretchable to include numer- 
ous contingencies, could not possibly have covered all the even- 
tualities reserved in the exchanged notes. Chamberlain's explana- 
tion of "certain regions/' which both Chamberlain and Kellogg 
declared was only self-defense, 17 was a reservation of imperial pro- 

trouble about [that] was that if each country went to tacking on [sic] to this 
treaty understandings which would be in the form of reservations or provisos 
or stipulations as to what it means, each country would have a different con- 
struction and different reservations and different provisos and we would end up 
by having so many that the treaty would be a joke. I said that I was not pre- 
pared to do it and I could not agree to any such proceeding; that if my con- 
struction of the treaty was correct, they can say that that was their understand- 
ing . . ." Memorandum by Kellogg of a conversation with Howard, May 29, 
1928, 711.4113 Anti-War/ 107. 

15. "There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which 
restricts or impairs in any way the right of self-defense. That right is inherent 
in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at 
all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack 
or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require 
recourse to war in self-defense." FR: 1928, I, 36. 

16. Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted by the 
United States (Boston, Little, Brown, 1945), III, 1683. 

17. Said Chamberlain in Parliament, July 30, 1928: ". . . our doctrine is 
exactly comparable to that of the American Government [that is, the Monroe 


portions. Then there were France's alliance treaties; France had 
reserved those agreements with all their unknown details. Surely 
self-defense under such imprecise interpretation was ambiguous. 
And even had there been no gaping reservations such as the British 
Monroe Doctrine and the French alliances, the fact remained that 
Kellogg in his explanatory note had held that ''Every nation . . . 
alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require re- 
course to war in self-defense.'* This was open invitation to license. 
As Edwin M. Borchard has written: "In view of the fact that the 
'treaty apparently leaves each country contemplating or exercising 
measures of force the judge of what is 'self-defense/ who could 
assert that any signatory, going to war under circumstances which it 
claims require 'self-defense/ is violating the Pact? Has any modern 
nation ever gone to war (and without any suggestion of bad faith) 
for any other motive? How then could this Pact ever be legally 
violated?" 18 

In spite of all this, some international lawyers have continued 
to minimize the importance of the prepact correspondence. Pro- 
fessor Hersch Lauterpacht, whose editions of Oppenheim's Inter- 
national Law are the best general treatises, on the subject, main- 
tains that "In law, the scope of ... [the Kellogg treaty's] excep- 
tions is small when compared with the magnitude of the change 
effected by the Pact in the system of International Law." 19 But 
while Lauterpacht is very explicit in naming the treaty's exceptions 
(self-defense, League and Locarno wars, war between a signatory 
and a nonsignatory, war with a violator of the pact), 20 he is tantaliz- 
ingly vague in detailing the magnitude of the pact's, influence on 

Doctrine], that it is not a doctrine o aggression, that it is not a desire for terri- 
torial expansion, but a pure measure in self-defense . . ." 250 H.C. Deb., 5 s., c. 
1842. Said Kellogg to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Dec. 7, 1928: 
" . . Great Britain was talking about nothing but self-defense." U.S. Sen., 
7oth Cong., sd Sess., Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, on 
the General Pact for the Renunciation of War, I, n. 

18. Edwin M. Borchard, "The Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of 
War," Am. /. of Int. L., 23 (1929), 117. 

19. H. Lauterpacht, ed., L. Oppenheim, International Law (z vols., London, 
1935-37)^ II* 166-167. 

20. Ibid., p. 153. 


international law. Resort to war, he explains, is no longer a dis- 
cretionary prerogative of states signatories of the pact, but rather 
an act for which a justification must be sought in one of the four 
exceptions permitted by the pact. 21 One of Lauterpacht's excep- 
tions, of course, was self-defense. 

Another minimizer of the antiwar treaty's reservations, Pro- 
fessor Quincy Wright of the University of Chicago, has admitted 
that "it can not be said that the interpretative notes are without 
weight." Wright thought, however, that the notes should be treated 
"merely as evidence of the sense of the text and not as modifications 
of or exceptions from it, or even as conclusive interpretations/* 22 
One nonetheless has difficulty distinguishing between, on the one 
hand, "evidence of the sense of the text" and, on the other, "modi- 
fications" and "exceptions" and "conclusive interpretations." How 
does the first category differ from the second, third, and fourth? It 
would seem that Wright rather confused than clarified the situa- 
tion. But not content with this, he confounded confusion by next 
explaining that use of force in self-defense was not a resort to war 
as an instrument of national policy. 23 

From all this welter of comment by the international lawyers 
one fact stands out: of the writers we have cited Miller, Hyde, 
Moore, Brown, Borchard, Lauterpacht, and Wright only the lat- 
ter considered the pretreaty correspondence as not in the nature 
of reservations. And even Wright would agree that the meaning 
of the treaty lay not simply in its two substantive articles its "post- 
office articles" but rather in those articles together with the ex- 
changed notes and also the treaty's preamble (Wright would call 
the notes and preamble "evidence of the sense of the text"). 

The present writer believes it would have been better had 
Secretary Kellogg accepted the French draft of April 20, 1928, 
which candidly put the reservations into the body of the treaty. 
Kellogg, however, chose to retain and negotiate his own two-article 
treaty and to describe any differences therefrom as modifications, 

21. Ibid.^pp. 166-167. 

22. Quincy Wright, "The Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties," Am. J. 
of Int. .,25(1929), 104. 

23. Ibid., p. 106. 


qualifications, considerations, or interpretations. The result was 
that the secretary of state, when he finally "delivered the goods/' 
delivered a great amount of wrapping paper. 

It is not possible at this point in our narrative to discuss the 
benefits of the Kellogg-Briand antiwar treaty. Suffice to end this 
present discussion with some remarks Senator Borah addressed to 
his good friend Salmon O. Levinson on August 2, igs8. 24 

"Levinson/' Borah wrote, "I may be extremely obtuse, but I 
am unable to understand how talks and suggestions on the side 
can have the slightest effect upon the terms of the treaty as it will 
be signed. ... I had a letter yesterday from Professor Borchard 
in which he seemed to think that these statements made by the 
British Government and by France would have the same effect 
upon the treaty as if they were reservations to the treaty. If there 
is any such doctrine or principle as that, the treaty would not be 
worth a damn/' 

24. J. Stoner, Levinson, p. 306. 

Chapter Fourteen: "THE MIRACLE HAS COME' 

Lift up your heads, ye peoples, 
The miracle has come. 
No longer are ye helpless, 
No longer are ye dumb. 


o wrote Robert Underwood Johnson, creator 
of New York University's Hall of Fame, 1 who in August 1928 had 
arrived in Paris to see with his own eyes, the signing of the treaty 
against war. 2 

i. New York Times, Aug. 26, 1928. Johnson published much poetry. See, 
for example, his Poems of the Longer Flight: Chiefly Odes and Apostrophes, 
with Prefatory Consideration of Obstacles to Poetry in America (New York, 

As for the Hall of Fame, there is the remark Mr. Dooley made one day to 
Mr. Hennessey: "A Hall iv Fame's th' place where th* names iv the most 
famous men is painted, like th' side iv a bar-rn where a little boy writes th' 
name iv th' little girl he loves. In a week or two he goes back an* rubs it out." 

a. Somewhat different was Ambassador Herrick's view of the miracle. Her- 
rick wrote from Paris, July 3, 1928, to Robert Woods Bliss, his colleague at the 
American Embassy in Buenos Aires: "We seem to be gradually approaching 
better times universally and Briand's peace efforts, aided and enlarged by those 
of our chief seem to be nearing accomplishment. I suppose treaties are some- 
what like children's games. When some child does not want to play any longer, 
he breaks up the game and that's the end of it. Some day, if the world continues 
to grow better, say in 100 or 500 years, people may become so good and kind 
and peaceful, and so loath to be 'joggled' out of their everyday avocations, in 


Paris from the start had seemed the proper place to sign the 
treaty. The French capital was rich in memories of the World War 
of the great ministry of Clemenceau, who at times seemed to hold 
off the German hordes by sheer will power; of the hurried parleys of 
Allied statesmen and generals who on several occasions momentarily 
expected a breakthrough by Hindenburg's gray veterans; of a poign- 
antly memorable day in November 1918; of miles of ranks of 
cuirassiers with sunlit regimental colors gleaming as, on June 28, 
1919, President Wilson and the Allied leaders passed slowly through 
packed streets toward Versailles. No other city could boast such 


As early as June 23 Secretary of State Kellogg suggested to 
Ambassador Paul Claudel that the nations sign the antiwar treaty 
in Paris, and Claudel received the suggestion with "obvious emo- 
tion." 3 A month later President Coolidge at his summer residence 
near Superior, Wisconsin, was reported to approve of Paris; the 
president did not regard Washington as a feasible place for holding 
such a conference, it being manifest that to send official representa- 
tives and their staffs from Europe to the American capital would 
cost much more than to send them to the French city. 4 

Paris, however, had one drawback its relative proximity to 
Moscow. There was real danger that the Bolsheviki might show up 
at the Paris ceremonies and make a scene. Cables flew back and forth 
between Paris, Berlin, London, and Washington as statesmen sought 
some way to deal with the matter. Herrick informed Kellogg that 
if the powers even asked Russia to adhere to not to sign but to 

other words, the force of economic considerations may become so great and they 
so good that there will be no more war and there will then no longer be any 
need of armies. It is possible that you and I and Mildred [Bliss' wife] may not 
live to see this but if Mildred's faith is strong, as I am constrained to think it is, 
she may feel that we may be perched somewhere where we may observe the 
consummation of this delectable dream/* Herrick MSS. 

3. Memorandum by Olds of a conversation between Kellogg and Claudel, 
June *3, 1928, FE: 1928, 1, 97-98. 

4. New York Times, July si, 1928. 


adhere to the treaty, she might seize upon the occasion to write 
an intemperate answer. 5 Kellogg heard that Sir Austen Chamber- 
lain personally would not make the slightest effort to obtain Russia's 
participation; 6 and in Parliament Sir Austen repeated that if the 
American Government proposed an invitation to Russia he would 
not support it, neither would he object to it. 7 The German Govern- 
ment, although in treaty relations with the Bolsheviki, at that mo- 
ment was engaged in an argument with Moscow; the Soviets had 
imprisoned some German engineers, and the Wilhelmstrasse was 
lukewarm to Russian participation in the treaty to outlaw war. 
Eventually the powers solved the ticklish problem: only the great 
powers, the Dominions and India, and the Locarno powers signed 
at Paris, the other nations of the world sending their adherences 
to Washington. The United States not having recognized the Bol- 
shevik Government, the French ambassador in Moscow received 
the Russian instrument of adherence and then transmitted it an- 
tiseptically via Paris to Washington. 

Statesmen were discussing the Bolsheviki when a matter of even 
greater unpleasantness burst into the newspapers: the French and 
British Governments announced conclusion of what amounted to 
an anti-American naval agreement. While Paris and London had 
negotiated with Kellogg they simultaneously had conferred behind 
his back about a new disarmament scheme to throttle the American 

The agreement sounded very abstract and technical, merely a 
plan to limit building of 

(1) Capital ships, i.e. ships of over 10,000 tons or with guns of 

more than 8 inch calibre. 

(2) Aircraft carriers of over 10,000 tons. 

(3) Surface vessels of or below 10,000 tons armed with guns of 

more than 6 inch and up to 8 inch calibre, 

(4) Ocean going submarines over 600 tons. 8 

5. Herrick to Kellogg, July 26, 1928, FR: 1928, I, 127. 

6. Atherton to Kellogg, July 26, 1928, ibid., p. 128. 

7. 220 H.C. Deb., 5 s., c. 1771. 

8. The British charge* in Washington, Chilton, to Kellogg, July 31, 1928, 
FR: 1928, 1, 265. 


These four classes of warships, however, did not include 6-inch 
cruisers or submarines of less than 600 tons the very types in which 
Britain and France respectively were interested. Moreover, the two 
powers were proposing, in class (3) above, limitation of io,ooo-ton 
8-inch cruisers and this was the very type which the United States 
Navy desired most to build, American desire for large cruisers and 
British preference for small cruisers, we recall, had resulted already 
in the acrimonious breakup of the 1927 Geneva Naval Conference. 
Ray Atherton of the American Embassy in London remarked to 
Sir Ronald Lindsay at the Foreign Office that the proposed naval 
limitations affected only vessels in which the United States was 
interested, "Yes, that is true/' replied Lindsay. Atherton asked if 
Sir Ronald had any explanation. Sir Ronald weakly answered that 
he hadn't, except that no further military disarmament seemed 
possible in Europe especially because of Russia, yet some sort of 
disarmament had to be accomplished and hence the Anglo-French 
discussion. 9 

From Superior, Wisconsin, President Coolidge on August 3 
advised Kellogg: "I have your wire relative to the British naval 
proposals. What I desire to have done in relation to these at pres- 
ent is nothing at all. * . . I do not especially like the meeting that 
is to be held in Paris. While it is ostensibly to sign the treaty, I 
can not help wonder whether it may not be for some other purpose 
not yet disclosed. Of course, so far as this Government is concerned, 
it will neither discuss nor decide any other question of any kind or 
nature at the Paris meeting." 10 

Secretary Kellogg the next day replied to the president. "I am 
also very sorry," he wrote to Coolidge, "that I agreed to go to Paris 
to sign the treaty." Kellogg then told how he originally had decided 
to go because the French so desired it. "Nevertheless," he repeated, 
"I am sorry I agreed to go to Paris/' u 

Although the Anglo-French naval agreement thus heartily dis- 
gusted both Kellogg and Coolidge, it appears that Coolidge's an- 
noyance went far deeper than his secretary of state's. As Assistant 

9. Atherton to Kellogg, Aug. 4, 1928, 5oo.Ai5 Franco-British/4. 

10. Coolidge to Kellogg, Aug. 3, 1938, FR: 1928, 1, 270. 

11. Kellogg to Coolidge, Aug. 4, 1928, 5oo.Ai5 Franco-British/io 1/2. 


Secretary Castle recorded in his diary, "The President . . , was 
annoyed that we even asked the British to explain vague statements 
in the note [the British note o July 31 detailing the agreement] 
and orders us to do nothing more about it whatsoever. ... All I 
am afraid is that he will get so angry that he will tell the Secretary 
he cannot go to Paris after all. This would be an utterly impossible 
situation and the Secretary says that if it should by any chance arise 
he would have to tell the President that he must either go or re- 
sign." 12 

Sir Austen Chamberlain had spoken in Parliament on July 
go, and in addition to announcing the Anglo-French naval agree- 
ment he had made some announcements about the Kellogg treaty. 
Sir Austen was. not sure what importance the treaty would have in 
the future. "It may mean much, very much for the peace of the 
world. It may mean not much, even very little." Everything de- 
pended on what part the United States would take in international 
affairs. Chamberlain assumed that the American Government would 
take no engagements in advance, but if American public opinion 
ranged itself behind its own treaty "then, indeed, the signature of 
this treaty will be an additional and most formidable deterrent of 
war/' 13 In that spirit, Sir Austen said, His Majesty's Government 
was signing the treaty. 14 

12. Castle diary, Aug. 7, 1928. 

13. Mrs. Ben Hooper of Oshkosh, Wisconsin, chairman of international 
relations of the General Federation of Women's Clubs, read about Chamber- 
lain's remark that American public opinion would have to range itself behind 
the Kellogg treaty. Mrs. Hooper wrote to Mrs. Otis G. Wilson, Aug. 2, 1928: 
"I think that little quotation tells us in the dearest, most definite form that the 
women of these nine great organizations [in the National Committee on the 
Cause and Cure of War] have undertaken the biggest and most important 
piece of work for the benefit of our country and all the world that has ever 
been attempted by any group. We just must make good for the sake of the 
boys and girls who are coming up. ... I wish I could be every place at once. 
My whole heart is in this work." Hooper MSS. 

14. 220 H.C. Deb.> 5 s., cc. 1842-1843. Chamberlain undertook to calculate 
his antiwar zeal for the information of dubious M.P/s: "Mr. Kellogg took six 
months to reply to M. Briand. I took six weeks to reply to Mr. Kellogg. Mr. 
Kellogg took six weeks to reply to me and I took between three or four weeks 
to answer again, to send my final reply to life GQverjipi^at." c. 1838, 


This, statement did not sound enthusiastic. Nor was it meant to 
be. Sir Austen, in fact, was in a quandary. "I can form some opin- 
ion/' he wrote in his diary, 

as to what France or Germany or Italy may be likely to do in 
this or that contingency. Except in a narrow field the course 
which will be taken by the United States is a riddle to which no 
one not even themselves can give an answer in advance. But 
perhaps this is only saying that the United States has no foreign 
policy* The ship drifts at the mercy of every gust of public opin- 
ion. Take the Kellogg proposal for example. Who could guess 
when they left Briand's suggestion unnoticed for months that 
it would suddenly become the cardinal feature in their attitude 
to the rest of the world? And what do they mean it to be even 
now on the eve of signature a "moral" gesture, vox et praeterea 
nihil; or a new Monroe doctrine? It will be the one or the other 
according as the trend of American opinion makes the rest of 
the world think that they are in earnest or the reverse. I end 
as befits the whole correspondence with an enormous mark of 
interrogation. 15 

As if to answer Chamberlain, Professor Shotwell, described as 
an expert on renunciation of war, undertook in the New York 
Times to tell "How the Anti-War Compact Binds. Us." Shotwell 
thought that the United States itself must now make good its offer 
to the world to renounce war as an instrument of national policy. 
"There can be," he wrote, "no two opinions on this point." But 
when someone brought Chamberlain's Parliament speech to Kcl- 
logg's attention the secretary of state said that the treaty contained 
no sanctions and no commitment for the United States to go to war. 
The treaty, he was sure, did not involve the United States in Eu- 
ropean affairs. 16 

15. Chamberlain diary, n.d., in Sir Charles Petrie, Life and Letters of the 
Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain, II, 324. 

16. NewYorkTzm^July 29 ,Aug. 2 ,i 9g 8.KelloggonJuly ?1 hadsaidthat 
the antiwar compact would not draw the United States into European affairs 
any more than the various arbitration treaties which this country had negoti- 
ated with European governments. Ibid., July 33, 


Reports nevertheless kept flowing out of Europe that the Eu- 
ropean nations accepted the Kellogg treaty as a means to let or get 
the United States into world councils; 1T and Frank H. Simonds, 
the distinguished journalist, felt himself compelled to write to the 
editor of the New York Times that because the European interpre- 
tation of the antiwar compact was so different from the American 
interpretation the Senate would be justified in refusing to ratify 
the treaty. 18 

The problem of the pact's interpretations soon bobbed up 
again as an object of comment, and on August 8 Secretary Kellogg 
said to the press that interpretations of the multilateral treaty to 
renounce war were in no way a part of the pact and could not be 
considered as reservations. The interpretations, he announced, 
would not be deposited with the text of the treaty. 19 Senator Borah 
reassured Colonel Robins, telling him that the so-called reserva- 
tions were nothing more than the expression "of a personal opin- 
ion, I presume largely for local use/' Certainly, Borah added, they 
were in no sense a modification of the treaty or reservations to the 
treaty; the friends of the treaty need not be disturbed. 20 

Although Kellogg and Borah thus had to reassure some of their 
followers, others were undisturbed. Senator Capper on August 5 
was describing the treaty as "the most telling action ever taken in 
human history to abolish war." 21 Colonel E. M. House, once Wood- 
row Wilson's alter ego, said that the Kellogg peace plan was the 
greatest move toward peace the world had ever attempted. 22 

Meanwhile President Coolidge in Wisconsin told the press he 
did not anticipate any reduction in the army and navy by reason 
of the Kellogg treaty. He viewed the army and navy purely as 
defensive weapons. 23 French Government officials, according to sub- 

17. See, for example, Edwin L. James* dispatch from Paris, July 29, in 
New York Times, July 30, 1958. 

18. Ibid., Aug. 8. 

19. New York Times, Aug. 9, 1928. 

20. Borah to Robins, Aug. 6, 1928, Borah MSS. 

21. New York Times, Aug. 5, 1928. 

22. Ibid., Aug. 11, 1928. 

23. Ibid. The president developed his ideas on international affairs, the 
army, and the navy to the accompaniment of a red-coated boys' brass band from 


sequent newspaper reports, received the president's words with 
great satisfaction, declaring that France and her allies had expected 
a new disarmament drive, especially against land armaments, as a 
result of the treaty. 24 In London Walter Bridgeman, first lord of 
the Admiralty, lauded the treaty and hoped it would pave the way 
for disarmament. He added that Britain would not modify her 
Singapore naval base plans in consequence of the multilateral 

compact. 25 

A few days later President Coolidge spoke at Wassau, Wiscon- 
sin, and spared no words in praise of the Kellogg treaty. Secretary 
Kellogg, busily preparing to sail for Europe, must have blushed as 
he later read the president's remarks. Coolidge stood in a canopied 
pavilion, facing a large grandstand filled to capacity and behind 
which rose a shield of tall pines. Observers estimated the crowd to 
be between 15,000 and 20,000 persons. "Had an agreement of this 
kind [the Kellogg treaty] been in existence in 1914," said the presi- 
dent, "there is every reason to suppose that it would have saved the 
situation and delivered the world from all the misery which was 
inflicted by the great war. . . . It holds a greater hope for peaceful 
relations than was ever before given to the world. If those who are 
involved in it, having started it will finish it, its provisions will 
prove one of the greatest blessings ever bestowed upon humanity. 
It is a fitting consummation of the first decade of peace/' 26 Careful 
readers of the president's speech might have detected some presi- 
dential doubts about the treaty, but no one remarked them, and 
Coolidge did not undertake to elaborate them. 27 

Two days, after he spoke at Wassau the president telephoned the 

Cumberland, Wisconsin, which stood on the lawn outside and played "Under 
the Double Eagle" reminiscent of an empire that fell to ruin in 1914-18 after 
having tried war as an instrument of national policy. 

24. New York Times, Aug. 12, 1928. 

25. Ibid. 

26. Dispatch from Wassau, Aug. 15, in New York Times, Aug. 16, 1928. 

27. Telegrams from all over the United States and cables from abroad 
reached Coolidge the next day, praising his speech at Wassau. The president 
was delighted. Sources close to Coolidge said the president was more keenly 
anxious to learn the reaction to this speech than to any other he had made in 
years. New York Times, Aug. 17, 1928. 


State Department in Washington and commented on the itinerary 
of Secretary Kellogg' s forthcoming visit to Europe. After signing 
the antiwar treaty in Paris Kellogg had planned to stop briefly in 
England and Ireland. 28 Coolidge, however, now said over the tele- 
phone that Kellogg could not go to England. Reason: the president 
was still intensely disgusted with the Anglo-French naval agree- 
ment. 29 


Lying along one of the great piers of lower Manhattan the lie 
de France bustled with activity on the night of August 18, 1928, for 
the secretary of state of the United States, the Honorable Frank 
Billings Kellogg, was coming aboard to sail shortly after midnight 
for France. The secretary, his small but burly figure distinguished 
by his shock of white hair, briskly strode up the gangplank. A small 
but distinguished company of friends watched and waved when, 
at 12:30 A.M., tugs began pulling the huge French liner out into 
midstream. The only incident was an abortive demonstration by 
some one hundred members of the Ail-American Anti-Imperialist 
League. Getting to the dock almost too late, they feverishly began 
pulling out signs reading "Hands Off Nicaragua," "Down with 
American Imperialism," and "Down with Kellogg's Fake Peace 

28. Kellogg to Herrick, July 30, 1928, FR: 1928, I, 129-130. 

29. Castle diary, Aug. 17, 1928. There later was much newspaper specula- 
tion as to why Kellogg did not visit England. On the very day the nations in 
Paris were signing the antiwar treaty Assistant Secretary Castle had to tell the 
Washington newspaper correspondents half-truths about Kellogg's itinerary: 
"This morning has been a hectic one and the press pretty vicious on account 
of a story Wilmot Lewis [correspondent of the London Times} telegraphed to 
London that the Secretary was not going to England because the President 
prevented it to show his disgust at the Franco-British naval agreement. Of 
course I gave the various reasons why he did not go and of course the corre- 
spondents did not believe I told the whole story as I did not. Perhaps the 
President will now announce that he told the Secretary not to go. That would 
make trouble worse confounded. The President did wrong in issuing his order 
because it could only lead to bad feeling and because he should have trusted 
Kellogg not to talk about the agreement. It cannot be helped now." Castle 
diary, Aug. 27, 1928. 


Treaty/' Watchful police herded the leaguers off the pier and there 
were no arrests. Newspapermen otherwise found little that was 
.spectacular about the secretary of state's departure. Before going 
aboard Kellogg had been almost uncommunicative about his mis- 
sion, saying merely that signing the treaty was his only purpose. 
The Kellogg party included, in addition to Mrs. Kellogg, William 
H. Beck, Kellogg's private secretary, Michael J. McDermott, chief 
of the State Department's press relations, and Spencer Phenix, 
former assistant and a close friend and advisor to Kellogg. J. Theo- 
dore Marriner, chief of the Department's Division of Western 
European Affairs, already was in Paris arranging preliminary de- 
tails of the ceremony of signature. 

Some doubt had arisen as to whether many or any of the foreign 
ministers would come to Paris for the ceremony. Stresemann had 
been severely and, as it proved later, fatally stricken in the 
summer of 1928, and for days his doctors were uncertain if he 
could make the trip. Chamberlain suffered something close to a 
nervous breakdown about the first of August and had to retire 
temporarily from the Foreign Office, turning his duties over to Lord 
Cushendun. Premier Mussolini of Italy, who was also his own 
foreign minister, found his time occupied by army maneuvers in 
Northern Italy (he also was war minister). 30 Nor could he spare his 
assistant at the Palazzo Chigi, Dino Grandi. The best Mussolini 
could offer was his ambassador in Paris. As we have seen, Kellogg 
himself wished after the Franco-British naval agreement that he 
had never offered to go to the French capital. For a while it looked 
as if Aristide Briand might sign the treaty with the various am- 
bassadors at Paris. Even Briand's presence was somewhat in doubt. 
The French foreign minister was in delicate health that summer of 
igs8, 31 and might well have been taken ill and become unable to 
sign for France. 

30. A versatile person, Mussolini in addition presided over the ministries 
of marine, aviation, interior, and labor. Simultaneously he was commander- 
general of the Fascist Militia. Probably the reason he personally would not go 
to Paris was not busyness but rather the possibility of anti-fascist demonstrations 
and the problem of police precautions. So guessed Ambassador Fletcher in a 
dispatch to Kellogg, July 32, 1928, 711.6512 Anti-War/66. 

31. He had been very ill early in the summer. 


Secretary Kellogg rejoiced in his ocean voyage. Mrs. Kellogg 
told reporters on the boat that for the first time since her husband 
became secretary of state he slept until ten o'clock in the morning. 
Afterward he paced the deck with an old gray slouch cap pulled 
down over his eyes. 

While the secretary enjoyed himself little problems of cere- 
monial procedure troubled the Quai d'Orsay. First, there was the 
pen which Kellogg should use to sign the treaty. The city of Le 
Havre, where the secretary planned to come ashore in France, 
decided to offer him a solid gold pen, twelve inches long, nearly 
half an inch thick, and surmounted by a large aquamarine stone 
suitably inscribed "F.B.K." The pen bore the legend Au Grand 
Artisan de la Paix, Son Excellence M. Frank Billings Kellogg: la 
ville du Havre, A out, 1928. The city encased this magnificent 
pen in a green leather box bearing the words Si Vis Pacem Para 

Unfortunately another pen was available. Robert Underwood 
Johnson in mid-June had offered Kellogg the use of perhaps the 
most distinguished pen in America, excepting the pen with which 
Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation. This pen John- 
son had fashioned from a feather, plucked in 1890 from a live eagle 
in the National Museum. Presidents Harrison, Taft, and Wilson 
had used the pen for various occasions. 82 Nearly a month later 
William H. Beck, Kellogg's efficient secretary, replied that Kellogg 
would "keep the pen in mind." 33 Not to be put off so easily, John- 
son took his eagle feather to Europe so that Kellogg could use it if 
he desired. The secretary of state desired to use the Le Havre gold 
pen. This nonetheless was not the end of the tale of the Johnson 
pen, for after the Paris ceremonies Johnson hurried around and 
persuaded each of the fourteen signatories to sign a sheet of paper 
for the archives of the American Academy of Arts and Letters. Not 
satisfied with this signal achievement, Johnson then had the idea 
of each one of the adhering powers signing the sheet of paper 
using of course the famous eagle-quill pen. He believed the sheet 

32. Robert Underwood Johnson to Kellogg, June 14, 1928, 711.0012 Anti- 

33. William H. Beck to Johnson, July 10, 1928, 711.0012 Anti-War/m. 


of paper then would be a unique souvenir. 84 It certainly would 
have been. But the director of New York University's Hall of 
Fame eventually had to give up this scheme. He began to realize 
that the paper and pen would have to travel from Afghanistan to 
Venezuela and some forty-odd other places. Perhaps pen and paper 
would have been lost somewhere between Caracas and Kabul. 

The problem of the pen disposed of, there arose the question of 
the chair. What chair should Kellogg sit in? The signing was to 
take place at the Quai d'Orsay in the Salle de 1'Horloge, and in 
that very room was a chair which Woodrow Wilson had used dur- 
ing the Paris Peace Conference. Should Kellogg use Wilson's chair? 

Soon it was announced that Kellogg would not sit in Wilson's 
chair. The reason however was quite proper and unsensationaL 
Wilson had had a special chair with a high carved back; and ac- 
cording to Quai d'Orsay protocol such chairs were reserved for use 
of heads of state, which is to say kings and presidents. Thus Kellogg 
could not have sat in Wilson's chair even if he had wanted to. 

The He de France on August 23 touched at England and rode 
at anchor in Plymouth harbor for half an hour, discharging passen- 
gers and mail. A deputation of local dignitaries had time to clamber 
aboard and visit Secretary Kellogg, congratulating him on his 
treaty against war. It being necessary to say something in return, 
Kellogg said he believed the treaty was "a great step forward in 
civilization a great moral step." 85 

Early the next morning the He de France docked at Le Havre 
and Kellogg underwent his first ceremonial introduction to France. 
Accompanied by Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King, who 
had sailed with the Kelloggs from New York, the secretary of 
state stepped ashore and received a greeting from a company of 
French infantry rendering a military salute, A committee repre- 
senting the city of Le Havre presented Kellogg with the foot-long 
pen, so heavy that he handed it to Admiral Burrage to hold. Mrs. 
Kellogg received a large bouquet of roses, and Mackenzie King a 
gold medal. Said Kellogg to the assembled crowd: "This treaty 

34. Johnson to Assistant Secretary of State Wilbur J, Carr, Oct. 23, 1928, 
711.0012 Anti-Wary^. 

35. New York Times, Aug. 24, 


had its inspiration in the grand idea of M. Briand, your distin- 
guished Foreign Minister. It was an idea which appealed to the 
statesmen of the world, and I am very glad that the consummation 
is to take place in Paris/* 86 After this solemn declaration the Kel- 
logg party proceeded to their special train, escorted between troops 
lined at attention. A special detail of fifty French bicycle police 
followed the secretary to the city limits, pedaling vigorously to keep 
up with the train. Newspapermen noted that the entire ceremony 
took only twenty minutes. 

As a precaution against possible Communist demonstration 
the Kellogg train slipped into Paris forty-five minutes early. One 
lone reporter was there; Ambassador Herrick received just four- 
teen minutes' notice before the train arrived. Only M. de Fou- 
quieres, director of the protocol of the French Republic, was on 
the platform. Kellogg drove quickly to the American Embassy 
with five hundred policemen as a guard of honor. Later he went 
out to the American hospital at Neuilly and inquired for Mar- 
riner, ill with pleurisy; Marriner's condition was serious, and Kel- 
logg could not see him. The secretary lunched with Ambassador 
Herrick. He had a chat with Briand at four o'clock. There followed 
dinner with the Herricks and then early to bed. 

The next morning the secretary received at the Embassy nearly 
two hundred American and foreign correspondents. "As you 
know," he told them, "I am here simply to sign a treaty which I 
hope, and I know all nations of the world hope, will be a forward 
step in the interest of world peace. It was the grand conception of 
M. Briand which led to the making of this treaty. The United States 
and I personally feel under great obligation to him . . ." Kellogg 
then bowed to the journalists, indicating the interview was over. 

"I hope it will be well with the American Senate/' came from 
a Hungarian correspondent in the back row.' Everyone strained 
eagerly for the secretarvU reply. 

"That is a matte\>entirely up to the Senate, and I do not feel 
I can say anything on the point/' Kellogg quickly answered. He 
then bowed again as if to end the meeting. 

The reporters made further attempts to draw him out, but be- 

36. New York Times, Aug. 25, 1928. 


yond stating that those countries which were not signing the treaty 
would receive on the following Monday individual invitations to 
adhere to it, Kellogg would say nothing and withdrew hurriedly. 87 

Shortly after noon of the same day Kellogg and Herrick drove 
to the Arc de Triomphe, where the secretary laid a wreath of roses 
on the tomb of the unknown soldier. Although there had been no 
announcement a large crowd had gathered. Walking ahead of the 
ambassador, Kellogg placed the flowers on the grave and then knelt 
in prayer first on one knee and then on both. This little ceremony 
became the subject of much friendly comment in afternoon Parisian 
newspapers. After lunch the two American diplomatists had a round 
of golf at the St. Cloud country club. 

On the evening of August 26, the day before the ceremony 
of signature, Secretary Kellogg played host to the signatories. They 
all came except Stresemann who was too sick for social activities. 
Servants set up a huge horseshoe-shaped table in the American 
Embassy. The most distinguished gathering of diplomats since the 
days of the Versailles Peace Conference enjoyed an elaborate menu, 
featuring delicacies such as aiguillette de boeuf Richelieu. There 
was an "impressive" list of French wines and champagne, the details 
of which unlike other items of the menu were not announced. 88 
After dinner the guests strolled through the Embassy gardens, il- 
luminated for the occasion by hundreds of small colored electric 
lights buried in flower beds and bushes and placed in trees. A 
twenty-five piece band from the cruiser Detroit, then anchored at 
Le Havre, played the latest American jazz tunes. 

Secretary Kellogg, surveying his laughing, jostling guests, and 
catching occasional strains of jazz from the Detroit's band, must 
have mused silently over the many events of the past few months. 
From the enthusiastic activities of a group of people whom Kellogg 

once had called " paci&b^" and from the exigencies 

of the French Foreign Office, had comemonths ago a proposed 
Franco-American Pact of Perpetual Friendship. The American 

37. New York Times, Aug. 26, 1928. 

38. Although American Embassies abroad were exempt from the provisions 
of the Volstead Act, most foreign service officers undertook to make their con- 
vivialities as inconspicuous as possible. 


secretary of state quickly had caught the implications of this 
innocent-sounding treaty. Only after half a year of ingenious stall- 
ing did Kellogg decide to answer the French Government with his 
counterproposal of a multilateral, universal pact instead of a bi- 
lateral Franco-American treaty equivalent to a negative alliance. 
And after Coolidge's laconic "We can do that, can we not?" Kellogg 
did it with a vengeance. Then for three months Aristide Briand 
painfully sought to wiggle off the hook, but finally had to accept 
Kellogg' s proposal in principle. After nearly four months more of 
observing and qualifying, the great powers, the Locarno powers, 
and the British Dominions and India had sent their plenipoten- 
tiaries to Paris. At that fleeting moment on the evening of August 
26 Secretary Kellogg, standing in the Embassy gardens, might have 
agreed with Robert Underwood Johnson that the treaty against 
war really was something of a miracle. 


Flags of all the nations of the world hung from public and other 
buildings in Paris on August 27, 1928. The hammer and sickle even 
waved from the Quai d'Orsay itself. This was the day for the re- 
nunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. This was the 
day for which Salmon O. Levinson and James T. Shotwell, Nicholas 
Murray Butler and Charles Clayton Morrison, Colonel Raymond 
Robins and Senator William E. Borah all had waited. At 2:30 P.M. 
diplomats began to gather in Briand's office at the Quai d'Orsay, 
ready to walk to the Salle de THorloge where they would sign 
the treaty. A large crowd lined the streets opposite the Foreign 
Office and cheered the statesmen as they arrived. Newspaper re- 
porters estimated that several thousand Americans were there who 
seemed to enjoy themselves greatly. Fully half of them were women. 

The famous clock room was crowded. It was not a big room, and 
in addition to the signatories and several hundred invited guests it 
had to hold six huge klieg lights, placed so that all the people of 
the world might see the ceremony. Ushers clad in blue and gold 
trimmed coats, red velvet breeches, and white silk stockings directed 
guests to their seats. One of them helped Harrison Brown who at 


the last minute had, as he put it, wangled a ticket. Brown thought 
it scandalous that Chamberlain, who was not nearly so ill as Strese- 
mann, should not have come to sign, 39 but at that moment in the 
afternoon of August 27, 1928, he was too busy examining the 
beautiful rococo decoration of the Salle de 1'Horloge to bother 
much with scandals. 

Harrison Brown was fortunate to have wangled a ticket, for less 
than seventy-five Americans witnessed the great ceremony in the 
clock room. 40 Twenty of them were members of Secretary Kellogg's 
official party. Several hundred people had sought, or fought, at the 
American Embassy to get tickets. For two weeks Mrs. Carter Mur- 
ray of the Embassy staff listened to "the man who knew Coolidge," 
to "friends of the Administration." Even after Mrs. Murray had 
distributed the few tickets there was trouble. At the last minute 
it turned out that Robert Underwood Johnson, who as one-time 
American ambassador to Rome could claim a ticket, had not gotten 
one. Because he had failed to pick up his ticket Mrs. Murray had 
given it to Justice Pierce Butler of the Supreme Court. There en- 
sued a wild scramble and finally the Embassy came up with another 
ticket for the former ambassador. 

William Allen White, on hand to report to American newspaper 
readers on what he called "the first treaty renouncing war ever 
signed on this planet/' counted only twenty-three silk hats out of 
three hundred headpieces at the Quai d'Orsay check room. He saw 
half a hundred gray business suits among the invited guests in the 
audience. "It was," he wrote, "the middle class speaking through 
the treaty." Business demanded and needed peace, wrote the 
famous and sophisticated editor of the Emporia Gazette, and the 
treaty was an expression of this demand and need. 41 

Among other Americans present that afternoon were Senator 
and Mrs. Walter E. Edge of New Jersey, Hamilton Fish Armstrong 
of the quarterly Foreign Affairs, Secretary of Labor James J. Davis, 

39. Brown to Levinson, Aug. 27, 1938, Levinson MSS. 

40. Fifteen nations had to divide about a thousand tickets. 

41. New York Times, Aug. 28, 1928. See also White's A Puritan in Babylon 
(New York, 1938), p. 410. 


former Undersecretary of State Robert E. Olds/ 2 Dr. Earl B. Bab- 
cock of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Dr. 
Hugh Young, the famous Johns Hopkins surgeon. Europeans 
among the audience looked askance when Mrs. John W. Morrison 
of New York, representative of the American League of Women 
Voters, entered the clock room unescorted. "Naturally, an Amer- 
ican," was the whispered comment, for no European lady would 
have thought of arriving alone for such a notable ceremony. While 
there were fully twenty other American women present, all of them 
were wives of Embassy officials and other prominent Americans and 
were accompanied by their husbands. 

As the hands of the ornate gilt clock pointed to three, a Swiss 
guard with a halberd led a distinguished group of diplomatists 
into the room, where they seated themselves around a horseshoe- 
shaped table. There was the president of the Irish Free State, 
William Thomas Cosgrave, and the premier of the Dominion of 
Canada, the Right Honorable W. L. Mackenzie King. There were 
the six foreign ministers, Dr. Gustav Stresemann of Germany, the 
Honorable Frank B. Kellogg of the United States, Aristide Briand 
of France, Dr. Eduard Benes of Czechoslovakia, Paul Hymans of 
Belgium, and A. Zaleski of Poland, There was Britain's acting secre- 
tary of state for foreign affairs, the Right Honorable Lord Cushen- 
dun, who signed also for India. Then there were the five special 
plenipotentiaries: the Honorable Alexander John McLachlan of 
Australia, the Honorable Sir Christopher James Parr of New Zea- 
land, the Honorable Jacobus Stephanus Smit of the Union of South 
Africa, Count Gaetano Manzoni of Italy, and Count Uchida of 
Japan. A most distinguished gathering. 

At 3:02 Briand began to speak. Contrary to his usual custom he 
read his speech and this meant he had prepared it with care and 
calculation. Briand described the treaty to his audience. Some peo- 
ple, he said, insisted the treaty was not realistic for it had no sanc- 
tions. Then Briand the orator contradicted those individuals, for 
the treaty bore the sanction of "moral forces, among which is that of 

4?. Early in the summer of 1928 Olds had resigned from the Department. 
J. Reuben Clark took his place. 


public opinion/' What nation, he asked, could safely oppose such 
forces? Briand told his audience the history of the negotiations 
which had brought them that historic day into the clock room. 
"When, on the goth of June, 1927," he said, "I had the honor of 
proposing to the Hon. Mr. Kellogg the form of words which he 
decided to accept and embody in the draft of a multilateral pact, I 
never contemplated for one moment that the suggested engagement 
should only exist between France and the United States. ... It 
was, therefore, a source of gratification to me to see Mr. Kellogg 
from the beginning of the active negotiations that he was to lead 
with such a clearsighted and persevering mind, advocate extension 
of the pact and assign to it that universal character that fully an- 
swered the wishes of the French Government/* In his mind's eye 
Briand looked beyond the walls of the clock room and over all 
frontiers whether on land or on sea. He was sure that, with this wide 
communion of men surrounding the signatories, they sincerely 
were entitled to reckon that there were more than fourteen around 
the table in the clock room. Gentlemen, Briand said, in a moment 
the awakening of a great hope would be signaled to the world along 
the wires. "Peace is proclaimed. That is well; that is much; but it 
still remains necessary to organize it." Briand closed by proposing 
that the signatories should dedicate the treaty to the dead, to all the 
dead, of the Great War.* 3 The audience listened to the foreign min- 
ister's words with rapt attention. In the midst of the speech reporters 
3aw tears trickle down the cheeks of Secretary Kellogg. 

When Briand had finished Professor Camerlynk translated his 
speech into English. As the professor ended his translation, a 
whisper of 'TAmdricain, rAmericain" ran through the audience, 
for they expected Kellogg to speak. Instead Briand rose and read 
the preamble and text of the treaty. 44 Then one by one the diplo- 
mats began signing. 

43. New York Times, Aug. 28, 1928. 

44. A day or so before the ceremony Kellogg made known his decision not 
to make a speech, and this made it improper for the other signatories to 
deliver speeches. Unfortunately they already had prepared their speeches. The 
Quai d'Orsay had twenty-four strenuous hours of work persuading the states- 
men not to speak. 


Quai d'Orsay officials had spread the treaty on a small table in- 
side the horseshoe table. Already the treaty bore fifteen wax wafers, 
each marked with the seal of the signer; the Foreign Office had 
requested each of the plenipotentiaries to lend it his seal so that the 
wafers might be stamped in advance. 45 

Stresemann as representative of I'Allemagne signed first. Look- 
ing gaunt and unwell, the German foreign minister rose from his 
seat and walked to the small table. Seated before the treaty and fac- 
ing the audience in the clock room, he wielded the foot-long pen 
without difficulty. Next was the turn of Kellogg, representative of 
VAmerique, les tats-Unis. Kellogg started to sign his name but 
had trouble with the gold pen and had to dip it in the famous ink- 
well provided for the ceremony. 46 The other signatories who fol- 
lowed Kellogg had the same difficulty with the big golden pen, but 
otherwise everything went off without incident. At three minutes 
to four it was all over. The Swiss guard banged his. halberd on the 
floor and the signatories filed out behind him through Briand's 
office into the gardens of the Quai d'Orsay Palace. After half an 
hour's conversation over tea and cake they scattered to their re- 
spective embassies. 

That night the French Government illuminated all public 
buildings in Paris. Newspapermen from abroad still were busy 
sending out details of the afternoon's ceremony. Typesetters of 
great morning dailies in London, Berlin, Rome, Tokyo, New York, 
and elsewhere were beginning to put into print the day's events 
in Paris. There were festivities in the French capital that evening, 
and Harrison Brown, sitting down in a Paris hotel to typewrite a 
letter to Levinson, wrote that Dr. and Mrs. Morrison had gone to 
a soiree at the Quai d'Orsay. 47 

45. Kellogg used the aquamarine stone inscribed "F.B.K." set at the top of 
the great gold pen given him by the citizens of Le Havre. 

46. The inkwell used by Franklin and Vergennes in signing the Franco- 
American alliance of Feb. 6, 1778. 

47. Levinson MSS. 

That evening after the pact had been signed a certain anonymous "onlooker" 
wrote the following: "The deed cannot be doubted. I saw it done. I heard the 
words spoken. I looked into the grave faces of the men who were impowered to 
sign. I handled the finished pact. I read again the unambiguous words of re- 


Next morning American newspapers carried texts of messages, 
between President Coolidge and President Gaston Doumergue of 
France. Coolidge had written that the new treaty was a great for- 
ward step, and Doumergue replied expressing the thanks of the 
civilized world. As he had done on other occasions, Aristide Briand 
sent another message to the American people through the Asso- 
ciated Press. "It has been a year and a half/' he recalled, "since, in 
a message conveyed through The Associated Press, I let fall this 
fragile germ of a suggestion sufficiently discreet, anticipating noth- 
ing more than the spontaneous sympathy of the American people. 
. . . The harvest has not deceived my hopes . . ." 4S 

nunciation. I looked at the signatures and seals. I cannot do otherwise than to 
command my pen to write these words: Today international war was banished 
from civilization." "Words of an Onlooker," Hooper MSS. 
48. New York Times, Aug. 28, 1928. 


uristide Briand in his new message to the Ameri- 
can people had spoken of a harvest which had not deceived his 
hopes. The treaty against war apparently had delighted the for- 
eign minister of France. But to speak of a harvest was premature, 
for the American Senate had not yet voted upon the pact of Paris: 
according to the Constitution of the United States, the president 
had power "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to 
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present con- 
cur." x Sometimes as Europeans sadly learned after negotiation of 
the Treaty of Versailles the Senate chose to withhold its advice 
and consent. It was thus almost in the nature of things that there 
should have to be a fight for American ratification of the antiwar 
treaty. The American peace forces girded themselves for battle 
against recalcitrant or wavering senators. For Professor Shotwell 
and Dr. Butler, Salmon O. Levinson and Colonel Robins, there 
would have to be travail in Washington. 

Let us now follow the fortunes of the Kellogg antiwar treaty as, 
immediately after its signature, Secretary of State Kellogg carefully 
stored it in his bedroom at the American Embassy in Paris; as he 
nervously carried it with him on the cruiser Detroit to Ireland and 
back; as he watched the purser of the Leviathan stow it away in 
the great ship's safe; and as, back in Washington, he proudly stood 
guard over the precious parchment in his, office at the Department 
of State. 

i. Art. II, Sec. 2, par. 2. Italics inserted. 


It is not possible to describe in detail Secretary Kellogg's official 
activities in France and Ireland during the days after signature of 
the antiwar treaty. The secretary had luncheon with the president 
of the French Republic in the splendid presidential chateau at 
Rambouillet. Kellogg received the freedom of the city of Paris; 
Georges Lemarchand, president of the Municipal Council, wel- 
comed him at a grand ceremony, declaring Paris was proud that the 
antiwar treaty forever would bear the name Pact of Paris. (Kellogg, 
however, already had accepted a suggestion of Ambassador Herrick 
that the treaty be known as the General Pact for the Renunciation 
of War.) 2 After the secretary left France for Ireland, August 29, 
accompanied by President Cosgrave of the Irish Free State, he sent 
a message to Briand thanking him for the "delightful visit/' "I feel 
sure/' Kellogg declared, "that the work accomplished will mark 
a new epoch in international relations." 8 Briand, "profoundly 
touched," replied that he too hoped the work accomplished would 
mark the beginning of a new era. 4 

Arriving in Dublin, Kellogg and Cosgrave faced dense crowds 

2. Kellogg to Herrick, Aug. 16, 1938, 711.001? Anti-War/272. Nearly a 
year later, July 11, 1929, the Treaty Division of the Department of State pro- 
posed the designation Treaty for the Renunciation of War. 711.0013 Anti- 
War/839. The treaty has had many names: Pact of Paris, Paris Pact, Multilateral 
Treaty for the Renunciation of War, Treaty for the Renunciation of War, 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, Briand-Kellqgg Pact, Kellogg Pact, Peace Pact of Paris. 
Kellogg-Briand Pact probably is the most accurate title, historically. 

The present writer recently asked the Department of State for the correct 
title of the treaty. The Department replied that the treaty itself has no title 
but that, in accordance with the wording of the preamble, the accepted and 
proper designation is "Treaty providing for the renunciation of war as an in- 
strument of national policy." 

3. New York Times, Aug. 30, 1928. 

4. Ibid., Aug 31, 1928. Already the French foreign minister had written a 
thank-you to Nicholas Murray Butler: "I do not forget the effective part you have 
played in the vast movement of ideas which have paved the way and assured 
the success of the pact signed today. And I cannot refrain from sending you 
my most cordial greetings upon this day." Ibid., Aug. 30, 1928. 


of enthusiastic workmen, children, mothers, and colleens. Seumas 
Murphy, chairman of the City Commissioners, fairly outdid him- 
s.elf in extending the city's greetings. Said Mr. Murphy to Mr. Kel- 
logg: "There are many names on the world's register of fame, placed 
high by deeds of courage and acts of wisdom and honored for ad- 
ministrative genius and artistic qualities. With confidence we can 
say there is none imbued with finer nobility. In you the angels 
of peace have come to minister to men again. With your advent 
in Europe has come the birth of what may be termed the second era 
of peace peace on earth to men of good will." Surrounded by local 
Dublin dignitaries, Secretary Kellogg small, stoop-shouldered, 
white-haired, seventy-one years of age was so moved by this tribute 
that he faltered several times in replying. 5 A few days later, after 
enjoying himself thoroughly in the blarney-famed land of the 
shamrock, he sailed away on the Detroit for Cherbourg, and there, 
September 4, 1928, he happily boarded the Leviathan for home. 

Yet one must not presume that the European political scene 
in the late summer of 1928 was as irenic as it appeared to Secretary 
Kellogg. European politics were not confined to official receptions 
and complimentary speeches. 

Gustav Stresemann, while in Paris for the ceremonies of the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, conferred with Premier Poincar< of France. 
The two statesmen did not range over the general beauties of peace 
but confined themselves to more specific matters, such as the still 
occupied German Rhineland, the Saar basin (then under a fifteen- 
year guardianship of the League of Nations), and international 
debts. In regard to the latter Stresemann and Poincar< made some 
highly interesting comments, thereby illuminating one of the 
factors in Secretary Kellogg's successful negotiation of his cher- 
ished antiwar pact. 

"To meet our economic needs," Stresemann said, "we have bor- 
rowed many milliards of gold marks, especially from America, both 
in long-term and short-term loans. The moment it becomes gen- 
erally known that Germany is not meeting her international obli- 
gations, these American loans will be called in. And in that moment 
we could no longer feed the 64 millions of our population. . . ." 

5. Ibid., Aug. 31, 1928. 


"I am much interested," Poincar6 replied, "in the situation in 
Germany in regards the United States of America. All of us in 
Europe are suffering from the situation in which we find our- 
selves as regards the United States." 6 

There were other contemporaneous events which pointed 
ominously toward the future, for in spite of unceasing efforts of 
diplomats and peoples, peace in Europe in 1928 was not well or- 

The delicacy of Franco-German relations appeared in a truly 
startling manner at the September meeting of the League of Na- 
tions in Geneva. There Briand, famous as the conciliator and man 
of peace, suddenly became angry after listening to a speech by the 
German Chancellor Hermann Miiller. The chancellor, referring to 
the unilateral nature of disarmament i.e., that the disarmament 
provisions of Versailles seemed to apply only to Germany tact- 
lessly had spoken of the "double face" of international politics. 
Briand retorted with a sweeping attack on German good faith. 
Germany, said the aroused French foreign minister, had not ful- 
filled her disarmament obligations. This angry exchange raised up 
a storm of denunciation on both sides of the Rhine and threatened 
to undo all the effects of Briand's previous conciliatory policy 
toward the German Republic. 

It is not without interest that early in September 1928 im- 
portant decisions were made in Paris relative to fortifying France's 
eastern frontier. The 1928 French budget already had appropriated 
200,000,000 francs for the fortifications, at the request of the former 
minister of war, Andr Maginot. 

Such developments did not bother Secretary Kellogg as he 
sailed home to the United States. A reporter on the Leviathan, who 
had seen Kellogg daily for the past two years, could not help re- 
marking how the trip to Europe had changed the secretary. The re- 
porter believed that Kellogg looked immensely pleased with him- 
self and his treaty. A tired, worn, elderly man had gone to Europe 
only to return home buoyant, ruddy-complexioned, radiant. 7 

6. Notes by Stresemann of a conversation with Poincare*, Aug. 27, 1938. 
Eric Sutton, ed., Gustav Stresemann, III, 388. It is curious that this conversation 
should have occurred the very day of the signing of the Kellogg pact. 

7. New York Times, Sept. 7, 1938. 



Meanwhile in the United States political leaders were eyeing 
the forthcoming 1928 presidential election. It was a foregone con- 
clusion that the Kellogg treaty would become an issue in the cam- 
paign. For the Republican party, embarrassed for years with its 
negative record on foreign policy, the antiwar pact was heaven- 
sent. Leaders of the Grand Old Party realized with fond anticipa- 
tion that the Coolidge Administration a Republican administra- 
tion had "outcovenanted" s Woodrow Wilson himself. 

Originally there had been a strange reluctance among certain 
Republicans to use the antiwar treaty in the campaign. The Re- 
publican National Committee in May 1928, while the treaty nego- 
tiations still were in progress, zealously had begun collecting po- 
tential campaign planks. But when Assistant Secretary of State 
Castle on May 16 telephoned James White of the National Com- 
mittee that Kellogg was a little delayed in getting in the foreign 
relations plank which Castle had composed a few days before 
"Jim asked [Castle wrote in his diary] whether it would be necessary 
to talk about this outlawry of war negotiation. I said it would. He 
then said he hoped it could be avoided as C.C. was bored with it 
and considered it foolish. I immediately went to the White House 
and asked Ted Clark 9 whether this was the case. He was much 
disturbed as to where White had got this information and said he 
thought it was not correct. I only wanted to know because if White 
was correct I wanted to cut out as much as possible. Jim White, of 
course, is working in the interests of C.C. and he ought to know. 
There are an infinite number of wheels within wheels." 10 

A few days later White visited the State Department and dis- 
cussed with Castle the various planks of the Republican platform. 
White said that the platform, as far as he had it, was "dry as dust." 
He thought it needed "a little jazzing up," for the Democratic 
platform would be "very lurid." lx 

8. The good word is Samuel Flagg Bemis 1 . See his Latin American Policy of 
the United States, p. 219. 

9. One of Coolidge's secretaries. 

10. Castle diary, May 16, 1928. 

11. /&uZ.jMay 8, 1928. 


But when Castle went to Kansas City in June to help Senator 
Smoot with the platform, the foreign relations plank remained 
almost as Castle originally had written it. 12 Thus it came to pass 
that the Republicans fervently endorsed the proposal of the secre- 
tary of state, an idea which "has stirred the conscience of mankind 
and gained widespread approval, both of Governments and of the 
people, and the conclusion of the treaty will be acclaimed as the 
greatest single step in history toward the conservation of peace." 

Outlawry and renunciation having become an issue in the cam- 
paign, American peace leaders resolved that politicians should not 
forget promises. Frederick J. Libby of the National Council for 
Prevention of War suggested to his peace workers that "Now is 
the time to ask your Congressman and Senators whether they sup- 
port unreservedly their Party platform . . . Don't take as a suf- 
ficient answer the promise to 'study' the subject or to 'give the sub- 
ject careful consideration when it arises/ " 18 

But Outlawry and renunciation were such easy paths to follow. 
In fact, they were not only easy but convenient. Dr. Hubert Work 
and Mrs. Alvin T, Hert, chairman and vice-chairman of the Re- 
publican National Committee, soon were hailing the treaty as. an 
outstanding achievement of the Coolidge Administration. Said 
Mrs. Hert, with obvious inspiration: "Never in all history has there 
been taken a step of so profound significance to mankind." Both 
she and Dr. Work announced that Herbert Hoover would con- 
tinue this policy if elected. 14 

Although the Democrats in their party platform also had 
adopted the Kellogg antiwar treaty (at Houston, Texas, they had 
resolved for ' 'outlawry of war and an abhorrence of militarism, 
conquest and imperialism"), a leading Democrat, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt of New York, found occasion to criticize the antiwar 
pact. "If the vision of real world peace, of the abolishment of war, 
ever comes true," Roosevelt declared in his speech nominating 
Alfred E. Smith at Houston, "it will not be through the mere 
mathematical calculations of the reduction of armament program 

12. Ibid., Kansas City, June 10, 1928. 

13. FrederickJ. Libby, in NCPW, News Bulletin, ; (Aug. i, 1928), p. a. 

14. New York Times, Aug. 28, 1928. 


nor the platitudes of multilateral treaties piously deprecating 
armed conflict." 15 Levinson anxiously wrote Kellogg about this 
attack on Outlawry, but Kellogg replied with assurance. "I am 
quite familiar with Franklin Roosevelt's statement at the Con- 
vention/' he wrote. "I also knew that Mr. Morgenthau had pro- 
posed stumping the country against the treaty but many Democrats 
had dissuaded him from doing it. ... The country is almost 
unanimous for the treaty." 16 

While Secretary Kellogg still was aboard the Leviathan coming 
back to the United States, Herbert Hoover himself undertook to 
make the new treaty redound to the greater glory of the Republi- 
can party. At his regular Friday press conference, September 7, 
Hoover broke his rule against being quoted and agreed to speak 
for the record. He announced that the Washington Disarmament 
Conference of 1921-22, the Dawes reparation plan, and the new 
Kellogg treaty (that "great treaty for the renunciation of war," 
that "magnificent step toward world peace") were "the greatest 
steps toward international peace by any country since the signing 
of the peace treaty ending the great war." 17 

But the mixing of politics with the antiwar treaty was doomed 
to failure. 

Secretary Kellogg repeatedly had stated that the pact belonged 
to the nation, and not to the Republicans. A group of reporters 
accompanying Kellogg aboard the Leviathan therefore engaged 
in a conspiracy to remove the antiwar treaty from politics. 

To Frederick T. Birchall, the managing editor of the New 

15. New York Times, June 28, 1928. Roosevelt made another attack on the 
treaty in the pages of Foreign Affairs: "Today our Secretary of State is working 
on a glorified multi-powered declaration solemnly resolving against war. ... It 
is of the utmost importance that this nation realize that war cannot be outlawed 
by resolution alone. . . . Practical machinery must be erected and kept in 
good working order. Secretary Kellogg's plan, even if approved by the leading 
nations, still fails in two points. It leads to a false belief in America that we 
have taken a great step forward. It does not contribute in any way to settling 
matters of international controversy." Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Our Foreign 
Policy: A Democratic View," Foreign Affairs, 6 (July 1928), 585, 

16. Kellogg to Levinson, Oct. 25, 1928, Levinson MSS. 

17. New York Times, Sept. 8, 1928. 


York Times, Drew Pearson, one of the conspirators, sent the fol- 

PLETELY NON-PARTISAN ISSUE UNQUOTE. Birchall radioed as. sug- 
gested. The reporters then showed a copy of the radiogram to Kel- 
logg who, as Pearson later wrote, "gobbled the bait." The pact of 
Paris, the secretary said vehemently, was not to become a political 
issue in the presidential campaign. Kellogg's eyes snapped when 
he said this* He did not know that Hoover already had declared 
that the pact was an achievement of the G.O.P. The next morning 
the New York Times carried a lead: "Aboard the SS Leviathan: 
Secretary of State Kellogg does not approve the attempt of Mr. 
Hoover to claim the renunciation of war treaty as a great achieve- 
ment of the Republican Party, and he has decided to do his best 
to prevent the treaty from becoming a political issue in this presi- 
dential campaign." 

Kellogg did not waver in his determination to ensure the non- 
partisan status of his treaty. As he left the Leviathan in lower New 
York harbor and steamed toward the Battery in a special tug, he 
received the press. 

"Well, have you got the paper in your pocket?" asked a reporter. 

"What paper?" 

"You know, that paper you signed over in Paris." 

Kellogg, disconcerted by this reception, fumbled in his pocket 
for several small slips of paper. Slowly he gave a slip to each reporter. 

They read: "I do not think the treaty for the renunciation of 
war should be made a party issue either in the campaign or in the 
Senate, and I cannot conceive that it will be." 1S 

When Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg returned to Washing- 
ton all unpleasant thoughts of politics had vanished from his mind* 
Undersecretary J. Reuben Clark and the four assistant secretaries 19 
greeted him at the train station. Having already lunched on the 

18. Drew Pearson and Constantine Brown, American Diplomatic Game, 
pp. 40-42. 

19. William R, Castle (western Europe), Nelson T. Johnson (Far East), 
Francis White (Latin America), Wilbur J. Carr (administration). 


train, Kellogg proceeded directly to the Department. There he 
happily showed his colleagues the treaty and the gold pen. Assistant 
Secretary Castle later recorded that the secretary of state talked 
about all of his experiences 'like a pleased child." 20 


The antiwar treaty placed above the reach o Republican po- 
litical leaders, there once more arose the problem of Soviet Russia. 
Did Russia's adherence to the pact of Paris automatically involve 
recognition by the United States Government? "By this act/' later 
wrote the learned jurist and international lawyer, John Bassett 
Moore, "we necessarily recognized the Soviet government; for, by 
the hornbooks the very primers of the kindergartens o inter- 
national law and diplomacy, recognition may be implied as well as 
express, and one of the stock examples of implied recognition is 
the entrance into conventional relations." 21 But the State De- 
partment would not so much as, glance at these hornbooks and 
primers. The Department steadfastly refused to acknowledge that 
Russian adherence to the treaty had resulted, automatically, in 
American recognition of the Bolshevik regime. 

Yet the Department recently had recognized Nationalist China 
by concluding a bilateral commercial treaty with the Nationalist 

20. Castle diary, Sept. 10, 1928. En route to Washington there occurred a 
humorous incident. Kellogg's secretary, William H. Beck, was in charge of the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, which Beck carried locked in a special suitcase purchased 
in Paris. Kellogg warned his secretary never to let the treaty out of sight, At 
Pennsylvania Station in New York Beck desired to repair to a telephone booth 
to telephone his family in Washington. Kellogg willingly assented but re- 
minded him of his responsibility concerning the pact of Paris. Whereupon 
Beck repaired to the booth taking the suitcase along, much to the amusement 
o Secretary and Mrs, Kellogg. (Mr. Beck to the writer.) 

21. The Collected Papers of John Bassett Moore (7 vols., New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1944), VI, 349. In this connection one recalls the unsuccessful 
mission of Francis Dana to St Petersburg in 1780 to secure American adherence 
to Catherine It's league of armed neutrals; such adherence, Congress then 
thought, would constitute implicit recognition of the United States by the 
members of the league. 


government. 22 There was as a consequence some support within 
the Department for the idea that a bilateral (not a multilateral) 
treaty should constitute recognition. The Department's Treaty 
Division, however, was not prepared to accept as a general rule 
even such a proposition as this. The Treaty Division canvassed the 
entire question of recognition in an official memorandum of No- 
vember 15, 1928, entitled "Recognition by Means of Treaty." "Prac- 
tical convenience/' proposed the division, "will, it would seem, be 
best served by confining the acts which may constitute recognition 
as narrowly as possible to express statements that one country 
recognizes the other. Where recognition does not follow from any 
other act or statement, the nervousness lest certain acts not in- 
tended to constitute recognition may nevertheless do so, may be 
avoided." 2S 

The Government of Soviet Russia surely was difficult to treat 
with. Although the great powers after much discussion had ar- 
ranged to exclude Russia from the Paris ceremony of signature, 24 
this could not prevent the Soviets from giving a sarcastic note to 
M. Herbette, the French ambassador in Moscow, for transmission 
through Paris to Washington. Maxim Litvinoff as acting commissar 
for foreign affairs called attention in the note to Russia's proposals 
for general and total disarmament 25 and pointed out the "total 
impotence" of the League of Nations in rejecting these proposals. 
The British reservation of "certain regions" he declared a shabby 
attempt at imperialism. "But the .said note of the British Govern- 
ment is not communicated to the Soviet Government as an in- 
tegral part of the Pact or an annex thereto, therefore it can not be 
considered as binding on the Soviet Government, just as the other 
restrictions concerning the Pact mentioned in the diplomatic cor- 
respondence, are not binding on the Soviet Government." After 

22. The commercial treaty, moreover, did not contain an explicit clause of 
recognition. See text in FR: 192.8, II, 475-477. 

23. "It may be recalled," the memorandum continued, "that during recent 
years most of the recognitions of new Governments by this Government have 
taken place through definite statements to that effect, and have not been left to 
be implied or presumed from some other act or statement." 711.9412 Anti- 

24. See above, pp. 502-203. 
25 See above, p. 126 n. 


several hundred words of sharp criticism of the pact and its authors, 
Litvinoff in the second to the last sentence of his long note ex- 
pressed the Soviet Government's desire to adhere to the antiwar 
treaty. 26 (But a few weeks later K. E. Voroshiloff , Soviet war com- 
missar, said in a speech in Kiev that the Soviet Government had 
never considered the Kellogg pact seriously and had adhered to it 
merely for tactical purposes in order to prevent other powers from 
accusing Soviet Russia of "Red imperialism.") 2T 

The Soviet Russian Government nonetheless had the honor 
of being the first state formally to adhere to the treaty against war. 
The French Embassy in Washington, September 27, 19218, pre- 
sented the State Department with Russia's instrument of adher- 
ence. Most of the other nations of the world, although having sig- 
nified their intention of adhering, chose to withhold formal ad- 
herence until such time as the United States Senate should advise 
and consent to American ratification. 


The great popular campaign for ratification of the antiwar 
treaty did not get under way until after the campaign to elect a 

26. Litvinoff to Herbette, Aug. 31, 1928, FR: 192$, I, 170-175. 

27. Dispatch from London, Sept. 24, 1928, quoting a Riga dispatch in the 
London Times. New York Times, Sept. 25. 

According to Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs (2 vols., Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1951), II, 774-775, a sharp struggle in Bolshevik 
ranks preceded Russia's decision to adhere to the Kellogg pact. The party 
theorist, Nikolai Bukharin, favored adhering. The foreign minister, Georgi 
Chicherin, opposed. Chicherin argued that it would open the way to outside 
dictation to Moscow. President Mikhail Kalinin remarked that the pact 
"amounts to nothing. Instead of a real abolition of war some more talk. . . 
Will the cause of peace be advanced a single metre? It will not." Why, asked 
Kalinin, did the nations do such things? To trick the workers and masses into 
acquiescing in larger armies and navies, he believed. "This is the only pur- 
pose." Prime Minister Alexei Rykov replied that the Kellogg pact would help 
deprive the leaders of the "anti-Soviet bloc" of the formal possibility of an 
attack on the Soviet Union. With all its faults the pact constituted a moral 
obligation, Rykov believed, and therefore obstructed, to some small extent, the 
psychological preparation for war. The then secretary general of the Com- 
munist party, Joseph Stalin, seems to have said nothing. 


president of the United States. Only after that great quadrennial 
milestone of American political life the first Tuesday after the 
first Monday in November had passed, did the antiwar cohorts 
begin the fight for ratification. Carrie Chapman Catt's Committee 
on the Cause and Cure of War, the World Peace Foundation, the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the American Com- 
mittee for the Outlawry of War, the Commission on International 
Justice and Goodwill of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ 
in America, the World Alliance for International Friendship, to- 
gether with a veritable host of churches and women's clubs all 
these then swept forward in grand alliance. No senator in Wash- 
ington escaped the imperious request of these organizations: that 
the antiwar treaty receive promptly and without reservation the 
Senate's advice and consent for ratification. Salvos of resolutions, 
letters, and telegrams fell on the heads of the senators in Washing- 

In this strenuous campaign for ratification Mrs, Catt's cause- 
and-cure committee was especially effective. Battle-hardened in the 
fight for women's rights, Mrs. Catt knew how to exert pressure on 
the American Government. As she told her friend Laura Puffer 
Morgan, she was writing to her representatives in the various states 
for a report on how their senators stood. That of course, Mrs. Catt 
added, was merely a start. She had never considered that a senator's 
attitude was assured unless he had become an all-out advocate, and 
unless he had been interviewed by several people and had said to 
each one the same thing. 28 

Mrs. Catt already had spread across the entire country an in- 
tricate network of state and local conferences on the cause and cure 
of war. The ladies, announced Mrs. Catt from her office in New 
York, were working with immense enthusiasm, furthering the 
movement for peace which was sweeping over the world. One 
woman drove her car eight hundred miles for a single interview 
with an important female in her state, and another said that she 
arose at four o'clock in the morning to take an early train to ar- 
range for the meeting of cooperating organizations preceding the 
formal cause-and-cure conference in her state. At one conference 
38. Letter of Sept. 20, 1928, NCPW files, 


a representative of the American Legion was making the chief 
address. Patriotic women's organizations were joining in the peace 
movement in several states, and a number of colleges had decided 
to sponsor reading courses and extension lectures supplementing 
the peace conference programs.. 29 

The cause-and-cure committee held more than 10,000 meetings. 
A standard resolution was presented and adopted at each meeting 
imploring the Senate to pass the antiwar treaty. Minnesota was the 
most resolute state, adopting the resolution over a thousand times. 80 
The mere list of all the resolutions throughout the nation, wrote 
Mrs. Catt triumphantly to Senator Borah, "weighs i pound and 
9 ounces and the resolutions themselves, if placed end to end, 
would measure nearly 2 miles." Mrs. Catt placed the resolutions on 
file, for inspection purposes, at the committee's headquarters in 
New York. "We are convinced from our experience of the past six 
months/' she concluded, "that the women of this Nation are more 
united in their endorsement of this treaty than we have ever known 
them to be on any other question." 31 

The women of the nation however experienced disappointment 
on Armistice Day 1928 ordinarily a day of thoughts of peace 
for President Coolidge made it an occasion for requesting new 
heavy cruisers for the American Navy. Coolidge spoke in the Wash- 
ington Auditorium at exercises held under the auspices of the 
American Legion. "We meet to give thanks for ten more years of 
peace," he began auspiciously. But soon he turned to the Anglo- 
French naval agreement. "During last summer France and Eng- 
land made a tentative offer," the president said, "which would limit 
the kind of cruisers and submarines adapted to the use of the United 
States, but left without limit the kind adapted to their use. The 
United States, of course, refused to accept this offer." Coolidge 
concluded bluntly: "It is obvious that . . . world standards of de- 
fense require us to have more cruisers." 82 It appeared as if the 

29. New York Times, Nov. 4, 1928. 

30. Mrs. Ben Hooper to Mrs. Oce Curtis, Jan. 26, 1929, Hooper MSS. 

31. Carrie Chapman Catt to Borah, Dec. 28, 1928, Congressional Record, 
Jan. 3, 1929, p. 1022. Borah introduced this letter into the record. 

32. New York Times, Nov. 12, 1928. In his Armistice Day speech the presi- 


president having in past months made many flattering remarks 
about the antiwar treaty now was inaugurating a world naval race. 

Yet the peace movement held the center of the stage in New 
York City. There on Armistice Day Secretary Kellogg spoke at the 
Metropolitan Opera House before the World Alliance for In- 
ternational Friendship. The secretary of state maintained that the 
best way to abolish war as a means of settling international disputes 
was to conclude treaties of arbitration, conciliation, and renun- 
ciation. This, he inferred, the United States faithfully had done, 
under Secretaries Elihu Root, William Jennings Bryan, and him- 
self. 33 

After the secretary's speech there followed a two-day Goodwill 
Congress. Not all of the speakers championed the Kellogg anti- 
war pact. Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, for example, described the Paris 
pact as a wishbone of peace rather than a backbone. But both Rabbi 
Wise and Carrie Chapman Catt strongly criticized for its mili- 
tarism President Coolidge's Armistice speech. 34 

Senator Borah spoke in Carnegie Hall on the night of Novem- 
ber 13 at the final meeting of the Goodwill Congress. He pledged 
his support to the Kellogg treaty against war. He promised to do 
all in his power to expedite it through the Senate. At the same time 
he declared himself in favor of an appropriation for heavy cruisers 
and added frankly that he would not fight such a measure: failure 
of a naval bill would, he believed, jeopardize passage of the antiwar 
treaty. But this advocacy of heavy cruisers could not brand Senator 
Borah as a militarist: the American Navy, he was certain, would 

dent did not fail to praise the Paris treaty: "While this [antiwar pact] leaves 
the questions of national defense and limitation of armaments practically where 
they were, as the negative supports of peace, it discards all threat of force and 
approaches the subject on its positive side .... it is the most complete and 
will be the most effective instrument for peace that was ever devised .... this 
is the best that mortal man can do. ... The progress that the world has made 
in this direction in the last ten years surpasses all the progress ever before made." 

33. Frank B. Kellogg, The Settlement of International Controversies by 
Pacific Means. The cost of distributing this speech in Europe was $2,520.00. 
Norman Armour, American charge" in Paris, to Kellogg, Dec 18, 1028, 71 1.0012 
An ti- War/572. 

34. New York Times, Nov. 13, 1928. 


be used only as a defensive weapon. And the sole war admissible 
under the Kellogg treaty, said Borah, would come under the 
"higher law of self-defense, which can never be given or taken 
away from a nation by treaty." At this point when Borah began to 
discuss the higher law, there was an interruption. A well-dressed 
individual marched down the side aisle and stepped across the stage 
to where Borah was standing. Taking his place before the micro- 
phones of station WOR, which was broadcasting the evening's 
speeches, the man announced that he was bringing a message on 
world peace which he had received from the Kingdom of Heaven. 
Someone sitting on the platform escorted the messenger off the 
stage, and Senator Borah completed his speech without further 
ado. 35 

During the general public acclaim of the new treaty, Secretary 
of State Kellogg in Washington was eagerly anticipating arrival 
from Europe of a portrait of the Salle de 1'Horloge, by the eminent 
artist Phillip de Laszlo. The portrait was to be hung in the White 
House. Becoming impatient, the secretary inquired of Charg 
Atherton in London whether the portrait showed the likenesses of 
the signers, and, if so, did it show "me" signing the treaty? Ather- 
ton cabled that Laszlo had painted only an interior of the salle, 
with no figures. Crestfallen, Kellogg decided that a mere picture 
of the clock room would be rather disappointing. 36 

The secretary's disappointment was only momentary. He could 
not help feeling encouraged, even elated, by the way peace work- 
ers throughout the United States were supporting his Paris pact. 
Typical were the labors of Mrs. Fred Pittenger of Idaho, chairman 

35. New York Times, Nov. 14, 1928. There were many other Armistice 
speeches throughout the country, and it is impossible to treat them at any 
length. Ambassador Herrick, home in Cleveland on leave, made a speech 
praising the Kellogg treaty and declared it destined "to go down into history as 
the final act toward removing that great burden [of war] from the shoulders 
of men." Ibid., Nov. 13, 1928. Herrick's public declaration, that the treaty was 
"the final act," was not quite in harmony with what he had written privately 
July 3, 1928, to Robert Woods Bliss. See above, pp. 201-202. 

36. Kellogg to Atherton, Nov. 13, 1928, 711.0012 Anti-War/494. Atherton 
to Kellogg, Nov. 14, 1928, 711.0012 Anti-War/5o6. Kellogg to Atherton, Nov. 
15, 1928, 711.0012 Anti-War/5ii. 


of the department of international relations of the Idaho Federa- 
tion of Women's Clubs. Writing to her senator, William E. Borah, 
Mrs. Pittenger poured out her heart. Since last seeing Borah she 
had been faithfully working for the Kellogg treaty. It had be- 
come a personal matter with her. Through her efforts and others' 
the treaty now was before every federated women's club in Idaho. 
What, she asked, was the prospect? She thought that she would go 
into an early decline if the senators in Washington failed to do 
their duty by the treaty. Was there any message which Senator 
Borah had for the women of Idaho? Was there anything else she 
herself might do? 8r Borah hastened to assure Mrs. Pittenger that 
"I feel that when we get to a vote, it [the treaty] will be ratified. 
It would be simply awful if it were not ratified." 88 

Other eminent senators were feeling the ground swell of public 
opinion in favor of the treaty against war. Senator Arthur Capper, 
speaking November 23 at the Hotel Astor in New York before a 
thousand members and guests of the Academy of Political Science, 
hailed the signing of the antiwar pact as "the greatest turning point 
in the history of nations." He promised his whole-hearted support. 80 
Soon came another advance for the peace movement: Senator 
Claude Swanson of Virginia, the ranking Democrat on the for- 
eign relations committee, announced his support of the Kellogg 
pact. 40 

Congress assembled on December 3, and President Coolidge in 
his Annual Message proudly described the country in the midst of 
an era of prosperity more extensive and of peace more permanent 
than it ever before had experienced. The president in his message 
gave nearly three times as much comment to national defense as to 
the peace treaty, but what he did say about the Kellogg treaty was 
flattering enough. The treaty, Coolidge declared, was "the most 
solemn declaration against war, the most positive adherence to 
peace, that it is possible for sovereign nations to make. . . . The 
observance of this covenant, so simple and so straightforward, 

37. Nov. 19, 1928, Borah MSS. 

38. Nov. 23, 1928, Borah MSS. 

39. New York Times, Nov. 24, 1928. 

40. Ibid., Nov. 27, 1928. 


promises more for the peace of the world than any other agreement 
ever negotiated among the nations." 4l 

By the time President Goolidge was delivering his Annual 
Message the peace movement's campaign for ratification was surg- 
ing to ever greater heights. All of the various American peace 
organizations were at work, and their labors were herculean. Phil 
Harris Jr., an official of the National Council for Prevention of 
War, wrote to Professor Shotwell about astonishing ' 'recent develop- 
ments" in Kentucky. "The letterhead on which this is written," 
Harris informed Shotwell, "was drawn up after little more than 
three days' work in this State. An office, established at the Y.W.C .A., 
in Louisville, has employed a staff and has sent out seven thousand 
letters. We have a speakers' bureau, a weekly release to ministers, 
a weekly service to editors and contacts with the colleges and other 
groups of young people. . . . Petitions have been signed in great 
numbers . . ." * 2 Miss Dorothy Detzer, the executive secretary of 
the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (Ameri- 
can Branch), wrote to Emily Balch, the WILPF-US's president, of 
a plan to push through ratification of the treaty by Christmas. Miss 
Detzer had become acquainted with Ludwell Denny, chief editorial 
writer of the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain of twenty-five pa- 
pers. Denny had volunteered his cooperation. When Miss Detzer 
arrived home one evening she discovered that Denny had been 
attempting to get in touch with her all that day. She offered "Lud" 
a number of leads, and Denny kept at the long distance telephone 
for most of the night. 48 

The ratification campaign rolled on. The National Council for 
Prevention of War was receiving countless requests such as: "En- 
closed find check for 60 j for which send me 100 fliers & 5 
broadsides and 10 petitions." 44 Shrewdly the council advised cor- 

41. For the text of this message, see FR: 1928, 1, vii-xxvi. 

42. Phil Harris Jr. to James T. Shotwell, Dec. 3, 1928, NCPW files. The 
NCPW opened a special office in Tennessee, which between Nov. 5 and Jan. 
14 sent out approximately 18,000 letters containing 33,700 pieces of literature. 
Minutes of the executive board meeting, NCPW, Feb. so, 1929, NCPW files. 

43. Dorothy Detzer to Emily Balch, n,d. (late Nov. 1928?), Balch MSS. 

44. Dwight Arnold, of Arcanum, Ohio, to NCPW, Nov. 17, 1938, NCPW 



respondents to write individual letters to Coolidge, Borah, and 
Swanson, rather than prepare typed letters and then collect signa- 
tures under them. Laura Puffer Morgan of the council informed 
Jane Addams how the Western European Division of the State 
Department was "completely swamped with our letters and peti- 
tions. There is no doubt/* Mrs. Morgan added proudly, "that our 
methods are effective/' 4 * In the meantime Dorothy Detzer of the 
WILPF-US had discovered that the State Department was an- 
swering all letters with the following form: "The General Pact for 
the Renunciation of War will be submitted promptly after the con- 
vening of Congress/* Miss Detzer called upon Prentiss Gilbert, act- 
ing chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, who had 
been signing the forms. She asked a pointed question: Could he 
interpret the word "promptly"? Prentiss Gilbert, with some em- 
barrassment, said he could not. 46 

Letters and petitions continued to pour into Washington. 
Secretary Kellogg on December i wrote to Senator Borah, giving 
the chairman of the foreign relations committee a list of various 
organizations and societies which had sent in resolutions express- 
ing commendation of the pact (the Department had received no 
petitions against the pact). Kellogg wrote again three days later: 
"I am sure that you will be interested to know that . . . some 
2,200 further communications have been received, addressed both 
to the President and to myself . . . These communications have 
come in from all the states, from the large cities, as well as from 
small towns. ... I believe that a conservative estimate would 
indicate that the persons who have sought to express themselves 
through the letters and resolutions to which I refer exceed 50,000 in 
number, and I might furthermore add that the volume of such 
communications, at present about 300 daily, seems to be increas- 
ing rather than diminishing/ 1 47 

A few days afterward President Coolidge announced that the 

45. Laura Puffer Morgan to Jane Addams, Nov. 30, 1928, NCPW files. 

46. Report of the executive secretary, WILPF-US, Oct-Nov. 1928, WILPF- 
US files. 

47. Kellogg to Borah, Dec. 4, 1928, 711.0012 Anti-War^. 


White House was receiving letters at the rate o 200 a day, and the 
State Department at the rate of 6oo. 48 

48. New York Times, Dec. 8, 1928. "Are the letters coming in uniformly 
favorable?" asked a reporter at Coolidge's press conference. Replied the presi- 
dent: "I haven't seen one that is in opposition. Of course some of them are in 
the nature of propaganda, evidently having been made by people that were 
asked to write, but a great many of them are voluntary expressions of their own 
desire to see a treaty of that kind." Transcript of Coolidge's press conference, 
Dec. 7, 1958; transcripts deposited in The Forbes Library, Northampton, Mass. 


Before Secretary Kellogg had gone to Paris to 
sign the treaty against war, Senator Borah had predicted to his 
friend Colonel Robins that opposition to the treaty in the United 
States would come from the "militarists," those persons who thought 
that the United States could not get along without the institution 
of war. 1 It was not quite to be expected, however, that the antiwar 
treaty, when coming before the Senate for advice and consent, 
should have to fight for a place on the docket against a naval ap- 
propriation bill which called for fifteen heavy cruisers and one 
aircraft carrier. 2 It even appeared that this cruiser bill might come 
up to the floor of the Senate before the antiwar treaty. Senator 
Hale of Maine, chairman of the naval affairs committee, and Sen- 
ator Borah, chairman of the foreign relations committee, held a 
conference on November 22. Afterward Hale said that the cruiser 
bill would come up immediately after the Boulder Dam bill, and 
Borah added cryptically that he would go ahead with the antiwar 
treaty just as if there were no naval bill pending. 3 

1. Borah to Robins, July 25, 1928, Borah MSS. 

2. This bill dated back to the failure of the Geneva Naval Conference of 
1927. The Wilbur bill (named after the secretary of the navy), introduced im- 
mediately after the 1927 fiasco at Geneva, had stipulated for construction of 
seventy-one vessels costing altogether $725,000,000. Early in 1928 a new bill 
replaced the Wilbur bill, and this new bill asked only for fifteen io,ooo-ton 
cruisers and one aircraft carrier, with an aggregate cost of $274,000,000, This 
second bill passed the House on Mar. 17, 1928, and then went to the Senate. 

3. New York Times, Nov. 23, 1928. 


President Coolidge transmitted the treaty to the Senate on 
December 4. Three days later the Committee on Foreign Relations 
held its first hearing. Secretary Kellogg appeared in person to de- 
fend his treaty. 

Kellogg began by describing the treaty's obligations: beyond 
the agreement not to go to war there were no obligations, said the 
secretary. The nations knew, he declared, "from the notes that I 
wrote, that I was not willing to impose any obligation on the 
United States. I knew that was. out of the question." 4 Kellogg 
warmed to his subject. "They [the nations] knew perfectly well 
that the United States would never sign a treaty imposing any obli- 
gation on itself to apply sanctions or come to the help of anybody." 6 
Asked about the British reservation of "certain regions," he an- 
swered: "I did not acquiesce in it at all; and if there was anything 
in that note contrary to the treaty they signed, it would not be a 
part of the treaty/' 6 It was clear, however, said the secretary, that 
"Great Britain was talking about nothing but self-defense." T 

"Supposing some other nation does break this treaty," asked 
Senator Walsh of Montana, "why should we interest ourselves in 

"There is not a bit of reason," responded Kellogg. 8 

Senator Reed of Missouri hypothesized an alliance between 
England and Japan to attack the United States. Could not the 
United States, suffering under this aggression, call on the other 
signatories of the antiwar treaty for help? Kellogg answered to the 
effect that the United States was big enough to take care of itself; 
the American Government, Kellogg said, would not be calling on 
other countries of the world for help. Reed replied that he thought 

4. U.S. Sen., yoth Cong., ad Sess., Hearings before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, on the General Pact for the Renunciation of War (Washington, 


5. Ibid., p. 7. 

6. Ibid., p. 8. 

7. Ibid., p. 11. 

8. Ibid., p. 14. 


the United States would be calling for all the help it could get. 9 
The foreign relations committee, having satisfied itself as to 
the obligations of the antiwar treaty, reported the treaty to the 
Senate on December 19. This did not in the meantime prevent 
senators from debating the pact 10 or even proposing reservations 
to it. 

Senators Reed of Missouri and Moses of New Hampshire on 
December 14 introduced a resolution proposing four reservations: 
the treaty contained no obligation of coercion; the treaty did not 
affect the Monroe Doctrine; it did not interfere with self-defense; 
it did not entangle the United States in the League. 11 This resolu- 
tion did not please the chairman of the Senate foreign relations 
committee, for Borah told reporters it would have an "immoral" 
effect. 12 Secretary Kellogg himself sought to block the resolution 
by talking to individual senators, but when he spoke to McLean 
of Connecticut and Johnson of California they refused to abandon 

9. Ibid., p. 21. 

10. Before opening debate the Senate removed the injunction of secrecy. 

11. The full text of the Reed-Moses resolution is as follows: ''Resolved, 
That the Senate of the United States declares that in advising and consenting 
to the multilateral treaty it does so with the understanding 

(1) That the treaty imposes no obligation on the United States to resort to 
coercive or punitive measures against any offending nation. 

(2) That the treaty does not impose any limitations upon the Monroe 
doctrine or the traditional policies of the United States. 

(3) That the treaty does not impair the right of the United States to defend 
its territory, possessions, trade, or interests. 

(4) That the treaty does not obligate the United States to the conditions of 
any treaty to which the United States is not a party." Congressional Record^ 
Dec. 14, 1928, p. 599. 

When the foreign relations committee on December 19 sent the treaty to 
the Senate floor, it also reported out the Reed-Moses resolution, albeit without 
comment on the latter. 

12. New York Times, Dec. 15, 1928. The Washington correspondent of the 
Times, Richard V. Oulahan, understood that the resolution had originated 
from Professor Borchard of Yale. Senator Bingham of Connecticut later read 
into the record a letter from Borchard in which the latter said, "This is the 
first time in 10 years that I have ventured to differ from Senator Borah in a 
matter involving our foreign policy." Congressional Record, Jan. 10, 1929, 
p. 1469. 


support of the Reed-Moses resolution. The two senators, on Presi- 
dent Coolidge's invitation, went to the White House, but Coolidge 
also was unsuccessful. 13 

Senator Bruce of Maryland on December 15 made a merciless 
attack on the treaty. Ever since the rejection of the Treaty of 
Versailles, Bruce said, the Republicans had been playing with 
peace. He cited the "profuse spawn" of conciliation and arbitra- 
tion treaties with Central and South America. He cited the much- 
reserved adhesion to the World Court. "And now comes along this 
anemic peace pact of our able and amiable Secretary of State, Mr. 
Kellogg, which is about as effective to keep down war as a carpet 
would be to smother an earthquake, but which, nevertheless, has 
worked up all the unsophisticated humanitarians of both sexes to a 
high state of excitement." If President Coolidge had any real faith 
in the pacific virtue of the antiwar treaty, "why, pray, when Mr. 
Kellogg [on Armistice Day] was cooing like a gentle dove, did the 
President set up such a jungle roar about more cruisers?" The 
United States, Bruce believed, should abandon "the unreal make- 
believe policies of peace which find their supreme expression in 
the Kellogg peace pact." It must enter the World Court and the 
League. Bruce felt that it was really of not much consequence 
whether he voted for or against ratification of the antiwar treaty. 
But it might aid in bringing the United States to a truer world 
cooperation. "... I shall, therefore, under the determining in- 
fluence of this thought, vote in favor of ratifying the mighty, multi- 
lateral Kellogg peace pact, which may the prayers of the pious in- 
duce heaven to prosper far beyond my present expectations!" 14 

Petitions for the treaty continued to pour into Washington. Sen- 
ators dutifully read them into the Congressional Record, consum- 
ing much time thereby. Representatives of the Federal Council of 
Churches brought to the White House on December 17 a monster 
of a petition asking for prompt ratification and containing more 
than 180,000 signatures. 15 

13. New York Times, Dec. 16, 1928. 

14. Congressional Record, Dec. 15, 1928, pp. 678-681. 

15. Senator Fess of Ohio read into the Record a letter of Dec. 17 from the 
Reverend Sidney L. Gulick, which described the petition. Signatures, classified 


Christmas was. approaching. This meant a long congressional 
recess until January 3, 1929. Several senators consequently met De- 
cember 20 with Vice President Charles G. Dawes and agreed that 
both the peace treaty and the cruiser bill would be the Senate's un- 
finished business on January 3, the cruiser bill in legislative session 
and the peace treaty in open executive session. 16 To this arrange- 
ment the Senate consented unanimously. 


On New Year's Day, 1929, the secretary of state and Mrs* Kel- 
logg were entertaining the diplomatic corps at a breakfast in the 
beautiful building of the Pan-American Union. 

"Why, where is Senator Borah?" Kellogg asked the wife of the 
Idaho senator, as she walked up the steps of the Union. 

Mrs. Borah, a gentle-mannered lady, smiled. "He said that if 
you asked for him I should say he was at home working on your 
damned treaty," she replied. 

The secretary of state and Mrs. Kellogg chuckled audibly. They 
stood together at the head of the marble staircase, "That is all 
right/' responded Kellogg as Mrs. Borah passed on into the halL 
"I want him to work on that treaty.'* 1T 

When the Senate reconvened January 3 Senator Hale obtained 

by states, numbered as follows: Alabama 2; Arkansas 12; Arizona 210; Cali- 
fornia 7,632; Colorado 2,205; Connecticut 8,268; Delaware 208; District of 
Columbia 495; Florida 663; Georgia 284; Idaho 645; Illinois 11,427; Indiana 
6,229; Iowa 5> 8 % Kansas 8,313; Kentucky 377; Louisiana 347; Maine 1,998; 
Maryland 4,710; Massachusetts 8,809; Michigan 8,253; Minnesota 4,265; Mis- 
souri 2,141; Montana 527; Nebraska 2,159; Nevada i; New Hampshire 997; 
New Jersey 5,472; New York 27,793; North Carolina 369; North Dakota 936; 
Ohio 15,399; Oklahoma 440; Oregon 2,585; Pennsylvania 19,712; Rhode Island 
1,469; South Carolina 85; South Dakota 1,771; Tennessee 483; Texas 417; 
Utah 96; Vermont 1,004; Virginia 699; Washington 3,772; West Virginia 727; 
Wisconsin 5,085; Wyoming 677; miscellaneous 4,150. 

16. Diary of Charles G, Dawes, Dec. 20, 1928. C. G. Dawes; Notes as Vice 
President: 1^28-^2^ (Boston, Little, Brown, 1935), pp. 191-192. 

17. New York Times, Jan. 2, 1929. 


the floor for a speech on the cruiser bill. He argued cogently that 
nothing in the Kellogg treaty prohibited self-defense, that the 
cruiser bill was an implement of self-defense, and that no foreign 
nation had changed its naval program because of the Kellogg pact. 
At the conclusion of Kale's rather long speech Senator George of 
Georgia submitted a resolution on corruption of postmasters in 
the South. The Senate immediately went into open executive ses- 
sion to consider the Kellogg pact. Borah took the floor and began 
a speech which because of continual interruption soon turned into 
a running debate. 

Borah stated frankly why the United States Government had 
concluded a multilateral instead of a bilateral pact. A treaty of the 
nature originally proposed by the French Government, he said, 
would have been "something in the nature of an alliance/' This 
the American Government had refused to enter. 18 Borah declared 
that the treaty carried no provision, express or implied, for use of 

Senator Reed of Missouri soon managed an interruption. He 
sought to embarrass. Borah by opening up the subject of self-defense 
and citing the Spanish-American War. Reed recalled how, after the 
Maine explosion in Havana harbor, the Spanish Government im- 
mediately had disclaimed the act and made great efforts to avoid 
war. Surely, he concluded, if the United States in 1898 had been 
party to a Kellogg treaty there never would have been a Spanish- 
American War. But Borah deftly sidestepped the argument. "The 
principle of the treaty/ 1 he replied, "is that we can only go to war 
in self-defense; if we did not do that in the Spanish-American War, 
then it would have been barred by this treaty/' Reed made a feeble 
attempt to reopen the subject; Borah answered in such a manner 
as to twist the discussion away from the Spanish-American War. 
Vanquished, Reed gave up the struggle. 19 

Senator Shipstead of Minnesota asked Borah if, in some future 
contingency the treaty should require interpretation, the notes ex- 
changed by the powers would have any effect. 

18. Congressional Record, Jan. 3, 1929, p. 1063. 

19. Ibid., pp. 1069-1070* 


Borah responded: "... I regard these notes in the light of the 
fact that they add nothing to the treaty nor take anything from 
the treaty as having no legal effect whatsoever/* 

"The notes are a part of the treaty without adding anything 
to it or taking anything from it?" Shipstead asked innocently. 

"I say that the notes are interpretative," Borah explained. 20 

Later in the debate Shipstead 21 cleverly raised the ever-recur- 
ring question of self-defense. Probably recalling Coolidge's asser- 
tion that the Kellogg antiwar treaty, if it had been in force in 1914, 
would have prevented the World War, Shipstead asked Borah if 
it were not true that every government taking part in the World 
War had done so under the right of self-defense. 

"Under the claim o the right; yes," answered Borah. 

". . . how could this treaty have stopped the World War?" 
queried Shipstead. 

"I do not know/* Borah admitted, "that this treaty could have 
stopped the World War." 22 

Hiram Bingham of Connecticut then mentioned that Briand 
of France once had said the antiwar treaty outlawed only selfish 
wars. "Is it not likely," Bingham asked, alluding to the pending 
cruiser bill, "[that] as many cruisers are needed to fight an unselfish 
war as to fight selfish wars?" 23 The Senate laughed. 

Debate on the treaty continued the next day, January 5. Sen- 
ator McLean believed that it was high time to cease throwing peace- 
paper wads at the dogs of war. It was time to pull the teeth of those 
dogs that is, it was time for disarmament. He would not begin by 
pulling the teeth of the United States' half-grown pups, however, 
but rather would start on the sharp teeth of the European beasts! 
In other words he desired a disarmament conference rather than an 
antiwar treaty. Changing his picturesque language McLean admon- 
ished his auditors to remember the Indians. "Mr. Briand comes to 
us with his new pipe of peace. We suggest that it is a good time for 
all the braves to gather around the international wigwam and have 

20. Ibid., Jan. 4, 1929, p. n 2 Q. 

21. Who was not a lawyer by profession, but a dentist. 

22. Congressional Record, Jan. 4, 1929, p. 1134, 

23. Ibid., p. 1138. 


a smoke. This 'they did, but, as might have been expected, they 
found a carload of coughs in the first puff of the self-defense mix- 
ture, and they declined the second puff until it was understood 
that it would not interfere with the free use of tomahawks and 
hatchets." 24 

A$ debate thus proceeded it became quite evident that the 
Senate was not in reality hostile to the Kellogg pact, but rather that 
some of the senators were simply humoring themselves: so long as 
they eventually cast their votes in favor of the treaty they saw no 
harm in offering sharp questions or disparaging comments. It was 
also clear that many .senators, although favoring the treaty, con- 
sidered it of questionable value. One senator told Bingham of 
Connecticut, confidentially, that he would vote for the treaty be- 
cause it might keep American ships and men out of China and 
Nicaragua, where he thought they should not be. Another senator 
said to Bingham that he was going to vote for the treaty because 
he believed it meant nothing and would in no way limit the United 
States' freedom of action. A third senator remarked to Bingham 
that if the treaty meant exactly what it said there would not be a 
dozen senators on the floor of the Senate who would vote for it. 25 

Senator McKellar of Tennessee told his confreres, that he would 
vote for the antiwar pact because he had voted for the Bryan 
treaties and for the League and did not wish to spoil his voting 
record. To vote against the treaty, moreover, might make his posi- 
tion as to war misunderstood for McKellar was against war. He 
then quoted a statement by an anonymous person in the Washing- 
ton Post of January 9, 1929: "I called on Senator McKellar, and 
he said the pact didn't amount to anything. He said the only way 
you can have peace on earth is to have a navy bigger than Eng- 
land's." McKellar denied having said this; he merely had con- 
tended for many years that the best way to secure peace was for the 
United States and Great Britain to have equal-sized navies. 26 

24. /&&, Jan. 5, 1929, pp. 1189-1190. 

25. Senator Bingham, ibid., Jan. 10, 1929, p. 1467. 

26. Ibid., Jan. 9, 1939, pp. 1414-1415. One suspects that the Post had pub- 
lished an actual statement by the loquacious Tennessee senator, and that Mc- 
Kellar was indulging in a diplomatic denial. 


Senator Borah soon began to find his colleagues' long speeches 
rather boring. On January 1 1 he sought a limitation of debate to 
thirty minutes per senator, but failed to obtain the necessary 
unanimous-consent agreement. 27 The Senate was in a self-indulgent 

Some senators, moreover, were circulating a round-robin to ob- 
tain pledges that their colleagues would not vote for the treaty 
without an interpretive declaration. The round-robin reached for- 
midable proportions, with twenty-five signatures and some ten 
more adherents. The Senate seemed stubbornly determined to place 
some sort of reservations to the Kellogg pact. Among the senators 
there was a feeling amounting almost to pique, which Senator 
Bruce aptly expressed as follows: England, France, even Afghani- 
stan and Persia, have given their interpretations of the treaty; Mr. 
Kellogg has stated his understanding of it; why cannot the Senate 
of the United States do likewise? 2a Such an attitude on the part 
of the senators was highly distracting to Secretary Kellogg who by 
this time doubtless was pacing the floor in the State Department, 
fussing, fidgeting, calling in assistants, and in general working him- 
self into a state of exhaustion. 29 

27. Ibid., Jan. n, 1929, pp. 1567-1568, 

28* Congressional Record, Jan. 14, 1939, p. 1658. Bruce concluded that 
Mr. Kellogg was not Sir Oracle. Kellogg could not say that when he opened 
his mouth let no dog bark, whether a senatorial dog or otherwise. The Senate 
had a function to perform just as well as Mr. Kellogg. There was a need for an 
expression of the Senate's opinion. Ibid., p. 1665. 

29. Something of his feelings emerges from a telegram which he sent hur- 

FIDENTIAL, Telegram of Jan. 14, 1939, Levinson MSS. 


Already, however, the outlook for the treaty had begun to 


President Coolidge on Sunday, January 13, called Vice Presi- 
dent Dawes on the telephone and asked him to help to get the 
treaty ratified as soon as possible. Dawes, a peppery, resolute indi- 
vidual, declared he would "steam up" on Monday. The vice presi- 
dent wrote in his diary that Sunday evening how bored he was by 
the ponderous debate over the treaty: "I find myself more or less 
in a state of irritation . . ." so And so when Monday came, "Hell- 
and-Maria" Dawes 31 set to work. 

He enjoyed a considerable support. During the next twenty- 
four hours that is, between Monday and Tuesday, January 14 and 
15 petitions flooded into Washington. 82 Also, over a thousand 
women peace leaders were in Washington attending another Con- 
ference on the Cause and Cure of War; and these militant ladies 
divided into forty-eight groups and descended upon the senators 

30. Dawes diary, Jan. 13, 1929, in Notes as Vice President, p. 230. 

31. As he was known after a flamboyant speech in 1921. 

32. The Senate was overwhelmed by petitions. Senator Vandenberg of 
Michigan on Jan. 15 presented petitions of 70,000 citizens and 896 organizations 
of the state of Michigan, praying for the prompt ratification of the Kellogg- 
Briand peace pact. Senators Dale and Greene of Vermont presented 440 reso- 
lutions from Vermonters. Senator Frazier presented 20 resolutions from the 
state of South Dakota. Shipstead of Minnesota presented "numerous" resolu- 
tions from his state. Thomas of Idaho presented petitions signed by 9,000 
women of Idaho. Tydings of Maryland presented "numerous" resolutions. So 
did Senator Sheppard of Texas. Bayard of Delaware presented 74 resolutions. 
Phipps presented petitions bearing the signatures of 60,000 citizens of Colorado. 
Neely of West Virginia presented 118 resolutions. Blaine of Wisconsin offered 
a resolution of the Woman's Foreign Missionary Society of North Freedom, 
Wisconsin. Hawes of Missouri presented petitions. Bingham, Caraway, and Bur- 
ton did likewise. So did Senators Walsh, Copeland, Simmons, McKellar, Glass, 
Bruce, Sackett, and Smoot. It was stated finally that every senator had the right 
to file petitions without asking permission to do so. Congressional Record, Jan. 
15, 1929, pp. 1709-1710. 


from their home states, arguing imperatively for the antiwar treaty. 
The women presented 12,533 resolutions to the senators. "Do you 
realize that meant 12,533 meetings held in the United States at 
which the treaty was read, explained, discussed and voted upon?" 3S 
Indeed the work was so strenuous that Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt 
suffered a heart attack. 34 

All this while General Dawes was putting on the steam in the 
Senate chamber. The vice president set out to talk personally to 
each recalcitrant senator: he argued that the antiwar treaty and 
the cruiser bill together were "the declared and unified policy of 
the United States/' and that the antiwar pact therefore required no 
reservation. As set down in his diary Dawes' argument was long 
and complicated. 35 The general's thoughts today read slowly in 
print. But if accompanied by suitable Dawesean gestures and punc- 
tuation they must have been altogether convincing. 

On Tuesday, January 15, events moved toward a climax. Shortly 
after Vice President Dawes called the Senate to order, Senator 
Borah asked Dawes to leave the chamber and meet him in the 
vice president's office. There Borah proposed that the Senate, in 
advising and consenting to the antiwar treaty, adopt simultaneously 
an explanatory report of the foreign relations committee: this re- 

33. Mrs. Ben Hooper to Mrs. J. C. Zeller, Feb. 8, 1939, Hooper MSS. 

34. Miss Josephine Schain to Mrs. Ben Hooper, Jan. 28, 1929, Hooper 

35. "The first Senator . . . took immediately to my suggestions, which were 
that the Cruiser Bill and the Treaty considered together were the declared 
and unified policy of the United States that if they were read together and 
agreed upon together by the Senate, the desire and determination to co- 
operate for peace woulcj not only be properly expressed but the Treaty would 
be defined as not abrogating our determination to recognize our rights of self- 
defense, a part of which policy includes the Monroe Doctrine; that reservations 
detailing specific acts covered by the term 'self-defense' were unnecessary; that 
any Senator fearing to be called to account for his action in voting for the 
Treaty without reservations or their equivalent (such as the promulgation of a 
report by the Foreign Affairs [sic] Committee or a similar device) could protect 
himself by this statement to wit: that the concurrent action on the peace Treaty 
and the Cruiser Bill emphasized before the country and the world their true 
relation as a definition in combination of a unified national policy." Dawes 
diary, Jan. 14, 1929, in Notes as Vice President, pp. 231-232. 


port, however, would state explicitly that it was not a modification 
of or reservation to the treaty. 86 Satisfied with Borah's proposal, 
Dawes telephoned President Coolidge. The president said that he 
did not wish to be publicly quoted but would say "I think you 
have done all you can." Then Secretary Kellogg happened to ring 
up the vice president while Borah yet was in Dawes' office, and 
Kellogg also acquiesced. 37 Thus fortified, Borah went back on the 
Senate floor, Dawes returned to the presiding officer's chair, and 
both men set about putting the treaty through that very day. 

Nothing, though, could prevent Senator Carter Glass of Virginia 
from making a speech. "... I intend to vote for the peace pact," 
Glass announced, "but I am not willing that anybody in Virginia 
shall think that I am simple enough to suppose that it is worth a 
postage stamp in the direction of accomplishing permanent peace. 
I think we are about to renounce something as a national policy 
which no nation on earth for 150 years has ever proclaimed as a 
national policy. . . . But I am going to be simple enough, along 
with the balance of you," Glass told his fellow senators, "to vote for 
the ratification of this worthless, but perfectly harmless peace 
treaty." 88 

After Glass had finished his remarks Borah read the report from 
the foreign relations committee. 

The report repeated the substance of the earlier Moses proposal. 
It reserved self-defense and thereby the Monroe Doctrine, a part 
of the United States' .self-defense. The report stated the foreign 
relations committee's understanding that the treaty did not pro- 
vide sanctions, express or implied. Nor did the treaty in any respect 
change or qualify the United States' position or relation to any pact 
or treaty existing between other nations or governments. The re- 
port was made "solely for the purpose of putting upon record what 
your committee understands to be the true interpretation of the 

36. From Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas, wrote Dawes in his 
diary, came the suggestion of the committee report instead of formal reserva- 
tions. From Borah came the addendum that the report did not modify or reserve 
the treaty. Dawes diary, Jan. 15, 1929, in Notes as Vice President, p. 236. 

37. Ibid. 

38. Congressional Record, Jan. 15, 1929, p. 1728. 


treaty, and not in any sense for the purpose or with the design of 
modifying or changing the treaty in any way or effectuating a 
reservation or reservations to the same." 89 

Shortly after four o'clock in the afternoon of January,^, 1929, 
Senator Borah proposed a vote on the treaty; and the treaty passed, 
85 yeas and i nay. The lone dissident was Senator Elaine of Wis- 
consin. 40 Of the nine senators not present for the vote, five were 
"unavoidably detained," and their colleagues reported that they 
would have voted yea. 41 

Immediately after Vice President Dawes announced the results 
of the vote, Senator Brookhart of Indiana arose. "Mr. President," 
he said, "at this moment I desire to call attention to the fact that 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of 
America are the only two nations that have ratified this treaty and 
are parties to it, and I hope these two great revolutionary countries 
will now proceed to outlaw war throughout the world." 42 

39. Congressional Record, Jan. 15, 1929, p. 1730. Wrote Elihu Root to 
Borah, Jan. 17, 1929: "I think the concluding paragraph of your report on the 
multi-lateral treaty sufficiently saves the treaty from being involved in any 
confusion." Root MSS. Two international lawyers, Professors Borchard of Yale 
and Philip Marshall Brown of Princeton, wrote to Senator Bingham that the 
Senate's explanatory report lacked the force of a formal reservation because 
it was not communicated. But both professors believed that the report would 
have a strong "moral" significance. Congressional Record, Jan. 14, 1929, pp. 

Kellogg took the attitude that the senatorial report was nothing but a report 
and had no legal effect whatever. Kellogg to Houghton, Jan. 17, 1929, 711.0012 
Anti-War/622. The report, he wrote to Nicholas Murray Butler, "was not 
adopted by the Senate; it was not attached to the treaty, and the only objection 
to it is the humiliation forced on me." Letter of Jan. 16, 1929, in N. M. Butler, 
Across the Busy Years, II, 209. 

40. He could not approve of the British certain-regions doctrine. Blaine had 
offered a reservation disclaiming any American recognition of this doctrine on 
Jan. 3 (Congressional Record, pp. 1044-1045). His speech on Jan. 9 was a long 
tirade against the British Empire (ibid., pp. 1400-1407). 

41. Senators who had been most outspoken in criticism of the treaty finally 
voted for it. When a constituent asked Senator Reed of Missouri about his yea 
vote Reed is said to have replied: "Do you think I want to be hung in effigy out 
in Missouri?" 

42. Congressional Record, ]an t 15, 1929, p. 1731. 

Chapter Seventeen: RATIFICATION 


"uccess at last had crowned the strenuous cam- 
paign to renounce and outlaw war as an instrument of national 
policy. Peace forces in the United States could look back with 
pleasure over their recent activities. Only two years before, French- 
men and Americans had been exchanging insults over who had won 
the war and who should pay for it. Then, almost miraculously, 
there came what Aristide Briand later described as his "fragile 
germ of a suggestion sufficiently discreet, anticipating nothing more 
than the spontaneous sympathy of the American people." Follow- 
ing an intense campaign by the American peace movement, a cam- 
paign strengthened fortuitously by airplane diplomacy, Briand's 
fragile germ suddenly, on December 28, 1927, burgeoned into gi- 
gantic proportions: a treaty to renounce all war as an instrument 
of national policy. And after much maneuvering and debate the 
powers had actually agreed to such renunciation, albeit with reserva- 
tions. In Paris on a memorable day in August 1928 representatives 
of fifteen nations had solemnly affixed their signatures. The other 
nations of the world quickly indicated a desire to adhere to this 
multilateral antiwar treaty. As soon as the United States Senate 
had advised and consented to American ratification nations from all 
parts of the globe undoubtedly would be sending to Washington 
their formal instruments of ratification and adherence. Only rati- 
fication by the United States was needed to set off this thrilling 


chain reaction. And on January 15, 1929, the Senate advised and 

Two days later President Coolidge signed the American instru- 
ment of ratification. The presidential signature was occasion for 
ceremony. Coolidge signed in the East Room of the White House, 
surrounded by the Cabinet and members of the Senate, and he used 
the gold pen of Le Havre. 

The ceremony lacked something of dignity. The president be- 
came angry at a veteran State Department employee, Sidney Smith, 
who sought to assist by blotting the presidential signature. Coolidge 
looked up at Smith and snapped rudely, "Who are you? I don't 
know you. Go away/' * Then the foot-long gold pen again ran dry. 
To complete the signing the president was forced to maneuver a 
heavy inkwell on to the table. In addition to the above incidents 
there were the orders and noises of forty or fifty photographers at- 
tempting to record the scene for posterity. The photographers im- 
pertinently asked the president to "Keep perfectly still" and sug- 
gested to Secretary Kellogg, who also signed the instrument of 
ratification, to "Keep your hand steady." Observing all this with 
some amusement from a vantage point next to the president, Vice 
President Dawes concluded that there was no peace during the 
antiwar ceremony. 2 

When Secretary Kellogg afterward returned to the State De- 
partment he confided to Assistant Secretary Castle that it was de- 
plorable the president had lost his temper. "But the funniest thing/' 
Castle wrote later in his diary, "was that the Secretary in telling me 

got so furious that he trembled all over. He .said 'G d it. 

The President has no right to lose his temper. If a man can't keep 
his temper he had better not hold public office/ " 8 

i. Motion picture cameras recorded all this, and Assistant Secretary Castle's 
diary relates that someone had to attempt to have the episode cut out of the 
film, "as the President's face looked like murder." Castle diary, Jan. 17, 1928. 

*. Dawes diary, Jan. 17, 1929, in Notes as Vice President, pp. 

3. Castle diary, Jan. 17, 1929. 



Once the Senate had given its advice and consent to the pact 
of Paris, and President Coolidge had signed the American instru- 
ment of ratification, there remained only the question of when the 
other fourteen signatories would themselves ratify the treaty, thus 
bringing it into force. The Coolidge Administration, and espe- 
cially Secretary of State Kellogg, was anxious that the other rati- 
fications all should arrive before March 4, 1929, when the adminis- 
tration went out of office. Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, 
Germany, Great Britain, India, the Irish Free State, Italy, New Zea- 
land, and the Union of South Africa deposited their ratifications 
at Washington on March 2. 4 The remaining nations were tardy. 
Ratifications arrived late from Poland (March 25) and Belgium 
(March 27). Nearly a month later came France's instrument (April 
22). There still was lacking ratification by the Government of 

The Japanese were perplexed by a phrase in Article i of the 
treaty according to which the signatories professed to sign the 
treaty "in the names of their respective peoples." This was contrary 
to the Japanese Constitution: the emperor signed treaties by him- 
self and not in the name of his people. Secretary Kellogg reassured 
the Japanese that "in the name of" was synonymous with "in be- 
half of," and therefore could cause no harm to the imperial preroga- 
tive. 5 The Japanese Privy Council nonetheless debated the mat- 
ter most thoroughly. The debate led to such violence that one 
privy councilor was compelled to resign for being rude to an old 
man. 6 

Kellogg, embarrassed by requests from other powers as to when 
the treaty would come into force, finally intimated to the Japanese 
ambassador that he might have to propose the signing of a protocol 

4. So also did the United States. Depositing was a formality, and the Ameri- 
can Government politely had waited until other nations were ready. 

5. Kellogg to Charge" Neville in Japan, July 6, 1928, FR: 1928, 1, 104-105. 

6. Memorandum by Castle of a conversation with the Japanese ambassador, 
Katsuji Debuchi, May 15, 1929, 711.9412 Anti-War/is6. 


which would put the treaty into effect as between the powers which 
had ratified. The secretary added that he did not wish to do this un- 
less it were absolutely necessary. 7 But not until over six months after 
the American Senate had ratified the treaty did the Japanese Gov- 
ernment, July 24, 1929, deposit its ratification in Washington. 8 

While aged privy councilors debated in Tokyo, State Depart- 
ment officials in Washington had no opportunity to rest. The mere 
clerical labor of bringing a multilateral antiwar pact into force was 
extremely heavy. According to the pact's Article 3, the American 
Government had to furnish each of the fifteen governments named 
in the preamble of the treaty, and also every government subse- 
quently adhering to the treaty, with a certified copy of the treaty 
and of every instrument of ratification or adherence. 9 Department 
officials estimated that this obligation would necessitate more than 
4,000 separate copies, each one certified by actually signing the 

Thus in the spring of 1929 the State Department found itself 
bogged in clerical labor making copies of antiwar documents and 
duly certifying them. Not so the European foreign offices. Other 
problems demanded the attention of the Quai d'Orsay, No. 11 
Downing Street, and the Wilhelmstrasse. 

In England, late in May 1929, No. 10 Downing Street received 
a new occupant. In the parliamentary elections the Conservatives 
had met defeat at the hands of Ramsay MacDonald's Labor party, 

7. Memorandum by Assistant Secretary Nelson T. Johnson of a conversa- 
tion between Kellogg and the Japanese ambassador, Mar. 7, 1929, 711,9412 

8. The Japanese accompanied their ratification with the following "Declara- 
tion": "The Imperial Government declare that the phraseology, 'in the names 
of their respective peoples/ appearing in Article I of the Treaty for the 
Renunciation of War, signed at Paris on August 27, 1928, viewed in the light of 
the provisions of the Imperial Constitution, is understood to be inapplicable 
in so far as Japan is concerned." FR; 1929, III, 255. 

9. "It shall be the duty of the Government of the United States to furnish 
each Government named in the Preamble and every Government subsequently 
adhering to this Treaty with a certified copy of the Treaty and of every instru- 
ment of ratification or adherence. It shall also be the duty of the Government 
of the United States telegraphically to notify such Governments immediately 
upon the deposit with it of each instrument of ratification or adherence/' 


arid Arthur Henderson replaced Sir Austen Chamberlain. French 
officials in Paris feared Henderson would not cooperate with France 
on the Continent in the friendly fashion of Sir Austen. Meanwhile 
there were ominous rumblings in Germany where the liberal parties 
were losing ground to the Catholic Center and the Prussian Con- 
servatives; Stresemann's policy of fulfillment was slipping toward 
disaster. All this while a committee of economic experts, headed by 
the American financier Owen D. Young, prepared a new plan for 
German reparations payments, a complicated proposal already 
known as the Young Plan. Acceptance of this plan, it was under- 
stood, would raise the exceedingly delicate question of Allied evacu- 
ation of the Rhineland. 10 

1 But times generally were good on the Continent, and in the 
British Isles, and in the United States since March 4 under the 
guidance of President Herbert Hoover and Secretary of State 
Henry L. Stimson. 11 In America especially, almost everyone was 
happy. Business was good. The stock market was booming. 

To the average person and even to close students of interna- 
tional affairs, war during these piping times seemed, if not alto- 
gether unthinkable, at least a long way off. There might be obscure 
squabbles in some remote corner of the globe. Amanullah, the 
Padishah of Afghanistan, could fight for possession of KabuL But 
the chances of a great European war such as broke out in 1914 ap- 
peared small indeed, Frank H. Simonds, surely a distinguished ob- 
server of international realities, wrote for the Review of Reviews 
during the summer of 1929 that "Nothing seems more assured to- 
day than two decades of freedom from any general European con- 
flict." 12 

Such was the prospect when the Imperial Japanese Government 
signified its intention of depositing in Washington, July 24, 1929, 
its instrument of ratification of the antiwar treaty. Secretary of 

10. The Allies had decided this at Geneva, Sept. 16, 1928, when they agreed 
to revision of German reparations. 

11. Actually Stimson did not take office until Mar. 28, 1929, for he had to 
return from the Philippines (whence he had gone as governor general). Kellogg 
served during the interim. 

12. Frank H. Simonds, "The Fifteenth Anniversary/' Review of Reviews, 
80 (August 1929), 62. 


State Stimson quickly set about preparing a suitable ceremony 
for this would be the final ceremony in connection with the pact 
of Paris. Japan would be the fifteenth, and last, of the signatories 
to ratify the pact. 


Henry L. Stimson looked forward to the approaching ceremony 
with pleasure. A handsome, capable man with graying mustache 
and ascetic forehead, thoroughly patrician in appearance and 
tastes, 13 the new secretary of state looked upon the world of early 
1929 and pronounced it good: it was peaceful and two great English- 
speaking powers ruled much of it. Secretary Stimson was very glad 
to help bring into force an antiwar treaty which might maintain 
this excellent situation. 

For the ceremony of proclamation he invited the Washington 
representatives of all the signatory and (as of July 24, 1929) adher- 
ing powers, 14 a total of forty-six states. Former Secretary of State 

13. A Yale man, Stimson had a penchant for fellow Yale men, preferably 
members of Skull and Bones. 

14. Fifteen signatories and the following thirty-one adherents: Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (Sept. 27, 1928), Ethiopia (Nov. 28, 1928), Afghanistan 
(Nov. 30, 1928), Dominican Republic (Dec. 12, 1928), Austria (Dec. 31, 1928), 
Siam (Jan. 16, 1929), Albania (Feb. 12, 1929), Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, 
and Slovenes (Feb. 20, 1929), Liberia (Feb. 23, 1929), Panama (Feb. 25, 1929), 
Portugal (Mar. i, 1929), Spain (Mar. 7, 1929), Cuba (Mar. 13, 1929), Rumania 
(Mar. 21, 1929), Denmark (Mar. 23, 1929), Norway (Mar. 26, 1929), Lithuania 
(Apr. 5, 1929), Sweden (Apr. 12, 1929), Estonia (Apr. 6, 1929), China (May 8, 
*9*9)> E ypt (May 9, 1929), Nicaragua (May 13, 1929), Iceland (June 10, 1929), 
Turkey (July 8, 1929), Netherlands (July 12, 1929), Guatemala (July 16, 1929), 
Bulgaria (July 22, 1929), Hungary (July 22, 1929), Peru (July 23, 1929), Latvia 
(July 23, 1929), Finland (July 24, 1929). 

The following states later transmitted their instruments of adherence: 
Persia (July 25, 1929), Greece (Aug. 3, 1929), Honduras (Aug. 5, 1929), Chile 
(Aug. !2, 1929), Luxemburg (Aug. 24, 1929)* free City of Danzig (Sept. 11, 
1929, transmitted by the Polish Government on behalf of Danzig), Costa Rica 
(Oct. i, 1929), Venezuela (Oct. 24, 19 2 9 ), Mexico (Nov. 26, 1929), Switzerland 
(Dec. 2, 1929), Paraguay (Dec. 4, 1929), Haiti (Mar. 10, 1930), Colombia (May 
28, 1931), Ecuador (Feb. 24, 1932), Kingdom of the Hedjaz and Nejd (Feb. 24, 
1932, invitation to adhere issued after recognition of the Hejazi Government in 


Frank B. Kellogg came from his home in St. Paul, and former 
President Calvin Coolidge abandoned his front porch at Northamp- 
ton for a few days. Most remarkable of all the guests, however, was 
a stocky, bustling lawyer from Chicago none other than Salmon 
O, Levinson. Secretary Stimson ("Stimmy," 15 Yale '88) had in- 
vited Levinson, his old college classmate, as the only unofficial 

The guests, official and unofficial, were assembling in Washing- 
ton for the ceremony of proclamation when word came that Prime 
Minister Ramsay MacDonald of Great Britain had suspended work 
on two new cruisers for the British Navy. MacDonald also decided 
to cancel contracts for, or slow down, other naval construction. 
President Herbert Hoover responded immediately by holding up 
construction of three of the American Navy's new cruisers author- 
ized by the recently passed cruiser bill. 16 This Anglo-American 
demonstration of good will augured well for the future of the 
antiwar pact. But the Japanese kept on building up to the 
Washington-treaty allowances. 

While Britain and the United States were disarming each other 
a local war suddenly threatened along the Russo-Chinese bor- 
der in Manchuria. State Department employees in Washington, 
busily certifying documents and preparing for the treaty's cere- 
monial proclamation, must have gasped in amazement when they 
learned of the billowing war clouds in Manchuria. Perhaps Frank 

1931), Iraq (Mar. 23, 1932, invitation to adhere issued after recognition of the 
Iraqi Government in 1931), Brazil (May 10, 1934). 

Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, and Uruguay did not deposit instruments of 

Andorra, Monaco, Morocco, Liechtenstein, and San Marino received no 
invitations to adhere. 

15. So Levinson affectionately referred to the secretary of state. 

16. As passed, Feb. 13, 1929, the bill had authorized construction of fifteen 
io,ooo-ton cruisers five each in the fiscal years 1929, 1930, and 1931 and one 
aircraft carrier (in fiscal 1930). The president was empowered to suspend this 
program in the event of successful negotiations at a naval conference. Of the 
five cruisers for fiscal 1929, private shipyards obtained, contracts for two, and 
government yards undertook to build the other three. It was on these latter 
three cruisers that Hoover decided to halt construction. 


H. Simonds, whose prediction of "no general European war for 
twenty years" already was rolling off the presses of the Review of 
Reviews, began to review his previous, line of reasoning. The able 
Mr. Simonds knew full well that these Asiatic affairs had deep 
meaning for the politics and diplomacy of Europe. 

It is not possible within the scope of these pages to investigate 
the Sino-Russian undeclared war in Manchuria, or even to study 
the part played in it by the antiwar treaty (to which both China 
and Russia were parties). Suffice to say that here, in this Manchurian 
imbroglio over ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway, lay the 
seeds of future world disaster. The pact of Paris, although hastily 
invoked, proved of little value in averting the conflict or in settling 
it once fighting had begun. 17 Chinese nationalism exhibited in this 
undeclared war convinced certain Japanese leaders that the time 
for reckoning with China was at hand. In 1931 there consequently 
began the fateful "Manchurian affair," forerunner to achievement 
of Hakko Ichiu, or The Eight Corners, of the Universe under One 
Roof. Observing the futility of the League of Nations' Lytton 
Commission, 18 certain ambitious individuals in Europe took hope 
and began to develop their own Hakko Ichiu. 

But we must return now to a scene in Washington, on a summer 
day in 1929, where representatives of most of the nations of the 
world had gathered in the East Room of the White House to see 
the president of the United States proclaim a .solemn treaty against 

17. For this there is the authority of Assistant Secretary of State Castle, who 
wrote in his diary, July 23, 1929: "The Secretary has been appealing to China 
and to Russia through France, basing his action on the Kejlogg Pact. One reason 
for this was to prevent declaration of war on the day the pact is declared effec- 
tivetomorrow. It may have a definitely good effect if the world can be made 
to believe that, through respect for the Pact, war was averted. This will not 
be true but that does not matter if the world believes it true. It will make the 
Pact a real thing and something to be called forth in similar cases in the future." 

18. A commission of inquiry set up by the League. After investigation in 
China the commission brought in the famous Lytton Report, a model of 
judicious reasoning. The League, however, did little toward putting an end to 
the Manchurian affair, other than advising League members apt t9 recognize 
the puppet state of Manchukuo, 


President Herbert Hoover declared the antiwar treaty in force 
at 1:255 P.M., July 24, 19^9. "I dare predict," he said, "that the in- 
fluence o the treaty for the renunciation of war will be felt in a 
large proportion of all future international acts." 19 

"The Kellogg Pact party today at the White House was a great 
success/' wrote Assistant Secretary Castle in his diary. 

The only slip being that the President, who was nervous, made 
his speech a minute sooner than he should have and, therefore, 
the radio people did not get the microphones on the table so 
that he could be heard all over the country. In addition, since 
his voice was not on the air, the two announcers at the back of 
the room felt they must keep on talking and that caused a cer- 
tain confusion of sound. The cameras, etc. were bad, but since 
the whole purpose of the thing was publicity it was all right. 
The East Room looked very well and all the seating werit 
smoothly. Representatives of all nations which had ratified 
were there and the rest came for luncheon. Kellogg was much 
affected. The luncheon table, horse-shoe shape, was attractive 
and the food was good. We all had coffee on the piazza after- 
ward. Levinson, the only outsider, was rather a blot on the 
occasion . . . Ted [Marriner] sat opposite him and said he 
had never heard so much misinformation dispersed in a short 
time. 20 

Upon proclaiming the treaty, the Government of the United 
States received congratulations from statesmen the world over. 
Stresemann cabled that "The Pact, which gives expression to the 
inmost yearning of the nations, has created a new foundation for 
the peaceful development of relations between the States/' 21 Briand 
echoed Stresemann's praises: "The Pact, which tenders such pre- 
cious promises for the future, becomes today part of the law of 
nations and is the most important contribution thus far made to 
the cause of peace/' 22 Baron Kijuro Shidehara, minister of foreign 

19. New York Times, July 25, 1929. 

20. Castle diary, July 24, 1929. 

21. Stresemann to Stimson, July 23, 1929, 711.0012 Anti- War/849. 

22. Briand to Stimson, July 25(?), 1929, 711.0012 Anti-War/835. 


affairs of the Imperial Japanese Government, declared in similar 
vein that "the treaty opens a new chapter in the history of inter- 
national relations." 23 

"The inmost yearning of nations/' said Stresemann. "Such pre- 
cious promises for the future/' said Briand. "Opens a new chapter/' 
said Shidehara. 

All these statements were correct. 

23. Shidehara to Stimson, undated (received July 23, 1929), 711.0012 Anti- 

Chapter Eighteen: CONCLUSION 



.he Kellogg-Briand Pact was the peculiar result 
of some very shrewd diplomacy and some very unsophisticated pop- 
ular enthusiasm for peace. 

Although the French Republic had been among the victors of 
the first World War, France's position in the postwar years was 
precarious. Germany, vanquished, nonetheless was a nation of 
nearly twice the population of France. The Ruhr Valley held an 
enormous concentration of heavy industry, giving Germany a huge 
war potential. Not without reason the French people felt insecure 
vis-a-vis their restless neighbors across the Rhine and desired all 
the guarantees of peace they could get. 

The French relied principally upon their army and upon a new 
postwar series of military alliances. By the spring of 1927 France 
had alliances with Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and 
Yugoslavia. 1 The French foreign minister, Aristide Briand, then 
attempted to bring the world's greatest non-European power, the 
United States of America, into France's new design for her own 
security. If Briand could not obtain an outright alliance (such, we 
recall, had failed to be ratified after Versailles), then perhaps he 
might at least secure American neutrality in event of another Eu- 
ropean war. That such was Briand's purpose appears quite evi- 
dent from the text of his proposed Pact of Perpetual Friendship: 
this proposition was naught but a negative military alliance. 

To the American State Department such a Franco-American 

i. Albeit the latter alliance had not yet been signed. 


Pact of Perpetual Friendship was impossible, for it would have 
deeply embroiled the United States in the age-old rivalries and 
collisions of the European nations. Briand, however, enlisted in 
support of his pacific-sounding idea the extremely well-organized 
and vocal American peace movement. Enthusiasts all over the 
United States began urging the Coolidge Administration to sign 
with France. 

After several months of ingenious inaction the State Depart- 
ment made a counterproposal: a multilateral treaty for renuncia- 
tion of war. This verbal change side-stepped the dangers of Briand's 
proposed bilateral pact and at the same time placed the American 
peace enthusiasts who could not see the difference between a 
bilateral and a multilateral treaty on the side of Secretary of 
State Frank B. Kellogg. Briand, instead of Kellogg, now was em- 
barrassed. He of course did not desire a multilateral treaty. But 
the French foreign minister man of peace, "Locarno prophet," 2 
holder of the Nobel Peace Prize could scarcely refuse outright so 
grand a treaty against war. As Assistant Secretary of State William 
R. Castle happily wrote in his diary, "We have Monsieur Briand 
out on a limb ... I do not think the French will agree [to the 
multilateral proposal], but I think they will have an awful time 
not to agree." s 

The upshot was (i) Briand's attempt unobtrusively to disen- 
tangle himself from the Kellogg demarche and when this failed 
(2) agreement, but with reservations particularly "self-defense." 
Meanwhile the American peace movement waged a tremendous 
campaign. Even Secretary of State Kellogg caught the popular in- 
fection and came to envision his counterproposal as a great con- 
tribution to world peace. The popular movement for peace in the 
United States seemed to reach its apogee of success when the Kel- 
logg treaty was signed, ratified, and proclaimed. 

The history of the origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact shows 

2. Ambassador Myron T. Herrick's phrase. Herrick to Kellogg, Feb. 28, 
1938, Herrick MSS. 

3. "After all," concluded Castle, "we have done what we set out to do. We 
have made a big, peaceful gesture . . ." Castle diary, Feb. 28, 1928, 


that American popular understanding of the great problems and 
policies of post-igiS international affairs was appallingly naive. 
Moreover, some of America's most respected citizens, possessing 
the cherished visible signs of education, proved themselves almost 
as benighted as the public they sought to lead. This is not in any 
way to belittle the cause in which the public and its, leaders worked, 
nor to question the goodness which filled their hearts. The volun- 
teer diplomats worked long and arduously for what they believed 
the public welfare. Peace leaders and workers, according to their 
lights, did their best. This should not be forgotten. The fact re- 
mains that Aristide Briand, observing this immature American 
idealism, was able to manipulate it with astonishing ease for his 
subtle purpose of "perpetual friendship" between France and the 
United States. 

Public ignorance hence created a serious problem in the con- 
duct of American diplomacy. American diplomats were capable 
men, well intentioned, as full of good will as the peace leaders and 
workers who bothered them. But they had to cope with a public 
opinion whose only virtue often was that it was public and opinion- 
ated. The strength, voice, and unintelligence of American public 
opinion during the twenties forced the State Department into tor- 
tuous diplomatic maneuvering necessitating even the grand pro- 
posal of a multilateral treaty against war. 

It is impossible within the confines of the present volume to 
offer any general conclusions about the various "invocations" of 
the Kellogg pact from the summer of 1929 onward. That is an ex- 
tremely interesting portion of history which perhaps can be dealt 
with in another work. The present purpose has been rather to ex- 
amine the origins as apart from the later development of the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact. These origins illustrate in a unique way the 
peculiarities, difficulties, and eventual denouement of the Search 
for Peace after the first World War. They point up the extremely 
important and grave problems involved in the inevitable interac- 
tion, in a democracy, of foreign policy and public opinion. Perhaps 
therefore one should hope that by the 1950*8 American public 
opinion has become truly sophisticated and will give its unwaver- 
ing support to a realistic American foreign policy. 

The Kellogg-Briand Pact 


Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of 

Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of 
war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end 
that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their 
peoples may be perpetuated; 

Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another 
should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peace- 
ful arid orderly process, and that any signatory Power which shall 
hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war 
should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty; 

' Hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other na- 
tions of the world will join in this humane endeavor and by adher- 
ing to the present Treaty as soon as it comes into force bring their 
peoples within the scope of its beneficent provisions, thus uniting 
the civilized nations of the world in a common renunciation of 
war as an instrument of their national policy; 

Have decided to conclude a Treaty and for that purpose have 
appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries: 


The President of the German Reich: 

Dr. Gustav Stresemann, Minister for Foreign Affairs; 

The President of the United States of America: 

The Honorable Frank B. Kellogg, Secretary of State; 

His Majesty the King of the Belgians: 

Mr. Paul Hymans, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister 
of State; 

The President of the French Republic: 

Mr. Aristide Briand, Minister for Foreign Affairs; 

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British 
Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India: 

For Great Britain and Northern Ireland and all parts of the 

British Empire which are not separate Members of the League 

of Nations: 

The Right Honourable Lord Cushendun, Chancellor of the 
Duchy of Lancaster, Acting Secretary of State for Foreign 

For the Dominion of Canada: 

The Right Honourable William Lyon Mackenzie King, 
Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs; 

For the Commonwealth of Australia: 

The Honourable Alexander John McLachlan, Member of 
the Executive Federal Council; 

For the Dominion of New Zealand: 

The Honourable Sir Christopher James Parr, High Com- 
missioner for New Zealand in Great Britain; 

For the Union of South Africa: 

The Honourable Jacobus Stephanus Smit, High Commis- 
sioner for the Union of South Africa in Great Britain; . 

For the Irish Free State: 

Mr. William Thomas Cosgrave, President of the Executive 

For India: 

The Right Honourable Lord Cushendun, Chancellor of the 


Duchy o Lancaster, Acting Secretary of State for Foreign 

His. Majesty the King of Italy: 

Count Gaetano Manzoni, his Ambassador Extraordinary 
and Plenipotentiary at Paris; 

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan: 

Count Uchida, Privy Councillor; 

The President of the Republic of Poland: 

Mr. A. Zaleski, Minister for Foreign Affairs; 

The President of the Czechoslovak Republic: 

Dr. Eduard Benes, Minister for Foreign Affairs; 

who, having communicated to one another their full powers found 
in good and due form have agreed upon the following articles: 


The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of 
their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for 
the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an 
instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. 


The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution 
of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin 
they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought 
except by pacific means. 



The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting 
Parties named in the Preamble in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements, and shall take effect as between them 
as soon as all their several instruments of ratification shall have 
been deposited at Washington. 

This Treaty shall, when it has come into effect as prescribed in 
the preceding paragraph, remain open as long as may be necessary 


for adherence by all the other Powers of the world. Every instru- 
ment evidencing the adherence of a Power shall be deposited at 
Washington and the Treaty shall immediately upon such deposit 
become effective as between the Power thus adhering and the other 
Powers parties hereto. 

It shall be the duty of the Government of the United States to 
furnish each Government named in the Preamble and every Gov- 
ernment subsequently adhering to this Treaty with a certified copy 
of the Treaty and of every instrument of ratification or adherence. 
It shall also be the duty of the Government of the United States 
telegraphically to notify such Governments immediately upon the 
deposit with it of each instrument of ratification or adherence. 

IN FAITH WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed 
this Treaty in the French and English languages both texts having 
equal force, and hereunto affix their seals. 

DONE at Paris, the twenty-seventh day of August in the year one 
thousand nine hundred and twenty-eight. 

[SEAL] Gustav Stresemann 

[SEAL] Frank B. Kellogg 

[SEAL] Paul Hymans 

[SEAL] Art. Briand 

[SEAL] Cushendun 

[SEAL] W. L. Mackenzie King 

[SEAL] A. J. McLachlan 

[SEAL] C. /. Parr 

[SEAL] /. S. Smit 

[SEAL] Liam T. MacCosgair 

[SEAL] Cushendun 

[SEAL] G. Manzoni 

[SEAL] Uchida 

[SEAL] August Zaleski 

[SEAL] Dr.EduardBenes* 

* FR: 1928, 1, 153-156, 

Note on Sources 

L Bibliographical Aids 

For the period of the 1920'$ the best single guide remains William 
L. Langer and Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Foreign Affairs Bibliog- 
raphy: 1919-32 (New York, 1933). More recent publication must 
be searched out in the quarterly lists of such journals as the Ameri- 
can Historical Review and Foreign Affairs. In a sense a bibli- 
ographical aid, because it points to the problems besetting all his- 
torians of the years since the first World War, is the brilliant article 
by Max Beloff, "Historians in a Revolutionary Age," Foreign Af- 
fairs, 29 (January 1951), 248-262. 

II. General Works 

There is no good diplomatic history of the twenties, and one must 
turn to works of larger scope which deal in part with the period. A 
fine analysis of European politics in the twentieth century may be 
found in Hajo Holborn's The Political Collapse of Europe (New 
York, 1951). E. H. Carr, International Relations since the Peace 
Treaties (London, 1937; rev. ed., 1941) contains a dependable sur- 
vey. For catching the diplomatic problems of the 1920*5 in volu- 
minous detail, the best source continues to be the Survey of Inter- 
national Affairs^ published annually by the Royal Institute and 
usually written by Professor Arnold J. Toynbee. 

For diplomatic histories of leading European countries during 
the twenties it also is necessary to consult larger works dealing with 
the entire interwar period. There are not many of these. A very 


good monograph is W. M. Jordan, Great Britain, France and the 
German Problem: 1918-1939 (London, 1943). Likewise good is 
Arnold Wolfers, Britain and France between Two Wars: Conflict- 
ing Strategies of Peace since Versailles (New York, 1940). W. N. 
Medlicott, British Foreign Policy since Versailles (London, 1940) 
has a competent treatment. 

The best introduction to American diplomacy of the period 
may be found in two short articles: Edward Mead Earle, "A Half- 
Century of American Foreign Policy: Our Stake in Europe, 1898- 
1948," Political Science Quarterly, 64 (1949), 168-188; and Sam- 
uel Flagg Bemis, "The Shifting Strategy of American Defense and 
Diplomacy/' in Dwight E. Lee and George E. McReynolds, eds., 
Essays in History and International Relations in Honor of George 
Hubbard Blakeslee (Worcester, Mass., 1949), pp. 1-14. The Coun- 
cil on Foreign Relations began publication of its annual survey of 
American foreign relations in 1928. These volumes, under varying 
editorship, are not always as critical as they might have been; cer- 
tainly the initial volumes are not up to the high standard of the 
Royal Institute's Survey of International Affairs. The best treat- 
ment of American diplomacy during the igso's is in the pertinent 
chapters of Professor Samuel Flagg Bemis' excellent Diplomatic 
History of the United States (3d ed., New York, 1950). Herbert Feis, 
The Diplomacy of the Dollar: First Era 1919-1932 (Baltimore, 
1950) concerns American lending policies during the twenties; the 
diplomacy of the dollar was, of course, highly important. 

Books on international peace are innumerable, but most of 
them are tracts advocating one scheme or another. Historians have 
made little effort to study the peace movement. Arthur C. F. Beales, 
History of Peace (New York, 1931) is the only acceptable general 
account. In this book, however", peace during the igao's when the 
peace movement reached its apogee received only some twenty- 
five pages, entitled "Epilogue." Professor Merle Curti has written 
the only history of the American peace movement. Peace or War: 
The American Struggle 1636-1936 (New York, 1936) is heavily 
weighted in the years 1860-1918; again, the all-important era of 
the twenties received cursory examination. Denna Frank Fleming, 
The United States and World Organization: 1920-1933 (New York, 


1936) is a somewhat uncritical account, written largely from sec- 
ondary works. Jerome Davis' Contemporary Social Movements 
(New York, 1930) has a rather interesting chapter (pp. 747-868) 
on "The Peace Movement" from a pacifist viewpoint. Devere Allen, 
The Fight for Peace (New York, 1930) is a tract for pacifism; cha- 
otically written, it nonetheless is crammed with important bits of 
information. Reliable data about peace organizations appear in 
Florence Brewer Boeckel, Between War and Peace: A Handbook 
for Peace Workers (New York, 1928). Lyman Besse Burbank, "In- 
ternationalism in American Thought: 1919-1929," a doctoral dis- 
sertation submitted in June 1950 to the faculty of New York Uni- 
versity, has value as an introduction to the organized peace move- 
ment of the twenties. 

///. Special Works 


John E. Stoner, S. O. Levinson and the Pact of Paris: A Study in the 
Techniques of Influence (Chicago, 1942) is an excellent account of 
the Outlawry movement, written almost exclusively from the Levin- 
son MSS in the Library of the University of Chicago. Many of 
Professor S toner's judgments would have been different had he 
extended his research to other sources. The authoritative exposi- 
tion of Outlawry as a philosophy may be encountered in Charles 
Clayton Morrison, The Outlawry of War: A Constructive Policy 
for World Peace (Chicago, 1927). Not without interest is Frank 
B. Kellogg and William R. Castle, "Outlawry of War," Encyclo- 
pedia Britannica, 14th ed. Typical articles by the Outlawrists are 
Charles Clayton Morrison, "Briand Opens a Door/' Christian Cen- 
tury, 44 (May 26, 1927), 646-647; John Dewey, "Outlawing Peace 
by Discussing War," New Republic, $4 (Feb.-May 1928), 370-371; 
John Dewey, " 'As an Example to Other Nations/ " New Republic, 
54 (Feb.-May 1928), 88-89; Carrie Chapman Catt, "The Outlawry 
of War/ 7 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 138 (July 1928), 157-163; Raymond Robins, "The Out- 
lawry of War The Next Step in Civilization/* Annals of the 
American Academy, 120 (July 1925), 153-156. For a European at- 
tempt to trace Outlawry down through international affairs of the 


igs>o's, see Hans Wehberg, The Outlawry of War (Washington, 
1931); this philosophicolegal analysis envisions Outlawry where 
there was nothing of the sort. 

A considerable number of books have been written on various 
aspects of the peace movement. The War Resisters' International 
published War Resisters in Many Lands (Middlesex, England, 
1928?), a brief account of its activities; on the same subject is Run- 
ham Brown, Cutting Ice (Enfield, England, 1930). Then there is 
Twenty Years of the Foreign Policy Association (n.p., 1939). Fern 
E. Stowe compiled a MS ''History of the National Council for the 
Prevention of War," a copy of which may be found in the Swarth- 
more College Peace Collection. The Carnegie Endowment recently 
issued "A Brief Review of Thirty-Five Years of Service toward De- 
veloping International Understanding," International Concilia- 
tion > No. 417 (January 1946), 17-39. For other organizations see 
Marie L. Degen, History of the Woman's Peace Party (Baltimore, 
1939); Lilian Stevenson, Towards a Christian International: The 
Story of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (^d ed., 
London, 1941); Allan W, Eister, Drawing Room Conversion (Dur- 
ham, 1950); Walter H. Clark, The Oxford Group (New York, 
195 1); Charles S. Macfarland, Pioneers for Peace through Religion: 
Based on the Records of the Church Peace Union (Founded by 
Andrew Carnegie) 1914-1945 (New York, 1946). There is material 
on the Bok Peace Plan in Esther Everett Lape, ed., Ways to Peace 
(New York, 1924). The voyage of the Ford peace ship, the Oscar II, 
is chronicled in Louis P. Lochner, America's Don Quixote: Henry 
Ford's Attempt To Save Europe (London, 1924). No one has at- 
tempted to indicate the part which women played in the organized 
peace movement. Mary R. Beard's Woman as Force in History 
(New York, 1946) virtually ignores the forceful role of women. 

Many books have been written on the Kellogg-Briand Pact, all 
of them during or shortly after its negotiation. The best juridical 
analysis is David Hunter Miller, The Peace Pact of Paris: A Study 
of the Briand-Kellogg Treaty (New York, 1928); Miller was princi- 
pally concerned with the few documents published in 1928. James 
T. Shotwell, War as an Instrument of National Policy: And Its Re- 
nunciation in the Pact of Paris (New York, 1929) sought to describe 
the broader meaning of the pact but failed, in the present writer's 


opinion, to look very deeply beneath the printed and spoken word. 
Other studies of the Kellogg treaty, all written closely from a few 
official documents, are Kirby Page, The Renunciation of War (New 
York, 1928); Denys P. Myers, Origin and Conclusion of the Paris 
Pact (Boston, 1929); and J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, Information on 
the Renunciation of War 1927-1928 (London, 1928). Signature of 
the pact in Paris encouraged an epidemic of poor French doctoral 
dissertations, of which the following are representative: Robert Le 
Gall, Le facie de Paris (Paris, 1930); Cecile Balbareu, Le Pacte de 
Paris (Paris, 1929); P. K.ostofi:,LeMoratoire de guerre (Paris, 1930); 
Spyros. Calogeropoulos Stratis, Le Pacte general de renonciation a 
la guerre (Paris, 1931). 

For acute contemporary criticism of the pact, see Edwin M, 
Borchard, "The Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War/* 
American Journal of International Law, 23 (1929), 116-120; and 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Our Foreign Policy: A Democratic View,'* 
Foreign Affairs, 6 (July 1928), 573-586. The first effort to get be- 
neath the published documents was Drew Pearson and Constantine 
Brown, The American Diplomatic Game (New York, 1935), chap, i, 
"The World Renounces War/' Written with considerable error 
and not a little bombast and sensationalism, this account contains 
an impressive residue of fact. 

There are many monographs on the League of Nations, but the 
best is Alfred Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of 
Law: 1918-1935 (London, 1936; sd ed., 1939). Very good is C. K, 
Webster and Sydney Herbert, The League of Nations in Theory 
and Practice (London, 1933). For one of the most important origins 
of the League, see Ruhl J. Bartlett, The League To Enforce Peace 
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1944). Professor Harry R. Rudin's definitive 
Armistice 1918 (New Haven, 1944) provides the immediate setting 
out of which the League emerged. Then there is David Hunter 
Miller's The Drafting of the Covenant (2 vols., New York, 1928). 
W. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate (Baltimore, 1933), 
and Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal 
(New York, 1945) explain the League's rejection in the United 
States. Worthy of note is the little book by J. Paul Selsam, The At- 


tempts To Form an Anglo-French Alliance; 1919-1924 (Phila- 
delphia, 1936). Much debate has arisen over exactly why the League 
failed to avert the second World War, and certainly one excellent 
reason is set down in William W. Kaufmann, "The Organization 
of Responsibility," World Politics, i (July 1949), 511-532. Pro- 
fessor Kaufmann contends that responsibility should go only to 
those nations capable of exercising it whereas the League (and 
also the United Nations) gave responsibility of sorts to the small 
powers. The result was failure because the small powers could not 
be responsible. (Nor would the large ones, I might add.) 

A very important aspect of post- 19 18 international relations was 
the naval question the size of navies, the scope of wartime bel- 
ligerent and neutral rights and duties. The naval question had deep 
roots in prewar days. E. L. Woodward, Great Britain and the Ger- 
man Navy (Oxford, 1935) analyzes one of the prime causes of the 
first World War. American naval policy in the postwar years is 
well treated in George T. Davis, A Navy Second to None (New 
York, 1940). Edwin M. Borchard and William P. Lage, Neutrality 
for the United States (New Haven, 1937; rev. ed., 1940) surveys 
the neutrality question, much alive during the twenties; written 
during the mid-thirties when conditions had greatly changed, this 
volume presents strict neutrality as an essential of American life. 

American foreign policy in other particular aspects is dealt with, 
excellently, in Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of 
the United States (New York, 1943), and A. Whitney Griswold, The 
Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938). For Far 
Eastern policy, see also the very competent monograph by Dorothy 
Borg, American Policy and the Chinese Revolution: 192,5-1928 
(New York, 1947). 


David Bryn-Jones, Frank B. Kellogg: A Biography (New York, 
1937) has a valuable memorandum on the Kellogg-Briand Pact, 
written by Kellogg himself. Professor Bryn-Jones received Kellogg's 
active assistance throughout this biography. No one can study Kel- 
logg's career without reference to Professor Bryn-Jones' authorita- 
tive work. 


There is no adequate biography of Briand. Georges Suarez, 
Briand: Sa vie, son oeuvre> avec son journal et de nombreux docu- 
ments inedits (Paris, 1938-41) has appeared in five volumes; but, 
because of the death of Suarez, will not go beyond the year 1923. 
The extremely important period from 1923 to Briand's death in 
1932 thus is not covered. Unlike his contemporary in French po- 
litical life, Raymond Poincar6 (who burned nearly all his papers), 
Briand saved almost everything. Suarez reported that Briand kept 
many secret papers in an iron box (so also did Briand's illustrious 
predecessor, Thophile Delcass). At the beginning of the recent 
war the papers were at Cocherel, Briand's summer house in Brit- 

The Stresemann papers (see below, pp. 279-580) are best for the 
activities of that statesman. There is a recent biography by Walter 
Gorlitz, Gustav Stresemann (Heidelberg, 1947), based on these 
papers. Antonina Vallentin, Frustration: Or Stresemann' s Race 
with Death (London, 1931) is a rather unreliable fictionalized 
account but of some interest because of the authoress* personal 
acquaintance with her subject. 

For Sir Austen Chamberlain there is Sir Charles Petrie, The 
Life and Letters of the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain (2 
vols., London, 1940), a collection of sketchy extracts from letters 
and a diary, interlarded with explanatory editorial comments. The 
Chamberlain diary contained some devastating appraisal of the 
Kellogg pact. Sir Austen's reminiscences on various international 
and other subjects unfortunately not including much on the 
Kellogg treaty are in his Down the Years (London, 1935). 

The best biography of President Calvin Coolidge is Claude M. 
Fuess, Calvin Coolidge: The Man from Vermont (Boston, 1940); 
appropriately, it contains only perfunctory reference to the Kellogg 
pact. For understanding Coolidge the man, the best source is The 
Autobiography of Calvin Coolidge (New York, 1929), supported 
with the observations in Irwin Hood (Ike) Hoover, Forty-Two 
Years in the White House (Boston, 1934); Edmund W. Starling and 
Thomas Sugrue, Starling of the White House (New York, 1946); 
Duff Gilfond, The Rise of Saint Calvin: Merry Sidelights on the 


Career of Mr. Coolidge (New York, 1932); and, especially, William 
Allen White, A Puritan in Babylon (New York, 1938). 

Colonel T, Bentley Mott, Myron T. Herrick: Friend of France 
(New York, 1930) is very slight on the 1920*8. Claudius O. Johnson, 
Borah of Idaho (New York, 1936), an almost official biography, is 
written mainly from the Borah MSS now in the Library of Congress, 
and consequently has the strength and limits of those MSS. Sir 
Esme Howard, Theatre of Life (2 vols., Boston, 1935-36) has a 
few interesting pages on the Kellogg treaty. Hugh R. Wilson, 
Diplomat between Wars (New York, 1941) offers a breezily in- 
formal, often informative account of life in the State Department 
during the period 1925-27; it also relates the history of the 1927 
Geneva Naval Disarmament Conference. There is nothing about 
the Kellogg pact but some information on the Search for Peace 
during the 1920'$, especially the World Court, in Philip C. Jessup, 
Elihu Root (New York, 1938), Vol. II. For interesting and often 
acute contemporary biographical sketches of American political 
leaders, see Walter Lippmann, Men of Destiny (New York, 1927). 
A similar but much less successful effort is Oswald Garrison Villard, 
Prophets, True and False (New York, 1928). Unreliable, but pro- 
vocative for its gossip about Washington diplomatic personalities, 
is Drew Pearson and Robert S, Allen, Washington Merry-Go- 
Round (New York, 1931). 

As for leaders in the peace movement there is, first of all, Nich- 
olas Murray Butler's delightful Across the Busy years (2 vols., New 
York, 1939-40). Jane Addams recorded her activities in The Second 
Twenty years at Hull-House: With a Record of a Growing World 
Consciousness (New York, 1930); Miss Addams' war work appears 
in her Peace and Bread in Time of War (New York, 1922). There 
are two Addams biographies: James Weber Linn, Jane Addams: 
A Biography (New York, 1935), and Winifred E. Wise, Jane Ad- 
dams of Hull-House (New York, 1935). Mary Gray Peck, Carrie 
Chapman Catt: A Biography (New York, 1944) was written partly 
from Mrs. Catt's memory not always reliable. The world of states- 
men and scholars would appreciate a biography of Professor Shot- 


IV. Newspapers and Periodicals 

The New York Times is extremely useful for recent American 
history for two reasons: its admirable coverage, and its equally ad- 
mirable index. During negotiation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact the 
Times carried dispatches from its Paris correspondent Edwin L, 
James which often reflected the viewpoint of the French Foreign 
Office. The Times also usually printed reports of presidential and 
Department of State press conferences. Frequently, of course, the 
Times obliged Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler by publicizing his activi- 

The London Times was consulted at various points where in- 
formation offered by the New York Times seemed unnecessarily 
bare. Almost always the New York Times reported European affairs 
better than did its London opposite. I did not undertake the enor- 
mous task of hunting through files of Continental newspapers. On 
important occasions during negotiation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, 
the London Times or the New York Times or the State Depart- 
ment made systematic surveys of foreign press opinion. Foreign 
public opinion moreover was relatively unimportant, compared to 
American opinion, in negotiation of the pact. 

Especially useful periodicals were the American Journal of In- 
ternational Law and the British Year Book of International Law. 
On a more popular level were articles in Foreign Affairs and its 
British counterpart, the Journal of the Royal Institute of Inter- 
national Affairs. 

V. Printed Sources 

Documents relative to general diplomatic history of the igso's 
may be found in appendixes or documentary annexes to the Royal 
Institute's annual Survey of International Affairs. The only compa- 
rable American collection is the documents printed in the Carnegie 
Endowment's monthly International Conciliation. 

Upon signature of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in August 1928, 
several of the signatories issued collections of exchanged notes! 


The German, French, British, and American publications were 
virtually identical. The French Pacte general de renonciation a la 
guerre comme instrument de politique nationale: Trente pieces 
relatives a la preparation, a V elaboration et a la conclusion du 
trait^ signe a Paris le zj aout 1928 (6 avril xyzj-zj aout 1928} 
(Paris, 1928) contained two or three cables between Briand and 
Claudel, but these were not very informative. All o these ex- 
changed notes published by the various nations, together with 
much new and highly important material, appear in Foreign Rela- 
tions of the United States for the years 1927 and 1928. German, 
French, and British archival papers relating to the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact have not similarly been re-examined and representative por- 
tions of the papers printed. 

A convenient guide to parliamentary debates on the Kellogg- 
Briand Pact was Malcolm W. Davis and Walter H. Mallory, A 
Political Handbook of the World: Parliaments, Parties and Press 
as of January i, 1928 (New Haven and Cambridge, Mass., 1928); 
first published in 1928, this handbook has passed through many sub- 
sequent editions. Parliamentary debates consulted were the Con- 
gressional Record, House of Commons Debates, Verhandlungen 
des Reichstags, and debates of the French Chamber of Deputies. 
The German and French debates had little to do with the Kellogg- 
Briand Pact. The Record has the important debate on American 
ratification. The Commons debates are interesting for various in- 
terpellations during negotiation of the pact. 

The League o Nations published annually, under slightly vary- 
ing titles, verbatim records of its Assembly and committee meet- 

The League's Treaty Series printed the original texts and, 
when necessary, English translations of all registered treaties. A 
specialized treaty collection is Max Habicht, Post-War Treaties for 
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Cambridge, Mass., 

Few personal papers of statesmen and other participants in the 
Kellogg pact have been published. Most notable of the published 
papers of course is Eric Sutton, ed. and trans., Gustav Stresemann: 
His Diaries, Letters, and Papers (3 vols., London, 1935-40). This. 


collection prints memoranda, letters, speeches, and press confer- 
ences, with commentary by the editor. The Stresemann papers offer 
an excellent view of German diplomacy during the twenties. The 
only other published collections worthy of notice are The Collected 
Papers of John Bassett Moore (7 vols., New Haven, 1944), which 
has some trenchant criticisms of the Kellogg pact by Judge Moore; 
and Charles G. Dawes, Notes as Vice President: ip^-ip^ (Boston, 
*935)> the vice president's diary from June 27, 1928, to March 6, 
1929, useful for its account of the Senate's advice and consent to the 
Kellogg treaty. 

Peace organizations themselves rarely bothered to issue year- 
books or other documentary publications. The only available ma- 
terial concerns the Carnegie Endowment: its annual If ear Book, 
published since 1911; also its Manual of the Public Benefactions of 
Andrew Carnegie (Washington, 1919). Worth some mention is the 
British National Council for Prevention of War, Peace Year-Book 
(London, 1921, 1927, 1929), presenting cursory glimpses of the 
peace movement in various European countries. 

VI. Manuscript Sources 


The basis of the present study was the voluminous records of the 
Department of State, now deposited in the National Archives in 
Washington. The Kellogg pact material comprises several entire 
files. Ancillary files have other valuable documents. In stressing 
the value of the archives one .should not however offer the impres- 
sion that the documents printed in Foreign Relations were rela- 
tively insignificant, or that the compilers of Foreign Relations 
suppressed important material. The State Department has been emi- 
nently fair in its publications, but it can print only a limited num- 
ber of documents. The American archives are now (1952) open, 
under certain restrictions, for investigation of material dating to 
the year 1937. 

Archives of the Weimar Republic, captured by the American 
Army during the second World War, in a few years may also be 
opened. The British Foreign Office archives of the interwar period 


are now being studied by Professors E. L. Woodward and Rohan 
D. Butler; but there is no assurance that publication of the several 
new post-igi8 series of Documents on British Foreign Policy will 
be followed by opening the archives beyond 1901, their present 
dateline. The Quai d'Orsay records are closed beyond the year 


Of great value was the detailed diary of William R. Castle, assistant 
secretary of state for Western European affairs during negotiation 
of the Kellogg pact. For the period of the negotiations the diary has 
several hundred typescript pages. 

The Salmon O. Levinson MSS (University of Chicago Library) 
are a huge collection of 40,000 letters and over 100,000 pieces of 
various sorts. Levinson saved everything. These manuscripts are of 
high importance for the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the peace move- 
ment generally during the twenties. 

The papers of Senator William E. Borah, now in the Library of 
Congress, have a significant amount of material on the Kellogg pact 
and related subjects. Borah's interests were wide. 

The Calvin Coolidge MSS (Library of Congress) are a very large 
collection which has to be consulted through an inadequate card 
file. Coolidge rarely committed himself on paper, and most of this 
material is interesting for what people told Coolidge rather than 
for what he replied. Occasionally, however, the presidential per- 
sonality peeps through the answers, and these glimpses well reward 
much search. It is obvious from the Coolidge collection that the 
president had little faith in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, 

The William Howard Taft papers (Library of Congress) con- 
tain little on the Kellogg treaty, although during the igso's Taft's 
political interests were exceedingly wide: his curiosity about po- 
litical affairs was insatiable. 

The papers of Elihu Root (Library of Congress) are not espe- 
cially interesting for the period of the twenties. But although the 
correspondence during this era is mostly personal, there are occa- 
sional letters from important individuals which are worth search. 
Root, in reply, frequently made no carbons. 


Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler's papers, now gathering dust up 
near the dome of the Low Memorial Library at Columbia Uni- 
versity, are a vast collection of mostly trivial correspondence. It is 
reported that a secretary to Dr. Butler, shortly before the latter's 
death, went through the papers and pulled out and burned many 
letters. Some of the most important folders of correspondence are 
empty; and each empty folder has a peculiar crayon "X" mark. 
There nonetheless remained a few letters of exceptional interest 
relative to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 

The papers of Myron T. Herrick (Western Reserve Historical 
Society, Cleveland, Ohio) are in considerable disorder, and Her- 
rick's correspondence while home in Cleveland on leave is not here. 
There is not much on the Kellogg pact, or even generally on Her- 
rick's second Paris ambassadorship, 1921-29. 

Senator John J. Elaine was the only senator to vote against the 
Kellogg treaty. His papers, now in the library of the State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin, reveal virtually nothing that was not already 
known about his position on the treaty (Blaine voted against the 
pact because he considered it recognition of the British Empire). 

Mrs. Jessie Jack Hooper, a prominent clubwoman of Oshkosh, 
Wisconsin, was international relations, chairman of the General 
Federation of Women's Clubs. In this capacity she advocated sig- 
nature and ratification of the Kellogg treaty. Her correspondence 
(State Historical Society of Wisconsin) indicates in great detail that 
the treaty provoked nation-wide interest and had a large following 
in Midwestern states. 

The American ambassador to Germany during negotiation of 
the Kellogg pact, Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, left many of his 
papers to the Collection of Regional History, Cornell University. 
For the period of Schurman's Berlin embassy there is very little 
in the Cornell collection except clippings of newspapers and drafts 
of speeches. 

The Carter Glass MSS (Library of the University of Virginia) 
have virtually nothing on foreign relations, although the senator 
was very outspoken in his opinion of the Kellogg pact. 

The papers of John Bassett Moore, presently under the per- 


sonal supervision of Karl T. Frederick of New York City, reflect 
Judge Moore's slight interest in the Kellogg-Briand treaty. 

Miss Emily Greene Balch has deposited some of her papers in 
the Swarthmore College Peace Collection. These illustrate the 
1927-29 activities of the Women's International League for Peace 
and Freedom, of which Miss Balch was president of the American 

The papers of Hannah Clothier Hull also are at Swarthmore. 
Mrs. Hull was active in the peace movement. 

The Jane Addams MSS at Swarthmore are disappointing for 
the igso's. Miss Addams was very careless with her correspondence. 
The Swarthmore collection however does offer piquant details both 
of the general functioning of the international WILPF and the or- 
ganization's special concern with the Kellogg treaty. 

Mr.s.. George H. Moses of Concord, New Hampshire, kindly 
searched through the senator's papers for material touching the Kel- 
logg pact, but discovered nothing of special interest. 

The office files of several American peace organizations are now 
deposited at the Swarthmore College Peace Collection. These files 
are essential to understanding the fervor and method by which 
peace groups worked. Especially valuable were the files of the 
National Council for Prevention of War, the Women's Interna- 
tional League for Peace and Freedom (American Branch, and In- 
ternational Office), and the Women's Peace Union of the Western 

A very useful source for President Calvin Goolidge's opinions 
on various subjects, including Outlawry of war, is the voluminous 
verbatim transcript of Coolidge's press conferences. For over twenty 
years this transcript reposed in a nailed-up wooden box at The 
Forbes, Library, Northampton, Massachusetts. The present li- 
brarian, Lawrence E. Wikander, obligingly opened the box, and 
the transcript now is available to interested students. 


Adachi, Mineichiro, 166 

Addams, Jane, 30, 119-120, 177; 
and Woman's Peace Party, 8-9; 
Women's International League for 
Peace and Freedom, 29. See also 
Women's International League for 
Peace and Freedom 

All-American Anti-Imperialist League, 

Alliances, 174, 176, 187, 190, 195, 
198. See also Anglo-American guar- 
antee alliances; Franco-Belgian al- 
liance; Franco-Czechoslovak alli- 
ance; Franco-Polish alliance; Franco- 
Rumanian alliance; Franco-Yugo- 
slav alliance; Italo-Albanian alli- 
ance; Locarno, treaties of 

Amanullah (Padishah of Afghanistan), 


American Academy of Arts and Let- 
ters, 211 

American Arbitration Crusade, 87 n 

American Committee for the Out- 
lawry of War, 232; organization and 
growth of, 31-37 

American Foundation, 87 n; and Bok 
Peace Plan Award, 24-25, 37 n 

American Legion, 232-233 

American Peace Society, 177; organi- 
zation of, 6 

American Union Against Militarism, 

Angell, Norman, 42, 91 

Anglo-American guarantee alliances, 
53-54* 263 

Anglo-French naval agreement, 203- 
205, 208-209, 233-234 

Arbitration, 206 n, 234, 243; "all-in" 
treaty of, 124-125; Franco-British 
formula on, 6; Kellogg treaties of, 
132-135, 137, 138 n, 144, 158-161, 
163-164; Root treaties, 6, 87, 92, 
108-109, iS*-^ 1 S7> H 1 * Siamese 
treaties, 63-64, 97 

Armistice 1918, 3; reception in Lon- 
don, Paris, i; Berlin, New York, 
Washington, 2 

Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, attends 
signature of Kellogg pact, 216 

Atherton, Ray, 235; queries British on 
Anglo-French naval agreement, 204 

Babcock, Earl B., 90; attends signa- 
ture of Kellogg pact, 216-217 

Balch, Emily, 29. See also Women's 
International League for Peace and 

Balfour, Arthur, on registration of 
treaties, 57; Briand, 62 

Beck, William H., 210, 211, 229 n 

Bemis, Samuel Flagg, 225 n 

BeneS, Eduard, 217; on Geneva Proto- 
col, 47 n; denies military agreement 
to Franco-Czech alliance, 61 


Berger, Victor L., on results of World 
War, 42 

Berthelot, Philippe, 95-96, 188 n 

Beveridge, Albert J., on League of Na- 
tions, 39 

Bingham, Hiram, debates Kellogg 
treaty, 242 n, 246, 247 

Birchall, Frederick T., 227-228 

Blaine, John J., votes against Kellogg 
treaty, 252 

Blokland, Beelaerts van, and Geneva 
Protocol, 120-121 

Blum, Leon, on Geneva Protocol, 47 n 

Bok, Edward, and Bok Peace Plan 
Award, 24-25. See also American 

Borah, William E., 72-73, 75, 77, 100- 
102, io4n, 111, 115, 118, 129-130, 
138 n, 139-141, 160, 168, 187 n, 215, 
233 n, 234-235, 240, 244, 248; favors 
Outlawry of war, 32; introduces 
Outlawry resolution, 33; wishes to 
outlaw rum, 74; asks release from 
antiwar treaty in event of violation, 
161-163; on reservations to anti- 
war pact, 200, 207, 236; puts treaty 
through Senate, 245-246, 250-252 

Borah, Mrs. William E., 244 

Borchard, Edwin M., 242 n, 252 n; 
speech at Williamstown, 193; on 
reservations to antiwar pact, 194 n, 
200; self-defense, 198 

Briand, Aristide, 62-63, 89, 93, 95-97, 
105, 128-129, 132, 136-137, 142-149, 
152, 154, iS?-^ 8 * l6 4> lg 6, 169- 
172, 183-190, 210, 212-213, 217-218, 
222, 253, 261-265; and Greco-Bul- 
garian dispute, 48; talks with Nicho- 
las Murray Butler, 66-67, 95; with 
James T. Shotwell, 68-70; message 
to American people, 70-74; lunch 
for Lindbergh, 85; advocates re- 
nouncing war to League Assembly, 
122-123; Christmas message to 


American people, 126-127; con- 
cludes new arbitration treaty with 
United States, 160-161; third mes- 
sage to American people, 220-221; 
loses temper at League, 224 

Bridgeman, Walter, 208 

British League of Nations Union, 17- 
18; advocates "all-in" arbitration 
treaty and "simple" antiwar treaty, 


Brookhart, Senator, on Soviet-Ameri- 
can friendship, 252 

Brown, Constantine, 138 

Brown, Harrison, i2on, 125 n, 219; 
urges Outlawry to Europe, 91, 103- 
104, 152-153; to John Bassett 
Moore, 112-113; attends signature 
of antiwar pact, 215-216 

Brown, Philip Marshall, 252 n; on 
reservations to antiwar pact, 194 

Bruce, Senator, debates antiwar treaty, 
*43> 248 

Bryan treaties. See Conciliation 

Bryan, William Jennings, 234 

Buchman, Frank N. D., and Oxford 
Group movement, 18-19 

Buisson, Ferdinand, awarded Nobel 
Peace Prize, 18 n 

Bukharin, Nikolai, 23 in 

Bulgar-Greek dispute, 48 

Bureau International de la Paix, de- 
cay of, 17 

Butler, Nicholas Murray, 21 n, 22-23, 
75-8i, 93* 94~95* 99> 215, 221, 222 n; 
and Briand, 66-67, 95; refuses to 
outlaw rum, 74; Logan Act and, 79; 
American Locarno, 85-87; on Sal- 
mon O. Levinson, 104-105; Senator 
Capper's antiwar resolution, 1 15-1 16 

Butler, Pierce, attends signature of 
Kellogg pact, 216 

Camerlynk, Professor, 218 

Capper, Arthur, 236; mailing list, 31- 


32; antiwar resolution, 115-118 

Carnegie, Andrew, and Hague Peace 
Palace, 7; Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 7, 21; Church 
Peace Union, 24 

Carnegie Endowment for Interna- 
tional Peace, 7, 26, 67, 116, 177, 232; 
program, 21-23 

Carr, Wilbur J., 228-229 

Castle, William R., 76 n, 132-134, 
136-138, 140, 144, 146-147* HQ-W 
154 n, 156, 158 n, 162-165, 169, 185, 
204-205, 209 n, 225-226, 228-229, 
254, 260 n, 261, 264; portrait, 131- 

Catt, Carrie Chapman, 45, 155-15?' 
193 232-234* 250; and Woman's 
Peace Party, 8-9; Committee on the 
Cause and Cure of War, 29-30. See 
also Committee on the Cause and 
Cure of War 

Cecil, Robert, and Outlawry of war, 
35; registration of treaties, 57; "all- 
in" arbitration, 124-125 

Chamber of Deputies, 159; shelves 
debt-funding agreement, 69; votes 
new naval vessels, 126 n 

Chamberlain, Austen, 109, 144, 166, 
175, 178-182, 184-185, 197-198, 203, 
205-206, 210, 216, 256-257; on gaps 
in the Covenant, 39; Locarno, 46, 
47 n; Greco-Bulgarian dispute, 48; 
Briand, 62, 109; Geneva Protocol, 

Chamberlain, Joseph P., and Ameri-' 
can Locarno, 86, 89, 96-97, 162 

Chicago Daily NewSj advocates Out- 
lawry of war, 99, 104 

Chicherin, Georgi, 231 n 

Church Peace Union. See World Al- 
liance for International Friendship 
through the Churches 

Clark, J. Reuben, 21711, 228-229 

Clark, Theodore, 225 


Claudel, Paul, 111-112, 130, 132-134, 
136-137, 141-144, 146-147, 149-152, 
154. 157* 162-163, 168-169, 173, 189; 
portrait, 112; signs arbitration 
treaty with United States, 135, 160 

Clemenceau, Georges, on Armistice, i; 
ministry of, 202 

Colcord, Samuel, on outlawing aggres- 
sive war, 150 n 

Commission on International Justice 
and Goodwill, 24, 26, 130, 232, 243 

Committee on the Cause and Cure of 
War, 176-177, 205 n, 226, 232-233, 
249-250; program, 29-30; Third 
Conference, 155-157 

Conciliation, 234, 243; Bryan treaties 
of, 87, 107, 135 n, 247 

Coolidge, Calvin, 35, 45, 77-79, 88-89, 
98, 107, 111, 117-119, 124, 128-131, 
143, 150 n, 154, 160, 176-177, 202, 
207-208, 215, 220, 225, 236-239, 241,* 
243, 249, 251; on Senator Borah, 33; 
relations with Nicholas Murray But- 
ler, 79 n; on Anglo-French naval 
agreement, 204-205, 209; heavy 
cruisers, 233-234; ratifies antiwar 
treaty, 254; attends treaty's procla- 
mation, 258-259 

Copeland, Royal S., 75-76 

Cosgrave, William Thomas, 222; signs 
Kellogg treaty, 217 

Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard N., and 
Paneuropa Union, 17 n 

Council on Foreign Relations, pro- 
gram of, 166 

Covenant of League of Nations. See 
League of Nations, Covenant of 

Cushendun, Lord, 210, 217; on Out- 
lawry of war, 152-153 

Dana, Francis, mission to St. Peters- 
burg, 229 n 

Davis, James J., attends signature of 
Kellogg treaty, 216 


Dawes, Charles G., puts antiwar treaty 
through Senate, 244, 249-252; ob- 
serves ratification, 254 

Dawes Plan, 227 

Delcasse", The'ophile, and construction 
of European alliances, 4 

Denny, Ludwell, 237 

Detzer, Dorothy, 237, *3 8 - See also 
Women's International League for 
Peace and Freedom 

Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft, 17-18 

Dewey, John, on Salmon O. Levinson, 
31; Outlawry of war, 32; Nicholas 
Murray Butler, 104-105 

Disarmament, 5-6, 15, 27-28, 49-51, 
168, 179, 207-208, 224, 333-234, 246. 
See also Anglo-French naval agree- 
ment; Geneva Naval Disarmament 
Conference; Hague Conferences; 
Preparatory Commission for the Dis- 
armament Conference; Washington 
Naval Disarmament Conference 

Doumergue, Gaston, 220, 222 

Edge, Mr. and Mrs. Walter E., attend 
signature of Kellogg treaty, 216 

Edward VII, alleged remark on dis- 
armament, 5n 

Federal Council of Churches of Christ. 
See Commission on International 
Justice and Goodwill 

Fellowship of Reconciliation, pro- 
gram, 18-19 

Filene, Edward, peace plan contest, 
25 n 

First Hague Conference. See Hague 

Fish, Hamilton, Jr., 1 19 

Fletcher, Henry P., 2 ion 

Fleuriau, Aime*- Joseph de, 186-187 

Ford, Henry, on history, 9n; the 
"Peace Ship," 9-10 

Foreign Policy Association, 26; pro- 


gram, 23-24; draft of American Lo- 
carno, 87 

Forster, Arnold, i25n 

Fouquieres, M. de, 213 

Franco-American arbitration treaty. 
See Arbitration 

Franco-Belgian alliance, 145, 162, 171, 
263; conclusion, 55-56; Balfour on, 

Franco-Czechoslovak alliance, 145, 

171, 273; conclusion, 60-61 
Franco-Polish alliance, 145, 171, 263; 

conclusion, 56-57 

Franco-Rumanian alliance, 73, 97, 
121-122, 145, 171-172, 263; conclu- 
sion, 64 

Franco-Yugoslav alliance, 64, 97, 121- 
122, 145, 171-172, 263; conclusion, 


French, George Barton, 80-81 
French National Assembly, and inter- 
national peace, 3-4 
Fromageot, Henri, 173, 188 

Garvin, J. L., 35-36, 91 

Gaus, Friedrich, 188 

Geneva Naval Disarmament Confer- 
ence, 68-70, 71, 76, 82-83, 96, 108, 
110-111, 124, 204, 240 n 

Geneva Protocol, 47 n, 50, 52, 126, 149; 
rejection of, 14; reintroduced, 120- 

George, David Lloyd, 178-179; on Ar- 
mistice, 3; offers alliance to France, 


George, Senator, 245 
Gilbert, Prentiss, 238 
Glass, Carter, debates Kellogg treaty, 


Grandi, Dino, 210 
Grey, Edward, on disarmament, 5-6 
Guarantee alliances. See Anglo-Ameri- 
can guarantee alliances 


Hague Conferences, First, 4-5, 12; 
Second, 5 

Haig, Douglas, 41-42 

Hale, Senator, debates Kellogg pact, 
240, 244-245 

Hall o Fame, 201 n 

Harding, Warren G., on Outlawry of 
war, 35 

Harris, Phil, Jr., 237 

Hart, Albert Bushnell, on James T. 
Shotwell, 103 

Havana International Conference of 
American States, 157; antiwar reso- 
lutions, 167 

Hay, John, on pretreaty correspond- 
ence, 195 

Headlam-Morley, James, on Locarno, 


Heidelberg University, speeches at, 

Henderson, Arthur, 256-257 

Herbette, M., 230 

Herrick, Myron T., 84, 88, 105, no- 
111, 154, 159, 160-161, 201 n, 202- 
203, 213, 214, 222, 235 n, 264; on 
war debts, 69 

Herriot Socialists, 20 

Hert, Mrs. Alvin T., 226 

Hill, David Jayne, 103, 118 

Holmes, John Haynes, 32, 115 

Hooper, Mrs. Ben, 205 n 

Hoover, Herbert, 226-228, 257; sus- 
pends naval construction, 259; pro- 
claims antiwar treaty, 261 

Houghton, Alanson B., 109, 175, 184- 

House, E. M., 207; and open diplo- 
macy, 54 n 

Howard, Esme, 108, 135-136, 196 n 

Hudson, Manley O., on Kellogg arbi- 
tration treaties, 134-135 

Hughes, Charles E., and World Court, 
44; women's peace delegation, 45 

Hurst, Cecil James Barrington, 188 


Hyde, Charles Cheney, on reservations 
to Kellogg pact, 197 

Hymans, Paul, on Franco-Belgian al- 
liance, 56; signs Kellogg pact, 217 

International debt. See War debts 
Italo-Albanian alliance, signed, 125 

James, Edwin L., 76, 137-138, 148, 166 

Johnson, Hiram, 242-243 

Johnson, Nelson T., 228-229 

Johnson, Robert Underwood, 201, 
210-211, 215-216 

Jones, Hilary, at Geneva Naval Dis- 
armament Conference, no 

Kalinin, Mikhail, 231 n 

Kellogg, Frank B., 77, 80-82, 92-95, 
99-100, 105, 107-108, no, 128-129, 
138-148, 153-154, i57 *59> 163-167, 
170-171, 173-176, 178, 180-188, 
191-200, 202, 206-207, 209-214, 
217-218, 221-224, 227, 228, 234, 238, 
241-244, 248 n, 251-252, 254-255, 
257 n, 264; career, 79-80; advocates 
bigger navy, 1 1 1 ; on new arbitration 
treaty with .France, 135, 138-139, 
161; Anglo-French naval agreement, 
204-205; anticipates picture, 235; 
attends proclamation of antiwar 
treaty, 258-259, 261 

Kellogg, Mrs. Frank B., 210-212 

Kenworthy, Commander, queries 
Chamberlain, 179 

Kerr, Philip (Lord Lothian), and Out- 
lawry of war, 35-36 

King, Senator, 76 

King, W. L. Mackenzie, 212; signs Kel- 
logg treaty, 217 

Kipling, Rudyard, on American war 
effort, 42 

Knatchbull-Hugessen, Hughe, and Lo- 
carno spirit, 49 n 


Labor party, British, and peace, 20 
Laszlo, Phillip de, portrait of Salle de 

1'Horloge, 235 

Lauterpacht, Hersch, on antiwar 
pact's reservations, 198-199 

Lauzanne, Stephen, 92, i78n 

League of Nations, 145, 150 n, 163, 
196 n, 198, 223-224, 230, 242-243, 
247; and European peace organiza- 
tions, 15-16; American attitude to- 
ward, 15, 26-27, 39, 42; Greco-Bul- 
garian dispute and, 48; French se- 
curity, 52; renounces war, 120-124, 
167-168. See also League of Nations, 
Covenant of 

League of Nations, Covenant of, 71, 
106, 122-124, 134, 158, 171-172, 174, 
176, 179, 187, 190; Article 8, 49-5; 
Article 15, 39, 47; Article 18, 55-61; 
Article 19, 38. See also League of 

League of Nations Non-Partisan As- 
sociation, 26, 77; program, 24 

League to Enforce Peace, founding of, 
9; reincarnated, 24 

L<ger, Alexis, 90-91, 94-95, 148 n 

Lemarchand, Georges, 222 

Levennore, Charles H., and Bok Peace 
Plan Award, 25 

Levinson, Salmon O., 70, 88, 90-92, 
99-104, 116, 140 n, 162-163, 176, 
215, 221, 227, 261; organizes Ameri- 
can Committee for the Outlawry of 
War, 31-37; attends proclamation 
of Kellogg treaty, 259. See also 
American Committee for the Out- 
lawry of War 

Lewis, Wilmot, 209 n 

Libby, Frederick J., 28, 226; on arbi- 
tration, 135 n 

Ligue des Droits de 1'Homme, pro- 
gram, 17 

Limitation of armaments. See Disarm- 


Lindbergh, Charles A., lands in 

France, 83-85 
Lindsay, Ronald, on Anglo-French 

naval agreement, 204 
Litvinoff, Maxim, 230-231 
Locarno, treaties of, 14, 4 8 -5^ 7 1 * *45> 

149, 158, 1?*- 1 ?*, 174* 76* *79> 187, 

190, 195, 198; and Germany's return 

to society of nations, 46-47; mutual 

guarantee treaties, 61; Chamberlain 

refuses extension of, 122 
Lochner, Louis, and the "Peace Ship," 

Locker-Lampson, Godfrey, queried in 

Commons, 180 n 
Lodge, Henry Cabot, on League of 

Nations, 39 
Logan Act, 78-79; incrimination of 

peace leaders under, 79 
Lothian, Lord. See Kerr, Philip 
Lytton Report, 260 

McDermott, Michael J., 78 n, 210 

MacDonald, Ramsay, 179; suspends 
naval construction, 259 

McKellar, Kenneth, debates antiwar 
treaty, 247 

McLachlan, Alexander, John, signs 
Kellogg treaty, 217 

McLean, Senator, debates antiwar 
treaty, 242-243, 246-247 

Madariaga, Salvador de, on disarma- 
ment, 50 

Maginot, Andre*, 224 

Manzoni, Gaetano, signs Kellogg 
treaty, 217 

Marriner, J. Theodore, 78 n, 105-107, 
114-115, 140-141, 210, 213; on Sal- 
mon O. Levinson, 261 

M assachusetts Peace Society, organiza- 
tion of, 6 

Massigli, Rene", on Locarno spirit, 49 n 

Matsudaira, Tsuneo, 107-108 

Matthews, Annie, 157, 168 


Mellon, Andrew W., on war debts, 40 

Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Albrecht, 95 

Militarism, 153, 234-235, 240; prepar- 
edness and, 10; peace organizations 
and, 15, 27-28; Briand worried over 
American accusations of, 68-69 

Miller, David Hunter, 74 n, 149 n; on 
antiwar pact's reservations, 193-194 

Monroe Doctrine, 180, 242, 250-251 

Moore, John Bassett, on Outlawry of 
war, 112-113; antiwar pact's reser- 
vations, 194; recognition of states, 

Morgan, Laura Puffer, 238 

Morgenthau, Henry, 227 

Morrison, Charles Clayton, 117, 215, 
219; and Outlawry of war, 32, 114; 
book on Outlawry, 100-104, 153 

Moses, George H., 139, 242-243 

Mowrer, Edgar Ansel, 99 

Mowrer, Paul Scott, 99, 114-115 

Miiller, Hermann, speech at League 
of Nations, 224 

Murphy, Seumas, 223 

Murray, Mrs. Carter, 216 

Murray, Gilbert, 35-36 

Mussolini, Benito, 210; concludes 
Italo- Albanian alliance, 125 

National Committee on the Cause and 
Cure of War. See Committee on the 
Cause and Cure of War 

National Council for Prevention of 
War, 114, 193 n, 226, 237-238; pro- 
gram, 28 

National Peace Federation, founding 
of, 8; Henry Ford and, 9-10 

New York Peace Society, organized, 6 

New York Times, 75-77, 104 

Ninc'id, Mom&lo, initials Franco-Yugo- 
slav alliance, 64; signs, 125 

Nobel Peace Prize, awarded Bureau 
International de la Paix, 17; Lud- 
wig Quidde, Ferdinand Buisson, 18; 

Jane Addams, Emily Balch, Nicho- 
las Murray Butler, 29 n 
Norris, George W., 75-76 

Olds, Robert E., 86, 141 n, 154 n, 165, 
168-169; signs new arbitration 
treaty with France, 135, 160; attends 
signature of Kellogg treaty, 216-217 

Ormsbee, Carrie W., 193 

Orteig, Raymond, offers prize, 84 n 

Oulahan, Richard V., 242 n 

Outlawry of war. See American Com- 
mittee for the Outlawry of War 

Oxford Group movement, and peace, 

Page, Kirby, 168 

Paneuropa Union, program, 17 n 

Parr, Christopher James, signs Kel- 
logg treaty, 217 

Pearson, Drew, 138, 227-228 

Permanent Court of International 
Justice. See World Court 

Phenix, Spencer, 210; attends signing 
of arbitration treaty with France, 

Pittenger, Mrs. Fred, 235-236 

Poincare", Raymond, 157, 160; occupa- 
tion of Ruhr, 46-47; reading habits 
of, 67; on war debts, 69, 223-224 

Ponsonby, Arthur, 91 

Porter Convention, 5 

Preparatory Commission for the Dis- 
armament Conference, 50-51; Rus- 
sian proposal at, 126 n, 230. See also 

Preparedness, and American peace 
movement, 10 

Pritchett, Henry S., 78 

Prittwitz und Gaflxon, Friedrich W. 
von, 184 

Quidde, Ludwig, awarded Nobel 
Peace Prize, 18 


Rankin, Jeanette, on patriotism and 
war, 29 

Recognition of states, 229-230 

Reed, Senator, 168, debates Kellogg 
treaty, 241-243, 245, 252 n 

Robins, Raymond, 98, 100-101, 215, 
221; and Outlawry of war, 32-33 

Robinson, Joseph T., 251 n 

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 226-227; and 
Bok Peace Plan Award, 25 

Roosevelt, Theodore, on arbitration, 
6; pacifism, 8 

Root, Elihu, 141-142, 234; and arbi- 
tration, 6 

Root treaties. See Arbitration 

Rykov, Alexei, 231 n 

Sayre, Francis E., 87 n 

Schubert, 189 n 

Schurman, Jacob, 92, 166, 177-178 

Schwimmer, Rosika, and the "Peace 
Ship," 9-10 

Scialoja, Vittorio, warns League As- 
sembly, 122 

Second Hague Conference. See Hague 

Secret diplomacy, popular condemna- 
tion of, 54 

Shidehara, Kijuro, 261-262 

Shipstead, Henrik, 76; defeats Kellogg 
for Senate, 80; debates Kellogg 
treaty, 245-246 

Shotwell, James T., 22, 67-70, 72-74, 
77~79* 9-9^ 9 8 -99 103-104, 158, 
163, 206, 215, 221, 237; at Honolulu 
conference, 21-22, 102; portrait, 23; 
American Locarno, 85-87, 89, 96- 
97, 162 

Simonds, Frank H., 207, 257, 259-260 

Sino-Russian undeclared war, 259-260 

Slemp, C. Bascom, 45, 150 n 

Smit, Jacobus Stephanus, signs Kel- 
logg treaty, 217 

Smith, Sidney, 254 


Social Democrats, German, and peace, 


Socialists. See Herriot Socialists 
Sokal, M., proposes renunciation of 

war at League, 121-124 
Stalin, Joseph, remains silent, 231 n 
Steed, H. Wickham, proposes new 

Monroe Doctrine, 124, i29n 
Stimson, Henry L., 257-258 
Stresemann, Gustav, 166, 175, 177, 210, 

214, 217, 257, 261-262; and Ruhr 

occupation, 46; Locarno, 48, i23n; 

war debts, 223-224 
Swanson, Claude, 236 

Thomas, Albert, 68 
Total war, coming of, 11-12 
Trade unions, European, and peace, 

Uchida, Count, signs Kellogg treaty, 


Unions. See Trade unions, European 
United Nations Charter, and word 

"war," 38 n 

Voroshiloff, K. E., 231 

Wald, Lillian D., against militarism, 

Walsh, Senator, 241 

War debts, 155, 223-224, 253; Andrew 
W. Mellon on, 40, European view 
of, 41; Franco-American impasse 
over, 69-70, 106 

War Resisters' International, program, 

Washington Naval Disarmament Con- 
ference, 43-44, 227 

Watkins, Arthur Charles, 193 n 

Webster, Charles K., on Outlawry of 
war, 10411 

White, Francis, 228-229 


White, James, 225 

White, William Allen, attends signing 

of Kellogg pact, 216 
Whitehouse, Sheldon, 95-96, 147, 157 
Wilhelm II, on disarmament, 5 n 
Wilson, Hugh, on Kellogg, 80; Ad- 
miral Hilary Jones, no 
Wilson, Woodrow, 202, 211-212; on 
Armistice, 2; Henry Ford, 9; elec- 
tion of 1916, 10; preparedness, 10- 
n; war, 11; Fourteen Points, 12; 
League, 38; balance of power, 53; 
secret diplomacy, 54-55; outcoven- 
anted, 325 

Wise, Stephen S., 118-119, 234 
Witte, Sergei, and First Hague Con- 
ference, 4-5 
Woman's Peace Party, founding of, 8- 

Women's International League for 

Peace and Freedom, 87 n, 119-120, 
177, 237, 238; program, 18-19, 28- 


Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 26; 
program, 24 

Work, Hubert, 226 

World Alliance for International 
Friendship through the Churches, 
26, 232, 234; program, 24 

World Court, 35, 243; and American 
peace organizations, 15, 26, 27; Sen- 
ator Borah and, 33 n; American res- 
ervation to, 44; optional clause, 
181 n 

World Peace Foundation, 26, 232; or- 
ganization, 6-7; program, 23 

Wright, Quincy, on reservations to 
Kellogg pact, 199 

Young, Dr. Hugh, attends signature of 

Kellogg pact, 216-217 
Young Plan, 257 

Zaleski, A., signs Kellogg pact, 217 
Zeeland, Paul van, on Franco-Belgian 
alliance, 56 n